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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I.

Background

Economic globalization 1 promises growth and success in development of the
international community. There has been a huge increase in transnational
economic activity such as foreign direct investment, and the international capital
flows in global financial markets are enormous. Economic globalization has been
realized not only through supranational legal regimes such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO), but through reforms to regulatory regimes and national laws
advocated by international institutions including the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund. These reforms have furthered deliberate policy
choices to liberalize trade and capital mobility, deregulate markets, increase
commercial participation, and eliminate cross-border transactional barriers.

1

See Vito Tanzi, Globalization, Tax Competition and the Future of Tax Systems (IMF, Working
Paper No. 141, 1996), summarizing the benefits of economic globalization as: (a) world resources
are better allocated and output and standards of living rise; (b) individuals enjoy a greater range of
choice in goods and services because of the greater access to foreign goods; (c) individuals are
able to visit faraway places because the cost of travel has fallen significantly; (d) the amount and
range of information available to individuals has increased enormously while the cost of getting
information has fallen dramatically

The post-World War II development strategy of many developing or transitional
economies has included a special role 2 for tax policy, which is employed as a
means of intervention into the economy. 3 All types of taxes, particularly trade
related taxes, are legitimate tools of the state in monitoring the development
process. Today, tax reforms mainly aim to establish a diverse mix of taxes that
will encourage savings and capital investment in open market economies, because
development priorities have shifted from promoting self-sufficiency and
subsidizing domestic industry to encouraging export-led growth and improving
global market participation. At the same time, driven by a need to fund
government activities and reduce debt or government deficits, another key focus
of tax reform has been tax revenue growth and socially conscious wealth
redistribution. 4 In particular, following the epidemic debt crisis in the 1980s,
developing countries were forced to achieve and maintain a fiscal surplus in order
to clear their debts to international financial institutions and other creditors 5 as
well as strive for a healthy economic settings.
A key feature of modem tax reforms is the prioritization of tax administration
including resident registration, computerized compliance systems, stricter

2

See Dharam Ghai, Introduction to the IMF and the South: the Social Impact of Crisis and
Adjustment (Dharam Ghai ed., 1991), noting that states use tax reform to manage the process of
economic growth, giving high priority to the goals of industrialization, diversification, and
modernization
3
See Id., stating that in part the tax policies meant tariff protection for domestic industry, input
subsidies, and favorable domestic tax regimes (containing tax concessions or incentives) for
industry. The agricultural and mineral sectors are highly taxed through mechanisms such as export
taxes, heavy taxation of mining surpluses, and low expenditures).
4
See Malcolm Gillis, Tax Reform in Developing Countries 16-17 (Malcolm Gillis ed., 1989)
[hereinafter Tax Reform (Gillis)]
5
See generally Glenn P. Jenkins, Tax Reform: Lessons Learned in Reforming Economic Systems
in Developing Countries at 293-95 (Dwight H. Perkins & Michael Roemer eds., 1991)

2

collection efforts, auditing, evasion control and tax law enforcement. 6 Therefore,
tax reforms have been regarded as a subcategory of public finance or economic
policy. At the same time, legal system reforms typically involve transplanting
legal theories and institutions across borders. Tax governance, with its focus on
institutional reform and (re)construction, has been a focal point to facilitate legal
system construct.
As tax reform has been a crucial component of economic development initiatives
and structural adjustment programs for developing countries, the sheer number
and scope of international institutions has dominated developing countries' tax
reforms. Tax reforms usually focus on universal development goals including a
single-rate, broad-based VAT to replace older-style sales taxes, a low-rate, broadbased corporate and personal income tax, tax neutrality, and the reduction or
eventual elimination of tariffs. Moreover, the WTO distinguishes its role by

indirectly interfering in domestic tax law reforms of its member countries under
the aegis of protecting free trade in domestic tax systems. The recognized,
comprehensive advantages of WTO accession provide a rational for the
globalization tax standards that other international institutions could not require.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) underlying all WTO
activities includes the key principles of non-discrimination and liberalization of
trade, which drive much of developing countries' tax reforms. The nondiscrimination obligation is comprised of the Most-favored-nation (MFN)

6

See Vito Tanzi & Howell H. Zee, Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: Developing Countries, 3-4
(IMF Working Paper No. 35, 2000), http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft!wp/2000/wp0035.pdf
(last visited on March 15, 2011)

3

principle, 7 which demands that trade concessions granted to any country be
extended equally to all other WTO members, and the National Treatment (NT)
principle, 8 which requires that no internal tax, charge, law, regulation or other
measure should discriminate between domestic and foreign suppliers.
A decade after China formally became the 143rd member of the WTO on
December 11, 2001, 9 its developing country status does not substantially relieve it
from its obligations as a member of the WTO. The WTO provides technical
advice and certain concessions to existing or potential developing economies,
including China. Although these concessions supposedly allow for extended
transition periods to implement principles of the WTO Agreements, only rarely
has any country been allowed to use the extended transitional grace period, which
has essentially been reserved for developing countries that were founding
members ofthe GATT.
The WTO's technical assistance is about more than plugging up loopholes or to
crafting an implementation structure; rather, it aims to imbue tax reforms with
broader legal theories and structures conducive to international trade. Before this
thesis develops a discussion of the tax system reform, an overview of China's rule
of law order and post-WTO legal reform is necessary. These narratives are crucial
underlying factors even in the analysis of reforms of specific areas ofthe tax laws.

In particular, the establishment of a "socialist rule of law order" and commitments
by the government to act "in accordance with law" have been incorporated as
7

See General Agreement on Tariffs And Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, Art. I, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194.
8
Jd, Art. III
9
For detailed description of China's efforts for WTO accession, see http://www.wto.org (last

visited March 15, 2011)
4

amendments into China's Constitution. Consideration is also given to contested
rhetorical conceptions of the rule of law. Debates between instrumental and
substantive, positivist and natural law, and thin and thick models of the rule of
law, as well as the economic development rhetoric discussed ad infinitum in the
literature are all reviewed. This thesis aims to prepare a reasonable, handy and
realistic foundation with which to evaluate the progress of the Chinese tax law
reform. Pushing this goal further, this thesis tentatively submits - on the basis of
debates on the rule of law and understanding of the WTO principles applicable to
China - a tailored, pragmatic and practical set of proposals for the tax reform
under China's current legal infrastructure. The proposals are underpinned by
instrumental notions of, inter alia, generality, clarity, consistency, enforceability,
stability, congruence, and substantive notions of judicial independence, human
rights and the limitations of bureaucratic government with regard to the nonprofit
sector.
However, one inescapable attribute squeezed into debates on China's legal reform,
in which the tax law reform is embedded, is the imposition of a standard based
upon a specific conception of the rule of law. Is there a need to conceptualize a
"rule of law-Chinese tax laws reform rhetoric?" This theoretical challenge is too
grand and too premature to undertake, even though the tax law context is viewed
as one of most receptive sectors to legal transplant. The development of a socialist
rule of law is a paradox, being receptive to market economy principles and
modernizing state and private enterprise governance on the one hand, while
unabashedly preserving an autocratic form of socialism on the other. Such a

5

paradox can only be described as "the socialist rule of law with Chinese
Characteristics." with vague description of "characteristics" and re-interpretative
conceptions of "socialism". The tax law reform, which contains elements of
traditional conceptions of the rule of law, cannot be understood independently
from China's social, political, economic and legal inheritances. Different from
Western jurisdictions with liberal democratic frameworks, under China's quasisocialist, soft authoritarian system, the social-political evolution influences the
theory and interpretations of the rule oflaw in many ways.
China's accession into the WTO has been a double-edged sword. Optimists
maintain that China's entry will benefit the global community as well as China's
domestic economy and society by promoting the rule of law, undercutting the
state's control over administration, and accelerating the transition to a market
economy. In addition, the WTO membership helps modernize accounting
practices, banking frameworks, taxation systems and environmental protections,
while at the same time, bringing hostility to bear on corruption and protectionism.
By contrast, pessimists contend that China has agreed to more than it can deliver.
This is evidence, they say, of its lack of commitment to abide by WTO rules, and
its plan to free-ride on the benefits of the global trade system and export its socioeconomic problems.
A close examination of China's accession commitments reveals that effective
economic reform and trade liberalization call for substantiations from a matching
legal infrastructure reform. For example, taxpayers' rights protection should be
viewed in terms of broader political and civil rights reform. Indeed, a number of

6

the values featured in the WTO principles and the rule of law framework
encourage China's further integration into both the global trade network and the
international human rights regime. This is particularly evident in the Chinese tax
law context. WTO principles and the rule of law requirements must be introduced
and evaluated together in tax law reform proposals. WTO principles of
transparency, uniform and impartial administration, judicial review match the
instrumentalist's rule of law elements of consistency, generality, predictability,
enforceability, stability and congruence, and the substantive rule of law
framework's requirements of democracy, limited government, accountable
administrative decision-making, and judicial independence.
China's accession to the WTO requires reform not only of China's substantive
laws, but also of its institutional arrangements, to which the Chinese government
has given inadequate consideration. Without real institutional reforms creating an
independent and functional administrative framework or judiciary, any
substantive economic reforms are likely to fall in nascent or vague - the
tremendous economic success will be held back when ill-designed incentives are
spoiled or exploited. The transparency requirement scattered in various provisions
of the WTO Accession Agreement is an elevated burden for China. The uniform
and impartial administration principle demands the removal of subtle trading
barriers such as local protectionist practices. More importantly, independent
judicial review of administrative actions challenges the status quo of slow judicial
reform in China - requiring that China's courts meet WTO standards of
independence, impartiality and non-arbitrary enforcement of judgments.

7

China's tax law system is administrative in nature but this characterization is
complicated by legislative and judicial functions in the tax law. In this sense, the
tax law reform benefits from as well as is circumvented by the post-WTO legal
reform. The accession to WTO bounds China calling for transparency,
consistency, simplicity and certainty in terms of tax legislations at both national
and local levels. The hierarchical tax administration structure should not impede
enforcement of tax laws. Uniform and impartial administration of tax regulations
at various local levels should be improved to a level acceptable to guarantee wellgrounded tax administrative decisions and facilitate tax judicature independence.
Given the growing awareness of taxpayers' rights, tax authorities should not dwell
at the stereotype "monitor" position proclaiming obligation to pay tax, rather, a
workable system of protections should be established and honored. Moreover, the
tax treatment of the nonprofits sector as the third sector of the society should be
formulated and enforced.
China's tax reform cannot be expected to fit any pre-designed, transplanted model.
The project here is to build a versatile tax system, which takes opportunities to
streamline, track, and propel economic development.

II.

Purpose

The purpose of this thesis is to develop a framework for post-WTO tax law
reform in China. A historical overview of China's current tax system is an
important starting point. It sets out the scope from which a reform proposal or

8

policy orientation may derive, and ensures that the analyses are historically
balanced but not constructed to cater to any particular viewpoint or political
stances. Realistically, this thesis is founded on a theoretical notion of the rule of
law rhetoric, which provides indispensible background to understand the Chinese
tax law reform. Moreover, it provides a discussion of the impacts of WTO
accession on China's legal system construction in general and applications to
China's tax law reform in specific. In addition to its discussions of the relevant
historical and theoretical bases of China's tax reform, this thesis provides targeted
analysis of tax legislation, tax judicature, taxpayer's rights, and tax treatments of
the nonprofit sector from a comparative law perspective, all considering the
administrative nature and hierarchical structure of China's tax law system.
Space limitations preclude detailed analysis of each of the major topics covered in
this thesis. However, the whole provides a comprehensive discussion on historical
background, theoretical overview, origins of problems, interpretations of
proposals, and feasibility of implementation. The thesis employs a mix of
synopsis and analysis drawn from a wide variety of materials across disciplines
and jurisdictions. The goal is to bring together threads of legal theories with
consideration of the realities of China's tax system. This thesis therefore seeks to
proyide practical understanding of China's tax law system for the sake of further
reform.
The selection of topics, rules and standards is not comprehensive. Rather, it aims
to make connections across different sectors of the tax law system, which have
been under-discussed or neglected, sometimes from comparative or international

9

perspectives. In many parts, it is more than summarizing the limited extant
literature on the Chinese tax system. The proposals for reform herein are often
nuanced to suit the current Chinese tax law context and limited to what is
meaningful, reflective or practical with appreciation of applicability in China's
actual position.

III.

Limits and Assumptions

This thesis relies significantly on the common law jurisdiction in cases or
examples it furnishes and the theories it refers to. This is a typical weakness
behind the analysis of China's law and legal institutions, although for certain
ideas the thesis uses Japan or Germany as reference points. This thesis is also
limited by a dearth of materials in English to certain extent. However, this
weakness does not undercut the analyses, which reflect a compilation of
international treaties, surveys and documents discussed. Although this thesis
covers certain comparative review, it has a strong U.S. emphasis or bias, partly
because the U.S. tax system provides justification to this thesis and is widely
valued as one of the best examples of tax system operation and structure.
Analysis in this thesis is also constrained by a dilemma created by a scarcity of
available materials on many of the topics covered and a vast overabundance of
literature on others. In particular, literature on China's tax judicature, taxpayers'
rights and its nonprofit sector is very limited. However, the rule of law, WTO
principles, and Chinese legal reform in general are all covered in great depth and

10

breadth. Therefore, this thesis has to selectively lay particular emphasis on
generally accepted principles or discussions to provide a basis for analysis while
developing its own analysis of certain of the topics covered.
The target of this thesis is not to summarize existing literature on specific topics
or theories. It is also unnecessary to provide detailed tax codes or render exact
wordings of tax regulations to substantiate the proposals raised herein except
insofar as they are directly relevant. This thesis also provides a wide survey of
relevant literature but certain significance references are contained in the
footnotes.

IV.

Data Analysis

Before this chapter develops an outline or synopsis of its theories, principles and
analyses or raises reform proposals on specific tax law topics, it is useful to
engage a brief empirical survey of relevant data. The short statistical analysis
below in every means does not pretend to expand topics to be covered in this
thesis, rather, it aids understanding of the rationales behind the discussion. In this
sense, the overall circumstances of social and political settings, economy size,
position in global trading, international voicing power, national treasury scale,
and composition of tax revenue call for a set of quality proposals in the Chinese
tax context.
The past decade of China's economic development is eventfully marked. In 2010,
China's GDP was valued at approximately $5.87 trillion, surpassing Japan's

11

$5.47 trillion, and became the world's second largest economy after the U.S.
(Figure 1). China's currency reserves came close to approximately $2.82 trillion
at the end of 2010, about half of which is in U.S. dollars (Figure 2). In 2009,
China celebrated the 60th birthday of the People's Republic. In 2008, china
celebrated 30 years of economic growth and the holding of its first Olympic
Games. Considering China's starting point with a GDP of approximately $60
billion in 1978 and its intermediate, pre-WTO GDP of approximately $1.15
trillion in 2001, the enormous economic development is remarkable, and without
a doubt, the accession to the WTO is a primary contributor in the past decade.
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After China's accession to the WTO in 2001, its utilized foreign direct investment
doubled from approximately $46.9 billion in 2001 to approximately $97 billion in
2010 (Figure 3). Meanwhile, China's trade balance increased about 10 times from
approximately $22.6 billion to approximately $197 billion by the end of 2010
(Figure 4) from mostly five largest trading partners including the U.S. and Japan,
but not the European Union (Figure 5). To this end, given the revenue-wise
contribution made by China's accession to the WTO, there is a set of legitimate
reasons to keep the Chinese tax law reforms in line with WTO principles. First,
China's economic development remains export driven. As probably the largest
"global" manufacturer and distributor of products, China's tax mix must keep it
attractive to, for example, the European Union markets. -Second, China's tax
regime started as FDI-oriented and investment-friendly, however, formulas of tax
incentives should be adjusted for keeping FDI but circumventing profit transfers
after exploiting tax preferential policies. Third and more importantly, the tax law
system should comply with WTO principles or requirements in terms of providing
robust taxpayer protections and an established tax judicature system.

(Figure 3)
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(Figure 4)
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(Figure 5)
At the same time, a careful reading of the numbers above reveals that China's tax
revenues beat out GDP growth. China's tax revenues jumped to $1.17 trillion
(RMB 7.74 trillion) in 2010,22.64% more than that recorded in 2009 (RMB 6.31
trillion) and doubled that of2005 (RMB 3.76 trillion) (Figure 6).
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(Figure 6: Tax Revenue vs. GDP, 1990-2010)
In terms of the composition of tax revenue in overall treasury income in China,

surprisingly, there is a declining trend since China's accession to the WTO
(Figure 7). The weight of tax revenue in the treasury dropped from approximately
95% in 2001 to approximately 87% in 2009 (Figure 8).

(Figure 7)
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Meanwhile, such weight displayed a fluctuation due to various factors such as the
SARS and global financial crises, which influenced exportation and domestic
needs (Figure 9). There are three major causes in this connection. First, extrabudgetary revenue such as educational surcharges, urban real estate surcharges
and tariffs contributed a relatively larger share of the treasury during this period.
Second, the roaring local real estate market kept a larger share of revenue within
localities. Certain localities have adopted protectionist local tax exemptions or
incentives, which also decrease overall tax collection. Third, the redistribution of
revenue was twisted by an increased focus on low-growth or weak tax-generating
needs such as urban infrastructures and government expenses.
On the other side of coin, considering the "smaller government, larger society"
movement in China since the 1990s, the illustrations show that revenue
contributed by the non-taxable, or nonprofit, sector now plays a much larger role
in social wealth distribution. More importantly, it helps reduce the notorious
expansion of government scale in terms of expenses, benefits of public servants
and the shrinking allocations for public services. As long as the non-taxable
nonprofit sector manifests a balance between slightly lower revenue contribution
and much larger role in reducing government expenses, its development should be
encouraged with appropriate tax preferential policies.
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Returning to the tax revenue itself, its composition deserves further analysis,
which suggests the direction tax law reform may head (Figure 10). A few
observations can be drawn therefrom. First, China's tax revenue is still dominated
by turnover taxes including the VAT, Business Tax and Consumption Tax. Based
on the revenue sharing formula between the central and local governments in
China, any reform of the turnover tax will have important ramifications in terms
of tax administration and enforcement. Second, the enterprise income tax
contributes a steadily growing portion of tax revenue after unification and
simplification. Third, quite different from Western tax jurisdictions, revenue
contribution made by individual income tax is quite undersized. Fourth, taxpayer
rights protection and tax judicature reform must consider the impacts they may
have on revenue collection for each major type of tax.
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(Figure 10)
In summary, the overall circumstances of China's economic size, position in the
world market, trade balance, national treasury scale, and composition of tax
revenue have dramatically changed over the past three decades, especially after
China's accession to the WTO ten years ago. The tax law system, although it has
had some success overhauling in legislation, needs a more tailored and guided
reform to fulfill challenges from both the WTO and the socialist rule of law in
which it is embedded.

V.

Outline and Synopsis

Chapter II

Chapter II of the thesis provides an overview and analysis of China' s taxation
system since the establishment of the People's Republic. It sets out the scope and
rationale for subsequent chapters to develop a formulation of China's tax law
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system reform. For decades of political, economic and social upheaval and strife,
China's taxation system is shaped by China's political and economic settings as
well as is influenced by the western or capitalist ideological raiding (Figure 11 ).

Chapter II summarizes a two-pronged reform agenda contributed by the Chinese
tax law system and policies: (1) reforming domestic economic system with
increased revenue and macroeconomic control, and (2) opening China up to
outside world. Both prongs are commingled with political concerns of increasing
social welfare, reducing income disparities and monitoring foreign investment. In
particular, a key objective is to be internationally competitive, granting various
tax incentives to promote investment in designated areas or industries but being
cautiously aggressive in contracting bilateral or multilateral tax treaties with
trading partners to address foreign investors' concerns regarding double taxation.
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Chapter II firstly reviews the drastic and recurrent changes experienced by
China's tax law system in adapting to political-economic philosophies and m
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strengthening its revenue designation by way of steady incorporation into the
international tax norms. Mostly, for the Chinese tax context, it discusses the
evolution from a centralized, planned and closed "socialist economy" to a market
driven, open economy and then to China's accession to WTO in 2001 and
thereafter. The tax law system has intertwined with other laws contributing to the
development of competent and internalized legal institutions in China. Tax mix in
China, as part of the macroeconomic regulatory system, has its singularity and
irreplaceable function in adjusting commercial activities of corporate and
individual taxpayers. It is even said that the tax law field is the only field brought
in line with and integrated into the international norms.

Chapter II outlines the evolution of the Chinese tax law system and structures
shaped by China's socio-economic forces, fiscal and governmental reforms,
administration reforms, fiscal decentralization, and the implications of its WTO
accession. It introduces the four broad stages of China's tax law system
development since 1949: the pre-1978 period (1949-1978); the economic reform
period (1979-1993); the market economy period (1993-2000); and the post-WTO
accession period (2001-present). Three major phases of tax law reform in China,
especially those associated with FDI, enterprise governance modernization and
legislation consolidation in the 1980s, the indirect tax reform and establishment of
a revenue sharing system in 1994, the merge of the two-track enterprise income
tax treatments, and WTO related tax policy adjustments, all have improved the
structure of Chinese tax law system. Chapter II further emphasizes that China's
tax system is administrative and hierarchical in nature, therefore, the reform of tax
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administration would be better targeted by discussing it in specific sectors in the
Chinese tax law context, such as tax legislation, tax judicature, taxpayers' rights
and nonprofits tax treatment in this thesis.
The thesis then discusses social and economic policies that have influenced the
development of China's tax law system by documenting the framework of
China's tax law system. In particular, the SOE modernization process is shown to
have had a decisive impact in structuring the painful process of China's tax law
reform.

Chapter II also explores the fiscal decentralization reforms over the past three
decades and outlines possible reform orientations in tax administration, especially
regarding how to structure a tax framework for improving efficiency and equity.
In this connection, China has experienced cycles of fiscal and administrative
decentralization and recentralization dominated by a socialist legacy and
alignment of political compromises with a significant consideration for
transactional costs and budgetary constraints. China's decentralization efforts
have been endogenous to the centralized, planned economic system featured by
heavy industrialization development strategy to a market economy-oriented
revenue sharing scheme with international inputs. Although fiscal decentralization
for market-oriented reforms helped strengthen provincial and local incentives to
foster economic growth, it was plagued by impotent central redistributive powers
and growing interregional inequality. Bearing only a rough articulation of the
division of intergovernmental expenditure responsibilities and egalitarian fiscal
transfer provisions, the recentralization since 1994 has significantly impaired
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local capacity to provide decent public goods and services, and witnessed serious
local governance issues such as land-requisition-based local GDP growth and
scattered social unrest. Moreover, tax farming by the central government on the
one hand fortifies central revenue and authority. On the other hand,
decentralization allows for the growth of local autonomy in designing localfriendly tax incentives and flexibility in carrying out centrally authorized tax
policies. The game of intergovernmental bargaining resulting from this balance of
power employs the tax administrative hierarchy. Local jurisdictional competition
for (foreign) investment and local development leads to inefficient and irrational
local tax concessions such as over-extended contractual land leases for plant
constructions. It also creates a detrimental fiscal culture of fortifying local GDP
by concentrating tax levies on only a few tax bases such as real estate
development and land sale.
Chapter II notes that China's local autonomy and intergovernmental balance is

not a westernized federalism model based on separation of powers. Rather,
decentralization is a regulatory compromise to align different political and
administrative hierarchies. Since the rural tax was officially repealed in 2004,
some local governments in agricultural regions have increasingly relied on
government transfers and off-budgetary revenue sources. Such reductions in local
tax bases suggests how the central government can provide sufficient transfers
and also how it can maneuver transfers and end local notions of a soft budget
constraint without discouraging local resource mobilization. A centralized partysate bureaucratic system inevitably leads to a shortage of local government
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accountability due to the central government's inability to monitor widespread
corruption and distorted local tax practices. In the long run, a robust tax
governance system will only result from a more decentralized administrative and
fiscal system that includes a sound inter-governmental transfer arrangement. Such
an arrangement must entail wider local political participation and competition
under free elections, and ultimately, of stronger capital mobility across regions.
Chapter II further posits that the central-local two-track tax administration is not

uniformly institutionalized across the nation. Diversity or irregularity in local tax
administration especially at sub-provincial levels evidences the cooperation or
competition between local business and governments to evade central control or
to avoid contributing taxes upward in favor of serving local economic interests.
Local administrations may lose their incentive to provide locally adequate public
goods and services as long as more shares of transfers are not assigned for
specific local needs. Moreover, the inflated but untailored extra-budgetary and
off-budgetary revenues are a responsive effort to seize more resources outside
central control and to keep larger tax revenues for local development. Such extrabudgetary and off-budgetary revenues translate into consequential informality in
the system, which exacerbates interregional disparity and rampant corruption, and
therefore inevitably erodes the tax base.
Chapter II concludes that, the past six decades of tax law reform in China are

embedded in the context of enormous economic development, ups and downs
with overall legal reform, a socialist political system, efficiency concerns, tax
equity considerations, cultural factors, assimilation to internationally accepted
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accounting standards, and fulfillment of WTO principles and international tax
norms. This varied context contributed to the evolution of a modem and
internationalized Chinese tax system, albeit one with Chinese characteristics. The
tax authorities reshuffled. An ever-growing need for transparent, uniform and
impartial tax administration pose vital challenges and opportunities for tax reform.
Tax laws in China, in the first place, are designated to promote revenue collection
with the hope of enlarging tax bases and improving living standards of citizens
with sound enforcement and compliance regimes. Meanwhile, the concerns of
balancing tax treatments of domestic and foreign enterprises and minimizing
interregional disparities consist of underlying considerations for tax law
administration, enforcement, and fiscal transfers. Returning to fiscal and
administrative decentralization, tax farming by the central government increases
central authority and revenue collection, even as it increases local autonomy by
allowing local bargaining in an intergovernmental compromise, which can be
seen as a result of ex ante limiting while developed into a hotbed for ex post
opportunism. The central-local two-track tax administration system fails to
institutionalize a framework to manage growing extra-budgetary and offbudgetary revenues. The abolishment of rural tax and perverse local GDP
development practices add another layer of complexity to fiscal decentralization
and transfers. From this perspective, the large scale of China's economy creates
urgency to adopt fiscal policies and develop China's tax system in terms of
legislation, administration, judicature and internationalization.
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Chapter III

Chapter III summarizes the theoretical debates regarding conceptions of the rule

of law, the evolution of the Chinese socialist rule of law rhetoric, and progress
that Chinese legal reform has made to date. In this sense, it attempts to evaluate
how the rule of law rhetoric has impacted Chinese legal reform, particularly on
the post-WTO accession framework and the major implications of this impact.
Because materials on these topics are voluminous, discussion in this chapter is
cautiously limited to those directly relevant to this thesis. This chapter posits that
China's legal system, in which China's tax law and its reform are embedded, has
experienced dynamic evolution and reform in an expansive, novel, and globalized
fashion for the past three decades in China. However, China's unprecedented,
ongoing legal reform is intertwined with its enormous economic development,
and more importantly, burdened by a deep introspective ambivalence on the part
of its reformers. After ten years of WTO membership, China has rigorously
overhauled its legal system to a postural stability by incorporating both
international and domestic norms.
Chapter III argues that discussions of Chinese legal system development should

not be ahistorical. China's contemporary legal system is neither fundamentally
inherited from its imperial tradition nor entirely a western transplant - various
eventful turning-points in the 20th Century are critical to evaluating the progress

°

and troubles arising from China's legal reform. 1 China's adoption of a "Socialist

10

China endured critical turning points such as massive foreign invasion and semi-colonization
from the late nineteen century by western forces, republican democratic revolution, various civil
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Market Economy" in 1992 and "protection of property rights" in 2004
Amendments to the Chinese Constitution signaled a breakthrough in China's selfconscious westernization. The CCP also officially endorsed such notions in its
Party Charter. 11 China's WTO commitments have driven China's immense, if
disorganized, legal infrastructure increasingly into compliance with a decidedly
non-Marxist international legal order.
Chapter Ill introduces the significance of another turning point in Chinese legal
reform - the triumph of the "rule of law" ("fa zhi" ¥t1i:J) over the "rule of men"
("ren zhi")di:J). The CCP's commitment to subject itself to law finally offers
domestic reformers and foreign observers a limited but expanding arena, in an
authoritarian society, to advocate liberal ideals of limiting the arbitrary use of
power, establishment of the rule of law, and possibly democratic political reform.
Market economy development has been a crucial stimulus for creating the rule of
law in the contemporary Chinese legal system. 12 This is primarily because the
market economy requires "the establishment of legal rules governing the rights
and duties of those carrying out transactions." Chapter III also argues that, for the
past three decades, the Chinese legal system development has focused on

wars and wars against Japanese fascists, Communist revolution (civil war with the KMT Regime),
socialist construction and transformation in the 1950s, Cultural Revolution, opening to the outside
world and consequent globalization, the development of market economy, and accession to the
WTO, among other major transformations. However, several important elements of China's
traditional legal system survived this century-and-a-half of uncommon upheaval and
transformation
11
Political slogans such as "performing in accordance with international standards" and
"assimilation or harmonization with international practice" materialized in the official propaganda
agenda and daily political and legal settings
12
From Deng's "reform and open door" orientation to its WTO accession in 2001, China has
arguably implemented a setting in which "acting according to law" is conceived as the "objective
demand of a socialist market economy." The economic reform, based on autonomy, equality,
credit and honesty, and fair competition, needs to be maintained primarily by legal tools

26

absorbing westernized legal norms, modernizing legal practice, and conforming to
the demands of a globalized market-based order.
Chapter III further suggests that an objective assessment of China's legal reform

should acknowledge the successes of China's law reforms in laying the
foundation for constructing the rule of law, albeit ''with Chinese characteristics."
Notably, China agreed to initiate sweeping reform measures "designed to
implement the WTO market access, national treatment and transparency standards,
to protect intellectual property rights, to limit the use of trade-distorting domestic
subsidies and to make other changes to bring its legal and regulatory system in
line with those of other WTO members." China has put tremendous effort into
honoring such commitments.
Chapter III critically analyzes the rule of law rhetoric developed by western

jurists and philosophers in order to show the rule of law for the contested concept
it is. It then questions whether identifying and designing a rule of law model for
China is necessary. Usually, literature authored by western jurists and theorists
selectively creates and insinuates a rule of law model into the Chinese legal
system. This methodological setting is not without merit, but it risks reifying a
biased and contested standard in mind in advance before making quality
evaluation. There are a number of debated categorizations of the rule of law
rhetoric in general and formulations for China's legal system in specific. For
example, the instrumental and substantive definitions, positivism and natural law
ideals, the bifurcated thin and thick models, the rule of law - development
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rhetoric, views of futility in application 13 or radical proponents of overhaul
reconstruction, all advocate different approaches to developing the rule of law.
Chapter III submits that conceptualizing a perfect model of rule of law for the

China's legal system is not practical for its current social, economic, and legal
settings. Rather, notions of necessary elements of the rule of law are considered
and suggested as reasonable priorities for China's legal reform.
Chapter III further presents that democracy is still a sensitive, but not untouchable

topic in China. It suggests that democracies benefits should be explained and
arrived at through a practical lens such as a discussion of taxpayer rights. It notes
that China's rule of law reform has strong inner political, economic and social
drives and support from top glitterati, a growing middle class, and broader
constituencies including farmers and low-income groups. However, China does
not enjoy the luxury of the historical, religious, and philosophical traditions out of
which western and American models of democracy organically arose. When
discussing the relationship between democracy and the rule of law, especially in
the Chinese context, a normative conception of Chinese rule of law should
13
The legal orientalism rhetoric in part may present an example. It is over the capacity of this
thesis to detail discussion on legal orientalism given the voluminous theoretical discussion on this
subject. Therefore, this thesis respectfully disregards the radical and partially distorted
categorization charged by the legal orientalism rhetoric against Chinese legal system. This thesis
also respectfully notes that Professor Ugo Mattei now serves as the editor-in-chief, and together
with Professor Teemu Roskola, owns editorships of the latest (7th) version of the remarkable book
"Schlesinger's Comparative Law" (2009). For instance, orientalism favored by Professor R. B.
Schlesinger (Mattei's advisor) by itself is an unsubstantiated concept contaminated by limited
knowledge of historical civilization development and unfounded ethnocentric discrimination.
Moreover, the understanding and description of Chinese legal system, ancient or contemporary,
are inaccurate and intentionally twist deep-rooted morality law in China. Professor Mattei mostly
advocated the "tripartite taxonomy": rule of professional, rule of political law and rule of
traditional law, which is contrast with stereotyped common law - civil Jaw bifurcation. Thesis
fails to accept the notion of"rule oftraditionallaw", to which Mattei purposefully disregard legal
system diversity and evolution by non-analytically grouping the Islamic legal regimes and most of
Asian or Confucian-based legal systems together which all bear pre-designed traditional
orientalism stigma.
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therefore be confined to discussions of judicial independence, while democracy
has to be viewed from a historical and developmental perspective. This approach
may seem over-simplistic, but it is realistic. The rule of law as a political and
democratic theory should not be exaggerated and abused, and should be used
carefully in a comparative context. After all, empirically and conceptually, a fullscale Chinese conversion to a western style of politics and democracy may not
translate into a stable political and economic order, on which the establishment
and development of rule of law is conditioned in China. It is difficult to
substantiate whether a democratic government that might invite social turmoil and
political chaos is better than failing to implement certain political ideals or
romanticized legal conceptions, so this thesis will limit its focus to legal and
judicial reform independent from democratic developments.
Chapter III tentatively offers the following positions regarding China's legal
reform. First and foremost, securing the independence of legal system as an
institution, even in a relatively self-sufficient manner, is the foundation for
transformation to the rule of law. Political barriers in China are evidently against
reaching the autonomy ofthe legal system because "political science" and "law"
conceptions (zhengfa

!& $ )

have never been officially separated in the

governmental reform agenda. One notorious example is the CCP controlled
"politics and law committee" (zhengfawei

!& $

~ ),

which has the highest

authority in the legal and judicial system administration. In this sense, the Chinese
legal system as an independent infrastructure promises considerable reform
opportunities. Second, transparency and public accountability are normative
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catalysts for promoting the publicity oflaws, judicial decisions and administrative
processes. The very limited success of "law dissemination campaigns" (pufa
yundong l1ff $ill iW) and the prevalence of "black box" practices including

"backstage operations", affiliated trading and secret deals all have plagued the
legal system in China. Third, the independence of the judicial system and the
autonomy of legal professionals, especially those presiding in lower courts, are
threatened by many sources. Finally, the sensitive role of human rights in China's
rule of law development should be addressed in a flexible and realistic manner.
Although the Chinese government claims that it acknowledges and respects
meaningful, universally accepted human rights and values, it caveats that cultural,
economic, historical and social facts must be accounted for in order to understand
and to honor basic human rights. China's government with political withering and
ideological rigidity has to identify a balanced and healthy relationship among
goals of economic development, human rights protection, and related substantive
norms of the rule oflaw. Human rights can be interpreted in various ways, but at a
minimum level- for example, a citizen's ability to contribute to and benefit from
the economic behaviors she chooses - a citizen has the right to know into which
area her taxes go and how they are distributed. Flexible and strategic
interpretations of human rights can therefore be a boon to efficient administration
and contract enforcement protection. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, a
list of pragmatic and proactive taxpayers' rights walks a middle ground on the
issue ofhuman rights, which is both morally defensible and politically viable.

Chapter III concludes by examining the often-paradoxical forces exerted on
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China's rule of law development - historical roots, ideological interferences,
economic development, and dynamic reforms in the past thirty years. China's
young modem legal system suffers from infrastructural deficiencies, domestic
political intrusions, understaffing, and difficult demands from the outside world.
But it has already embraced many traditional rule of law characteristics, albeit in a
somewhat unique socialist rearticulation, respectfully acknowledging universal
basic human rights, creating room for scholastic submissions and debates, and
more importantly, inviting foreign observation and attempting compliance with
international norms. Chapter III further shows that, despite valid critiques,
Chinese legal system does embody both a normative and an instrumental sense,
which must be respected and accommodated. Solutions and upgrades are essential
to tackle technical misidentification, but implementation (zhixingf}L :f]) and
enforcement have priorities in nursing difficulties arising at all times. When
outlining a meaningful tax law reform structure, an objective assessment of
China's historical, political and social traditions is necessary for targeted,
objective and meaningful promotion of China's rule of law construct.

Chapter IV

Chapter IV assesses the impacts of the accession to the WTO on China's legal

reform in general. The analyses continue those in Chapter III by considering the
normative impact of WTO accession in order to better understand the factors
underlying China's post-WTO tax law system reform. The objective of this

31

chapter is twofold: (1) presenting the progress that has been made to bring China
in line with WTO principles and China's commitments; and (2) considering the
extent to which the elements of the rule of law rhetoric and the WTO setting
together may impact China's legal reforms.
Chapter IV posits that China, overall, benefits from its accession to the WTO. The

benefits encompass productive reforms in many aspects driven by accession to the
supervisory and adjudicative oversight of the WTO. The Protocol contains
extraordinary concessions in terms of intensifying economic reforms, improving
administrative efficiency and transparency, localizing international norms, and
removing trade barriers. In many respects, China accepted much higher and
carefully calculated accession standards than any other WTO member state.
Analytically, the accession to the WTO is driven by political reliance on external
forces and international outreach to sustain economic development and foster
global competitiveness in Chinese industries. China's post-accession development
is also coupled with serious issues such as cross-region disparities, fluctuating
trade scales, financial market turbulence, an irregular labor force, overheated local
infrastructure construction, environmental degradation and shortages of natural
resources. China's continuous endeavor to overhaul its legal system in preparation
for and compliance with the accession is obvious including a completed pre-WTO
massive legislative clean-up and marvelous resources engaged in promulgating
new WTO-compliant laws for a national and local synchronization of WTO
practices. On the other hand, the integration into the globalized trading system
also brings in heightened complaints over perceived violations of national
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treatment and fair competition in terms of protectionism, economic nationalism
and profit transfer constraints. Following the WTO principles, China's legal
reform embodies a long list of international pursuits and domestic ambitions,
which would better its participation in the international legal order and realization
of domestic legal reform targets. Moreover, the scope of China's undertaking of
WTO obligations and principles is remarkable and unprecedented. Improving
market access and fulfillment of WTO principles requirements obligates China's
market economy development to conform to international standards through its
legal system to a much greater degree. This swift liberalization process has
brought dynamic yet astringent changes and reforms to China's legal system in
many areas.
Chapter IV further argues that China's WTO accession impacts its tax law reform

in several ways. First, China's market economy designation is not acknowledged
by a few major economies such as the U.S. and EU. Certain "WTO-plus"
obligations requiring market economy behavior, foreign investment, and domestic
governance may complicate the legal reform as those provisions contain
discriminatory measures against Chinese exports. Second, the jurisdictional reach
of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism requires that China develop its
capacity to litigate before the WTO Appellate Body as well as adept participation
of international legal order. Gradually dropping its passive approach to
international participation, China has been diplomatic in resolving trade crises
with its trading partners. The Chinese government, on one hand, takes cooperative
steps with domestic enterprises in resolving discrepancies before cases are
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submitted against China under the WTO, but it also preemptively initiates
complaints to seek protection of its own national interests against peer WTO
members, mostly the U.S. and EU. Third, fulfillment of China's commitments
also invites the fore issues of domestically financed competition with FDI.
National treatment requirements have given rise to demands by domestic
enterprises to enjoy privileges usually enjoyed exclusively by foreign
investments, but overall China's approach remains focused on attracting foreign
investment. It is also observed that, after "spoiling" FDI for thirty years, China
increasingly imposes tightened controls to monitor the foreign investment in
terms of quality, performance, and eliminating local graft. As per the TRIMs, to
liberate capital mobility and promote free trade, China must eventually eliminate
performance requirements or supervisory measures on technology transfers,
foreign exchange, and R&D acts. Meanwhile, China earnestly honors its market
access commitment by culling the list of restricted industries. All these impacts of
WTO accession contribute to a well-rounded legal framework from which to
conduct reform in specific areas of law including the tax law. A key example is
the enactment of the new Enterprise Income Tax law, which unifies treatments for
foreign and domestic enterprises. Fourth, the accommodation to FDI aggregates
an overhaul of the trade law framework, which is more directly associated with
the WTO regime. The Chinese government did significant work in upgrading the
trade laws with pragmatism and essentialism, such as substantially reducing
tariffs and non-tariff barriers, enacting a new Foreign Trade Law and full-scale
legislative suite to conform to its TRIPs obligations. Implications for the tax law
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in this context are vividly apparent, but in many aspects tax law reforms start
from the trade law regime and end with a better-formulated statutory framework.
Fifth, the normative implications of the WTO accession are not limited to the
trade regime. Although the WTO system does not demand a well-established
modem or westernized legal system, it requires various key features of such a
system, which directly impact the tax laws reform. The requirement of
transparency applies to all aspects of the legal system. Although foreign investors
are plagued by concerns as to transparency in making commercial and operational
decisions, observers should be optimistic regarding the prospect of refining
transparency in legislation, administration and procedural compliance. Another
normative value is the uniform and impartial administration of laws. Because the
Chinese legal system generally inherits the imperial tradition of the over-reaching
arm of the state and people still typically have a consciousness of obedience,
compliance with this norm in large part depends on the political determination of
central and local governments to honor it by, for example, instituting a reporting
system to eliminate noncompliance. Judicial review is also an established
compliance requirement- an independent, effective and true judicial authority is
essential to remedy discretionary administrative actions. It is not realistic for
China to set up an American style system of judicial review, however compliance
with the WTO judicial review requirement should be prioritized to ensure
impartiality and uniformity in administration, and to foster judicial independence
and the competency of judges.
Chapter IV further specifies that WTO accession as a whole has two major
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impacts on China's tax law system. First are the direct implications of WTO
commitments in specific tax law legislation and administrations. In particular, tax
issues such as export subsidies, tariff or non-tariff barriers, and FDI related tax
matters based on principles including the national treatment and most-favorednations commitments will directly impact tax reform. This implication is
relatively straightforward and identifiable. Jurisprudentially, even those traderelated laws that might ,not directly implicate the tax laws may have far-reaching
and frequent encounters with the tax laws. For example, intellectual property
protections under TRIPs invite a full set of tax considerations on transfer pricing
and international technology transfer. Therefore, the second prong goes to
comprehensive or normative changes in the tax law area in terms of substantive
characteristics of the rule of law, such as transparency, uniformity, impartiality,
judicial review and procedural justice, which once were hard to insert into the tax

system. Although this part of the ramifications should not be exaggerated or overromanticized, it bears significant jurisprudential value to incorporate them into
studies of specific sectors of Chinese legal reform -such as the tax law. In this
sense, the overall tax law structure including tax legislation, tax judicature,
taxpayers' rights and tax treatment in the NGO sector is considered.
Chapter IV further summarizes that the impact of WTO accession on the rule of

law development in China is profound. The force of WTO principles and rules is
sharp and straightforward in conforming China to both instrumental and
substantive conceptions of the rule of law: legal institutions, transparency,
uniformity, impartiality, judicial independence, limited government, and a culture
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seasoned with "common law" principles of stare decisis, and judicial review. In
this sense, the WTO system and the rule of law order are meaningfully
intertwined to incorporate positivist implications to the Chinese legal system, in
which the tax laws reform is embedded.

Chapter V

Chapter V involves a detailed discussion of post-WTO tax legislation reform

based on discussions in chapters II, III and IV. Considering the administrative
nature of China's tax law system, tax legislation manifests the impacts of the
WTO principles and the rule of law in a straightforward and formal manner. For
tax legislation, China is unique in a number of respects as the largest developing
economy and a communist sovereign. Chapter V further points out that the
voluminous literature on the WTO's implication for China's legal reform usually
falls in to one of two traps - either fantasizing about the WTO's capacity to
overhaul the whole Chinese legal system or by imagining the CCP out of China's
political reality. Some are more instrumentally oriented by fine-texturing details
in specific areas of law such as transplanting banking regulations or
environmental protection measures. As it applies to the area of tax laws, Chapter
V suggests that all these paradigmatic discourses are wrong.
Chapter V acknowledges that the traditional distinction between trade law and tax

law is vague under multilateral trading agreements such as the WTO. Meanwhile,
the line between tax administration and tax legislation is somewhat blurred in
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China. Chapter V further submits that the Chinese tax law reform embodies the
WTO principles in a visible but constrained manner, however, the normative
value targeted and contributed by those WTO principles would accommodate the
tax law reform for the rule of law construct effectively - it richly applies to tax
legislation which is embedded in the tax law system of administrative nature.

Chapter V draws two inferences for the Chinese tax legislation framework. First,
starting from the pre-WTO massive regulation clean-up, tax legislation reform is
particularly evident in trade related areas, such as lowering tariffs or non-tariff
barriers, turnover tax reformulation, income tax compliance updates, and
transplantation of international tax practices. Without any doubt, this aspect of tax
legislation is popular for scholars concentrating on WTO or trade related areas.
Although certain tax legislation updates are not ideal or are subject to fairly
constant change, tax laws generally remain stable and enforceable. Second,
modem tax thoughts should be adopted in a more vibrant way. For example,
advanced pricing agreements for curbing tax evasion should be employed or the
actual enterprise tax payment should be lowered. It is not without merit or
political substantiation to take cautious steps in transplanting modem tax
conceptions; however, such vigilance might be better achieved by experimental
practices in appropriate localities or industry lines. Given China's marvelous
expansion in revenue collection over the past three decades, the time is ripe to
introduce reform measures on certain types of taxes. Another dissonance in tax
legislation is the irregular orientation of tax administrative documents. Local tax
administrative rulings, notices or directives are out of true "legislation", however,
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the administrative nature and centralization efforts somewhat validate the
enforcement of local tax legislation given China's nascent tax judicature system.
Chapter V also briefs the binding tax-related provisions of the WTO Agreement

in terms of the nondiscrimination principles and the dispute settlement
procedures, but it divides its discussion into normative and formal implications.
Chapter V argues that the tax law system is not isolated; rather, it intertwines with

other sectors of law. The normative impact of WTO agreements on China's tax
legislation interlaces China's tax system with more general areas of legal reform.
Tax legislation also contributes to improving tax administration and protection of
taxpayers' rights through the Tax Collection Law, which sets forth clear rules for
combating inconsistency in tax collection and promoting transparency to assure
predictable tax consequences of transactional behaviors. In addition, it requires an
improved tax judicature system to review tax administrative decisions and
legislative actions. In particular, the binding effects of the WTO agreements
manifests in three WTO principles: transparency, impartial and uniform
administration, and judicial review.
Chapter V suggests that the transparency principle raises three separate issues: (1)

secrecy and lack of transparency in the tax legislation system partially stem from
China's basic hierarchical organization structure. The process of tax legislation as
to policy orientation and opinion collection should be open to public review
before final promulgation; (2) although the SAT released the "New Measures for
Normative Documents," reckless or manipulative inconsistency or irregularities in
local tax legislation in different localities still creates ambiguity; (3) intervention
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from other administrative apparatuses at different hierarchical levels also
complicates tax legislation reform by issuing overlapping and less formal notices
and supplemental circulars.
The uniform and impartial administration requirement sets a high standard for
China's tax legislation: (1) tax authorities usually suffer from insufficient
discretionary capacity to administer ill-designed tax laws: those drafted in vague
terms and those of too much details with narrow applicability; (2) modem
legislative techniques are missing in local tax legislation, which leads to a
proliferation of overlapping, repetitive, ambiguous or contradictory tax laws at
various hierarchical levels of government; (3) various extra-legal factors impede
the neutral and righteous implementation of tax laws, such as political
intervention, corruption oflocal tax officials, and local protectionism; (4) China's
favorable economic policies toward coastal areas create unbalanced uniformity
and predictability. Given the political stakes put on local economic performance,
many ill-drafted, ambiguous and contradictory tax laws and regulations are
enforced for local benefit, which causes disparity and unpredictability.
The judicial review requirement creates its own specific issues in the Chinese tax
context. A key concern is the amount of independence that China's judges can
exert to review and correct tax administrative decisions.
Chapter V further details implications of the national treatment and the mostfavored-nation principles. First, certain inconsistencies with the national
treatment principle are diagnosed even after a few major tax legislative pieces
came into place in the decade after WTO accession. However, the irregular
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treatments for Chinese domestic enterprises may be validated. The benchmark is
that the national treatment principle by and large serves to restrict, not to enlarge
state's taxing powers. Second, while China has made tremendous efforts in its tax
legislation to accord with the MFN principle, even the definitions of many key
words or commonly accepted practices thereunder are subject to broad
interpretation. Two inferences are made based on a mix of different tax treatments
towards FIBs and DEs: (1) the economic structure and development priorities
incentivize flexible treatment of specific industry lines. Tax preferential measures
are direct and enforceable without necessarily resulting in discrimination; (2)
complaints from foreign investors over non-transparent government procurement
processes may simply be a response to the fact that preferential treatments are not
available to foreign investors in negotiated procedures with competition bidding
for government contracts. The tax implication of the government procurement
process is not given enough attention according to the MFN principle of
eliminating barrier to facilitate the mobility of goods and services among member
countries.

Chapter V then considers, from a formal perspective, the impacts of WTO
accession to China's tax legislation system at length. In particular, rules and
principles of WTO Agreements call for China's turnover tax, enterprise income
tax and individual income tax legislation and reform to incorporate nondiscrimination principles and the transparency requirement to a significant extent.
However, a careful review of tax legislations in China reveals that some basic
elements of the instrumentalist concept of the rule of law are missed. This is
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specifically evident in the liT legislation reform, which is in need of immediate
attention - Chapter V provides a detailed account of current drawbacks and
related reform proposals. Meanwhile, even the 2008 EIT Law contains modem
tax concepts, it remains unclear how to realize both tax equity and efficiency by
balancing central and local tax authorities. Another aspect of Chinese tax
legislative reform is setting up a tax administration system with efficiency with
internalized rules and structure.
Chapter V further contends that the WTO regime has limitations in pushing tax
legislative reforms. Although the WTO principles and rules impose constraints
such as the adoption of export subsidies and enforcement of AB decisions, a
member country may, by literally complying with WTO principles, provide same
economic benefit by manipulating domestic tax policies. Lessons learnt from the
US FSC/ETI and the Sino-US semiconductor cases exemplify the inherent
weakness of the WTO for compelling substantive tax reform.
Chapter V concludes that the tax legislation reform has endured a painful process
of simplification, unification and the revenue sharing scheme. Tax legislation
started as FDI driven and incentive-focused, and so the structure of tax legislation
was imbalanced from the very beginning without honoring tax equity and
efficiency. For example, the dual-track enterprise income tax system for aroused
frustration from both DEs and FIEs. The design of liT Law does not manifest
revenue contribution and social wealth redistribution as it should be. Even as
turnover taxes dominate tax revenue in China, the structure of VAT and Business
Tax is still plagued by a few fundamental issues such as the transition to a
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consumption type VAT. Chapter V further summarizes that China's tax
legislation reform is complicated under WTO Agreements and the rule of law
order. In particular, rules and principles of WTO Agreements call for China's
turnover tax, enterprise income tax and individual income tax legislation and
reform to incorporate non-discrimination principles and the transparency
requirement.
Chapter V further shares and agrees with Avi-Yonah's proposal that, answers to

fine-tune China's tax legislation system might be found in an international tax
arena through a multilateral solution. It is essential that the fundamental goals of
taxation and WTO principles should be achieved in terms of revenue collection,
social wealth redistribution, transparency, uniform and impartial administration,
and judicial review. Equally important is to incorporate elements of the rule of
law order as well as to integrate China's tax legislation with an international

persp~ctive of facilitating development and institutionalization of the tax system.

Chapter VI

Chapter VI continues along the same lines as Chapter V to analyze another sector

of China's tax laws- the tax judicature reform. This chapter is disadvantaged by
the scarcity of materials available in relevant topics. Similar to other chapters, the
administrative nature of China's tax system encourages the preference to
incorporate related tax administration topics in this chapter. The Chinese tax
judicature is a complicated interaction between three objects of study: tax
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administration, the general Chinese judicial setting, and taxpayer rights. Tax
judicature reform is not an isolated undertaking. China's tax law framework has
its peculiarities. The role of tax judicature should not be prolonged for
overhauling the whole tax law arena or be left until the end of the tax reform.
Flaws and institutional propensities of China's judicial system translated into the
tax judicature must be carefully examined and evaluated. All tax judicature
reform proposals must be proactively reviewed in light of the judicial institution
in China. Under China's socialist legal system construct, the tax judicature should
ground itself in honoring the rule of law order emphasizing a fair, transparent,
certain, consistent, equitable, effective, and clear consideration of cases before it.

Meanwhile, the WTO principles of transparency, uniformity and impartiality and
judicial review should be incorporated to the utmost extent with a set of niceties

and convenient courses of action, even those principles might not directly apply to
the tax judicature. Overall, "China's tax judicature should account for China's
social and economic development settings before introducing pragmatic reform
proposals" .14
In general, the tax judicature structure consists of two layers: the dispute
settlement between tax authorities and taxpayers as to an assessment of tax; and if
a settlement is not achieved, a tax lawsuit is presented to a court against such tax
administrative decision. Different from a common law system such as the United
States, tax controversies in China are mostly litigated as administrative cases,
supplemented by civil and criminal proceedings as necessary. The awkwardly

14
See Xu Shanda Zhongguo Shuiquan Yanjiu [China Tax Jurisdiction Research] 6, (China
Taxation Press, 2004)
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small number of tax-wise lawsuits in China makes the tax judicature reform onesided. That is to say, Chinese tax authorities dominate related reform proposals
while taxpayers are quite noiseless in initiating advanced rights protection.
Meanwhile, there is a legitimate need to advance the reform in terms of fulfilling
the WTO principles that China has committed under the socialist rule of law
construct.
Chapter VI suggests that China's tax judicature system falls in the general
judiciary framework permeated with controversies and deficiencies. Paralleled
with alleged shortage of administrative impartiality, judicial review and a system
of elaborated rights, remedies and procedures for taxpayers would be of little
merit in the absence of an independent, impartial and competent judiciary in
general. The reality is that the independence of Chinese tax judiciary was
inextricably linked to or disadvantaged by the system of formal courts. The
independence of the China's judiciary sector has been notoriously plagued by the
judges' insecurity of tenure as well as the judiciary's own traditions of
knowledge, integrity and technique and the law of contempt. Therefore, the ideal
undertaking that China's tax judicature properly exercises its jurisdiction
presupposes at least three broad intertwined features: technical competence;
commitments to the rule of law; and finally; institutionalized independence
embracing domestic causes and international demands such as the WTO
principles. Regrettably, all these three factors are neither substantiated nor even
straightforwardly identifiable.
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Chapter VI further sets out three parts analyzing the following questions for
China's tax judicature reform before contributing a few reform proposals: What is
the procedure for administrative and judicial appeal and how predictable for the
taxpayer to process a reasonable case? Is all or a portion of the tax to be paid
pending appeal, and if so, how secured the taxpayer is in obtaining relief from this
requirement? Is there any realistic need to establish a judicial tribunal for tax
cases specifically, if so, why and in which format? Is the appeal process impaired
by corruption?
For the first part, Chapter VI discusses the rationales for structuring the tax
judicature system as it is. Chinese tax judicature reform is substantiated by
various legitimate drives. The administrative law reform expects tax authorities'
discretion to be efficiently limited by a functional judicial review process.
Taxpayers' awareness raises the request to find a more taxpayer-friendly and just
judicial setting for rights protection. At the same time, legislations in the tax areas
are comprehensive, verbose, and arcane, and thus embrace an assimilation of a
sophisticated judicature system. More importantly, the market economy and the
rule of law order urge the tax judicature to accommodate diversified economic
interests and social needs in a fair, impartial, accessible, efficient and clear-cut
manner. Pressures from international interests such as the WTO principles raise
the bar high for Chinese tax judicature reform according to transferable practice
from other tax jurisdictions. In addition, a tax judicature system contributes
competitive advantages to Chinese overall economic setting in keeping foreign
investments and improving revenue collection.
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For the second part, Chapter VI imports a comparative approach to expand and
justify potential proposals for China's tax judicature reform. It submits that there
is no uniform model that could be globally applied in tax judicature system. It
discusses the U.S. tax judicature system but does not initially aim to furnish a
critical review of the U.S. judicial model. Rather, a few factors in the U.S. tax
judicature system are identified and put together as reference to submit a
meaningful proposal catering to potential reform needs of China's tax judicature
system. In particular, Chapter VI offers a selectively tailored description of the
U.S. tax judicature system where taxpayers and the tax authorities share similar
concerns. Those concerns are the discretion ofthe court, timelines, cost-efficiency,
complexity of the issue, settlement potential, trial and appeals. And these
takeaways should be considered under the general framework of the judicial
system, overall financial capacities and social policy needs.
For the second part, Chapter VI further describes three co-existing factions of
thoughts to exemplify current "wretched" debates in terms of the imaginary
Chinese tax court system: oppositionists, supporters and a midlist view, but each
has its merits and drawbacks. Equally important is that they share a few similar
reform proposals such as removal of the pre-trail administrative reconsideration
and abolishment of the full-payment rule. Overall, the oppositionists prefer a mild
but pointed plea without inviting an overhaul of the current system. The
supporters, on the other hand, are more aggressive or optimistic to take the tax
court as a rare breakthrough opportunity to reform both the judicial system and
tax administration framework. A middle ground midlist but slacker view looks
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good at the first glance, but its transitory nature and over-conformism misidentify
a few key considerations in the construct. Again, this chapter notes that there is no
right or wrong answer to the speculative pursuit of upgrading the tax judicature
reform. The establishment of the tax court system co-opted for political and social
policy pursuits rather a solemn focus on the Chinese legal reform agenda.
For the third part, Chapter VI discusses the "triple whammy" embarrassments of
Chinese tax judicature reform, i.e. deficiencies in the three pillars of tax judicature:
tax administration, the Chinese general judicial situation and taxpayers' rights.
Historical improvements of the Chinese tax judicature system were an irregular
adaptation of the general administrative procedures in the tax context, a lack of
thoughtful attention to taxpayers and intractable interference from political and
administrative intricacies. The tax dispute resolution system uncontrollably takes
over and absorbs similar problematic deficiencies of the general administration
judicature framework into which it is embedded. Therefore, the Chinese tax
judicature reform primarily falls into two prongs: the peculiarities built in the tax
system and the upgrade of the overall Chinese judiciary reform for dispute
resolution. Due to space limitations, Chapter VI focuses on the first prong, i.e.,
the flaws and debates about the current tax judicature; and to a much less extent
the second prong, i.e., the competence, autonomy and independence of Chinese
judiciary in general. In terms of peculiarities, Chapter VI summarizes that
Chinese tax disputes generally includes two strides: tax administrative
reconsideration and tax administrative litigation. However, the tax judicature
system is plagued by a few flaws in practice. The condition of the pre-trial tax
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administrative reconsideration renders tax authorities' discretion too expansive to
avoid arbitrary administration. The full payment requirement for disputes arising
from tax collection holds scarce jurisprudential substantiation and receives
vehement criticism from both judges and scholars. Moreover, due to limited
number of less complex tax cases (Figure 12) accepted by the administration court,
the competence of judges in tax laws is not markedly improved, nor is the
application of the doctrine of stare decisis.
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All these defects, coupled with tax authorities adamant efforts to increase revenue
collection, call for an upgrade of the Chinese tax judicature reform from three
respects:

fil Chapter VI shows that tax judicature reform

IS

a legitimate need of

Chinese tax administration, which composes probably the foremost pillar
in structuring modernization of China's tax system. In China, tax law
remains heavily reliant on tax administration. The enforcement and
reconsideration of adverse decisions of the tax administration are
inherently hierarchical.

Subordinate tax officials' position in tax
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I

I

J

administrative hierarchy determines that superior's reconsideration is the
simplest, direct or the most cost-efficient manner to seek reliefs.
Therefore, tax administrative reconsideration has its tradition within
China's general administration framework. China does not have a court
hearing tax cases only; rather, the administration tribunal within the
People's Court system is the only available channel to seek judicial
remedies. Taxpayers' position therefore is disadvantaged given the
dominance and authority of tax administrations. In spite of various
prescribed rights, taxpayers are hindered in filing tax disputes against tax
authorities in terms of procedure, financial capacity and political pressure.
Chapter VI then summarizes that tax administration has failed the tax laws

reform in a few ways despite progress it has made. ( 1) The irregular local
enforcements of tax laws and regulations applicable nationwide creates
discrepancies, which invite tax disputes. Moreover, provincial and local
tax bureaus are entitled with too expansive discretion in handling tax
collection and dealing with taxpayers. (2) The expertise and independence
of tax authorities are subject to challenge and improvement in many ways.
The dualism of superior and subordinate tax officials may make taxpayers'
claims seem futile and impractical. Records of such hierarchical internal
communication such as reports, requests, instructions and directives were
mostly kept out of pubic availability. Therefore, taxpayers' right to know
is severely discounted by tax authorities' persuasion to encourage a
settlement. (3) Tax administration's resourcefulness and commitment to
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preventing tax controversies cause distortions in the system. The issue is
how committed it is to honoring taxpayers' legitimate requests. Advance
ruling, in this sense, exemplifies one of the cost-efficient approaches
available to tax administrations.
Q} Chapter VI also expands discussion on the tax judicature through the lens

of judicial review - the second pillar. In this connection, the rule of law
order in terms of judicial review 15 requires that only an ordinary court can
punish criminals but equality must be guaranteed regardless of social,
economic, or political status in terms of substance and procedure. Raz
further details that uniformity, independence, transparency and procedural
justice should be established in the judicial review construct towards a rule
of law order. Meanwhile, an independent, effective and true judicial
authority is essential to compliance with China's WTO commitments. The
Protocol mandates the establishment of tribunals, contact points and
procedures for the prompt review of all administrative actions relating to
the implementation of the laws, regulations, judicial decisions, and
administrative rulings of general application referred to in the WTO rules.
Obviously, the tribunals must be independent of administrative organs and
thus are required to be "impartial and independent of the agency entrusted
with administrative enforcement and shall not have any substantial interest
in the outcome of the matter." The tribunals may be administrative or
judicial, however, right to appeal must be granted if the case is originally
submitted for an administrative review following due process.
15

See generally Albert Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885).
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Chapter VI further notes that judicial review of tax administrative
discretion is doctrinal. Tribunals hearing tax cases with judicial review
power should examine tax authorities' actions that are incompatible with
the constitution, written tax laws and regulations, and related procedures.
Meanwhile, the tax judicature system is a key component of modem tax
governance. Since China does not embody a polity of separation of powers,
the tax judicature is a strong impetus for improving the general judiciary
system associated with the Party-state's hierarchy of administration
structures. However, expectations of the role of the tax judicature must be
realistic. The tax context has its peculiarities and is colored by a pragmatic
bent in Chinese legislation and administration.
Chapter VI then reviews, to a limited extent, flaws in the general judicial
review system in China that are attached to China's tax judicature
deficiencies. First is the non-uniformity of tax law application. Distorted
understanding and peculiarities of the tax laws and locality self-interests
create non-uniform adjudication of tax disputes. Cross-jurisdiction
irregularity in judgment may be brought against the same taxpayer and
lead to jurisdiction shopping for tax adjudicators. However, there is a
possibility to reach national uniformity under the supervision of the
Supreme People's Court and the SAT. Second regards political
intervention under the aegis of supervision from the local People's
Congress and local tax authorities. Third it considers impartiality in terms
of the flawed disparity in favor of tax administration in the adjudication
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practice. A few factors contribute to such a disparity such as assignment of
the burden of proof, merits of tax cases, litigation experience and
techniques,

and

over-expansive

discretion

enjoyed

by

the

tax

administration. Fourth involves in the tax expertise of local tribunal
judges. Deficiency of tax expertise is caused by weakened training,
shortage and irregularities of the caseload, and dominance of expertise
concentrated within the tax administration. Fifth goes to the arguably
narrow scope of judicial review in the tax context. This flaw has two parts:
(l) the scope should include abstract administrative acts such as local tax

rulings, notices and directives, if they clearly violate laws of higher
authority; and (2) tax disputes derived from uncontrolled, over-meticulous
and

voluminous

local

tax

administration

acts

should

not

be

unconditionally filed. The "case-merit control" should be incorporated but
not limited to an upgraded pre-trial tax administrative reconsideration
"filter".
£). Chapter VI also includes a very brief discussion of taxpayers' rights, third

and last cornerstone of a robust tax judicature framework. 16 As to China's
tax judicature reform, the most substantive reforms concern taxpayers'
right to know, right to plead, right to a fair hearing and right to appeal. The
right to know guarantees predictability of tax consequences after a
taxpayer learns details of applicable tax laws and regulations. The right to
plead refers to tax authorities' responsibility to explain details and
evidences for reaching an adverse decision against a taxpayer. The right to
16

See infra Chapter VII for details on the protection oftaxpayers' rights in China.
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a fair hearing envisions a process in which taxpayers and tax authorities
can present arguments during a pre-trial process. Usually, this happens
when an administrative reconsideration is filed. The right to appeal is the
last resort that a Chinese taxpayer may rely on; however, in many cases it
leads to a settlement between the taxpayer and tax authorities. To this end,
the issue centers on the realization of taxpayers' protections but not those
listed in legal documents.

Chapter VI further reminds that it might be overly cynical to understate
the progress and merits as to rights protection present in China's tax
system even if some frustrations of taxpayers' rights protection do exist.
Overall, China's tax system still provides a formulated, yet promising,
framework to channel available legal remedies, administrative and judicial,
for taxpayers. In particular, the administration lawsuits filed by taxpayers
attain more respect and identification all the time, although such
awareness is discounted by the "non-contentious" or "settlement-preferred"
culture in China.

Chapter VI then contributes the theoretical and details of a few proposals for
China's tax judicature after discussing the "triple whammy". Mostly, Chapter VI
structures these proposals based on the following theoretical analysis: (I) the tax
context is particular. The tax judicature's role therefore should not be exaggerated
in overhauling or extending to the whole tax law field. (2) Flaws and established
settings of China's judicial framework translated into the tax law must be
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carefully examined and evaluated. (3) The tax judicature should ground itself in
the rule of law order emphasizing a fair, transparent, certain, consistent,

equitable, effective, and clear consideration. (4) The WTO principles of
transparency, uniformity and impartiality and judicial review should be fulfilled
to the utmost extent possible, even those principles might not directly apply to the
tax context.

Chapter VI submits the following proposals for China's tax judicature reform (1)
Similar to many other tax scholars, I contend that the full-payment rule should be
abolished. For an adverse tax collection decision, a taxpayer does not need to pay
the assessed payment or provide guarantee at the first place before filing an
application for a tax administrative reconsideration. (2) This thesis contributes the
novel notion that a summary judgment procedure should be established for small
tax cases as a tax collection procedure. Summary judgment has several
advantages: keeping the current reconsideration procedure untouched, promoting
tax expertise of judges, lower burden of proof, Jess discovery practice, relatively
cooperative procedural standards at trial. (3) China should design a better scheme
for administrative reconsideration, but the structure must be calculated and
designed. (4)Tax expertise can be strengthened by teaming up more experienced
personnel with specialty in tax. (5) At county or lowest hierarchical government
levels, abstract administrative acts should be subject to judicial review, and this
reform may start as experimental at a few coastal localities with better tax talents.
(6) Echoing the debates regarding the imaginary Chinese tax court system, this
chapter submits a tentative proposal. The desirable structure is to adopt a circuit
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tax courts framework exercising both original (conditioned first instance) and
appellate jurisdiction sitting permanently in six to eight regions covering
nationwide territory and reporting to the SPC Tax Tribunal based in Beijing. The
designated High Tax Tribunal should be an SPC subsidiary and should have the
ultimate appellate jurisdiction over tax cases appealed at circuit tax courts and
provincial high courts, and perform tax court system administration or
management. Meanwhile, the transitory, costly and overhauling midlist "spin-off'
structure should be denounced based on tax policy routines.
Chapter VI concludes that the tax judicature reform in China should consider both

the idea of permanence and that of flexibility. It must balance the dynamic
between tax administration, the general judiciary framework, and taxpayers'
rights. As law supports the government's political authority as well as the power
of the legal system, the principles and tenets of the tax judicature system should
be enshrined in a jurisprudential manner, honoring the rule of law order.

Chapter VII

Chapter VII endeavors to review China's taxpayer's rights framework and

proposes reform guidelines to examine mechanisms for enforceable taxpayers'
rights. The discussion has two prongs. First, it contributes a review of the status
quo of China's taxpayer's rights framework. Taxpayers' rights are based on a

dynamic interaction between State, the tax mix and taxpayers. Second, it
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examines China's mechanisms for enforcing taxpayers' rights under the rule of
law conception and WTO principles and offers a reform proposal. 17

Chapter VII starts the discussion by giving historical background on Chinese
taxpayers' rights protection. First, the awareness of taxpayers' rights has
fashioned China's tax law reform in the past decade. A recent wave of taxpayer
consciousness sparked a movement to challenge the rights protection status quo in
China. As China was charged as the most miserable Asian country in terms of tax,
Chinese taxpayers are increasingly burdened by various tax levying coupled with
the inflationary currency and high CPI sensed. Moreover, enlarged tax bases
enrage taxpayers who compare them with the public benefits they receive in
return. Second, the Chinese government's official endorsements of universal
values and generally accepted human rights principles advance the debate on
reframing China's legal and social settings. However, traditional tax policy
discourse lacks a framework for exploring whether or how a taxpayers' rights
paradigm may guide and encourage China to pursue the sensitive human rights
protection goals that would help promote social order and international image in
which individual rights and freedoms can be fully realized.

Chapter VII contributes that the perspective of taxpayers' right protection could
help articulate a responsive approach to the problems of social welfare and
economic inequality in China. For instance, a list of pragmatic and proactive
taxpayers' rights promotes human rights protection, which is both morally
defensible and politically viable. Chapter VII suggests that the concept and
protection of taxpayers' rights presumes a generalized enabling framework of
17

See infra Chapter VII Section 4.2.4.
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human rights. At the same time, approaching human rights through the lens of
taxpayers' rights supports a focus on fairness in social policy orientations, and
brings in efficiency aspects in evaluating of a social policy by considering the
potential obligation against taxpayers. Ultimately, human rights protection might
be better served if a set of taxpayers' rights tends to uphold a professional
institutional order that balances state and taxpayers' interests. In this connection,
the situation of China's taxpayers is awkward: the human rights framework is not
fully embodied in the legal system, and the tax laws system itself is in its
nascence.

Chapter VII contends that the concept of taxpayers' rights is not isolated. It is
generally defined to limit the state power to promulgate, administer and enforce
the tax laws and to bindingly obligate uniformity, transparency and procedural
justice. The setting of rule of law in this sense warrants taxpayers' reliance on
creditable rights protection. On an international level, the protection of taxpayer
rights has received widespread attention and legislation from various sources is
available to define, provide, and defend taxpayer rights. Many tax administrations
and international organizations have formulated bills, declarations and manuals
specifically designed for the protection of taxpayer rights. The competitive
advantage from an international market further ensures that interference to
taxpayers' rights is limited, and the WTO exemplifies a robust multilateral regime
embracing capital mobility and free trade. Rights exercised by taxpayers demand
an internationally formulated standard to be incorporated into China's tax law
system to safeguard both revenue collection and fuel economic development.
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Chapter VII further briefs the rationale for taxpayers' rights based on the
relationship between taxation and the state. The discussion is founded on the state
theory that legal rights are meaningless unless they are honored with accessibility
and enforceability to enjoy, and therefore, taxpayers' rights are primarily part of
civil and political rights as to harmonizing taxpayers' rights and duties to the
state.

Chapter VII also reviews the status quo of taxpayers' right protection in China
and suggests the legitimate need to develop a set of rules for scoping and
protecting taxpayers' rights, the awareness of which emerge in a meaningful and
pragmatic manner for bettering outcomes of economic behavior and social policy
implementation. Chapter VII critically assesses the Chinese taxpayers' rights mix
in terms of constitutional interpretation, primary rights and secondary rights,
administrative rights and the principles of good conduct of tax authorities
available for Chinese taxpayers. An examination of the primary and secondary
taxpayers' rights in China reveals that almost all deficiencies and drawbacks of
human rights protection and the tax laws system fall onto the taxpayers' rights.

Chapter VII then proves why such deficiencies are not surprising. The
constitutional fortification of primary taxpayers' rights is weak because of an
absence ofthe word "taxpayers' rights" in China's Constitution, but also because
of a discontentedly misunderstanding of how to situate taxpayers to claim or
interpret primary legal rights. Secondary taxpayers' rights are supposed to be
enriched with enough clear-cut rules in detailing taxpayers' administrative and
legislative rights, while China's current framework fails to contribute those
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details. Rather, somehow it misidentifies the roles played by administrative
primary rights and secondary legal rights. Following the positivist rule of
recognition, the result is that an amalgamation of laws, rulings, and notices is
displayed out-of-order, and there lacks a systematic certainty to elevate protection
of taxpayer's rights. Although the Tax Collection Law, the Proclamation of
Taxpayers' Rights and Duties and relevant administrative procedural laws all
facilitate, to some extent, the clarification and expansion of rights available to
taxpayers at first glance, those stipulated rights remain short of jurisprudential
significance and practical value, showing the necessity to identify each category
of taxpayers' rights in detail. Paradoxically, taxpayers' rights are expanding
simultaneously with the expanding economy scale and a larger tax enforcement
force.

Chapter VII identifies the necessity to design each category of taxpayers' rights
with enough details. Chinese tax authorities should feel the insufficiency to set up
a hasty comprehensive framework of tax without polishing taxpayers' rights and
obligations. The connection between the general administrative law framework
with the tax law context should be better solidified to determine whether an
application in taxpayers' circumstance is appropriate or not. This comprehensive
approach should include both legal and administrative rights, embracing diverse
factors that may affect taxpayers.

Chapter VII then evidences that Chinese taxpayers' rights are limited by the
inherent deficiencies in the general tax framework. This is particularly manifested
by the discrepancy in the internal management of tax authorities. Moreover,
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because secondary legal rights, administrative rights and the principles of good
conduct of tax authorities are put together in the Tax Collection Law and the
Proclamation, the protection of each right is not guaranteed with enough
singularity and attention, and the separation of those rules and its impact should
be considered.
Chapter VII summarizes that, being mindful of deficiencies in taxpayer rights
protection in China, it is excessive to understate or neglect the progress and merits
as to the rights protection regime in China's tax context. Overall, China's tax
system still provides a problematic, yet promising, framework to channel
available legal remedies, administrative and judicial, for taxpayers. From the Tax
Collection Law and the Proclamation, continuous efforts and attention are put
forward by China's tax authorities to advance taxpayers' awareness and rights
recognition. In particular, the administrative lawsuits filed by taxpayers attain
more respects and identification, although such awareness is discounted by the
"non-contentious" or "settlement-preferred" culture in China. Chapter VII also
acknowledges the frustration due to the paucity of resources in modulating related
research, since many questions of this topic left unaddressed in full extent or some
questions are just not answerable given current development stage of the tax
legislation reform.
Chapter VII supports the protection of taxpayers' rights centers as a key element
substantiating China's construct of the rule of law order and fulfillment of WTO
principles. Chinese taxpayers' rights should theme with a fair, transparent,
certain, consistent, equitable, effective, and clear manner within the framework of
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the tax laws. Meanwhile, the WTO principles attach assimilation into
international taxpayers' rights routine and vitality in designing and rectifying
Chinese taxpayers' rights in terms of administration and adjudication. China's tax
laws should embody and honor the transparency, uniformity and impartiality and
judicial review principles with a full set of niceties and convenient courses of
action in taxpayers' protection.
Chapter VII concludes a summarized proposal for refining China's taxpayers'
rights protection, based on the positivist view in jurisprudence for taxpayers, the
rule of law order, and WTO principles. This proposal balances practical
significance and largely is underpinned by points of consensus among tax
authorities and taxpayers alike. In this sense, it is not a reordering or
rearrangement of existing prescribed rights, rather, it is submitted being reflective
of daily practice.

Chapter VIII

Chapter VIII contributes a comparative study of the tax treatments for the
nonprofit sector in the U.S. and China for three reasons. First, the development of
China's nonprofit sector 18 has been tremendous in the past two decades, but much
less comprehensive studies have been initiated on reforming China's nonprofit tax
18

See Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 Vill. L. Rev. 433-440
(1996), discussing that when referring to the third sector, the terms "charity" and "nonprofit" are
often used interchangeably. See also generally D.B. Reobertson, Should Churches be Taxed? 4068 and Chapters II, III and IV (Westminster Press, 1968). The same problem exists in the limited
research in China as to the definition or description of"cishan" or "gongyi", i.e., "charity".
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system -the crucial component that clinches an attainable nonprofit sector as a
partner of the state. Echoing China's success in economic growth in the past
decades, literature on Chinese tax typically focuses on tax incentives for foreign
direct investment and tax policies catering economic development. Second,
collaterally, the rule of law construct in the past decade invites some ambitious
scholarship as to modernizing China's charity sector with an "all-in" charity code
or cultivating expansive grassroots NGOs. This idealized study, however, suffers
from ignorance of the tax treatment for the nonprofit sector and an unrealistic
understanding of China' legal and political situation. Third, this analysis has
strong commercial implications that are often neglected by many commentators.
China's integration into the WTO or the globalized trade system arouses
heightened complaints on national treatment and fair competition from both
foreign and domestic enterprises. A key issue arising is that the profitability of
foreign investment shrinks as the tax preferential treatment is gradually being
phased out. 19 However, there is no materially meaningful tax law as to the nascent
NGO sector- how NGOs, as foreign investment vehicles, might be profitable.

19

See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of
the Welfare State, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573 (2000), presenting the relationship between tax
incentives and revenue; Professor Avi-Yonah examines the increased use of tax incentives as
weapons in the international competition to attract investment. Professor Avi-Y onah argues that
the establishment of tax havens allows large amounts of capital to go untaxed, depriving both
developed and developing countries of revenue and forcing them to rely on forms of taxation less
progressive than the income tax. Professor Avi-Yonah contends that both economic efficiency and
equity among individuals and among nations support limits on international tax competition, and
he presents a proposal that accommodates the competing concern for democratic states' ability to
set their tax rates independently. He proposes the coordinated imposition of withholding taxes on
international portfolio investment, with the goal of ensuring that all income may be taxed in the
investor's home jurisdiction. Professor Avi-Yonah also proposes that multinational corporations
be taxed initially in the jurisdictions where their goods and services are consumed. Professor Aviy onah outlines that, both developed and developing nations would be able to preserve the
progressivity of the income tax and to broaden and stabilize their tax bases in time to stave off the
fiscal threat to the welfare state
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Chapter VIII takes two positions are methodologically and jurisprudentially
meaningful to a comparative study20 of Chinese tax.

First, modem tax studies are debated predominantly in Western terms such as
progressivity, equity and efficiency, but the scarcity of decent comparative legal
tax scholarship fails to generate a "lively debate on comparative tax works and
their methodologies". Meanwhile, "a shortage of paradigmatic discourse in
comparative tax invites the simultaneous existence of bluntly conflicting
arguments, taking parallel courses, yet never engaging each other". Although
some frameworks of comparative tax studies are proposed or compiled, the
formulas enclosed therein remain hypothetical than practical- a pragmatic
concern is that only very limited areas of tax are forcefully analyzable by tax
comparativists. This embarrassment is particularly challenging to scholars in the
Chinese tax context who want to exploit the "tax transplant" methodology. In this
connection, this chapter contributes that a comparative tax study relating to China
might be better achieved by focusing on a "tax law sub-discipline" rather than on
a specific tax concept. One reason is that a tax concept, usually a transplanted
vocabulary of western tax origin, is too narrow to substantiate a patulous
comparative analysis. The other reason is that it lacks full-range expandability to
scrutinize other subsidiaries of tax law - an international tax concept at the
2

<The literature on comparative tax and federalism is voluminous. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Preface
to Comparative Fiscal Federalism: Comparing the European Court of Justice and the US
Supreme Court's Tax Jurisprudence, by R.S. Avi-Yonah, J. R. Hines Jr. and M. Lang, co-editors,
xvii-xviii. EUCOT AX Series on European Taxation, 14. Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands:
Kluwer Law International, 2007; Michael A. Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai, Changing in Tel
Aviv: Reflections on Progressive Taxation and "Progressive" Politics in a Globalized but Still
Local World, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 555 (2006). Professor Livingston is one of the major
contributors of the comparative tax literature and has conducted extensive research. See also
Victor Thuronyi, Comparative Tax Law, Kluwer Law International (2004) for a detailed account
of comparative tax methodologies and comparison of tax systems of over 20 jurisdictions
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maximum can only throw in scrappy value to other major tax areas such as
turnover tax or income tax.
Second, the tax cultural traditions and social, political and legal settings of a

systematic tax governance framework usually are much less discussed or even
purposefully excluded from tax comparativists' theorizations. This "snooping"
methodology unavoidably provokes abundant "contemptuousness" and skeptics
from orthodox tax scholarship against tax comparative studies. A tax study
ultimately has to be accommodating to the general cultural, social, political and
legal systems in which a tax system is embedded. Otherwise, a comparative study
may easily turn into a descriptive, mechanical, and perfunctory analysis. The
practical and scholastic significance of comparative tax studies cannot be
achieved by way of a limited comparison falling on the technical elements of tax.
The "big-picture" setting perspective must be addressed to formulate a
comparative study of Chinese tax. The same rationale applies to both the rule of
law construct and assimilation to the WTO system as well. This thesis tentatively
incorporates comparative tax culture considerations to compare prime elements of
nonprofit tax schemes of U.S. and China.
Chapter VIII argues that the development of China's nonprofit sector in the past

decade has been remarkable, especially following recent natural disasters, the
2008 Beijing Olympic Games, and celebrity donation scandals. Regulatory
deficiency regarding the treatment of nonprofit organizations demonstrates the
Chinese party-state's failure to maintain its rich tradition of philanthropy and the
exacerbation of the disparity between rural and urban livelihoods. Surges of
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grassroots NGO activity, millions of affectionate "netizens" at the time of natural
disasters, and faithful volunteers for the Olympic Games demonstrate the poor
administration and misallocation of charitable resources. Meanwhile, the Chinese
government has seriously identified the indispensable role played by the nonprofit
sector in alleviating bureaucracy, downsizing government, stimulating wealth
mobility, reducing regional inequalities, and, ultimately, promoting a harmonious
society.

Chapter VIII highlights the current dysfunctions in the Chinese legal framework
in establishing an enabling an operative nonprofit sector- namely that the state
fails to regulate it through a potent tax system which creates various tax
preferences and ensures no abuse of those preferences. Even though it has been
suggested that a comprehensive charity law should be enacted, the existing charity
tax laws and regulations remain discordant, anachronistic and inoperative. Worse
is that bureaucratic mismanagement and unprofessional administration have
jeopardized the incentives and confidence for reforming the nonprofit sector.

Chapter VIII aims to examine comparison between current nonprofit tax rules in
China and U.S. in practice, and highlights suggestions that may benefit charity tax
law reform in China. From a comparative point of view, the United States system
of tax treatment for nonprofit organizations is well established and sought-after
model for decades. Although there is no single pattern fitting in various global
needs, the U.S. model includes established principles of federalism, fiscal
incentives, and economic adaptability which are markers of a powerful system.
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Chapter VIII also presents a brief overview of China's current charity laws and
regulations -the historical development of charity tax laws and those in practice especially of charitable tax exemptions. In addition, Chapter VIII outlines a
number of institutional and theoretical backgrounds of the current U.S. charity tax
exemption systems. The U.S. tax system for the nonprofit sector arguably
embraces

maturity,

objectivity,

flexibility,

and

accountability.

Evolving

throughout the course of U.S. history, the U.S. scheme relies solidly on regulatory
authority, checks and balances, and confidence in the rugged individualism of
American democracy. The prerequisite to enjoying the benefit of the tax
exemption is objective and subjects to minimum level of discretional review.
Meanwhile, as an outcome-based set of measures, it enables the nonprofit sector
to adapt to new economic developments and strike a continuous balance between
external regulation and internal government.
Chapter VIII then suggests that the expansion of the nonprofit sector in the past
decades has caused many problems in China's tax framework. Dubious of the
suggestion of promulgating a comprehensive charity law, Chapter VIII does not
yield any unrealistic idea of transplanting all valid and enabling values under the
U.S. tax exemption system to China. The prime incentive oftax deduction has not
been solidly rooted in the general public. There is a lack of stimulating push for
the tax authorities and MCA to adopt a systematic responsive reform measures.
However, some positive reforms especially on the tax exemption and tax
deduction in the nonprofit sector are more implementable and manageable.
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Chapter VIII contributes the following observations after comparing the tax
treatment in the U.S. and China on nonprofit sectors. First, the public benefit or
charity purpose of nonprofit organizations has not been coherently defined. This
confusion predictably inhibits the development of the nonprofit sector by stalling
interested corporate and individual donors from taking exemptions and tax
deductions. Second, China has not set up an enforceable fiscal incentive system to
promote charitable donations. The administrative procedure of obtaining a tax
exemption certificate is arduous and discourages donors either to donate or
withdraw from obtaining the certificate, which worsens the efforts to modernize
the scheme. Third, there are still burdensome requirements for the application and
registration of nonprofit organizations, such as dual management, high thresholds
of capital endowment for foundations, and a prohibition on cross-regional
development. Fourth, the administration and supervision of the internal
management, human resources, and financial and accounting management of
nonprofit organizations is very weak. China's complex administration system on
the nonprofit sector, including the MCA, MOP, and SAT, is mismanages fund
raising, the appropriate usage of donations, and profit-making from donations.
Corruption also became a major concern of the general public to make donations.

Fifth, the determination of tax-exempt status and review of such status is ad hoc
and different from locality to locality. Such irregularities, on the one hand, invite
unethical manipulation of tax preferential policies, and create resistance to
making donations through locally available venues.
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Returning to a jurisprudential focus, Chapter VIII contributes a new methodology
in terms of situating comparative law in the Chinese tax context. In this
connection, this chapter holds that a comparative tax study relating to China
might be better achieved by focusing on a "tax law sub-discipline" rather than on
a specific tax concept. A western-originated tax concept might be too narrow to
substantiate a comprehensive policy orientation, and it lacks full-range of
expandability to scrutinize other subsidiaries of tax law. Moreover, the tax
cultural traditions and social, political, and legal settings of a systematic tax
governance framework should be included in tax comparativists' theorizations. A
tax study ultimately has to be conducted from a "big-picture" perspective in
which a tax system is embedded. This chapter holds that a comprehensive tax
transplant effort of valued ideas and practices, although it may seem bold and
uncomfortable at the beginning, is what China needs to build up a robust
nonprofit sector embracing broad visions rather than incremental, piecemeal
reforms.
Chapter IX

Chapter IX concludes the whole thesis by reiterating a few remarks. First, this
thesis aims to prepare a reasonable, handy and realistic foundation with which to
evaluate the progress of the Chinese tax law reform. Second and pushing this goal
further, this thesis tentatively submits - on the basis of debates on the rule of law
and understanding of the WTO principles applicable to China - a tailored,
pragmatic and practical set of proposals for the tax reform under China's current
legal infrastructure. The proposals are underpinned by instrumental notions of the
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rule of law rhetoric, inter alia, generality, clarity, consistency, enforceability,
stability, congruence, and substantive notions of judicial independence, human
rights and the limitations of bureaucratic government with regard to the nonprofit
sector.
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Chapter II
An Overview of the Chinese Tax Law System

I.

Introduction

Formed over decades of political, economic and social upheaval and strife,
China's taxation system reflects its own political and economic experiences as
much as its interactions with western, capitalist systems. Since its inception
shortly after the founding of the People's Republic of China in late 1949, China's
tax law system has experienced drastic and recurrent changes to adapt to new
political-economic philosophies and to strengthen its revenue designation by way
of steady incorporation of international tax norms. Evolving from a centralized,
planned and closed "socialist economy" to a market driven, open economy and
then to China's accession to WTO in 2001, China has gradually emerged as a
market oriented economy. As such an equitable market framework for
investments has taken shape, embracing a series of vigorous system restructurings
completed after enormous foreign capital entered China upon implementation of
the "reform and open door" policy in 1979. Moreover, the tax law system has
intertwined with other laws contributing to the development of competent and

71

internalized legal institutions in China.
Tax laws and policies in China have been important instruments for Chinese
government in realizing a two-pronged reform agenda: (1) reforming its domestic
economic system with increased revenue and macroeconomic control, and (2)
opening China up to outside world. Both of these prongs are commingled with
political concerns of increasing social welfare, reducing income disparities and
monitoring foreign investment. Tax law in China, as part of the macroeconomic
regulatory system, plays an irreplaceable role in adjusting commercial activities
of corporate and individual taxpayers. It is even said that Chinese tax law is the
only area of Chinese law brought in line with and integrated into the international
norms 1•
For instance, one of China's key tax policy objectives is to be internationally
competitive. The Chinese government has adopted practical approaches to realize
this goal. Particularly, China has designed tax rates that are competitive with
those in neighboring Asian Countries, granting various tax incentives to promote
investment in designated areas or industries. Tax incentives are used liberally,
despite limited empirical research showing their direct effect on foreign direct
investment in China. 2 Moreover, China has been strategically aggressive in
contracting bilateral or multilateral tax treaties with trading partners to address
foreign investors' concerns regarding double taxation. Chinese tax authorities are
also receptive to international tax norms such as the arm's length principle, which
serve foreign taxpayers.
1

See generally, Jinyan Li, The Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and Implications for
International Tax Debates, 8 Fla. Tax Rev. 669 [Hereinafter Rise and Fall]
2
Id., at 670
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This chapter aims to examine briefly the evolution of the Chinese tax law system
and structures shaped by China's socio-economic forces, fiscal and governmental
reforms, administrative reforms, fiscal decentralization, and WTO accession. 3

3

For an overview of China's taxation system since the WTO accession, see Li supra 1; See Xu
Shanda Zhongguo Shuiquan Yanjiu [China Tax Jurisdiction Research] (China Taxation Press,
2004) (Xu was the ex-Vice-Governor of the SAT). For an overview of the early China's taxation
on foreign investors, see Michael J. Moser & Winston K. Zee, China Tax Guide 105-06 (2nd ed.,
1993). For tax changes since the 1990s, see Jiang, infra 4; Stephen C. Curley & Darren R.
Fortunato, Tax Considerations for Investors in China, 20 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 531 (1995) ;
Jeri C. Weber, Note, Foreign Investment in the People's Republic of China: Tax Law Attempts to
Provide Incentives, 46 Tax Law. 275-93 (1992); Gerald A. Wunsch & Dingfa Liu, Recent Chinese
Tax Legislation Affecting Foreign Investment in China, 2 Ind. Int'l L.& Comp. L. Rev. 415 (1992);
Allison E. Wielobob, Note, China's Choice: Tax Incentives to Fund Economic Development, 9
Temple Int'l & Comp. L.J. 413 (1995). For the development of the tax regime governing foreign
investment during the 1980s, see, e.g., Jinyan Li, Taxation in the People's Republic of China ,
Praeger, New York (1991); A.J . Easson & Li Jinyan, Taxation of Foreign Investment in the
People's Republic of China (1989); Alex Easson & Li Jinyan, Taxation of Foreign Business and
Investment in the People's Republic of China, 7 Nw. J. Int'l L.& Bus. 666 (1985) , Richard D.
Pomp eta!. , The Evolving Tax System of the People's Republic of China, 16 Tex. Int'l L. J. 11, 1640 (1981); Paul D. Reynolds, Doing Business with the People's Republic of China: Tax
Consideration , 14 Int'l L. 49 (1980) . For tax enactments on foreign investment in the early 1980s,
see William P. Alford & David E. Birenbaum, Ventures in the China Trade: An Analysis of
China's Emerging Legal Framework for the Regulation of Foreign Investment, 3 Nw. J . Int'l. &
Bus. 56 (1981); Carl A. Nordberg, Jr. & Irene Price, The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic
of China Concerning Foreign Enterprises, in Legal Aspects of Doing Business in China 1983 191
(Practising Law Institute 1983); Don R. Castleman, Taxation in the People's Republic of China:
The System and Its Function, 46 Albany L. Rev. 776 (1982); David R. Simon, Note, Taxation of
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This will provide a concise description of the specific economic, political, social,
and cultural factors impacting the evolution of China's tax system after WTO
accession. Subchapter II briefly explains China's tax law system development
since 1949 in four broad stages: the pre-1978 period (1949-1978), the economic
reform period (1979-1993), the market economy period (1993-2000), and the
post-WTO accession period (2001-present). Subchapter III discusses social and
economic policy orientations that affect the development of China's tax law
system. Subchapter IV outlines the framework of China's tax law system.
Subchapter V discusses the fiscal decentralization reform for the past three
decades and outlines directions for possible reforms in tax administration,
especially with regard to how to improve efficiency and fairness. Subchapter VI
concludes briefly.

II.

Historical Development of the PRC Tax Laws

Right after the Communist Party of China assumed governance of mainland
China, taxes were imposed and collected to regulate the economy and rebuild the
fragmented country. The reform and restructuring of China's tax system can be
broadly divided into four stages: the pre-1978 period (1949-1978), the post-open-

Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China: A Legal Analysis in the Context of Current
Chinese Economic and Political Conditions, 15 Vand. J. Trans'! L. 513 (1982); Anna M. Han,
People's Republic of China's Foreign Enterprises Income Tax Law and Regulations, 6 Hastings
Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 689 (1983). Timothy A. Gelatt & Richard D. Pomp, China's Tax System:
An Overview and Transactional Analysis, in Foreign Trade, Investment, and The Law in the
People's Republic of China 42 (Michael J. Moser ed., 1987); James W. Harrison, Tax Aspects of
Doing Business in the People's Republic of China- A Comparative Summary for U.S. Investors, 5
Fla. lnt'l L.J. 381 (1990)
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door period (1979-1993), the market economy period (1994-2000), and the postWTO accession period (2001-present).

2.1. Pre-1978

For historical and political reasons, the pre-1978 tax law system had developed
through political turmoil, economic mismanagement, and stagnation of popular
living standards that marked China's Soviet economy as interpreted by Mao. 4
Ideological debates and a ponderous copy of the Soviet Union's industrial
structure made the taxation system a tool for class struggle and political control. 5
Political interference during this period twisted and deprived the taxation system
from developing according to modem theories of public finance and legal
articulation. Taxation was "a vestige of capitalism destined from oblivion" 6 and

4

See Zhaodong Jiang, China's Tax Preferences to Foreign Investment: Policy, Culture and
Modern Concepts, 18 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 549 (1998), at 559 [hereinafter Jiang: China's Tax
Preferences to FDI]; see, e.g., Thomas J. Klitgaard & Mayre Rasmussen, Preferential Treatment
for Foreign Investment in the People's Republic of China: Special Economic Zones and Industrial
Development Districts, 7 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 377, 384-90 (1984) (noting that various
preferential measures as investment incentives). For a general discussion of Chinese measures
intended to attract foreign capital in the 1980s, see Jerome Alan Cohen & Stuart Valentine,
Foreign Direct Investment in the People's Republic of China: Progress, Problems and Proposals,
1 J. Chinese L. 161, 169-78 (1987)
5
This understanding is strengthened by Professor Whitmore Gray at the University of Michigan
Law School, noting that China mostly follow Soviet Union's model for codification of important
laws and such heritage still plays a huge part in jurisprudent research settings) (discussion notes on
file with the author); See also Walter Gellhom, China's Questfor Legal Modernity, 1 J. Chinese L.
1, 6 ( 1987) (observing that China has relied heavily upon Soviet Union for content of law, and
training of judges, lawyers and legal staffs). for discussions in Chinese, See generally, He Qinhua,
Reexaminations of China's Transplantation of Soviet Union Legal System [Guanyu Xinzhongguo
Yizhi Sulian Sifa Zhidu de Fansi],2008) ( fiiJIIJ#< 0~-T*'TJ:f::l ~~~n;Jm'lS]~$JJJ3i!¥gjj,i~D
2008) http://www.china-review.com/sao.asp?id=2836 (last visited on March 15, 2011)
6
From 1950 to 1997, China's flagship newspaper The People's Daily in total used the term "a
vestige of capitalism destined from oblivion" for around 400 times. The usage ofthis term had two
goals (1) strengthening the ruling of CCP and (2) discussing which direction that China's
development may occupy. At the beginning, tax was specifically referred to as a "vestige". See,
How the History Gets Rid of the Vestige of Capitalism Destined from Oblivion [Cong Renmin
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was therefore used to depress industry and commerce held by private ownership.
China's economy during this period hardly had any tie with the rest of the world
and operation of foreign entities was rare. 7 Tax laws were domestically oriented,
applying to domestic and local enterprise, which induced a simplification of the
tax regime to build up and implement a centrally planned socialist economy.
Under the then existing socialist system of State Administration of Income and
Expense, in all State-owned enterprises (SOEs) the government retained all
earned profits (after reserving employee welfare), and then received governmental
subsidies for operation and production. Most of the taxes during this time were
levies on natural resources and in particular on individual wealth and
•

consumptiOn.

8

2.1.1. The Foundation ofthe Socialist System 1949-1952
Right after the foundation of the PRC, the CCP faced a fragmented, or vacant,
fiscal system left over from the KMT government, where the poorly functioning
central government had to a significant extent lost control over localities, and the
big bureaucratic capitalists and landlord classes levied taxes in their local
jurisdictions. Therefore, in order to finance and solidify its ruling, the CCP had to
design a tax system to unify localities and centralize fiscal control. To affect this
the Chinese central government promulgated the Major Rules Implementing the

Ribao Kan Lishi Shi Zenyang Gediao Ziben Zhuyi Weibade] ( {M.<A~ S j!X>~It.i~~:"&~"Jl
~~;ES(~ES"B'il?} ), China's leftists website http://www.maoflag.net/?action-viewthread-tid-

291762 (last visited on March 15, 2011)
See Li, Rise and Fall, supra I at 670
8
See Jiang supra 4 at 560
7
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National Taxation System by the Government Administration Council in 1950,
listing 14 types oftaxes to be collected nationwide. 9 They then adopted a uniform
agricultural tax in March 1951 to protect farmers from exploitation by landlords.
In the early 1950s, almost half of the Chinese government's revenue was
generated through taxes.
2.1.2. Socialist Transformation (1953-1957)
China's first Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) was successful in achieving a Socialist
social, political, and economic transformation. Capitalists were either asked to
surrender their assets to State treasury or were forced to jointly operate their
businesses with central or local governments as minority shareholders. Farmers
were put together to form cooperatives or communes giving their surpluses to the
government. Following the Soviet Union socialist model, taxation did more than
simply generate state revenue to finance socialist industrialization, but also served
as a class struggle tool to eradicate the exploitative class. During this period,
state-owned enterprises were exempt from taxes, but recalcitrant private
enterprises were squeezed through high income taxes to accept the CCP's ruling
and reorder themselves to follow the larger transformation. 10 As the Chinese
government adopted a socialist transformation of ownership towards the end of
the first five-year plan in 1953, taxation was used as a weapon to restrict
capitalistic industry and commerce and transform them into socialistic or semi9

These 14 taxes are industrial and commercial enterprises tax, transaction tax, salaries tax, land
tax, building tax, slaughter tax, salt tax, interest tax, inheritance tax, stamp duty, special excise tax,
customs duties, commodity tax and vehicle license tax. For a general review of taxation over this
period, see Jinyan Li, Taxation in the People's Republic of China, Praeger, New York (1991), at
25 supra 3
10
ld., Li supra 1
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socialist units and private enterprise were taxed more than SOEs." 11 By 1956,
private ownership of means of production was basically eliminated and SOEs
were revitalized and supported as the dominant force ofthe socialist economy. A
major change, enterprise income tax for the SOEs, was also introduced at this
time. Under the established enterprise bonus system, SOEs could retain a portion
of their surplus if there was excess production, or if their sales exceeded their
target levels. 12 The retained surplus would be transferred to a bonus fund to pay
for bonuses to workers or for improvements of the cultural and living conditions
for all workers. SOEs were responsible for almost all aspects of their workers'
welfare, housing, medical treatment, education, and retirement, etc. 13

2.1.3. Further Simplification ofTaxation System (1958-1966)
After the socialist transformation, the CCP firmly controlled the political, social
and economic status of the nation. 14 Tax laws and policies started playing a
diminished role in the centrally planned economic order. 15 First, all earnings
generated by SOEs belonged to the state treasury and private enterprises could
only serve as distributors or agents of SOE products. Second, due to the
simplification of economic activity and actors, the industrial and commercial tax
was levied as the only major turnover tax, and industrial and commercial income
tax was the only income tax in the modem sense. Such major taxes were
simplified and consolidated as evidence of the success and totality of socialist
11

See Wang Yanlai, China's economic development and democratization (Ashgate, 2003) at 87-89
See generally, Li, supra 1
13 ld.
14
See Wang supra 11 at 63-65
15 ld.
12
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transformation. In fact, as a result of the failure of the Great Leap Forward
movement (late 1950s) 16 and the Great Famine (early 1960s), 17 tax revenues alone
could not finance and support state operations, and the tax administration system
stalled. Therefore, although the national taxation system was nominally retained,
it was not an effective institution during this period. When China entered its
second five-year plan in 1958, most taxpayers were SOEs and the emphasis of
1958 reforms were influenced by the Soviet "tax less" concept. 18 Tax law was
further simplified so that enterprises had to pay as few types of taxes as possible.
The Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax (CICT) was introduced to
combine all turnover taxes, and enterprise income tax was imposed for the first
time. However, the enterprise bonus system that was applicable to the SOEs
remained, as retained profits of the SOEs had increased significantly. The bonus
system was retained until its replacement by the profit-contracting system under
which the SOEs could hand over a pre-determined proportion of the surplus and
retain the balance.
2.1.4. Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)
Rampant political turmoil and a stagnant economy meant that the Cultural
Revolution period hardly witnessed any new promulgation of tax law except the

16

Id., at 67-69
Id., at 71
18
Following the period of reconstruction, the phase of socialist transformation (1953-1956) is
perhaps best characterized by the consistency with which the majority of the CCP leadership
subscribed to those norms. Borrowing from the Soviet Union was also reflected in the extent of
practical Russian participation in the form of financial aid and scientific and technological
guidance. See, e.g., Roy W. Bah!, Jr., Fiscal Policy in China: Taxation and Intergovernmental
Fiscal Relations (The 1990 Institute and the University of Michigan Press, 1999), see also M.
Bakes, Tax Reform in Central and Eastern Europe, Australian Tax Forum 8(1) 117-128 (1991)
17
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Draft Regulations on the Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax, enacted in
1972, 19 which had a special political purpose of strengthening the military and
machinery industries. Other than this small piece of tax law, the administration,
collection, and adjudication the taxation system all collapsed with the downturn of
social and economic order. After the "Gang of Four" 20 was removed from the
political arena, the Chinese government reorganized the Ministry of Finance to
coordinate all taxation related matters nationwide. 21
During the early period of the Cultural Revolution ( 1966-1970), reflecting the
increasingly negative perception of modern economic organizations as symbols of
Western capitalism, China's tax law system was again simplified in the 1973
reform by consolidating different types of taxes, reducing taxable items and tax
rates, and unifying the obsolete tax collection system. The Industrial and
Commercial Tax (ICT), a turnover tax, generated a major portion of the total
revenue during this period.Z2
Although the tax law was revamped repeatedly and played a definite role in
China's economic development before 1978, all such restructuring functioned to
simplify the tax law system, streamline the socialist economy, consolidate similar
taxes, reduce number of taxes and tax rates, and most importantly, to safeguard
and build up a socialized economy deeply rooted in political and class struggle.
Tax laws and policies, played an auxiliary and insignificant role in the financing
of government and development of the socialist economy.
19

See Li supra 3
See generally, William Brugger, China Since the Gang of Four (Croom Helm,1980)
21
See History of Ministry of Finance of the PRC, http://www.mof.gov.cn (last visited on March 15,
2011)
22
See, e.g., Li supra 3
20
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2.2.The Economic Reform Period 1978-1992

After nearly three decades of political strife and socialist, central economic
planning, China encountered serious image problems due to its previous policies
and political polarity. In the early years of implementing reform and "openness"
policy, Deng Xiaoping' leadership in China sensed the gravity of crisis the
country faced: a stagnant economy, very low living standards, and increasing
mismanagement by the government. 23 Deng launched enormous construction
plans to accelerate the country's development. While such efforts turned out to be
too ambitious in their first attempt, as indicated by the period of retrenchment that
followed, the mentality of pursuing fast economic development persisted and was
later translated into various reform programs including tax law and policy.
China's economic underdevelopment and poor technological infrastructure were
an impetus for the openness policy, which aimed to improve conditions for
foreign investment and reassert central control over localities. Preferential tax
treatment, as a result, was considered vital to attracting foreign capital and
technology. "Foreign taxation" (Shewai Shuiwu) became a specialized branch of
state tax authority with the main objective of promoting foreign investment. 24

23

This thesis benefits from Professor Jiang's review of China's tax regime since the 1980s. See
generally Jiang, supra 4, at 561 and accompanying footnotes, presenting that, despite heroic
investment rates and rapid growth since the late 1950s, the Chinese people's living standards were
still lagging because of stagnant productivity; see also e.g., Carl Riskin, China's Political
Economy: The Quest for Development Since 1949 261-66 (1987); Robert F. Dernberger, The
Chinese Search for the Path of Self-Sustained Growth in the 1980s: An Assessment, in China
Under The Four Modernizations Part I 19, 20-27 (Joint Economic Committee Congress of the
United States ed., 1982), from which Jiang drew his notion
24
See Jiang supra 4 at 562, discussing the adoption of foreign taxation to promote foreign
investment; see, e.g., Niu Licheng et al., Zhongguo Shuishou Zhinan [China Tax Guide] 158 (1990)

81

A prominent attribute of China's legal system throughout this period was the
different treatment under law for purely Chinese commercial activities and those
transactions involving foreign interests.

25

Rather than promulgating a new

package of income tax rules to govern foreign direct investment, however, the
Equity Joint Venture Law (EJVL), promulgated in 1979, created preferential tax
treatment for investments involving foreign actors. 26 Just as corrective rates under
the ICIT were the legacy of policies that reflected past hostility toward foreign
and private capital, the claimed preferential tax treatment in this first foreign
investment legislation since 1949 was a milestone suggesting a favorable policy
change. As confirmed by its implementation, the very word youhui, meaning
preference, conveyed an encouraging signal. "Low tax burden, expansive
preferences and high competitiveness" soon dominated official statements meant
to convey the perception of a friendly and accommodating environment for
foreign investment. 27 The Chinese government spent "a great deal of time and
effort propagating new tax preference"

28

provisions overseas, not only for

attracting investment, but also to send a strong message to the outside world of

(discussing China set up a separate foreign taxation branch for the opening-up policy); Du
Mengkun, Zhongguo Shehui Zhuyi Shuishou Jingji Lilun Yu Shijian [The Theory and Practice of
China's Socialist Taxation and Economy] 187 (1989) (emphasizing that the role of foreign
taxation in the implementation ofthe opening up policy must not be underestimated)
25
see infra Chapter III
26
On July 1, 1979, the Chinese legislature adopted the Law on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures
(P.R.C.), which permitted private foreign capital investment in Mainland China. See Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Zhong Wai Hezi Jingying Qiye Fa [the Equity Joint Venture Law of the
PRC][hereinafter Equity Joint Venture Law or EJV Law]. Article 7 of the EJV Law stipulated tax
reductions and exemptions for joint ventures using advanced technology by world standards as
well as tax refunds for reinvestment of joint venture profits. Flexible approaches had been taken
by the Chinese prior to the adoption of the JVITL, including the reduction of foreign investors' tax
burden through contractual arrangements between the Chinese government and individual foreign
interests.
27
See Art. 7 EJV Law
28
See Jiang supra 4, at 604 and accompany footnotes
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China's

intention

to

improve

its

economic

development.

"Widespread

dissemination of preferential rules was viewed as necessary to the success to the
promotion and execution of foreign investment projects." 29 Various preferential
tax schemes were then set up over the next several years. Some supposedly
applied nationwide and others were available only to those foreign investors
settled in designated areas 30 with additional industry-specific fiscal benefits.
Moreover, the government handed out special concessions that promoted
investment projects by Overseas Chinese. 31 With overlapping and sometimes
inconsistent regimes, foreign taxation in general and tax preferences in particular
looked so complicated and confusing that a prominent commentator at the time
stated "calculating which tax provisions provide any single enterprise or
investment possibility the most favorable treatment has become a considerable
burden, and expense, for foreign investors." 32
In addition to the very significant changes on reforming tax law to cater to foreign
investment, there are two additional revenue crisis concerns that forced the
Chinese government to adopt a modem tax system to raise revenues and balance
development. The first was the burgeoning of private economies after the early
1980s. The second, probably more significant, was the corporatization of SOEs.
The previous model of submission of all profits to the state treasury - the primary

ld.
I d., at 567
31
ld., at 586, Professor Jiang specifically discussed how the factor of overseas Chinese influence
the local tax incentives especially in designated special economic zones
32
See generally, James V. Feinerman, Chinese Law Relating to Foreign Investment and Trade:
The Decade of Reform in Retrospect, in China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s: The Problems
of Reforms, Modernization, and Interdependence 828, 832 (Joint Economic Committee, Congress
of the United States ed., 199l),quoted by Jiang supra 4 at 562
29
30
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source of state revenue - was denounced as leaders of SOEs sought to retain
larger shares of profits for their own business expansion and modernization.

2.2.1. Foreign investment related tax law

33

The Equity Joint Venture Law (EJVL) promulgated in 1979 promised income tax
preferences in two ways. ENs were eligible for a reduction of or an exemption
from their income tax for the first two to three profit-making years if they had
advanced technology by world standard. 34 A foreign joint venture could apply for
a refund of a portion of the income tax paid if it reinvested its net profit in China.
The Joint Venture Income Tax Law (JVITL), 35 instituted an enterprise income tax
for EJVs, in addition to providing normative rules and a regulatory framework for
tax administration, the legislation included a number of tax preference measures.
36

Although the JVITL imposed an attractive nominal thirty-three percent tax rate

before any preferential measure is adopted, in practice, due to many tax incentives
and exemption offered to foreign investment, the actual tax rate was around

33

For detailed description on development of China's foreign investment related tax laws, see
Jiang supra 4, at 563-567; see generally, Li: Rise and Fall, supra 1; Gerald A. Wunsch & Dingfa
Liu, Recent Chinese Tax Legislation Affecting Foreign Investment in China, 2 Ind. lnt'l L.& Comp.
L. Rev. 415 (1992); Allison E. Wielobob, Note, China's Choice: Tax Incentives to Fund Economic
Development, 9 Temple Int'l & Comp. L.J. 413 (1995) at 415-418
34
Art. 7 ofEJV Law
35
For discussion about JVITL, See generally Li, Harrison and Pomp, supra 3
36
See Jiang supra 4, at 563-564, and Li: Rise and Fall, supra 1, at 671-679, for example, (1)
newly established EJVs could apply for an exemption from income tax in the first profit-making
year and a fifty percent reduction of income tax in the second and third years, provided that they
were scheduled to operate for at least ten years; (2) following the expiration of this initial
exemption and reduction, EJVs engaged in relatively low-profit sectors like farming and forestry
or established in remote and economically underdeveloped regions were eligible for fifteen to
thirty percent income tax reduction for ten more years, subject to the approval of the Ministry of
Finance; (3) joint venture enterprises that reinvested their shares of profit in China for a period of
at least five years could obtain, upon approval, a refund of forty percent of the income tax paid on
the reinvested funds; (4) two provisions for computing the taxable income of EJVs were
characterized as "preferential," including the use of accelerated depreciation of fixed assets in
special circumstances upon approval, and the carry-over of losses to offset profits for five years
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twenty-five percent rather than the nominal rate of thirty-three percent. 37
By promulgating The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China
Concerning Foreign Enterprises

38

(hereinafter FEITL) in December 1981,

Chinese government sets up a separate income tax to echo foreign investors who
chose the investment form of wholly-owned foreign enterprise (WFOE) and Sinoforeign contractual joint venture (CJV). The FEITL offered fewer preferences to
foreign enterprises than the JVITL does towards EJV s39 and the tax on the income
of a "foreign enterprise" was computed on a progressive rate schedule with five
brackets40 •
A significant move forward unifying enterprise taxation in China came a decade

37

See Li: Rise and Fall supra 1, at 675, noting that thirty percent plus an additional three percent
local surcharge, and this rate is said to designed because corporate income tax rates were around
fifty percent in most developed countries and between thirty-five and forty percent in many
developing countries
38
The Implementing Rules for Income Tax Law of the China Concerning Foreign Enterprises was
promulgated by the Ministry of Finance and became effective as of January 1, 1982. See Jiang
supra 4, at 565, presenting that "Foreign Enterprises" are distinct from "foreign-invested
enterprises" (FIEs) in the following ways: FIEs include Sino-foreign cooperative (contractual)
joint ventures ("CJVs"), Sino-foreign Equity Joint Ventures ("EJVs"), and Wholly Foreign-owned
Enterprises ("WFOEs"), all of which are characterized as having some form of physical presence
inside China, whether it be production nor service oriented, but more importantly possess
domestic legal person status. A foreign enterprise, on the other hand, may have a permanent
establishment within China territory engaged in production or other business operations, or
otherwise may derive income from sources inside the China without such an establishment; see
also Li: Rise and Fall, supra 1, at 672-675
39
See Jiang supra 4, at 566-569, briefing that (1) there was no general income tax exemption or
reduction for newly established foreign enterprises; (2) only foreign enterprises engaged in
farming, forestry, husbandry or other low-profit operations and scheduled to operate for ten years
or more could apply for an exemption in the first profit-making year and a fifty percent reduction
in the following two years. A fifteen to thirty percent reduction in income tax for another ten years
could be available after the expiration of the foregoing exemption and reduction, subject to the
approval of the Ministry of Finance; (3) unlike EJV s, foreign enterprises received no tax benefits
under the FEITL for reinvesting their profits in China; (4) in computing taxable income, foreign
enterprises like EJVs could carry forward losses for five years; (5) foreign enterprises could also
use accelerated methods of depreciation of fixed assets, provided that the operation did not involve
exploitation of offshore petroleum or other natural resources and subject to the approval by the
Ministry of Finance; (6) foreign enterprises with small-scale production and low profit, provincial
governments may waive or reduce local income tax to promote investment
40
See Arts. 3 and 4, FEITL, the thresholds range from twenty percent for the annual income of up
to RMB 250,000, to forty percent for the annual income exceeding RMB 1 million, and an
additional ten percent local tax was levied on the taxable income
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later, with the promulgation of the China Foreign-Invested Enterprises and
41

Foreign Enterprises Income Tax Law (the FIE Income Tax Law) on April 9,
1991, which replaced the JVITL and FEITL42 and no longer distinguished based
on the investment vehicle chosen. 43 The FIE Income Tax Law liberalized tax
preference rules and practice. As a result of the FIETL's official sanctioning of
various previously promulgated State Council regulations, 44 the two-year tax
exemption and three-year tax reduction are available to productive WFOEs and
CJVs,45 which was previously offered to EJVs exclusively. The FIE Income Tax
Law adopts a thirty percent flat rate to all PIEs, plus a three percent local surtax, 46
combining to effectuate a nominal rate of thirty-three percent in total. PIEs
engaged in productive sectors and scheduled to operate for ten years or more are
entitled to a two-year tax exemption, after they make a profit, followed by a threeyear, fifty percent reduction.

47

PIEs engaged in agriculture, forestry, or

husbandry, or those PIEs located in economically underdeveloped, remote regions
41

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waishang Touzi Qiye He Waiguo Qiye Suode Shui Fa [Income
Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreign Investment Enterprises and
Foreign Enterprises]
42
"Foreign investment enterprises" generally refers to EJVs, CJVs and WFOEs, see Jiang supra 4,
at 565-566 and accompanying footnotes; see also generally, Li: Rise and Fall, supra I; Gerald A.
Wunsch & Dingfa Liu, supra 3; Allison E. Wielobob, supra 3, at 4I5-418
43
see generally, Li: Rise and Fall, supra 1, discussing that "foreign enterprises" are divided into
two categories: foreign companies and business entities that set up an establishment in China and
those maintaining no establishment in China, but having earned an income with a source in China
44
See Arts. 7-9, FIE Income Tax Law of the P.R.C.; see also Art. 68-75, Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Waishang Touzi Qiye he Waiguo Qiye Suodeshui Fa Shishi Xize [Detailed Rules on
the Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreigninvestment Enterprises and Foreign-owned Enterprises][hereinafter, Detailed FIE Income Tax
Implementation Rules] which authorize provincial governments can waive or cut down local
surtax for all kinds of FIEs in designated industries or sectors, not just for small scale and low
profit foreign enterprises as under the FEITL
45
Arts. 7-9, FIE Income Tax Law of the P.R.C.
46
!d., Art. 10
47
Art. 8, FIE Income Tax Law of the P.R.C., but the tax holidays are not available, however, to
petroleum, natural gas, rare metal, and precious metal exploitation projects, which are governed by
separate government regulations; see Jiang supra 4, at 565 and accompanying footnotes; see
generally, Li: Rise and Fall, supra I; Allison E. Wielobob, supra 3, at 415-4I8
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may obtain, upon application and approval, another fifteen to thirty percent
reduction in income tax for ten more years after the expiration of such exemption
and reduction. 48 The new regime retains provisions permitting carrying forward of
losses 49 and the use of accelerated methods of depreciation. 50 While the JVITL
allowed only EJV s to apply for the forty percent refund of the tax paid on the
portion of any reinvested profit, the FIE Income Tax Law extends eligibility of
this refund to all PIEs. 51 The FIE Income Tax Law also raises the amount of
deduction for business entertainment expenses 52 and permits businesses to write
off bad debts. 53 One change that adversely affects foreign investors is the
revocation of tax holidays that the JVITL granted to EJVs engaged in nonproductive and service sectors. 54 Pre-1991 EJVs may still retain JVITL tax
holidays, until the end of the term of their joint venture contracts. 55
2.2.2.

Domestic enterprise income tax law

Changes were also made over this period (1979-1993) to the taxation of Chinese
domestic enterprises (DEs), 56 especially SOEs, which are divided into two groups:
large and medium scale charged at a 55 percent tax rate, and small scale charged
at an eight-step progressive rate (ranging from 10 percent to 55 percent). The
48

Art. 8, FIE Income Tax Law of the P.R.C.
!d., Art. II
50
Arts. 34 and 40, Detailed FIE Income Tax Implementation Rules, supra 44
51
Arts. 8,IO and I9(I), FIE Income Tax Law of the P.R.C., approving that qualified FIEs are
automatically granted the two-year exemption and three-year fifty percent reduction without any
prior application and approval, and profits received by foreign investors from FIEs are tax exempt
52
Art. 22, Detailed FIE Income Tax Implementation Rules, supra 44
53
!d., Art. 25
54
See Jiang supra 4, at 567
55
Art. 40, FIE Income Tax Law of the P.R.C.
56
Another key aspect of China's tax reform during this period of time is the restructuring of
separate income tax regimes governing domestically-owned enterprises; see generally Li, supra 3
and Jiang supra 4, at 567
49
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1983 tax-profit substitution system introduced the State-owned Enterprise Income
Tax (SOEIT) (effective from 1984), which subjected SOEs taxes on their profits,
and replaced the then existing profit-contracting system. 57 However, the profitsharing mechanism under the previous profit-contracting system 58 remained under
the SOEIT as the central government's share of the after-tax profits from the
SOEs. Furthermore, a regulatory tax, known as the State-owned Enterprise
Income Regulatory Tax (SOEIRT), was imposed on the after-tax profits of the
SOEs. The amount oftax was determined on a negotiated basis between the SOEs
and the central government. In this sense, both the SOEIT and SOEIRT were
taxes which were not based on taxing actual profits but a set of redesigned
implementation schemes based on the previous profit-contracting system. In the
case of non-SOEs which took three forms of ownership, namely, collective,
private, and individual, 59 three different sets oftaxation rules were promulgated to
replace the previous ICIT. 60
Until 1984, all enterprises operating in the China were subject to a turnover tax
known as the Industrial and Commercial Tax (ICT). In 1984, domestic turnover
tax reform was launched and the ICT was replaced by four separate taxes,
namely, Product Tax (PT), Business Tax (BT), and Resource Tax (RT) and a

57

See generally in Jinyan Li, China's Tax System: An Evaluation, 17 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 527
(1989)
58 !d.
59 !d.
60
/d. related rules include but not limited to Provisional Rules for the Collective Enterprise Income
Tax (CEJTL) (enacted in April 1985). Provisional Rules for the Individual Industrial and
Commercial Households Income Tax (IICHITL) (enacted in January 1986); and Provisional Rules
for the Private Enterprise Income Tax (PEITL) (enacted in June 1988). The IICHITL applied to
the profits of individually owned domestic enterprises and hence was a quasi-personal income tax.
The CEITL and PEITL applied to the business profits of collectively or privately owned domestic
enterprises and hence a quasi-enterprise income tax
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"trial" Value Added Tax (VAT). The trial VAT, however, was different in nature
than a modem conception of VAT; instead it served as a sales tax at a twenty-four
percent rate on select items. 61 However, foreign enterprises continued to be
subject to the ICT, which was once again renamed as the Consolidated Industrial
and Commercial Tax (CICT) in 1984. 62 Over this period (1979-1992), the tax
system went through several phases characterized by many new, scattered,
inconsistent and constantly changing taxes such as the VAT, PT, BT (for
domestic entities) and ICT (for foreign entities), generating the major portion of
the total revenue.
2.2.3.

Individual income tax law

The Chinese government introduced the concept of personal income tax soon
after 1979 63 to accommodate the disparity of income and foreign individuals
working in China, 64 therefore, the Ministry of Finance adopted the Individual
Income Tax Law on September 10, 1980 while the targeted subjects were mostly
foreign taxpayers with high incomes 65 • As of 1986, Chinese citizens were subject
to income tax under the Individual Income Regulatory Tax Law (IIRTL) 66 and

61

See generally A.J. Easson & Jinyan Li, The Evolution of the Tax System of the People's
Republic ofChina, 23 Stan. J. Int'l L. 399 (1987)
62Id.
63
See Jinyan Li, China's Individual Income Tax- A 26 Years Old Irifant, Tax Notes Int' I, July 24,
2006,297
64
One important reason for doing so was that many individuals, including domestic Chinese
citizens, built up their income and wealth following the adoption of "open door" policy in China.
Starting with the IITL in 1980, a personal income tax was levied on income earned by foreign
individuals working in the China
65
Foreign citizens in China are subject to Individual Income Tax Law of the PRC
66
Chinese citizens are subject to Individual Income Regulatory Tax Law of the P.R.C. (IIRTL)
((~~A~~~~~A~A~~--fi~ffl))
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most private Chinese enterprises are subject to a different income tax. 67
Without a doubt, such classification is based on three legal complications creating
many problems in enforcement and administration. First, the definitions of citizen
and residency requirement are far from clear. There are many Chinese
entrepreneurs who earned a salary comparable to foreign entrepreneurs but were
still subject to the lower citizen tax rate. Foreign taxpayers also usually stayed in
China for a quite short period of time. The residency requirement also lacked
instructions for dealing with common situations such as temporary absences,
business domiciles, and management centers. Second, due to administrative
deficiencies, these laws were not applied consistently across different regions.
Even in the same local tax jurisdiction, there were various approvals or special
treatments applicable to different taxpayers. Finally the local tax administration
had to set up three or more auditing teams for the collection of taxes given
different treatments and various tax rates applied, and this creates huge
administrative resource waste and irregularities. Therefore, a consolidated
individual income tax law was passed in October 1993 according to the NPC's
Decision on the Amendment of the Individual Income Tax Law.
Overall, individual income tax laws and regulations experienced a process of
differentiation and consolidation, to achieve the goal of standardization of the
individual income tax laws. However, given rapid economic development and
improvement of individual income, many problems arising were suitably handled
by the consolidated liT Law, even as the old challenges of opaque
67

Chinese private entrepreneurs and sole-proprietorships are subject to the Entrepreneurs and Sole-

Proprietorship Tax Law ofthe P.R.C.( ~l=j:I~A.~:#:.fll~~~-1'-f*Ii§l.illt..FfiJH~miaHT~'f?~}
)
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implementation and discretionary administration remained.
2.3. 1994 Tax Reform

In terms of tax policy, the 1994 tax law reform continues the Chinese tax system's
most important joint objectives: raising revenue and stimulating the economy by
encouraging exports and FDI. In comparison with the uncoordinated and
inconstant changes made in the previous fifteen years, the 1994 tax law and policy
designed a better synchronized system with determinative plans. A standardized
revenue-sharing scheme was established and implemented in large part to adjust
and balance the twisted and inconsistent relationship between the central and
provincial government. This decentralization effort coincided with the most
dynamic stage of SOE reform, which pushed SOEs to competitiveness through
"true" market participation and resulted in millions of layoffs.
In addition, there were two phases of changes during this period reflecting
China's shift to a market economy system: (1) the unification and modernization
of accounting standards to determine the base for indirect tax and income tax; and
(2) the comprehensive overhaul of the indirect tax laws and regulations and
rudimentary tax administration echoing the tax revenue-sharing regime. At first
glance, the changes appear to have emerged to modernize China's fiscal and
economic system to a market economy driven model. However, tax equity and tax
neutrality were still less emphasized than the economic benefits generated by
these tax policy changes.
The objectives of the 1994 tax reform were to unify the tax laws or rules, to
spread the tax burden more equitably, to simplify the tax system, and to share the
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tax levying power more reasonably between the central and local government.
The tax reforms brought changes in the areas of turnover taxes, personal income
tax for all individuals, and Enterprise Income Tax (EIT) for domestic enterprises.
As a result of this reform, the number of taxes has been reduced from 32 to 18.
Following this reform, the rapid increase of foreign trade and FDI also pushed
China to improve its tax system to conform with international tax best-practice.
The 1994 tax system consists of indirect taxes (VAT, business tax, and
consumption tax), enterprise income taxes (the FIE Income Tax Law and DEIT),
an individual income tax, property taxes, and payroll taxes among others. Indirect
taxes account for about 60 percent of the total tax revenue, while enterprise
income taxes account for about 30 percent. Of all of the instrumental changes
made to the tax law, the reform of accounting standards is the most important.
2.3.1. Accounting Standards
The lack of codified, standardized and uniform accounting rules has plagued
China's tax law reform since the early 1980s. There was no established privatesector accounting standard ever released by government authorities before 1992.
While, in general, taxable income cannot be solely determined on the basis of
accounting profits, the accounting standards are indispensable when applied to
obtain a straightforward understanding of taxable transactions. Accounting
standards usually provide the means to measure revenue and cash, cost allocation,
accounting period, and realization requirements for profits that are then adjusted
to apply incentives set out in tax legislation to determine taxable income, all of
which is subject to auditing assurance. A set of standardized accounting rules has
92

been a conspicuous hole in the tax law system.
An important piece of legislation enacted to fill in this gap is a new set of
financial accounting rules for domestic enterprises, the Standards for Business
Enterprises (ASBE), promulgated by MOF in 1992. Based on the generally
accepted international accounting standards model, implementation of the ASBE,
although it was loosely enforced, became particularly important given that most
SOEs, following decades of public ownership of the means of production and
expenditure, had developed a mixture of different accounting and booking
routines. Measurements of taxable income varied across sector and even among
different enterprises within the same sector. To be fair, the ASBE included many
"socialist" provisions, as it was designed for domestic enterprises, and was later
revised with sixteen supplemental detailed standards, all of which contributed to
reducing distorted and discretionary reporting practices by taxpayers and tax
administrators.
2.3.2.

Value -added Tax

The Chinese VAT is a production-type VAT. 68 It has a broad tax base with
limited exemptions, it applies to all taxable goods and services supplied in China,
and the standard rate is 17 percent. A lower rate of 13 percent is applied to sales
and imports of certain products. 69 VAT is collected at each level of trade on all

68

See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zengzhishui Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations of the
PRC on Value-Added Tax](effective as of January I, 1994, as amended) [Hereinafter VAT
Regulations]
69
See Art. 2, VAT Regulations, stipulating that the scope includes necessities such as grain and
edible oil, running water, hot water, gas, residential coal products, and air conditioning; print
publications, and agricultural related products such as feed, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, farm
machinery and agricultural plastic film
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taxable goods and services. To avoid cascading, suppliers are entitled to a
refundable input tax credits for taxes paid on goods and services to the extent they
were acquired for use in commercial activities. The effect of the input tax credit is
to remove any VAT from the cost of business supplies. Only consumers pay the
tax.
Exports are zero-rated, which means that while no output VAT is chargeable, all
VAT charged at the interim stages in the production chain is effectively refunded
to the exporter. Moreover, a special VAT rebate applies only to certain domestic
production, 70 partly to encourage foreign investment. 71 However, China does not
grant a full VAT refund on the export of many products 72 due to its fiscal
deficiency and administration concerns. It is hard to argue whether VAT refund
policies stimulate or restrict exportation by China, therefore whether the VAT
refund is a WTO non-compliant policy is open to debate.
2.3.3. Business Tax
The business tax (BT) 73 applies to business activities that are not subject to VAT.
Taxable activities include commercial activities, including but not limited to:
70

See Notice on Improving Measures for the Implementation of Import-Replacement of Steel, Guo
Shui Fa [ 1999] No. 68, April 16, 1999; see also Cai Shui Zi [1998] No. 117
71
See Circular on Enterprise Jcome Tax Credit for Purchasing Chinese-Made Equipment by
Enterprises with Foreign Investments and Foreign Enterprises", Cai Shui Zi [2000] No. 049,
January 1, 2000; See also, Notice on the Trial Measures for the Administration of Tax Refunds to
Foreign-Investment Enterprise Purchasing Chinese-Made Equipment, Guo Shui Fa [1999] No.
171, September 20, 1999 (encouraging FIEs in using Chinese-made equipment by offering VAT
refund)
72
For a review of export refund rate, see Xue Jianlan "Analysis and Overview of China's VAT
Refund Policies", presented at the Michigan-Peking Tax Conference, October 1, 2010, in Ann
Arbor, Michigan. For earlier discussions on this topic, see generally, MOF and SAT on Acijusting
Export Refund Rates, Cai Shui [Finance and Taxation], 2003
73
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yingyeshui Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations of the PRC
on Business Tax] (effective as of January 1, 1994, as amended) [hereinafter Business Tax
Regulations]
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transportation services, construction, banking and finance, insurance, post and
telecommunications, cultural and sports activities, and entertainment and services,
the transfer of intangible property, and the sale of immovable property within
China. BT is imposed mostly at rates of 3 percent, 74 5 percent, 75 and 5 to 20
percent. 76

2.3.4.

Consumption Tax

The Consumption Tax (CT) is an excise tax levied mainly on manufacturers and
importers in addition to the VAT. Exports are usually exempt. Generally, taxable
goods are luxury goods - petroleum products (gasoline and diesel), tobacco,
liquor, cosmetics, extravagant vehicles, fireworks, firecrackers, tires, and
motorcycles. 77

2.3.5. Individual Income Tax

For Individual Income Tax (liT), the 1994 reform program standardized the
income tax imposed on Chinese citizens and foreigners. The revised Individual
Income Tax Law (IITL) 78 replaced all the previous tax laws for personal income
taxation. The tax position of foreigners working in China remained the same
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Art. 2, Business Tax Regulations, and BT Tax Rate Chart, activities in this category include
transportation, construction, postal communication, and cultural and athletic activities
75
!d., activities in this category include banking, insurance, services, and the transfer of intangible
property and immovable property
76
Jd., activities in this category include entertainment and those determined by the local
government
77
!d., for example, the tax rates range from 45 percent on top quality cigarettes to 3 percent on
non-luxury cars, gasoline and diesel are taxes on an ad valorem basis at the rate of RMB 0.2 per
liter for gasoline and RMB 0.1 per liter for diesel
78
The Individual Income Tax Law of the P.R.C., (effective as of January 1, 1994, as amended); as
of December 31, 2010, the IITL had been amended 5 times since it was firstly promulgated on
September 10, 1980
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under the revised liTL. The revised IITL has removed inconsistencies, which
existed in the previous tax laws applicable to Chinese citizens. It aimed to provide
uniform tax treatment for all individuals. One of the most fundamental changes to
the IITL is the formal inclusion of the concept of residence and physical presence
as the criteria to determine individual income tax liability.
Article 1 of the liT Law stipulates that the liT is charged on "the income obtained
within or outside China by an individual residing for one year or more in the
PRC." For non-residents and individuals residing in China for less than one year,
only Chinese-source income is taxable. Individuals residing in China for one year
or more, but less than five years, pay tax on their Chinese-source income and the
portion of their foreign-source income that is remitted to China, and those
residing in China for over five years pay tax on all their income irrespective of its
source. Temporary absences from China are disregarded in counting an
individual's period of stay in the country.
China also adopted a list of categories of income subject to liT, 79 namely: (1)
wages, salaries, and bonuses from any office or employment; (2) compensation
for personal services, e.g., legal, medical, and accounting services; (3) royalties
from patent rights, copyrights, the right to use proprietary technology and other
rights; (4) dividends and bonuses from investments and interest; (5) income from
leasing property; and (6) other kinds of specified income. Moreover, the monthly
deduction is RMB800 for wages and salaries, and income in excess of RMB800 is
taxed at progressive rates ranging from 5% to 45%. For compensation received
from personal services, royalties and income from leasing property: a deduction
79

!d., Art. 2
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of RMB800 is allowed for expenses if a single payment is less than RMB4,000;
and a deduction of 20% is allowed for single payments in excess of RMB4,000.
The balance remaining after the deduction is taxed at a flat rate of20%. Payments
in kind or in marketable securities are taxed according to the market price at the
time of acquisition.
In addition, Article 4 of the liT lists various categories of tax exempt income,
such as prizes and awards, interest on savings, welfare benefits, insurance
indemnities, diplomatic related earnings, and deduction according to international
tax treaties.
A highlight of the 1993 amendment to the liT Law is the appeal procedures for
aggrieved taxpayers regarding local tax authorities' decisions. However, although
the taxpayer may appeal to higher level tax authorities or the people's court, the
tax due must be paid in advance notwithstanding the result of the appeal.
Moreover, a stringent tax audit procedure was designed to curb tax evasion with
high penalties, and serious tax evasion behaviors will be handled and criminalized
by people's court.
2.3.6. Enterprise Income Tax
As discussed in subchapter 2.2, the NPC enacted the FEITL for foreign
enterprises and enterprises with foreign investment (PIEs) to replace three pieces
of income tax laws relating to foreign enterprises. Although the FIEIT appears to
be incomplete, it sent out a vivid signal about China's intention to modernize its
tax law system through simplification and consolidation. As discussed, the FIE
Income Tax Law provides numerous incentives for PIEs to do business in China

97

or earn income from China. FIEs are subject to tax on their worldwide income,
whereas foreign enterprises are taxable only on their Chinese-source income.
Foreign enterprises operating in China through an "establishment" are taxable on
the net income derived through the establishment at thirty-three percent. Foreign
enterprises without operations in China are taxable only on Chinese-source
investment income and capital gains at twenty percent. The FIE Income Tax Law
is levied on taxable income, which is the amount of income net of costs, expenses,
and losses. The rules for calculating income largely follow internationally
accepted accounting principles.
The 1994 reforms did, however, introduce the Provisional Rules for Enterprises
Income Tax for domestic enterprises (DEITL), and this consolidation marks an
encouraging step along the road to modernization. Prior to the DEITL, there were
four separate sets of rules for domestic enterprise income tax purposes. 80 The
DEITL standardized the income tax charged on various types of domestic
enterprises and provided a tax treatment for domestic enterprises as closely
aligned to the tax treatment of foreign entities as possible. One noticeable change
for domestic enterprises was that the tax rate was reduced from 55 per cent to 33
per cent - the same rate applicable to foreign entities under the 1991 Foreign
EITL. It is notable that China undertook a remarkable reform aimed at the SOE
sector, which contributed more than half of the state's revenue for the first four
decades of the existence of the PRC. On the one hand, the reform reduced the

80

Rules for the State-owned Enterprises Income Tax (Draft) (enacted in September 1984); The
Collection Methods for the State-owned Enterprise Income Regulatory Tax (enacted in September
1984); Provisional Rules for the Collective Enterprise Income Tax (enacted in April 1985); and
Provisional Rules for the Private Enterprise Income Tax (enacted in June 1988).

98

domestic enterprise income tax rate from between 55% and 60% to 33%, the same
rate as FIE income tax, in order to lower the burden shouldered by SOE sectors.
SOEs were also challenged by BT and other forms of fees such as education
surcharges, real estate surcharges and urban expansion fees, among others.
Rather, SOE's payments related to tax and other social security benefits in total
were not reduced to the same extent.
On the other hand, the central government removed most meaningful preferential
policies for SOEs under the central, planned economy. For example, SOEs had to
demonstrate commercial performance in order to obtain commercial loans from
banks, while previously SOEs could take loans up to quota amounts assigned to
them and received little pressure to repay or risk of bankruptcy. Moreover, SOEs
had to reengineer their internal management structures to reflect modern corporate
governance principles and financial independence. Since many industries
occupied by SOEs were copied from the Soviet industrial model, such as
machinery, manufacturing, and mining, these corporations faced challenges
meeting consumer needs and organizing effective distribution channels after the
Chinese government threw them into the market. To deal with this challenge, over
90% of SOEs began their transformation processes by laying off millions of
workers, designing early-retirement plans, removing housing stipends and various
other benefits programs. This sudden push of SOEs into an immature market
aroused many social problems, but it also freed up enormous labor resources to
the market for FIEs and private start-ups. Moreover, the revenue-sharing scheme
deepened this problem by depriving government support to SOEs from local
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budgets. SOEs instead had to survive by themselves, bearing the difficulties of
drained financial sources.

2.3.7. Revenue Sharing

Another important aspect of the 1994 tax reform is the establishment of a revenue
sharing regime intended to shift the revenue base from the provincial level to the
central government, which was suffering an imbalance with provincial
government. According to the revenue sharing formula, 100 percent of revenue
generated from business tax on the supply of services, 25 percent of revenue from
the VAT on the sale of goods, and half of the revenue from enterprise and
individual income are allocated to provincial governments.
Given the inconsistent and incoherent accumulation of rules, formulas and
processes regarding the revenue split in the 1980s, the 1994 fixed revenue sharing
formula, as a non-legislative agreement reached after complex negotiations
between central and provincial authorities, was an enforceable scheme to alleviate
the central revenue deficiency. Moreover, with regard to the transfer payment
system, the central government guaranteed to the provinces that they would
receive the same base revenues they had in 1993. This revenue sharing formula,
on its surface, appeared quite alluring to provincial government, however, it
favored the central government by directing more high-yield and growing tax
revenue bases from provincial governments to the center.
2.3.8. Tax Administration
To echo the fixed revenue sharing formula designed m 1994, the tax

100

administration was adjusted accordingly to accommodate such change for tax
assessment and collection. Primarily, provincial tax authorities aimed to firmly
control the taxes, e.g., business tax and part of VAT, that were entirely allocated
to them. The division of tax administration responsibilities was acceptable to both
central and provincial authorities as an enforceable approach to implement the
new revenue sharing scheme.
Ultimately, the creation of provincial tax bureaus or branches was achieved by
assigning half of the administration's power and structure from provincial offices
ofthe central government's tax branches. The final tax administration structure in
the provinces is now comprised of two limbs: the local tax offices under control
of provincial governments, and the local branch of central state tax
administration. The operation and management of the local tax bureau of a
province are supervised by provincial governments, which provide operating
funds through a retention formula.
The local branch of the centrally administered SAT mostly serves as a conduit to
collect the central government's share. In particular, they are responsible for
assessing and collecting enterprise income taxes (PIEs and centrally-owned
SOEs), VAT and consumption taxes from all enterprises, and business tax from
selected industries such as insurance, banking, railway, and infrastructure, and
individual income taxes from non-citizens. The head of the local branch of SAT is
appointed jointly by the SAT and the provincial government. On the other hand,
the central SAT is generally responsible for administering centrally-owned
enterprises, public listed companies and foreign-owned enterprises with a few
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prescribed exceptions.
Provincial tax offices, as a result of the revenue sharing fonnula, pay more
attention to taxes that are entirely controlled by them, such as business tax and
individual income tax. In addition, they are responsible for assessing and
collecting enterprise income tax from provincial and private enterprises.

2.3.9. Summary

Tax law from 1992-2001 experienced rigorous reform to match China's economic
development changes in its political climate. In addition to a non-legislative
revenue sharing scheme, a relatively modem and equitable tax system has been
established in China through turnover taxes (namely, VAT, CT, and BT)
generating the major portion of the total tax revenue, and a set of consolidated
income tax laws. The refonn mostly simplified previous over-classified,
ideologically complicated and discriminatory sets of tax laws and regulations. For
example, three individual income tax laws targeting taxpayers on citizenship and
residence were consolidated into one piece of law with a clear definition of
residency and source requirements. Different types of foreign investment-related
enterprise income tax regimes were reorganized to formulate a systematic code.
Noticeably, the adoption ofVAT followed the international trends of putting more
focus on the balance between production and consumption. Although the Chinese
government suffered complaints from the SOE sector that they were pushed too
harshly into market participation, the tax law refonn strongly assisted in achieving
goals within the SOE refonn.
In terms of legislation drafting techniques, almost all tax laws promulgated by the
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NPC were sketchy and over elementary in form, and the implementation
regulations issued by the State Council were not that helpful in providing further
operative guidelines. Circulars, rulings, and notices issued by the MOP and the
SAT instead compose the operational body of tax laws and policies, but on an ad
hoc basis when unforeseen issues or causal political initiatives pop up. These
irregularities in legislation not only failed in structuring a modem tax law system,
but also frustrated taxpayers and, at times, officials in implementation.

2.4. Post-WTO Accession
In conjunction with the transition from a central, planned economy to an open,
market-oriented economy, China's new tax reform initiatives were designed and
formulated by its accession to WTO on December 11, 2001. This celebrated event
for both China and the international community presented China with the
laborious task of adjusting economic and tax policies to accommodate challenges
required by its WTO commitments and general WTO principles. Given the
complexities of China's legal, economic and social settings, finance and tax
authorities faced a daunting task ahead to cure and restructure tax law system to
lodge challenges brought by the WTO membership.
The implications of WTO membership for Chinese tax law reform are extensive.
It is not difficult to imagine various aspects of the Chinese tax law system
conflicting with general WTO principles, such as principles ofnondiscrimination,
transparency, uniform and impartial administration, and judicial review, among
others. To address this problem, China's commitments include instrumental
aspects of tax law reform such as lowering tariffs and removing non-tariffbarriers
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to encourage foreign trade and investment, removing tax-related export subsidies,
and designing tax policies following international standards, and substantive
reform proposals to reform its legal system to be more compatible with a market
economy and the rule of law.
In contrast to the stepwise consolidation and rough development of tax law reform
in the 1990s that characterized the legislation meant to establish a functional tax
order for China's new market economy, developments in tax law after China's
WTO accession comprised a steady and flexible approach in coordinating
international trade and tax norms. There are three major prongs in the reform. The
first is a continuation of the consolidation and completion process carried over
from the pre-WTO accession tax law aiming to rewrite tax legislation and deepen
the revenue sharing scheme. This can be understood as a continuation of the
socialist legacy and political-compromise culture. Such continued efforts included
releasing an update of accounting standards, adjusting the revenue sharing
scheme, and consolidating the enterprise income tax. Second, in order to fulfill its
Protocol commitments, China gradually removed its non-compliant tax laws and
regulations, especially regulations that provided special treatment for export
products. Third, the tax law reform, as part of the comprehensive legal reform in
China, 81 gradually began to accommodate the rule of law and WTO principles of
transparency, uniformity, impartial administration and judicial review. At first
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For more discussion on the Chinese legal traditions, see irifra Chapter III; see generally Randall
Peerenboom, China's Long March Toward Rule of Law. New York: Cambridge University Press
(2002); Stanley B. Lubman, Bird in a Cage-Legal Reform in China After Mao. Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press (1999); Stanley B. Lubman, Looking for Law in China, Columbia J. of
Asian Law 1 (2006); Hsu, C. Stephen, ed., Understanding China's Legal System: Essays in Honor
of Jerome A. Cohen. New York: New York University Press (2003); Xin Ren, Tradition of the
Law and Lm11 of the Tradition: Law, State, and Social. New York, Greenwood Press (1997)
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glance, the WTO accession suggests a general framework to guide further tax law
reform in China. However, compliance with the commitments made in the
Accession Protocol and the desire to build a rule of law will complicate China's
future tax reform as well.
2.4.1. Accounting standards

In February 2006, a new version of Accounting Standards for Business
Enterprises was adopted by MOF aimed at listed companies and SOBs. The new
ASBB, based on the 1992 set of financial and accounting rules for domestic
enterprises, mostly referred to the international financial report standards which
are widely accepted by developed countries, especially those with major capital
markets. Two problems led to the promulgation of these new standards. The first
was that the 1992 version of accounting standards was far out of line with and
even conflicted with international accounting standards, reflecting the domestic
enterprise focus of previous standards. Second, the jagged and unsystematic
accounting routines adopted by various SOBs presented huge difficulties for
auditors calculating profits and taxable income. Therefore, more stringent
requirements on disclosure are included in the new version. It is said that over
90% of SOBs, centrally or provincially-owned, for business expansion and
development have kept their own "treasury" which encouraged corrupt and
unprofessional retention and use of revenue resources. Moreover, with the boom
of China's stock markets and loosened monitoring on "A" share listing by SOEs,
scandals of false financial statements and performance reports caused headaches
for the securities regulatory commission, and a set of uniform financial and
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accounting standards was designed to remedy these problems.
While the new version of ASBE was modeled on international standards, it
contains quite a few rules reflecting the ideology of Chinese legislators regarding
their fears of exploiting rules and socialist characteristics of market economy. In
this sense, the new ASBE is a compromise between international standards and
specifically Chinese concerns. For example, the restructuring and adjustment of
enterprise debts is relaxed to encourage the use of financial planning and
derivatives, related-party disclosure rules remain loose, and there are significant
disparities between accounting and tax law treatments of recognition of profits
and cost identification. Among the above differences, the relaxation of regulations
governing the use of financial planning and derivatives was mostly targeted at
improving the vitality and competency of the enterprise surplus, given that SOEs,
after the painful restructuring after 1980s, have more financial capacity and
knowledge of modem corporate governance practices to compete in the market.
However, the loosened disclosure requirements allow SOEs to conduct more
related party transactions leaving a huge loophole, which complicates auditing
and the enforcement of tax compliance. Moreover, as far as tax practitioners are
concerned, the new ASBE created a larger gap between the accounting and tax
practice of profit recognition and cost identification, which would burden tax
auditing authorities to undergo complicated compliance audit and expertise
training. Moreover, the new ASBE also takes care of farming and small, private
enterprises by adopting cost rather than market price to determine product values.
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2.4.2. A silent transition to a consumption type VAT

After applying a pseudo "trial" VAT to domestic enterprise in the 1980s and
adopting a set of VAT laws and regulations of modem sense in the 1994 tax law
reform, VAT as a turnover tax has been proclaimed by both Chinese academics
and international commentators as an important step toward modernizing and
completing the reform of China's tax system. Since 2007, there has been a heated
debate on transforming the current production type VAT to a more neutral and
administratively efficient VAT model based on consumption. The academic
deliberation mostly centers on allowing a full input tax deductions as is
exemplified in the traditional, and more efficient, VAT system as adopted in other
market economies. Meanwhile, the opponents to a consumption based VAT, most
notably several central SAT officials, believe that such consumption based VAT
will hurt revenue in total and create administrative confusion. However, major
changes in the VAT arena since 2001 seem to have muted the opposition over
revenue concerns.
In 2003 a limited deduction for VAT inputs on capital equipment was allowed by
MOF and SAT to revitalize the northeastern rustbelt provinces for eight
designated industries, such as oil-drilling, auto manufacturing, metallurgy and
down-stream oil chemical production. However, the original initiative was not
intended as a tax law reform, rather, it served as an incentive to promote
investment in the northeastern region and to quell the unrest of laid-off workers
from regional large SOEs. However, an optimistic view would take this change as
a case for moving the VAT regime toward a neutral, modem system without
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burdening intermediate enterprises with a final VAT. Following the socialist
stereotype thinking, this change was phased in by an "incremental amount
deduction" that limits the deduction only to the VAT payable in excess of that in
previous years. Ironically, this change was delayed in implementation for three
months until July I, 2003 due to the extremely high number of fixed asset
purchases undertaken immediately after the policy was announced in early 2003.
This program, however, was extended to other regions in 2007 and 2008 to
rejuvenate twenty-six old industrial bases in the central region and five industryrust cities in the Inner Mongolia region. The third round of this program was
adopted to promote reconstruction of the three provinces that suffered earthquake
disasters in 2008 but carried more preferential input tax deductions on capital
assets: enterprises of all industries (with slight exception on military related
businesses) were approved to recognize the full amount of input tax on acquisition
of fixed assets. However, the policies adopted in the regions affected by the earth
quake were more deemed as a revitalizing approach to resurrect shattered public
confidence and nurture local investments. Ultimately and more remarkably, the
State Council in November 2008 announced that the deduction for VAT input tax
on acquisitions of fixed assets would be extended to all industries in a few regions
of China beginning in January 2009.
It is too early to assess the fiscal impact that may be brought by such expansive
VAT reform for the past eight years, and it is far too soon to guess the next move
MOF and SAT will make concerning the input tax deduction, given the pressure
from currency reevaluation of RMB, high foreign exchange reserve and the
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sweeping financial crisis since 2008. At the very least we can observe that the
shifting of the VAT base from production to consumption may direct more
revenues from poorer to richer provinces. Such an imbalance can only be resolved
through a well-channeled transfer payment regime designed by the government.
However, this may necessitate a reformulation of the current 25:75 split of
revenues from the VAT to a new ratio to be negotiated by central and provincial
governments, or a multi-tier formulation for richer or poorer provinces. In
essence, China's VAT reform demands a high learning curve, mature
commitments

by central

and

local governments,

and

caution

in

the

implementation of experiments with shifting the VAT from a production to a
consumption tax.
2.4.3. Adjusting the revenue sharing formula
Another significant move made by MOF to the tax system concerned the
adjustment to the 1993 arrangement on the share of enterprise and individual
income tax revenue between central and provincial governments. According to
the revenue sharing formula adopted in 1993, the agreed division between central
and provincial government would gradually move from 50:50 to 60:40 leading the
central government to take a larger share of the designated revenue base. The
change made in 2003 was therefore simply a delayed realization of previously
reached formulae. This change has had a larger impact than the central
government originally intended. Not only were relative finances of both tiers of
government rebalanced, but the central government also sent a strong signal
regarding its intention to further restrain the control of the provincial government
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over its own revenue. Provincial governments, instead, had to pay more attention
to the taxes (e.g. business tax) assigned exclusively to them. This change in part
also distorted provincial governments' behavior, causing them to increase their
revenue by various other means, including the recent real estate market boom and
land transfer fever dominated by provincial and local government actors is an
unsurprising result of the rebalancing of tax revenues and the systemic revenue
shortage perceived by provincial governments.
2.4.4. Nondiscrimination Principle

The principle of nondiscrimination is central to the WTO umbrella agreements,
comprising two important principles: the Most-favored-nation (MFN) and
National Treatment (NT) obligations. Under the MFN principle, GATT
contracting parties must grant each other treatment as favorable as they give any
country in the treatment of their goods (import and export tariffs, duties, and
charges). 82 The NT principle 83 prohibits member countries from discriminating
between imported and domestically produced products and services. Once import
duty is paid, imported goods and services must be treated no less favorably than
domestic products and services. This nondiscrimination obligation is applied
broadly to cover all internal taxes and charges, and all laws, regulations, and
requirements affecting the domestic sale, offering for sale, purchase, distribution
or use of a product.
The principle prohibiting tax subsidies is found in the Agreement on Subsidies

82
83

See GATT, Art. I
See GATT, Art. III
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and Countervailing Measures. 84 This provision sets out the general prohibition on
two types of subsidies, including tax subsidies. The first type of prohibited
subsidies covers those made contingent on export performance or, more common,
export subsidies. The second type of prohibited subsidies includes import
replacement subsidies, which are made contingent on the use of domestic, over
imported, goods. Some aspects of the current Chinese tax system may violate the
principles of nondiscrimination and prohibition of tax subsidies. 85 In addition, the
WTO system also requires an expanded scope of taxpayer rights and deepened
transparency in tax legislation and administration. 86
Another important aspect of China's tax system that may conflict with WTO
principles is the two-track tax system introduced since early 1980s, when China
first started modernizing its tax system. The two track system refers to the
existence of one set of rules for foreign investment and foreign individuals, and
another set of rules for domestic enterprises and Chinese citizens. As previously
discussed, 87 these two tracks were merged and simplified gradually during the
reform process in the areas of individual income tax, VAT, and other indirect
taxes, including the business tax and consumption tax.
A remarkable merging ofthe two tracks was undertaken in 2007 when the unified
Enterprise Income Tax was promulgated, but there are still some preferential
policies offered to foreign enterprises. In particular, (1) tax holidays: a standard
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See SCM Art.III
See infra Chapter V, Subchapters II and III
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See infra Chapter VII for details on taxpayers' rights protection
87
See supra 3 and accompanying texts
85
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five-year holidal 8 for FIEs engaged in productive activities, which entails a tax
exemption for two years and a 50% reduction in the tax rate for the next three
years; (2) preferential policies in special economic zones and recently established
new zones (e.g., Chongqing Liangjiang and Tianjin Binhai new zones), including
extended tax holidays, and lower income tax rates for large foreign investment
projects exceeding certain investment values such as USD I 0 million or 5 million;
(3) reinvestment refunds, whereby FIEs receive 40% refund of tax ifthey reinvest
their profits in China for at least five years, and a full refund is allowed if profits
are reinvested for establishing or expanding an export-oriented or technologically
advanced enterprise; and (4) reduced rates for export-oriented enterprises, 89 which
are granted a 50% reduction in the applicable tax rate after their tax holidays
expire and such reduced rate applies whenever it qualifies as an export-oriented
enterprise. In contrast, domestic enterprises do not receive many tax incentives
unless they choose investing in waste disposal projects, locating in remote,
poverty-stricken or minority ethnic regions, or creating large numbers of new
jobs, to name just a few.
Admittedly, China's tax system was redesigned based on WTO principles and
related economic policy changes. However, the extent to which it achieves and
implements these goals is another question. The unification process evidenced
that China catered various principles under WTO and honored the development
schemes of Chinese government with flexible tax policies. However, due to
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An export-oriented enterprise is one for which, on an annual basis, at least 70% of total output
value is derived from exportation
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limitations in the WTO rules and dispute settlement mechanism, the impact of
WTO rules will continue to be relatively modest. Another question is whether
China's tax system suffers from problems resulting from a lack of consideration
of principles of equity and neutrality. More time is needed under the WTO regime
to determine whether WTO principles may cure such deficiency.

III.

Framework of the Chinese Tax System

3.1. Sources of the Chinese Tax Laws
An examination of the framework underlying China's tax law system is necessary
at this stage. Not surprisingly, many problems arise pursuant to the sources and
hierarchy of China's tax law system. In a descending manner, the laws enacted by
the National People's Congress (NPC) have the highest authority. The provisional
regulations or "regulations" enacted by the State Council, the executive center
comprising various ministries, are next in the hierarchy. They are followed by
provisional implementation rules issued by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and
State Administration of Taxation (SAT). 90 Each of these tax laws or provisional
rules is usually supplemented by a set of detailed rules, regulations and various
circulars, rulings and notices for implementation. The law sets out broad taxation
principles whereas the provisional rules and regulations contain specific
provisions for implementation of the respective tax issues. Major tax legislation,
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MOF and SAT are entrusted with the authority from the State Council to interpret tax Jaws and
implement tax policies in China, some of which are coordinated with State Custom and State
Administration oflndustry and Commerce (SAl C)
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together with the detailed rules and regulations for implementation, provides the
basic regime for the related taxes.
Circulars, rulings and notices issued by various (central, provincial and local)
authorities theoretically have the least authority and are a supplement for
clarifying specific issues raised by the taxpayers and tax authorities. Although
these circulars do not have the force oflaw, they are often so highly valued by tax
authorities that they are deemed to possess the second highest level of authority.
Hence these tax circulars are practically binding on taxpayers and authorities. One
reason for this phenomenon is that the legislative process for basic tax laws and
regulations is time consuming and laborious- the NPC typically assembles only
once per year and only the State Council passes regulations on a regular basis.
Moreover, the internal legislation process requires MOF and SAT to serve as the
drafters and collectors of public opinion about tax laws passed by NPC.
Therefore, investors have to resort to local tax offices for explanations of related
tax regulations. Tight control on interpretation and enforcement of tax regulations
does not exist and circulars may be carried emanate from local tax administrations
and inconsistent with those of central government. There is no clear way to
establish "unified" measures.

3.2. Basic Factors Affecting China's Tax Law System in General
Tax law in China is marked heavily by political interference. When China's tax
system is discussed, scholars may initially go to the policy or guidelines enclosed
in resolutions of CCP Congress annual plenary session and CCP Central
Economic Working Conference. In this case, China's tax law and policies are a
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designated system relying on the social, economic and international settings and
norms. In the transition from a central, planned and socialist economy to an open,
market-oriented system, mixed with various domestic political and social strife,
China's tax law system presents a painful process of evolution mixed with backand-forth policy turbulence. This section aims to briefly describe the political
factors and policy orientations that might have or will continue to impact the tax
law system including legislation, administration and judicature in China.
The Chinese government has long used economic and fiscal policies to promote
the CCP's political and economic objectives. 91 In addition to the revenue-raising
function of taxation, 92 the government has used the tax regime to achieve
objectives beyond revenue allocation. 93 In the early 1950s, the CCP class struggle
policy and agrarian-land reform induced the imposition of arduous tax burdens on
landlords, 94 with the goal of transferring benefits extracted from land and property
to the working class. Moreover, in urban areas, especially large cities, taxation
was "a tool to protect and develop socialist and semi-socialist economies and
gradually to use, constrain, and transform capitalist industry and commerce." 95 To
this end, an Industrial and Commercial Income Tax" (Gongshangye Suodeshui, or
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ICIT) was introduced against "capitalist, industrial and commercial businesses"
to restrict their capital growth and divert their profits to strengthen the public
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See Xu, supra 3, at 25-29 and Jiang, supra 4, at 601-602
See Jiang, supra 4, at 601
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Gongshangye Shui Zhanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations on Industrial and Commercial
Taxes], adopted by the State Council of Government Administration on January 27, 1950 and
promulgated on January 31, 1950, see Li, supra 3 and Jiang supra 4 at 601
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sector, while collective or state-owned enterprises did not have such ICIT
liability. Instead, they remitted profits to the state treasury under separate
regulations. 97 At the same time, favorable treatment was given and applied to
industries or enterprises that met certain specified political and policy criteria.
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Following the same logic, after China adopted the open door policy of economic
reform to upgrade technology and attract foreign investment, the Chinese
government granted tax holidays and exemption for enterprises engaged in the
development and manufacturing of approved new products, 99 and for public and
state-owned enterprises suffering financial hardships. 100 Preferential tax measures
were also adopted to assign resources among industries, sectors and even
geographical regions, 101 especially to state-chosen advantageous areas, although
such treatment reduced nominal tax revenues. This policy orientation remains
popular based on the economic development needs of different regions. 102
As China had no modem corporate income tax of its own at the beginning of the
openness policy and felt pressure to replicate successful tax practices, the Chinese
government looked to other nations for both normative rules and special treatment
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For a detailed review of the history ofiCIT, and related tax reforms, see Jiang supra 4, at 602,
noting that in particular, in 1958, the government raised taxes on the profit of private enterprises
by ten to one hundred percent which brought the total income tax rate of private enterprises to as
high as sixty-seven percent. Moreover, in the early 1970s, the ICIT adopted a special category
named "temporary business" to catch any unregistered or unauthorized business activities, which
was further imposed non-state and private businesses a penalty of up to one hundred percent in
1977, despite the scope of the penalty provision broadly covered any individuals and units
98
!d., at 603, for example, to implement Mao's industrial policy of favoring industries over
commerce and heavy industries over light industries, a deduction of the ICIT rate ranging from ten
to forty percent was offered to SOEs in machinery and military production.
99
!d., for farm-related businesses including agricultural machine repair and leasing, small fertilizer
and cement producers, newly established enterprises in people's communes
100 /d.
101 !d.
102
See Xinmin Zhang, Tax Incentives for the Chong Qing Liang Jiang New Zones, presented at the
PKU-Umich International Tax Conference in October 2010
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to induce foreign capitai. 103 In order to maintain competitiveness in international
markets and further its open door policy, the Chinese government also appealed to
foreign business communities by comparing Chinese tax preferences and
incentives against other developing countries.

104

In this way, the Chinese

government was influenced by the concepts and practice of using fiscal and tax
incentives to attract investments. 105 Chinese authorities also ratified separate tax
regimes and incentives to codify differences between FIEs and DEs. 106 Moreover,
state tax authorities had to supervise the spending oftax savings. 107
WTO accession, through the application of international norms to the Chinese
economy, has tremendously shaped China's tax policy orientation. The Chinese
government is both a cautious adopter and a quick learner of international tax
practices. One important drive behind China's fast assimilation into international
103

See Jiang, supra 4, at 605 and accompanying footnotes, reviewing the legislative intents ofthe
first set of tax incentives;
104 ld.
105
ld., at 606, Jiang summarizes that it is not surprising that foreign investment enterprises were
initially limited to export-oriented and technologically advanced investments for the following
reasons: ( 1) taxes are negatively related to net profits and therefore negatively related to the net
rate of return, it follows that to increase [foreign direct investment] is to decrease the taxes on
foreign investment income; (2) Beijing also prioritized profit maximization considerations in its
decision-making to signal that China had become a friendly and willing host for business and
investment; (3) Chinese officials were aware that access and opening to China's immense market
would be immensely profitable to many overseas investors, but they were also concerned with the
domestic problems arising from opening
106
!d., at 607 and accompanying footnotes. Foreign investors were set apart from tax, finance, and
accounting rules governing domestic enterprises, most of which, during the 1980s, still operated
according to pkmned economy principles, for example, (1) different tax regimes also gave Chinese
policy makers more room for manipulating the illusion of preferential treatment for foreign
investors. As DEs were limited by stern rules and limitations in operation and business scope, any
relaxation or flexibility approved for foreign investors from such "standard practice" could be
called "preferences;" (2) such preferences hid the fact that DEs received state subsidies as well as
market protection; (3) this "trade-off' enhanced the domestic competitiveness of Chinese firms
and attracted foreign investments, but twisted the notions of fairness and efficiency in ways that
would complicate future SOE reforms. Without favorable tax and fiscal treatment, SOEs might
have lost support by competing for funds through costly and lengthy budgeting processes. SOEs
were educated to retain a greater share of their revenue for business expansion and investment by
depositing retained profit into designated accounts
107
See supra 3, Moser & Zee, at 112-16, discussing that Chinese tax authorities may request an
explanation of usage oftax savings and encourage re-investment in the same geographical area
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tax practice is its strategic use of external forces to drive internal economic
development. China has undertaken more extraordinary, or discriminatory,
obligations than other WTO member countries could accept. This is not without
its purpose however. China's leaders intended to take advantage of market access
commitments and international disciplines imposed by WTO to further strengthen
China's competence and competitiveness by transforming the state sector
economy. In this sense, almost all major tax law reforms and revisions after WTO
accession are directed at further liberalizing China's economy. This is evidenced
by the unification of income tax treatment between FIEs and domestic enterprises
in 2007, and China's prompt response to complaints filed by US on the export
VAT refund through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
In summary, looking back at China's tax law reform for the past three decades,
China's tax policies have been colored and dominated by the pursuit of economic
growth and standard of living improvement. Designed as a planned socialist
economy, the government had first to categorize particular areas or types of
foreign investment to make the openness policy successful. Then tax and non-tax
measures were targeted and adopted to promote such investments. National tax
legislation has been augmented by a myriad of particularistic rules designed for
targeted foreign investments, "regionally-oriented, industry-specific or ethnicallybased". 108

108

See Jiang, supra 4, at 607, explaining SEZs and other priority areas were created in coastal
regions because they were in the best position to attract foreign business. Overseas Chinese
businesses received additional preferential treatment because they were more likely to invest in
China
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IV.

Policy Considerations and the Reform of the Tax Law

China's tax law system experienced extensive and dynamic changes over the past
six decades, especially for the last thirty years. The speed of economic
development achieved through foreign investment has been paralleled by the
development of "preferential" tax policies and incentives. This describes the
ultimate goal of China's tax law architecture since the early 1980s. The WTO
accession drove China's tax law toward international and multidisciplinary
compliance. As a result, advocates on any side of the tax reform debate in China
are confronted with ambiguous and even contradictory results. However, there are
a few policy orientations worth noting regarding China's efforts to establish a
modem tax law system.

4.1. A Capitalist Profit Motive?
China's tax policy is marked by its socialist origins. On this foundation, the
country initiated the policy of openness and domestic reform to build socialism
with Chinese characteristics 109 and sought foreign capital for the "development of
socialist productive forces." 110 The development and application of law in China's
transition to a market economy therefore bears markers of a strong socialist
legacy and reflects the ideology of China's legislators. The Chinese authorities
109

ld, at 6IO and accompanying footnotes, quoting Deng Xiaoping, Building the Socialism With
Chinese Characteristics [Jianshe You Zhongguo Tese De Shehui Zhuyi], June 30, 1984, in
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, at 62-64, explaining socialism in terms of developing
productive forces); Deng Xiaoping, Yi Kao Lixiang Er Kao Jilu Caineng Tuanjie Qilai [Unite on
the Basis of Idealism and Discipline], at II 0, explaining that socialism with Chinese
characteristics depends on spiritual civilizations, idealism, ethics, morality, culture and discipline
110
See generally, Deng Xiaoping, Shehui Zhuyi He Shichang Jingji Bu Cunzai Genben Maodun
[No Fundamental Contradiction Exists Between the Socialism and Market Economy], October 23,
I985, in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, at 148-50
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had to convince themselves and the Chinese people that the use of tax preferences
would be beneficial to the country without sacrificing its socialist identity.
However, the concept of profit maximization initially did not resonate well
domestically when the CCP was dominated by left-wing military leaders. 111
Under their leadership, the predominant view was that purely profit-motivated
investment decisions would jeopardize the China's socialist legacy and long-term
development goals by inducing chaotic competition with foreign seizures of
domestic market shares and by threatening Chinese domestic industries. At the
same time, the fast growing domestic private sector economy troubled the
government on finding a mixed means to safeguard SOEs and public sector
economy. Therefore, it was conceded that the pursuit of profit by foreign
investors, while unavoidable, must therefore be controlled by the state.
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Many

even feared that because of preferential treatment, foreign investors might benefit
more from the country's opening up than the Chinese themselves.
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As a result, Chinese government had to formulate a two-track system. It
maintained a socialist system for domestic enterprises, i.e., SOEs, and Chinese
citizens, and a western-style tax system for foreign-owned enterprises and foreign
individuals. Therefore, a bifurcated tax, accounting and financial system was set
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According to Communist thinking, the capitalist idea of profit was offensive because it was
related to exploitation and cheating, and profit motivation was synonymous with selfishness and
greed
112
See Guanyu Woguo De Duiwai Jingji Guanxi Wenti [Issues Concerning Our Country's
Foreign Economic Relations], Hong Qi [Red Flag], April. 6, 1982, Hongqi Zazhi Bianjibu
[Editorial Board, Red Flag Magazine]. The Chinese admitted that their lack of advanced
equipment, technology, skilled personnel and management expertise, shortage of funds, and
overpopulation were factors unfavorable to Chinese-foreign economic ties. at 2, 3-4, quoted by
Jiang supra 4 at 611
113 !d.
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up to monitor foreign profit-seeking behavior. 114 Tax preferences also played a
role in controlling foreign investment through information gathering and other
monitoring. 115 Although the two tracks later merged in the areas of enterprise
income tax, individual income tax, VAT, business tax, consumption tax and other
indirect taxes, many tax incentives were kept to continue China's efforts in
attracting foreign investment and promoting international trade. This two-track
system served the goals of economic development and balancing foreign and
domestic interests. In this case, the original worries of capitalist transformation
seem overwrought. In addition, China's WTO accession bolstered the view that
the profit seeking nature of foreign capital will actually contribute to the
economic wellbeing of the Chinese economy. Tax policies, in this context, should
therefore attempt to enlarge tax revenues and balance development among
different regions.
Another notorious example of the "socialist notion" in the turnover tax law area is
the perverse dichotomy in which goods are subject to a VAT and services are
subject to a business tax. Such artificial distinctions, requiring taxpayers to draw
an artificial line in their business activities for different tax compliance purposes,
is outdated in China's modern economy in which hybrid supplies are provided
114

!d., Jiang supra 4 at 610-611, noting the 1979 EJV Law required EJVs to contribute to a
reserve fund and a venture expansion fund from their after-tax profit, before distribution of any
profit could be made to venture partners for reinvestment and joint venture expansion. Chinese
joint venture partners had to hand over their distributed profits to their superior government
department. Certain tax benefits were explicitly tied to reinvestment by foreign investors in China.
The profit that foreign investors could actually repatriate represented only a small portion.
115
See Pitman B. Potter, Foreign Investment Law in the People's Republic of China: Dilemmas of
State Control, China Quarterly, Mar. 1995, at 155, 173 (noting that the Chinese state seeks to
strengthen its capacity to obtain information on the financial condition, sales activities and
technology base of foreign investment projects" through tax preferences, quoted by Jiang supra 4
at 611)
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without showing the division of tangible elements and associated services. For
example, the sale of computerized hardware supplemented by database
infrastructures, for which the value is largely in the intellectual property, may
distort such a classification allowing firms to evade a high-rated VAT by
characterizing the products as a service item, subject to a lower business tax
obligation. A similar example is that in construction, taxpayers and tax authorities
may have different views regarding which component of the constructions can be
identified as immoveable and which as movable properties. The former are
subject to business tax and the latter to VAT. Worse yet, for products mixed with
goods and accompanying services it is hard find an enforceable formula due to the
complexities oftransactions. Therefore, two separate methods of keeping records,
one for goods and one for services, forces business taxpayers to drop optimal tax
planning activities. All of this contributes either to the draining of collectible
revenue and tax evasion, or to uncertainty in tax auditing and manipulative
discretion in tax administration.

4.2. Economic Efficiency and Tax Equity
Efficiency and equity are basic elements in a well-functioning modern tax law
system in a market economy, not to mention compliance with WTO principles. 116
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For a discussion of the tax equity in general, see, e.g., Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity,
Once More, 43 Nat'! Tax J. 113, 113 (1990); Deborah M. Weiss, Tax Incentives Without Inequity,
41 UCLA L. Rev. 1949, 1955 (1994) (about tax incentives created horizontal inequity); For a
discussion of the equity aspect of tax competition, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Bridging the
North/South Divide: International Redistribution and Tax Competition, 26 Mich. J. Int'l L. 371
(2004); Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax
Competition, 89 Geo. L. J. 543 (2001 ). For a critique of the role of Miranda Stewart and Sunita
Jogarajan, The International Monetary Fund and Tax Reform, British Tax Review (2004) 146-I 75
(2004); and Miranda Stewart, Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: The Disclosure of Tax Reform
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Not surprisingly, the Chinese government was aware of the efficiency argument
against tax incentives throughout years of tax law reform.

117

Allocation of

resources advocated in Western tax literature in perfectly competitive markets is
presumably not achievable in China. 118 However, such market efficiency would
imply significant government intervention in China. 119 On the other hand, in
China, tax policy is meant to achieve higher goals of state and individual ordering
that go beyond basic considerations of revenue maximization. In this case,
bilateral tax treaties signed by China help the recognition of the concept of tax
sparing and double taxation 120 to allow foreign investors to keep tax preferences
they were entitled to under Chinese law. 121 The efficiency argument is particularly
important in the current international tax regime as well. 122

in Developing and Transition Countries, 44 Harv. Int'l L, J. 134, 140-190 (2003).
117
See Jin Renqing (Minister of Finance ofthe P.R.C.), Explanation on Draft Enterprise Income
Tax Law, The full text of the speech in English is
http:// www.chinaembassy .org/eng/gyzg/t302221.htm
118
See Jiang supra 4, at 611-637, Professor Jiang discussed the cultural factors are part of an
important perspective on the reform oftax law in China in the past decades, and provided a policy
consideration to understand how Chinese tax reform may evolve even a market economy system
did not come into place
119
Economists tend to argue that state intervention in the form of tax subsidies distorts the
efficient allocation of resources through price and market mechanisms. For a survey of these
views, see Celine Azemar, Rodolphe Desbordes and Jean-Louis Mucchielli, Do Tax Sparing
Agreements Contribute to the Attraction of FDI in Developing Countries?,
ftp://mse.univparisl.fr/pub/mse/cahiers2004/Bla04047.pdf; James Hines, Jr., Tax Sparing and Direct Investment
in Developing Countries, Nat'! Bureau Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6728 (1998),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6728. see also Jiang supra 4, at 638, noting that as tax incentives are
intended to affect resource allocation and generate tax collection by deviating from market
principles, they are objectionable per se according to the most basic tax policy framework.
However, "in a world of uncertainty and imperfect information, a world in which most significant
policy decisions rest on assumptions and conjectures," taxation is "one of the range of governing
instruments at the disposal of government" and can be utilized "to maintain the acceptability and
influence ofthe governing party with important segments of opinion"
12
For further research, see Celine Azemar and Andrew Delios, Fiscal Incentives in Developing
Countries and FDI: Tax Sparing Matters (Apr. 2005),
http://www.afse.fr/docs/congres 2005/docs2005/Azemar.pdf
121
A typical tax sparing credit clause makes specific references to the Chinese legislation that
grants the tax reduction or exemption. The tax incentives granted under the FIE Tax (1991) have
been considered to be of a substantially similar. Because the new Enterprise Income Tax Law
(2007) retains the reductions and exemptions of withholding tax on dividends, interest and
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Measuring the 1994 tax system overhaul on indirect taxes for efficiency, none of
those three major indirect taxes (VAT, Business Tax and Consumption Tax)
achieve the correct relationship between negative externalities and social costs,
and tax burdens were mostly placed on firms in the intermediate part of the
production chain. The VAT, for example has a general 17 percent VAT for sales
of most goods and a 13 percent rate for a select few goods or products. Different
from a modem final-consumption-based VAT regime such as a retail sales tax
where tax is not collected in intermediate, business-to-business stages of the
production chain, China's VAT is refunded or credited for exportation and
business-to-business transactions. On the other hand, small businesses are subject
to two tax rates - 4 and 6 percent, but they are not entitled to recover VAT on
their acquisitions and businesses subject to higher tax rate can only recover the
input VAT from inventory, and no input VAT from capital goods is usually
refundable. As the most important tax, in terms of revenue contribution, the
current production-based cascading VAT induces economic inefficiencies by
associating externalities and social costs with longer production chains (with
various

intermediate stages of inventory

and production).

Intermediate

transactions completed within a single, inefficient, but integrated firm may avoid
more costs than those efficient intermediate businesses that need to deal with both

royalties available under the 1991 tax law, it should be clear that the tax sparing credit applies to
the new law.
122
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to overview the literature on international tax neutralities.
For further reference, see Hugh J. Ault & Brian J. Arnold, Comparative Income Taxation: A
Structural Analysis (Kluwer Law International2d ed. 2004); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure
of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1301 (1996); Michael
Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts and
Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 Tax L. Rev. 261 (2001); Michael Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing
International Portfolio Income, 56 Tax L. Rev. 537 (2003)
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input and output VAT compliance. Therefore, the efficiency rational fails to
justify the shortage of relief from input business tax for small businesses and
prejudice against businesses relying heavily on services.
Moreover, the VAT relief provided for exported goods creates another set of
inefficiency concerns. China offers a VAT refund to exporters to remove their
domestic externalities in terms of tax paid before exported goods leave China with
a credit for all tax incurred on inputs during the production of exported goods or a
refund of available input taxes. However, this general rule was fragmented into
five discretional rates of refund formulas as enforced by tax authorities, ranging
from the highest rate of 17 percent to the lowest - 3 percent. Tax authorities,
based on their sole discretion, may apply or selectively distort the application of
these various rates to penalize disfavored exports or subsidize industries desirable
in the particular industrial reform climate. These adjustable rates and applicable
industries may also serve to retool investments across different industries and
sectors, which leave ample room for tax authorities to administer the laws
inefficiently.
As to the other two types of indirect taxes, the business tax is imposed on all
services, whether provided to intermediate businesses or final consumption, and
this tax collection practice breads inefficiency as it creates both externalities on
intermediate business and burdens the final consumers. An example is the
business tax based on interest payments of bank loans, the most popular, if not the
only, way to obtain capital for business development. For enterprises with
different types of debt financing needs, especially those privately-held or medium
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and small sized businesses, such taxes on bank loan interest payment may lead
them to borrow capital from non-bank sources by back-to-back or alternative
means without incurring the business tax obligation through the high interest rate
charged on loans. This rule will definitely cause external costs for capital and a
social cost of unregulated and tainted financing practices. As to the consumption
tax, which is imposed on a long list of selected "luxury" goods, it can hardly
perform intended redistributive function. Rather it mostly serves as a punitive
measure, actualizing political biases with a very weak link to sound tax policy.
The consumption tax, with rates ranging from 3 to 45 percent, is at best a policy
to balance socioeconomic disparity in China. However it really succeeds only in
shifting the purchasing capacity of the growing population of wealthy Chinese to
overseas markets for luxury goods.
A focus on tax equity now turns more attention to the Chinese government, which
seemed to pay it little or no attention when they first introduced the two-track
system. While many other factors may have contributed to the dismal
performance of China's SOEs, disparate tax treatment has been criticized based
on irregular development of markets and the weakening of state planning. 123 To
eliminate these criticisms, in 1985, the State Council revised the progressive
income tax schedule for collectively-owned enterprises to reduce their tax
burden.
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While non-state sectors are thriving, the performance of many SOEs
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See Wang, supra 11at 166-168, discussing the control of the states are private economy sector
has been loosened since the 1980s
124
see Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiti Qiye Suodeshui Zhanxing Tiaoli [Provisional
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Income Tax of Collective Enterprises], issued by
the State Council on April 11, 1985; See Li, supra 3 at 47-49; see Jiang supra 4, at 647, noting
that after China's Constitution allowed for privately-owned businesses in 1988, the government
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remains dismal. 125 Differences in tax treatment between the state and non-state
sectors were eliminated by the 1994 tax law reform, which unified income tax
regulations governing all firms, whether state-owned or not. However, since then
the critics have shifted the thrust of their complaints to various tax and non-tax
preferences benefiting PIEs, all of which led to the unification of enterprise
income tax Jaw in 2007.
Tax incentives create horizontal inequity. After the unification of enterprise
income tax law, the debates that equity does not apply to tax preferences have
been animated, particularly after China's accession to WTO. Advocates for
uniform taxation of PIEs and SOEs usually assume that, although the rules should
be changed, the preferential tax policies should be maintained. Although SOEs
have eagerly sought tax benefits for themselves arguing with reference to policy
concerns,
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their equity argument does not require an abandonment of tax

preferences per se; rather, it simply demands the same tax benefits given to
foreign businesses. In reality, however, it is unlikely that existing tax preferences
favoring foreign businesses can indiscriminately be applied to domestic
enterprises.
Another aspect of tax equity - vertical equity - requires "an appropriate
differentiation among unequals." 127 Vertical equity is more controversial than
horizontal equity to China because the differentiation is made based on "social
applied a favorable thirty-five percent income tax rate to private enterprises, compared with the
then fifty-five percent rate for large and medium state-owned enterprises
125
See Jiang supra 4 at 648, noting critics blame disparate tax treatment for the plight of the state
sector. By I99I, large-and medium-sized SOEs paid a higher percentage of their profits as income
tax than did the non-state enterprises
126
See Wang supra II at I27-132, discussing SOEs may take the advantage of governmental
subsidies
127
See Musgrave supra II6 at 1I3, quoted by Jiang supra 4 at 651
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taste and political debate." 128 China once had a revenue-sharing system under
which a portion of locally-collected revenues were withheld for the central
government. The rest went into a pool to be shared between the central and local
governments according to pre-determined formulas or contracts.
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The efficiency and equity debate perfectly showcases the inability of China's tax
system to resolve challenges between foreign and domestic interests, coastal and
hinterland development and income disparities among various classes. China is
now far more open than thirty years ago. The debate is important because it serves
to perfect the agenda of domestic economic development and liberalization set by
Chinese leaders. The scope of this debate should focus on the future agenda of
Chinese economic development, given China's tradition of treating tax policies as
political and social adjustments.

V.

China's Tax Law Reform and Fiscal Decentralization

5.1. Overview
5.1.1.

Decentralization in General

A series of fiscal and tax law reforms undertaken in China in the past decades
witnessed the enduring, sometimes painful, process of de facto

fiscal

decentralization. Inheriting an established feudal, authoritarian, bureaucratic
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see Paul R. McDaniel and James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The
Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1, Fla. Tax Rev. 607 (1993)
129
See Xu, supra 3, at 163-169, discussing the effect of revenue sharing between central and local
governments; see Jiang supra 4, at 651, emphasizing rich or coastal provinces could yield tax
revenues because they had a large revenue basis to be shared with the central government, whereas
poor or interior provinces had scarce resources as all the revenues collected locally often fell short
of local development targets. Governments in poor areas tended to treat tax preferences as abuses
and distortions in favor of richer regions
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system lasting over two thousand years, the People's Republic took up the
imperial tradition of bureaucratic government by maintaining a centralized,
planned economy system with Soviet overtones. Tax collection, was run locally
but organized and manipulated by the central government. Insufficient financial
resources caused by political and economic centralization, vestiges of feudal
relationships,

and the denial of democratic

elections and government

accountability collectively contributed to serious corruption, uneven tax burdens,
and high prevalence of land annexation in both imperial China and the PRC.
In retrospect, the strategy of prioritizing heavy industries and a state-owned sector
was likely inconsistent with China's inherited governmental structure at the
beginning of the socialist transformation in the 1950s. The mobilization of capital
for resource-intensive industrialization and deficient material accumulation
require a planned economy system, and corresponding fiscal system. China's
history of distorted prices, highly centralized planned resource allocation, and a
micro-management of firms left its financial sector dangerously under-developed
and the fiscal system served as the key, if not the only channel, for centralized
resource enlistment and allocation.
Some scholars arguably theorized the institutional settings of China's "centrallocal two track" system in the past three decades as a "market-preserving
federalism."
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In particular, it emphasized local fiscal incentives created for local

economic development and growth by retaining a high degree of local revenue as
providing powerful incentives to expand local tax bases through market-friendly
130

See generally, Qian Yingyi and Gerard Roland, Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint.
Am. Econ. Rev., Vol. 88, No.5, (1998}, Qian Yingyi and Barry Weingast, China's Transition to
Market: Market-Preserving Federalism Chinese Style, Journal of Policy Reform, 1:149-185 (1996)
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and development-oriented policies. 131 During periods of socialist industrialization
and market formation when capital was scarce, a profoundly centralized fiscal
system, such as the "unified revenue and unified expenditure" (tongshou tongzhi)
model, was sought where the accounting system and financial indexes of SOEs
were directly incorporated into and formulated through the fiscal system and all
important resources were heavily controlled by the central government. For
instance, all budgets were devised and monitored by the central while local
governments did not have discretionary power to determine independent
budgets. 132 On the other hand, local governments were not silent in voicing out
their "autonomy." They not only obtained significant autonomy over their own
budgetary decision processes, investments, land requisitions and sales, local fees
and the like, but they also took on the responsibilities of providing and monitoring
public goods and services, such as healthcare, social insurance, education and
infrastructure construction. Local governments also relaxed the control of SOEs
and TVEs by promoting a market-based system honoring contractual business
activities and independent firm operation in the hope to establish a coordinated
local system of tax incentives.
Not surprisingly, the intergovernmental game in China followed a cycle of
"decentralization leads to disorder; disorder leads to centralization; centralization

!d.
Local governments (at province, prefecture, county level and commune level) did not have
independent budgets. As to expenditure assignment, the central government was responsible for
national defense, economic development (capital spending, R&D, universities and research
institutes), industrial policy, and administration ofnational institutions such as the judicial system.
Responsibilities for delivering day-to-day public administration and social services such as
education (except universities), public safety, health care, social security, housing, and other
local/urban services was delegated to local governments
131
132
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leads to stagnation; stagnation leads to decentralization,"
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which was inevitable

under the soft-budget constraints vested to local government and SOEs. However,
the evolution of the Chinese fiscal and tax system hardly can be portrayed as a
"federalism" 134 which is constitution-oriented, election-based and inter-regional
mobility-driven 135 • Consequently, a de facto informal and flexible tax framework
administered by local government intertwined with central, formal and national
tax regime controlled by the central government inevitably came into place
contributing to a complex "central-local two track" system.

5.1.2.

The Dilemma of the Decentralization Cycle in China's Planned
Economy

The typical problem of State control and centralized scrutinizing caused by
information asymmetry emerged shortly after the central planned system was
formulated in the early 1950s. Deficiencies of the over-centralized economy
inherited by the PRC received close attention from top Chinese leaders, 136 to
whom China's "territory is so vast," 137 and Chinese "population is so large and
the conditions are so complex that it is far between to have the initiatives come
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See Qian and Weingast, supra 130 at 152-53
See generally, Brennan, G. and J.M. Buchanan, The Power to Tax, (Cambridge University
Press, 1980). In Brennan and Buchanan's Model, the government is viewed as a monolithic
Leviathan to maximize its tax revenue, which should be restrained by the institutional settings of
fiscal federalism
135
See Ch.M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, Journal of Political Economy 64
( 1956), 41 ~24, discussing vote by hand vs. vote by feet
136
See generally Mao, Zedong On Ten Important Relationships, a famous speech published by
Mao in 1956
137 !d.
134
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from both the central and the local authorities than from once source alone." 138
Therefore, China "must not follow the example of the Soviet Union in
concentrating everything in the hands of the central authorities, shackling the
local authorities and denying them the right to independent action." 139 In light of
the substantial workload required to formulate, administrate, balance, coordinate,
and monitor a planned fiscal system in China and establish corresponding
intergovernmental arrangements, which only increased as the economy grew
larger and more complicated, decentralization of the fiscal function was
necessary. 140 As economic development coupled with more infrastructure projects
initiated and enlarged the SOE sector, fiscal centralization became increasingly
less efficient and competent. Moreover, a highly centralized planned system
thwarted promoting SOE incentives as well as discouraged local governments to
fully coordinate and foster local industrial projects.
To resolve problems arising from centralized socialist transformation, China
initiated the first round of decentralization efforts within the planned economy
framework by delegating more powers to local governments immediately after the
first five-year plan in 1957 141 , for example, revenue sharing schemes were fixed
for five years and local governments were granted some authority over taxes.
138
139

!d.
!d.

140

See Qian and Weingast, supra 130, at 160-161, the number of state owned enterprises(SOEs)
subordinated to the central government increased from 2,800 in 1953 to 9,300 in 1957, and the
number of items in material allocation under central planning increased from 55 in 1952 to 231 in
1957
141
/d., reviewing the history of decentralization in China, in particular, the policies then covered:
( 1) delegating nearly all SOEs to local governments such that the share of industrial output by the
enterprises subordinated to the central government shrank from 40 percent to 14 percent of the
national total; (2) central planning was to change from a national to a provincial basis, with
decisions about fixed investment to be made by local governments rather than the central
government
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However, the decentralization, together with Great Leap Forward, led to the
collapse

of cross-industry

coordination

assembled

under

the

planned

centralization and inter-regional segmentation pushed local governments to
establish an independent, but duplicative, set of industrial systems in the interest
of self-sufficiency. As a result, central government revenue heavily shrank from
75 percent to less than 50 percent of the treasury until the end of 1950s. 142
Expectedly, such radical decentralization efforts run to opposite extreme due to
coordination failures. The soft budget constraint faced by local governments and
SOEs soon led to excessive investment expansion and inefficient duplication of
production among various regions. Recentralization had to begin in 1959 in which
all large and medium-sized industrial enterprises were again subordinated back to
the central government. However, the centralization again brought about incentive
problems and economic stagnation in the 1960s, thus a second wave of
decentralization followed in the early 1970s when local governments gained more
authority over fixed investment and local revenue. Afterwards, a similar, but less
serious investment boom led to yet another round of recentralization in the mid1970s, coupled with the political strife caused by the Cultural Revolution.
To recap, the separation of administrative responsibilities and adjustment of
power division between the central and local governments ultimately only
changed the political statuses of regions and reshuffled industries in the resource
allocation scheme. However, the heavy-industry-stressed development strategy,
the distorted macro-policy environment, controlled resource allocation system and
rigid enterprise management institutions were left largely intact. It is easy to see
l42ld.

133

that the decentralization under a central, planned system was not able to alleviate
the inefficiency problem since it could neither improve micro-efficiency through
market discipline, nor could it change the heavy industry development strategy
inconsistent with China's comparative advantage. Therefore, a cycle of
"decentralization leads to disorder; disorder leads to centralization; centralization
leads to stagnation; stagnation leads to decentralization" was inevitable under the
soft-budget constraints vested to local government and SOBs.

5.1.3.

Administrative Decentralization

Although the distorted infrastructures and low efficiency under the planned
economy were considered problematic from the first round of decentralization in
the 1950s, it was not until the 1978 market economy reforms that fundamental
reforms were undertaken. There had been an inherent political logic for the
distorted development strategy, centralized resource allocation system and rigid
enterprise institutions, with production irregularities and twisted price control.
When China's top leaders realized in the late 1970s the production inefficiency of
SOBs and People's Communes and lack of stimulus for workers and farmers, the
Household Responsibility System became a dominant form of microeconomic
organizations in rural areas, and reforms of the Contract Responsibility System

(chengbao zeren zhi) on SOBs centering on power delegation and profit sharing
were initiated. Accordingly, those micro-reforms in rural areas and SOBs were
accompanied by a process of administrative and fiscal decentralization, which
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was deemed necessary in a large country like China to induce local coordination
in market-oriented reforms.
From the administrative perspective, fiscal and tax reform since the early 1980s
stimulated a significant increase in local governments' autonomy in local
administration and economic management. The autonomy was evidenced by a
few decentralization efforts in improving efficiency and justifying fair
competition, such as "local state corporatism" 143 , tax incentives for attracting
(foreign) investment, removal of barriers on industry entry standards, pledging
bank credit for the profitability of local firms, and flexibility in resource
allocation, Moreover, rural economies, especially the town and village enterprises
(TVEs), and some local SOEs were tentatively released outside the planned
framework due to deregulation. For instance, a shift of revenue sources from topdown stripping of profit or cash flow gradually moved to levying taxes on the
non-state sector to secure protection of local property rights under an
unpredictable centralized setting. Local governments behave as lawmakers when
they impose taxes on TVEs and as possessors when they declare residual profits
under local control. Another particularly remarkable development is the flexibility
of coastal systems in designing local tax incentives in the initial years of the open
door policy.
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Starting from the early 1980s, many regions especially coastal

provinces were designated and approved to establish their own foreign trade
143

See e.g., Jean Oi, Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in
China, World Politics 45:99-126 (1992) [hereinafter Oi: Fiscal Reform]; Jean Oi, Rural China
Takes Off: Incentives for Reform Berkeley: University of California Press (1994); Jean Oi, The
Role of the Local States in China's Transitional Economy China Quarterly 144:1132-1149 (1995)
(Professor Jean Oi from Stanford is one of the leading political scientists in studying the
federalism and central-local government relationships of China.)
144
See generally Jean Oi, Fiscal Reform, World Politics 45:99-126 (1992)
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corporations with regional opening-up experimentation. Experiments included the
"one step ahead" policy, implemented in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, the
establishment of four special economic zones ("SEZ") (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and
Shantou, and Xiamen) in 1980, and the designation of 14 coastal cities as "coastal
open cities" ("COC") in 1984. These areas were privileged to enjoy lower tax
rates and a higher share of collected revenues, but perhaps more importantly, they
benefited from special institutional and policy arrangements and gained more
autonomy over local economic development.
Granting more independent decision-making autonomy to an increased number of
local, especially littoral SEZs and COCs, governments is far from describing the
whole picture of administrative decentralization. The principle-agent relationship
is another deliberation underpinning many scholars' characterizations
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of

China's intergovernmental balance. Local government agencies exploited
different degrees of flexibilities in implementing central policies given their
diversified social, geographical, historical and resource allocation. With balance
shifted and separated between central-to-local ownership, local governments were
provided with incentives in tax and profit sharing to step up their effort in revenue
collection. Meanwhile, inter-regional rivalry compelled local governments to
adopt aggressive tax incentives to subsidize their tax bases. 146 A penetrating factor
in the administrative decentralization was the delegation, from the early 1980s
145

See generally Barbara Krug and Hans Hendrischke. (eds.) China's Economy in the 21st century:
Enterprise and Business Behavior. London: Edward Elgar (2007); see also Barbara Krug, (ed.)
China's Rational Entrepreneurs : The Development of the New Private Business Sector. London:
Routledge Press.(2004)
146
See Barbara Krug, Introduction: New Opportunities, New Sector, New Firms in Barbara Krug
(ed.) China's Rational Entrepreneurs: The Development of the New Private Business Sector.
London: Routledge Press.(2004)
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onward, of the operation and management of SOEs to local governments at the
provincial, municipal and county levels. 147 Fixed asset investments for localgovernment-owned-enterprises naturally fell on the shoulders of local government,
which had to take primary and final responsibilities as the SOE owners for
expenditures covering a wide range of social services like education, healthcare,
pension and retirement services. These created a de facto coalition of SOEs and
local government agencies incentivized to exploit central fiscal and tax policies to
maximize local benefits.

5.2. Overview of Fiscal Decentralization

5.2.1.

Fiscal Decentralization under Market Economy Development (19781993)

Chinese fiscal system also experienced substantial decentralizing process and
efforts since adopting the reform and economic reform policies from the late
1970s. The objective of decentralization was designed to substantiate local
government responsibilities and autonomy for local economic development and
fiscal functioning, while preserving an adequate degree of central fiscal control
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See Yingyi Qian and Chenggang Xu, Why China's Economic Reform Differ: The M-form
Hierarchy and Entry/Expansion of the Non-state Sector, Economics of Transition 1(2), pp.l35170 (1993), discussing the overall costs and benefits of U-forms and M-forms in terms of scale
economies, incentives, and coordination, and also the implications of these costs and benefits for
alternative approaches to reform and further noting that, by 1985, the state-owned industrial
enterprises controlled by the center accounted for only 20 percent of the total industrial output at
or above the township level, while provincial and municipality governments controlled 45 percent
and county governments 35 percent
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and appropriate nationwide resource allocation. Meanwhile, decentralization
brought unexpected headaches to top Chinese leaders in executing contractual
arrangements between the central and local agents, such as drains on revenue,
increased central deficits, weakened macroeconomic management and augmented
interregional disparities. China's fiscal decentralization efforts in the 1980s and
early 1990s involved balancing and delineating intergovernmental contractual
relationships in three areas: 1) division of expenditure responsibilities between
central and local governments; 2) reformulating the allocation or sharing of
revenue resources; and 3) vertical fiscal transfers among various levels of
governments.
China's division of expenditure responsibilities between the central
local

149

148

and the

governments follows the hierarchy of budgetary agencies, which is

roughly consistent with international practices. 150 Accordingly, expenditures of
budgetary agencies owned or materially managed by local governments are taken
care of by local budgets, whereas the central government only provides subsides
to poor or underdeveloped regions to meet a set of uniform national minimum
standards of basic public services and social security. Although the central
148
Details on such arrangement and formula are the website of the Ministry of Finance of the
P.R.C., http://www.mof.gov.cn, the center government's expenditure responsibilities include
national defense; foreign aid and external relations; capital construction and technical upgrading of
centrally owned enterprises and outlays on their new product development; agriculture, forestry,
and water conservation at the central level; industrial transportation, and commercial operation of
national importance; certain education, culture, health and social services; outlays on centrally
obligated price subsidies; geological surveys; and repayment of public debt (last visited on March
15, 2011)
149
Local expenditure responsibilities include basic construction and technical improvement of
locally owned enterprises and their new product development; rural production assistance,
agricultural development and water conservation at the local level; urban maintenance and
construction; education, health, culture, and social services; social welfare and pensions;
administrative expenditures; and a range of price subsidies.
150
See generally, Ze Zhu and Barbara Krug, Is China a Leviathan? ERIM Report Series Research
in Management (2005), https://ep.eur.nl/handle/1765/7175 (last visited on March 15, 2011)
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government no longer micromanaged with confusing stipulations for individual
local cases, it continued to burden itself with formulating compulsory guidelines
monitoring acceptable minimum levels of local expenditure, adjusted by factors
such as policy priorities such as disasters relief, price readjustment and
government procurement changes.
The revenue-sharing and tax assignment dimension of decentralization was no
less dramatic. Starting in the early 1980s, the central-provincial fiscal system
shifted from a "unified revenue and unified expenditure" into the "dining in
separate kitchens"(fenzao chifan) that divided revenue and expenditure
responsibilities between the central and the provincial governments.
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To

experiment with the transfer of fiscal power from central to local governments,
many programs were initiated such as the "fixed overall revenue sharing rate" in
Jiangsu Province in 1977, "dividing central, local and central-local share" in
Sichuan Province in 1979, and a "fixed lump sum upward remittance" in
Guangdong and Fujian Provinces from 1979 to 1983. The central-provincial
intergovernmental division experienced some further adjustments including the
proportional sharing system in 1982. Moreover, the central government adopted
the Contract Responsibility System followed by a "tax-for-profit" (li gai shui) in
1983 and 1984. The share of after tax profit or the tax rate was subject to a case-
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See Qian and Xu, supra 147 at 150-155, noting under such a system, (i) some fiscal sources
were clearly specified as the central government's revenue, among these were custom duties and
revenue remitted by central-government-owned-enterprises; (ii) other sources such as salt tax,
agricultural taxes, and the revenue of local-government-owned-enterprises were defined as the
local governments' revenues. (iii) for the profits of large-scale SOEs under dual leadership by
central and local governments, the industrial and commercial taxes (turnover taxes), central
government and local government shared them with some fixed proportion. It is obvious that the
spirit of the rearrangements in 1980 is to preserve the incentives for the local governments,
constraint to the guarantee of the central government's revenue
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by-case annual or bi-annual negotiation with the central government in terms of
enterprise size, industry sectors, and various development concerns. In this new
arrangement, SOEs, after submitting their contracted quota of profits to the
central government, behaved as independent market participants and kept residual
profits for wages, investments, and capital investment purposes without State
intervention. However, the underperformance of SOEs forced the central
government to increase expenditures and bank loans to bail out bankrupt SOEs,
while managers of profitable SOEs were suspected of manipulation and assetstripping through privatization of state assets or transfer of assets to non-state
sectors. Therefore, the subsidies for SOEs were much higher than the revenue
collected from SOEs. This led the central government to design more schemes to
expand the tax base including TVEs, Sino-foreign joint ventures and foreign
investments.
As to the fiscal contracting system, or tax farming, the central government
negotiated different contracts with each province on revenue remittances to the
central treasury, and permitted most provincial governments to retain the bulk of

. revenues.
the1r
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H owever, the contractual arrangements were not stnct
. Iy

honored, enforced, adhered to and were revised repeatedly for some provinces.
These breaches of central-local contractual arrangements can be explained.
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See Oi: Fiscal Reform, supra 143, noting that there were six basic types of sharing schemes in
1988 and they continued through 1993, such as a fixed subsidies from the center (in 14 provinces),
fixed quota delivery to the center (in 3 provinces), fixed sharing with the center (in 3 provinces),
quota delivery with a pre-specified growth (in 2 provinces), an incremental sharing, and sharing up
to a limit with growth adjustment (10 provinces retained a share within a specific percentage of
revenue from the previous year and then retain all revenues above that quota)
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Although the 1988 fiscal contracting system was extended until the end of 1993
with limited modifications to revenue-sharing ratios and quotas, the central
government was unable to find its way to negotiate a satisfactory replacement
scheme. First of all, the local budget planning as well as a comprehensive
understanding of cross-regional budgets is unpredictable. Second, the information
asymmetry based on the principal-agent relationship was dominated by various
localities, which may switch part of revenue offline from the sharing arrangement.
Under the fiscal contract systems, the local government controlled considerably
the actual tax rates and tax bases adopted in practice, although they did not enjoy
the legislative authority to design and adjust the statutory tax rates and bases.
Local governments offered various types of tax concessions and incentives to
enterprises especially foreign investments located and operated in local
jurisdictions, and shifted budgetary funds for non-budgetary or extra-budgetary
purposes, thus minimizing the tax revenue share to be remitted to the center.
Hence, the central government had to take various ad hoc measures to demand
and manage revenue remittances from local governments, which inevitably had
perverse reactions to those measures. Therefore, it was not uncommon for local
governments to submit fraudulent reports on, or even conceal, their true revenue
capacities when the central government reacted to tighten or revise rules to
squeeze or penalize local governments with rapidly growing revenues.
Due to the declining local tax efforts and then on-going SOE reforms, the state
financial bases were eroded heavily and the central government proposed to
remedy such deficiency. China's budgetary revenue-to-GDP ratio decreased
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sharply which caused more government deficits and constrained the central
government's flexibility in redistribution as well as its stabilization control. The
central government became increasingly concerned about the shrinking revenueto-GOP ratio, 153 which fell from an already low 26 percent in 1980 to 13 percent
in 1993, and the ratio of central government revenue to total revenue
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which fell

from 41 percent in 1984 to 22 percent in 1993. 155
Another unresolved issue is the vertical fiscal transfers between various layers of
administrative hierarchy (central, provincial, prefecture, county and township) in
addition to various levels of special economic zones. Although the central and
provincial governments may negotiate the share of expenditures and revenue, the
negotiation on sub-provincial levels of fiscal transfers was left unlegislated, and
the tax rates were contracted without reflecting efficiencies or legislative intent.
Diversity of the sub-provincial levels of governments even aggregated the
discretionary implementation of national tax legislations and policies. Subprovincial governments had to negotiate their shares of expenditure and revenue
with upper level of governments. Therefore, negotiations between different layers
of governments on transfers and reallocation were constant and added
considerable burden to tax administration and collection. Moreover, lower levels
of government made tentative attempts to maximize discretionary revenue and
their tax base but shift expenditure responsibilities upward in order to minimize
transfers.

The government revenue refers to the budgetary revenue
Domestic and foreign debts held by the central government are excluded
155
See China Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics, China (2004)
153

154
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5.2.2.

Recentralization efforts- the 1994 fiscal reform

Echoing the endangered two ratios 156 as well as to strengthen expansion on tax
revenue and expenditure policies implementation, in 1994 the central government
initiated a fundamental fiscal reform to replace the already disabling fiscal
contracting system thus to increase the regulatory share and authority of central
revenue and to establish a reformulated fiscal transfer system. The centerpiece of
the comprehensive package of fiscal reform in 1994, still in effect today, was the
revenue sharing scheme (fen shui zhi), under which the sources of revenue were
regrouped to include those shared revenues that central and local governments can
only collect revenue from designated taxes only. In total 29 taxes have been
imposed on income, turnover, property, resources and services, and indirect taxes
since then have composed the major revenue source. The revenue sharing scheme
(Table 4.1) authorizes the central government to collect the bulk of the tax
revenue, and importantly a 75% share of the newly created Value Added Tax
(VAT) and other indirect taxes. 157 Local taxes mainly consist of business taxes,
personal and enterprises income taxes, and other taxes such as urban construction
tax, land use and real estate taxes, and agricultural taxes (abolished in 2004). In
addition to VAT, shared revenue sources include securities trading tax and natural
resource taxes. The expenditure responsibilities were nominally unchanged with
the sub-provincial levels (prefecture, county, and township) bearing the same

!d.
Customs duty, consumption tax collected by customs, income tax on centrally-owned SOE,
turnover taxes on railway, banks, and insurance companies, and income tax from financial
institutions set up by the headquarters of People's Bank of China, etc.
!56

157
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expenditure

responsibilities

that

were

delegated

to

them

through

the

decentralization in the 1980s. (Table 1)

Table 1. Central-local Taxes Sharing Formula
Shared Taxes

Central

Local

VAT

75%

25%

Enterprise Income Tax

50% (2002)

50% (2002)

60% (2003)

40% (2003)

50% (2002)

50% (2002)

60% (2003)

40% (2003)

Individual Income Tax

94% of taxes

Stamp Duty

transaction

on Security
6%

Along with the reformed tax assignment system, the central government set up
strong infrastructural revenue collection agencies called State Tax Bureaus under
the supervision of State Administration of Taxation in all provincial, prefecture
and city level governments to collect central and shared taxes. The outcome of the
revenue sharing system was very remarkable. (Table 2 and Figure 14)
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Local/National Treasury
60.0%
~

40.0%
20.0%
0.0%

-Ratio ( Local/national)

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

47.0%

31.7%

37.4%

27.7%

28.0%

(Figure 14)
Local Revenue/ Total Government Revenue (2005-2009)

Tabl.2 Local Revenue
Percentage
Total

( Local/Tota

Governme

Local

nt Revenue

Revenue

2005

31649.29

14884.22

47.0%

N/A

2006

38760.2

12297.31

31.7%

-15.3%

2007

51321.78

19168.93

37.4%

5.6%

2008

61330.35

17008.04

27.7%

-9.6%

2009

68518.3

19168.93

28.0%

0.2%

/::,

1)

(weight)

The percentage of total budgetary revenue collected by the central government
jumped from 22 percent by the end of 1993 to 61 percent in the share of central
government revenue in 2009, more importantly, the central government regained
the authority to collect the major part of the VAT, which, alone, accounted for
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about 42 percent of total government revenue.
Although the reformulated revenue sharing scheme was carried out with more
transparency and stability, many rudiments of old fiscal system remained along
with emerging new problems. First, the central government compromised with
many provinces especially the affluent, coastal regions that were initially averse
to the revenue sharing formula. It was forced to agree that the tax-sharing system
would be implemented gradually over a few years and part of the shared revenues
would be returned to locals. Second, the central government allowed tax
exemptions associated with foreign investment and approved by local
governments to remain valid for the first two years after the fiscal reform. SOEs
that were previously co-managed by central and provincial governments could
continue to receive subsidies for launching large-scale investments and for
supporting laid-off workers. In addition, many new issues arose regarding the
expenditure burden borne by county and township governments, which together
provided the bulk of vital public services such as social security, social welfare,
education and health services, particularly after the large-scale SOE restructuring
in the mid-1990s. Many of the public services and social security responsibilities
that were provided by SOEs fell upon local governments, which were not
allocated corresponding capital and human resources to perform those
responsibilities. Accordingly, many local governments at county or township
levels became nearly insolvent or were in urgent need of redistribution or
additional transfers from the center.

146

Further, a notorious old problem remained unresolved under the revenue sharing
scheme - a serious lack of a clear assignment of responsibilities among subprovincial levels of government, which produced a high degree of concurrent and
overlapping expenditures and made it more difficult to identify what levels of
sub-provincial government were accountable to deliver particular public services
social security. Perpetuating the disadvantaged bureaucratic position lower level
county and township governments have always held in China, upper level
governments concentrate revenue near the center and delegating expenditure
responsibilities to lower level governments. Provincial governments on one hand
tend to squeeze larger shares of revenues from sub-provincial levels of
governments, and on the other hand, exploit means to request and negotiate more
transfers from the center.

158

This two-sided tendency became increasingly

apparent after the 1994 fiscal reform.
At the same time, the revenue sharing scheme fiscal reform also promised to
achieve a healthy intergovernmental fiscal transfer. Among those transfers or
grants, the sharing formula based on the old fiscal contracting system prevailing
during 1979-93

159

was still allowed in some regions. In some specific industry

lines, such contracting formulas remained unbothered to ensure silky completion
of those then on-going construction projects such as water conservancy,
electricity power plant and animal husbandry, etc. The second type of transfer is
the calculated share returned from the central government to ensure various
locality to keep the same revenue capacity that was no less than what it was prior
158

See Justin Y., Lin, Decentralization, Deregulation and Economic Transition in China
(Working Paper, CCER, Peking University, 2003) (on file with the author) at page 41
159 Jd.
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to 1994. Regretfully, the newly designed transfer formulas did not attain the
considerations of regional disparity, and worse is that many transfers were made
on ad hoc basis based on political needs and equalitarian concerns without a
scientific or statistic measurement of fiscal capacities and needs. Thirdly,
intergovernmental transfers comprised grants for various purposes, such as price
subsidies for bulk products, educational organization subsidies, environmental
protection missions, natural disaster relief and outlaying poverty-stricken regional
development. However, a "transitional fiscal transfer plans" for channeling more
transfers from richer coastal areas to poorer hinterland ones by the center was
never fully realized. 160

5.3. Impact of Fiscal Decentralization

Fiscal decentralization, characterized by local tax incentives, has played a
significant role in upholding state revenue growth and local economic
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!d., Lin, at 49. See also, Hu Shudong The Logic of China's Fiscal System Change in the Past
50 years. Ph.D. dissertation (2001) (CCER, Peking University), noting that in order to satisfy the
needs of coastal provinces that generate much of the revenues, a lump-sum tax rebates to
guarantee their pre-1994 income was agreed. In addition, to permit each province to share in the
growth of its lost tax base over time, the central government committed to giving back 30 percent
of its increased revenue from the newly created value added tax as well as consumption tax each
year. The tax rebates, the largest item in overall transfers, are highly correlated with incomes and
dis-equalizing in nature. The earmarked grants, the second largest item of transfer, have been
found to be mildly dis-equalizing because they were dominated by food and other consumer
subsidies that favored urban areas. To offset this regressive effect, the government introduced an
equalizing (general purpose) transfer to aid poor regions in 1996. They are rule based and rely on
variables such as provincial GDP, student-teacher ratios, number of civil servants, and population
density. However, these transfers have been under-funded since their inception, accounting for just
2% of total transfers. For example, in 1998 the central government allocated RMB 2.2 billion to
equalization transfers, compared to the estimated fiscal gap of RMB 63 billion produced by the
formula.
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development

161

in the past three decades, especially for the development of an

impressive and distinctive expansion of non-state sector enterprises, including
TVEs and foreign investment. The autonomy of local governments ensured their
flexibility in designing local tax incentives to attract foreign investment and
structure comprehensive local economic infrastructure. Meanwhile, the troubled
intergovernmental fiscal transfer system also stimulated non-state-owned sectors
to compete successfully in the market economy. Fiscal decentralization in China,
after rounds of ups and downs, deserves credit for promoting rapid economic
development.

5 .3.1.

Private Enterprises

The rise and expansion of TVEs,

162

some of which later developed into

successful private enterprises (minying qiye or siying qiye), were attributed to the
administrative and fiscal decentralization since the late 1970s. Local governments
actively supported market-oriented, needs-driven, non-state enterprises to expand
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See generally, Linda Chelan Li, Centre and Provinces--China 1978-1993: Power as Non-ZeroSum (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002), noting that, from 1978 to 1993, China's per capita GNP
increased in real terms by around 280 percent. National absolute poverty was reduced by more
than 50 percent in the first half of the 1980s, dropping from 17.9 percent of the population in 1982
to 6.1 percent in 1984. This downward trend corresponds to the growth of real income and real
GNP. China also witnessed an across-board growth both in coastal and inland regions. Indeed, if
each China's province were taken as an economy, about 20 out of top 30 growth regions in the
world in the period would be provinces in China
162
See Jiahua Che & Yingyi Qian, Institutional Environment, Community Government, and
Corporate Governance: Understanding China's Township-Village Enterprises, William Davidson
Institute Working Papers Series 59, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan
(1998), noting the output ofTVEs grew more than six-fold in real terms between 1985 and 1997,
leading China's rapid industrial and overall growth. By 1993, TVEs already accounted for 36% of
the national industrial output, up from 9% in 1978. Within the rural sector, the TVEs accounted
for three-quarters of rural industrial output
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their revenue bases, enlarge local markets, and increase their labor forces in
response to interregional competition, especially after the establishment of
Household Responsibility System in rural areas and discharge of agricultural
collectivization. Fiscal decentralization gave higher shares of revenue (TVE tax or
profits) to local governments as well as discretional authority to design locally
customized incentives for TVEs. The decentralization policies called for local
governments to enjoy great autonomy, including independently standardizing
pricing strategy, investing self-raised funds, and designing local labor-incentive
industries to margin cover capital shortage. More importantly, the autonomy to
restructure local enterprises structure and simplified procedures to issue licenses
to newly established enterprises, 163 which led to the golden period of TVE and
private enterprises growth. In addition, fiscal decentralization supported a better
delimitation of intra-governmental property rights, which provided provincial
governments as resident claimant and de facto controller of those previously
central-provincial jointly owned

SOEs

within

their jurisdiction.

Local

governments then stepped in and assumed the entrepreneurial role, which is
beneficial to the legislation and implementation of tax incentives and efficient
administration.
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See generally Linda Li, supra 161, noting that in the planning period, the state planning
seriously limited the autonomy of local governments to generate and retain revenues. Localities
were required to turn over all or most of their revenues to upper level governments. The surplus
retained was also subject to higher-level approval before any use. It is also interesting to mention
that the upsurge of TVEs in post-reform period is also closely related to the two waves of
decentralization before the reform, which led to the rise of some collective enterprises (such as
Commune and Brigade Enterprises in rural areas to emerge outside the state plan before the advent
of reform)
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5.3.2.

Foreign direct investment (FDI)

The fiscal decentralization process also intertwined with China's development
strategy by facilitating a gradual, region-by-region, and industry-specific tempo of
attracting of foreign capital and technology. Under a centralized authoritarian
state based on extensive expenditure decentralization but little revenue
decentralization or fiscal transfer, local government officials no doubt focused on
local development needs. With vast expanse, large population, huge regional
contrasts, outdated industrial infrastructure, and a ridiculous scarcity of trained
workers and business professionals, China has, since the late 1970s, needed an
enormous infusion of foreign capital and massive amounts imports of modern
equipment and technology in order to make an immediate, visible difference in its
productivity and standard of living. China's business and fiscal environment,
nationally and locally, were not so appealing to foreign investment. However,
China's top leaders understood clearly the importance of decentralization as
drastic changes had to be achieved by delegating more authority to localities to
improve efficiency and productivity nationally or attract foreign capital. Fiscal
decentralization was prioritized as a way of giving that authority by allowing
locally designed, region-specific tax incentives and flexible tax collection policies.
On July 15, 1979, experimental Special Export Zone (chukou tequ) proposed by
Fujian and Guangdong provinces were approved by the CCP Central Standing
Committee to compete for oversea investment, and such zones were later renamed
as Special Economic Zones (jingji tequ or SEZ) in part to attract funds from
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overseas Chinese

164

who were geographically proximate or had a cultural

closeness and kinship with the SEZs. Because SEZs served as a breakthrough of
opening-up policy, the government secured unprecedented undertakings to make
them successful. SEZs and their governments were given exceptional autonomy
and extensive powers in areas such as foreign exchange, financial management,
and labor and price controls. As a matter of decentralization, SEZs received
preferential policies on tax reductions, exemptions and other flexible fiscal
privileges to make them more attractive. Early preferential tax treatment of
foreign investors in SEZs was governed by the Regulations on Special Economic
Zones in Guangdong Province, which, in fact, preceded the 1980 JVITL and later
was fine-tuned and improved by the 1984 Tax Reduction and Exemption
Regulations by unifying tax treatment for foreign investment projects in all four
SEZs and in Hainan Island.
With a plethora of preferential schemes and overlapping promises, foreign
investors in a designated area may claim not only benefits that are available
nationwide, but also special treatment offered by regional schemes. On top of
nationwide preferential income tax treatments, several SEZ-specific privileges
stood out, evidencing the seriousness of China's decentralization efforts. 165
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See Jiang, supra 4, at 633 and accompanying footnotes, presenting the 1985 Regulations on
Preferences to Overseas Chinese Investment created confusion as overseas Chinese investors, no
matter where they invested, received more tax benefits than foreign investors even in SEZs, and it
was also difficult to distinguish overseas Chinese investment from other foreign investment as
many investors were companies, rather than individuals
165
!d., at 571 and accompanying footnotes, and see generally Li, supra 1, explaining that all FDI
projects in SEZs enjoyed a reduced enterprise income tax rate without distinction between forms
of investment and continued using this privilege even after the 1991 unified tax law was
promulgated. Moreover, the local governments in SEZs could waive or reduce local income tax.
Most significantly, SEZs established precedents for the authorities to create preferences, which
helped channel foreign capital and technology into other designated priority areas
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China's fiscal decentralization efforts were strengthened after the establishment of
SEZs when Chinese leaders decided to encourage almost all coastal areas to
accommodate foreign investment and attract foreign capital and technology. Tax
incentives ranked high on regional barometers of openness and hospitality to
foreign investment. Therefore, efforts to improve investment conditions needed to
incorporate preferential tax measures. In May 1984, the central government
designated fourteen coastal cities as Coastal Open Cities (yanhai kaifang chengshi
or COC) and released broader autonomy on local development and foreign
investment affairs. In particular, government assigned certain areas within COCs
as Economic and Technology Development Zones (jingjijishu kaifaqu or ETDZs),
which duplicated most of the characteristics of the SEZs together with other
preferential policies to target technology-oriented and capital-intensive projects.
ETDZs, however, in part evidenced the recentralization efforts of the central
government since it retained the final say on matters such as the feasibility of
establishing an ETDZ and the exact location and scale of ETDZs 166 Meanwhile,
as a regionally based initiative, Old Urban Districts (lao cheng qu or OUDs)
within COCs were created with limited incentives for foreign investment 167 to

166

/d., at 573
!d., at 575, and accompanying footnotes, OUD's tax preferential policies were closely applied
to another initiative of decentralization - the Coastal Economic Open Regions (yanhai jingji
kaifangqu or CEORs) that were established to strengthen export sectors as well as reinforce
receipts of foreign capital, technology, management skills. The 1984 Tax Reduction and
Exemption Regulations has allowed a reduced fifteen percent rate to certain productive EJVs,
CJVs and WFOEs in OUDs. In particular, the enterprises must be technology or know-how
intensive, with an investment exceeding U.S. $30 million and a long investment recovery period,
or they must be projects related to energy, transport or port construction. EJVs, WFOEs and CJVs
based in OUDs which are not eligible for the fifteen percent rate receive a twenty percent
reduction in their applicable income tax if they fall within one of the following sectors: (1)
machinery, manufacturing and electronics; (2) metallurgy, chemical, and building material; (3)
light industry, textile, and packaging; (4) medical equipment and pharmaceutical; (5) agriculture,
167
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refuel regional economy. China's leaders also championed the development of
those privileged regions and committed their limited available resources to the
improvement of related infrastructure. 168 Regional tax incentives made SEZs,
ETDZs, OUDs and CEORs outshine the rest of the country but hierarchies were
created even among those prioritized regions themselves. SEZs received special
attention with the most generous tax benefits to foreign investors due to their
pioneering positions and top priority status - a situation, which has remained
largely unchanged - since the establishment of the SEZs. The heightened tension
had already aroused certain unrest within the CCP leadership itself, so it is no
surprise that decentralized efforts and tax benefits available to foreign investment
in ETDZs, OUDs and CEORs were capped.
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The cycle of decentralization and recentralization in terms of tax incentives and
fiscal transfers repeated and carried over in the 1990s. Although interrupted by
the 1989 democracy movement, the CCP's top leaders realized that any continued
unreasonable clench on centralized power would hamper their ability to deliver on
promises of material improvements of standards of living. As a result, in addition
to those prioritized initiatives, the central government approved further opening
and development of the Pudong New District in the City of Shanghai as a
showcase for Chinese leaders' commitment to embrace foreign investments by
designating a new priority district, and preferential schemes comparable to those

forestry, husbandry, aquatic breeding and processing related to any one of these sectors; or (6)
construction
168
Id., at 575-76
169
!d., discussing that in fact, China's leaders suspected that to allow the same preferential
treatment in non-SEZ prioritized areas would lead to damaging rivalries and distract attention
from SEZs
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in SEZs were adopted for foreign investment in Pudong

170

followed by the Tianjin

Binhai 171 and Chongqing Liangjiang 172 new zones. Chinese leaders also adopted a
development plan to stimulate economy within unparalleled geographical width.
In early 1992, recognizing that urban popular discontent was responsible for the
unrest in the spring of 1989, the central authorities placed an increased emphasis
on economic development in cities and municipalities to maintain political and
social stability. Concerns for stability in border areas called for fast economic
growth and both domestic and foreign investments were encouraged through
preferential measures.
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Decentralization efforts, as evidenced by the

establishment and prosperous development of those privileged regions, were
largely implemented through tax incentives including tax holidays, exemptions,
concessions, and preferential tax rates for reinvestment, among others. Such
incentives were also in line with international practices of attracting foreign
170

See Xinmin Zhang, supra 102, the program applies a fifteen percent enterprise income tax rate
to FIEs engaged in productive sectors, large infrastructure development projects, construction of
airport, port, railway, road, power station, or other energy and communication projects, as well as
certain foreign banks, branches, and Chinese-foreign joint banking corporations or finance
companies established in Pudong. All FIEs in Pudong are exempt from local enterprise income
surcharge until the year 2000
171 /d.
172 !d.
173
See generally, Moser & Zee, supra 3, China Tax Guide 105-06 (2d ed. 1993). Jiang, supra 4 at
577-580, Curley & Fortunato, Tax Considerations for Investors in China, 20 N.C. J. Int'l L. &
Com. Reg. 531 (1995); noting that there are other a few types of special economic zones
established: in some cities bordering Russia, Mongolia and Vietnam were created as Border
Economic Cooperation Zones (bianjing jingji hezuoqu or BECZs), which were adjusted shortly
after the political chaos of former Soviet Union and Eastern European block. The plan offered a
preferential income tax rate of twenty-four percent to FIEs incorporated in BECZs. More border
cities and towns were later designated as open border cities and permitted to set up their own
BECZs. These efforts to stimulate economic growth in urban areas spread to non-coastal cities.
Large cities alongside the Yangtze River and in interior provinces were accorded a status similar
to that of COCs, with permission to set up their own ETDZs. Various newly designated priority
zones and areas mushroomed in coastal regions and urban areas which were given of special status
and subsequent preferential measures to accommodate foreign investment in those new designated
regions, such as Free Trade Zone (baa shui qu), High and New Technology Industrial
Development Zones (gaoxinjishu chanye kaifaqu), Taiwan Investment Zones (taishang touziqu),
and State Tourist and Resort Areas (guojia lvyou dujiaqu).
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capital and keeping profits in the host country. Many Chinese local governments
performed even better by setting up assorted auxiliary services such as supply
chain management, export control, quality supervision, and other services, all of
which were incidental to the successful implementation of tax incentives and
fiscal transfers.

5.3.3.

Development strategy for the Western Region

China's administrative and fiscal decentralization in the past decades also created
increased regional disparity and worsened the poverty situation in certain outlying
regions, in spite of the fact that originally tax preferential policies were designed
for nationwide economic development. In reality, over eighty percent of foreign
but high quality investment for the past three decades was pooled in coastal areas,
which account for less than twenty percent of China's territory. 174 The uneven and
imbalanced economic development across China was the product of an
unsustainable model based on lopsided preferential policies which would
eventually cause political instability and social upheaval. In China's Eleventh
Five-Year Plan, the CCP proclaimed the Grand Western Region Development

(xibu da kaifa) that in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, more
resources and favors will be transplanted and adopted to the hinterland and

174

See Sheila Rae, Time to Go West, China Brief,
http://www.amchamchina.org/article/3057 (last visited March 15, 2011)
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(September

2000),

western regions of China. 175 Hinterland provincial governments will enjoy larger
degrees of autonomy for attracting investment and substantiating local economies,
such as loosened land use approval processes, expanded access to national
markets, the ability to nurture agricultural and forestry business, and building up
selective industrial infrastructure profiles.
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Of course, tax preferential policies

and incentives, as proven tooling for advancing local development, account for
major approaches in development strategy reforms.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to catalog the pros and cons of reform

strategies on western development, however, several serious concerns have arisen
in terms of decentralization and poverty alleviation in western regions. First of all,
are hinterland provinces capable of handling special tax preferential policies? To
date, there has been a serious shortage of practical and meaningful approaches to
carry out nationwide reform measures. Moreover, is there any supervision on
quality of investment to which tax preferential policy will be applied? As capital
investment of various sources flooded into coastal areas, which have experienced
hardships in setting up standardized processes of hand lings, hinterland provinces
emerged as regions where unqualified or unhealthy funds go. More importantly,
because the agricultural, forestry and mineral industries dominate hinterland
economy, enormous environmental protection and natural deterioration challenge
the sustainability of development and land requisition. To this extent, hinterland
provinces are alarmed about the prospect of tightening the tax incentive and
investment quality supervision of the central government, which in turn may
175

See Mehmet Ogilt9U, FD! and Importance of the "Go West" Strategy in China's Energy Sector
(2002) http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/l/35/2085596.pdf (last visited March 15, 2011)
176
See generally in Rae, supra 174
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jeopardize the decentralization efforts designated for west regions. This dilemma
may require decades to work out. Finally and more controversially, coastal areas,
facing further centralizing efforts and enlarged fiscal transfers to western regions,
are reluctant to transfer capital investment to hinterland provinces.

5.3.4.

Harmful Impacts on Economic Growth

The cycle of decentralization is endogenous to China during the process of
economic development. Local governments face ruthless political pressure from
tight hierarchical personnel arrangements and polytropical fiscal transfer schemes.
Worse is that almost all levels of governments in China are economic-growthdriven and over-receptive in nature. Moreover, the promotion and performance
evaluation of individual local officials at every level are calculated by a series of
economic and social indicators manipulated by the central government, such as
annual growth achieved in local GDP, the growth of collected revenue, the
revenue contributions made to upper levels of government, output of SOEs and
the quantities of foreign investment attracted, etc. as unbreakable economic
factors; as well as various but sometime embarrassed societal measures, such as
birth control quota, public security maintenance judged by death sentences
approved, reducing elementary drop-out rate, elderly care system, and healthcare
reform and so on. Successfully completing or exceeding anticipated targets
prescribed by central and provincial governments is the sine qua non for local
officials seeking political promotion or retirement benefits. Meanwhile, to fulfill

158

economic and social targets, local officials have a tendency to fabricate statistics on
economic growth, exaggerate SOEs' growth, and underreport collected revenues.
Either image projects, such as more visible highway, outstretched educational
institutionalization, and expensive health care facilities, showcase in the local
government agenda, or arisen excessive fee charged on farmers or private enterprises,
are lavishly, repeatedly increased to meet revenue contribution needs requested by
upper level governments.
As discussed above, instead of decentralizing or loosening controls, the central
government is eager to centralize fiscal and administrative power. When local
governments are deprived of most oftheir fiscal and administrative autonomy, the
best option for the central government is to heavily manipulate local government
behavior, directly dictating local management and providing fiscal large transfers.
Unfortunately, such fiscal transfers fail to embody central policy intentions. Local
governments easily recourse to the further expansion of local bureaucracy and to
rent-seeking under the soft budget constraints created by such a transfer
mechanism. The fiscal transfers simply create imbalanced initiatives to mobilize
resources and failed to meet local development needs.
China's fiscal transfer schemes also include a fairly top-down approach to poverty
relief policy implementation, in which tax measures, tax exemption, and
intergovernmental transfers play a key role. Fiscal transfers were allocated to
various poverty-stricken and underdeveloped areas to nurture economy and
maintain lowest tolerable standard of living. A most prevalent complaint
submitted by government officials from underdeveloped areas is that they were
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not allowed the choice of what activities to do with poverty alleviation investment
funds allocated. Rather, they often are forced to participate in duplicative or lessurgent activities even when time, resources, and know-how for undertaking the
project is limited. The lack of fieldwork and survey, rule-based formula and
transparency in transfer tends to systematically distort local incentives and draw
local governments in poor regions into unhealthy competition for more transfers
and frame political performance that caters to upper-level officials. Moreover,
urbanization and industrialization in developed regions continually contributed to
escalation of land values, and forcibly seizure of country land from farmers
became pervasive and even up to neck of robbery. Revenue-hungry governments
have every incentive to expropriate more agricultural land for urban expansion
and commercial leases and make a profit since such land revenues fall into the
locally controlled extra-budgets. With faster urbanization and stronger regional
competition for outside investments, local governments initiated waves of land
requisition leading to roaring high housing price, and distorted promotional hype
of establishing unnecessary and duplicative lower-level industrial parks and
development zones.

5.4. Challenges raised by fiscal decentralization

5.4.1.

Dual Tax Administration Structure

160

Tax administration in China has a two-track institutionalized structure. The
national system governs major tax legislation that prescribes tax bases, (nominal)
tax rates, enforceable administrative procedures, the intergovernmental revenue
sharing formula, and budgetary planning above the provincial level. On the other
hand, the provincial and sub-provincial system mostly deals with local revenue
collection, implementation of national tax legislations, designing local (foreign)
investment-friendly tax incentives, stipulating local administrative procedures,
and detailing local budgetary planning. This dual-track tax administration system
creates several challenges for implementation. First, the transparency issue revenue collection and allocation remain mysterious and undisclosed. Many ad
hoc taxation and stipends are offered without scientific and statistical

substantiation. Procedural conflicts on tax administration are not uncommon.
Second, the uniformity issue - the actual tax rate for economic activities varies
across localities when local governments hold ultimate authority in calculating
and enforcing actual local rates and fees. One cause is that local tax preferential
policies and incentives may distort the legislative purpose of national tax rate
stipulation in implementation. In addition, the already worsened regional
development disparity aggregates jurisdictional competition for irrational tax
administration as to hunting for investment. Third, the principal-agent issue local governments experience constantly-changing financial needs and political
agendas in their negotiations with the central government. Finally, the
coordination issue - can the central government, national auditing and treasury

authorities essentially control and coordinate the vastly fragmented two-track
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system? How can the Chinese government remedy the ambiguity in local
collection of off-budget fees and tax-for-fee at sub-provincial levels? How to
streamline sub-provincial budgetary control ex ante for a more effective sharing
formula? Is it achievable for the central government to supervise and coordinate
sub-provincial sharing formula? Regretfully, answers to these questions are
thorny to identify, but these unaddressed concerns lighten the direction for further
policy orientations.

5.4.2.

Extra-budgetary and off-budgetary revenues

Extra-budgetary and off-budgetary revenues are two quasi-taxes collected by
local governments to compensate for revenue shortages under the existing tax
system. Usually collected in the name of service fees or charges for local
administrative activities, these non-tax levies de facto contribute inflows to local
treasury without being compromised by sharing commands of the central
government,

and

therefore,

foster

local

autonomy.

Without

legitimate

substantiation, extra-budgetary and off-budgetary revenues usually are presented
without uniformity and transparency in terms of calculation, base, rate,
procedures and statutes of limitation.
Extra-budgetary revenue is the legacy of the socialist planned economy to finance
locally nurtured expenditures, and it generally includes 1) locally collected funds
and administrative fees, such as road tolls, road maintenance fees, utilities charges,
and education fees (partially abolished for the 9-year basic education); 2) local
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funds and surtaxes, such as agricultural surtax and education surtax, imposed on
income, consumption, turnover or resources bases; 3) a special reserve for SOEs
such as depreciation, infrastructure innovation and repair funds (abolished in 1993
and 1997). 177 On the other hand, off-budgetary items are more locally-controlled,
self-raised and independent revenues with contributions from local land sales,
private enterprises, and charges from various administrative authorities 178 •
The outbreak of extra-budgetary and off-budgetary issues has come up with
regularity since 2003 when the central government adjusted the revenue sharing
formula leaving even lesser shares to local governments. Meanwhile, prompted by
self-interested maximization of revenue and expenditures, local governments are
forced to hunt for leeway to bolster their financial independence over and above
that provided by the small portion of taxes they are allowed to collect. Various
proposals have been explored to reinforce local disposable revenues, such as land
sales or long-term leases to investors, overcharged service fees, sales of
previously state-owned assets, SOE employee benefits buy-outs, investments in
local businesses, and mandatory apportioned collection to support local
infrastructure construction - all proceeds collected through these means are
legitimized as local extra-budgetary and off-budgetary items. In particular,
collections from

land sales, real estate management, and overcharged

177

See generally, Richard Eckaus, Some Consequences of Fiscal Reliance on Extra-budgetary
Revenues in China, China Economic Review 14:72-88 (2003); C.P.W. Wong, Financing Local
Government in the People's Republic of China. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press (1997);
Gang Fan, Market-oriented Economic Reform and the Growth of Off-budget Local Public Finance.
in Brean, D. J. S. (ed.) Taxation in Modern China. New York: Routledge Press (1998); Z. Zhu and
B. Krug, China's Emerging Tax Regime: Local Tax Farming and Central Tax Bureaucracy. in B.
Krug and H. Hendrischke. (eds.) China's Economy in the 21st century: Enterprise and Business
Behavior (London: Edward Elgar, 2007)
178
See, Richard Eckaus, Some Consequences of Fiscal Reliance on Extra-budgetary Revenues in
China, China Economic Review 14:72-88 (2003) at 76
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administrative fees are pillars of local revenues to buttress financial independence
and local autonomy. The roaring housing price increase has spread from coastal
regions and metropolitan areas to central provinces and second-tier cities since
2004, and local GDP growth has become more rapid as well. This has given local
governments the incentive to seek greater control over local assets without
interference from the center.
Extra-budgetary and off-budgetary revenues create the same transparency and
uniformity controversies as described above with regard to the decentralization
and redistribution process. The lack of administrative procedure, basis calculation,
rate stipulation and the ambiguous fiscal status of extra-budgetary and offbudgetary revenues, all challenge the capacity of central and provincial
governments in fiscal transfer and uniform coordination of sub-provincial fiscal
activities. Local governments find these off-budget levies an advantageous
alternative to simple political leverage in their quest to maintain social stability
and foster local development. However, considerations of efficiency and fairness
are not depicted given short spectrum of local political agenda and deteriorated
bureaucracy. Fiscal administration of extra-budgetary and off-budgetary revenues
is far from procedural substantiation such as public hearing and ex post audit. On
the one hand, such proceeds are ideal in terms of local governments' capacity to
provide local public goods, social services,

179

nimble reaction to local

emergencies, and management of local affairs. On the other hand, over-extraction
from local enterprises and taxpayers in the form of extra-budgetary and off-

179 !d.
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budgetary revenues may arouse opposition and cause social instability such as
rural unrest or protests. 180

5.4.3.

Intergovernmental transfer system

As discussed earlier, management of vertical fiscal transfers between a mixture of
levels in the administrative hierarchy (central, provincial, prefecture, county and
township) in addition to various administrative levels of special economic zones
presents another challenge to the central-local two track tax system. Since central
and provincial governments may bargain over the share of expenditure and
revenue, the total amount and nature of sub-provincial fiscal transfers is left
unlegislated and mismanaged. Calculation of basis, rates, and procedural
requirements are usually contracted in inefficient ways, contrary to legislative
intent and without regard for diverse sub-provincial social and economic needs.
Multiplicity of the sub-provincial governments even aggregates the discretionary
practice of national tax legislations and fiscal policies.
As long as the upper levels of government farm out lower levels to collect
revenue, negotiations between different layers of governments on transfers and
reallocation have to be constant. Tax farming imposes considerable logistical
burdens

on the

already complicated two-track tax administration

and

redistribution procedures. As negotiated formulas are in place, three issues
180
See generally, Thomas Bernstein and Xiaobo Lv, Taxation without Representation in
Contemporary Rural China (Cambridge Press 2003); Tsui, K. andY. Wang, Between Separate
Stoves and a Single Menu: Fiscal Decentralization in China, China Quarterly 177: 71-91 (2004)
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prompted in such principal-agent relationship. First, if contractual arrangements
in revenue sharing are breached, would upper level of government remedy the
revenue deficiency of those farmed lower levels of governments? Usually, As
long as a reallocation is invested and operated by the lower level, local
governments may request more allocation without any punishment for more
subsidies above the fixed agreed amount or based on the ad hoc appropriation of
local budget surpluses at the end of a fiscal year. Second, lower levels of
administrations have the drive to maximize their discretionary revenue and tax
base, and therefore, shift expenditure upward to minimize transfers. Third, the
fiscal administration of local extra-budgetary and off-budgetary proceeds is
opposed by lower level of governments in many aspects. In addition to the lack of
systematic way to measure an uncalculated bases and rates, lower levels of
governments investigate many ways to evade control from upper levels on
genuine local financings, if not discoverable, such as investments in local
business and profitable operation of local public services. Given the complicated
tax structure and administrative hierarchies, it is safe to highlight the selfconflicting yet evolving feature of China's two-track tax system.

5.5. Summary

China has experienced rounds of fiscal and administrative decentralization
dominated by a socialist legacy and alignment of political compromises with a
significant consideration for transactional costs and budgetary constraints. First,
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the decentralization efforts have been endogenous from the centralized, planned
economic system featured by heavy industrialization development strategy to a
market economy-oriented revenue sharing scheme with international inputs.
Although fiscal decentralization for market-oriented reforms helped strengthen
provincial and local autonomy and fostered economic growth, they are plagued by
impotent central redistributive power and enlarged interregional inequality. With
only a rough system of intergovernmental expenditure responsibility division and
egalitarian fiscal transfer scheme, the recentralization since 1994 has significantly
impaired local capacity to provide decent public goods and services, and
witnessed serious local governance issues such as land-requisition-based local
GDP growth and scattered social unrest.
Second, tax farming by the central government on one hand fortifies central
revenue and authority by squeezing local revenues with budget constraints and
national enforcement agencies; decentralization also harnesses the increased
autonomy of local governments in designing local-friendly tax incentives and
flexibly carrying on centrally-authorized tax policies on the other hand. The
intergovernmental bargaining influences the official tax system. Jurisdictional
competition for (foreign) investment and local development creates less efficient
and irrational local tax concessions such as over-extended contractual land leases
for plant constructions, and introduces a detrimental fiscal culture to boost local
GDP by concentrating tax levying on only a few tax bases such as real estate
development and land sale. It worth noting that the local autonomy and
intergovernmental balance is not a federalism model based on a separation of

167

powers. Rather, decentralization is a regulatory compromise to align different
political and administrative authorities. Since the rural tax was officially repealed
in 2004, some local governments in agricultural regions have become increasingly
reliant on governmental transfers or certain off-budgetary revenue collections.
The drop of part of local tax bases implies not only how the central government
can provide sufficient transfers, but also on how to make those transfers without
discouraging local resource mobilization and removing the soft budget constraint
for local governments. A centralized party-sate bureaucratic system inevitably
leads to a shortage of local government accountability due to widespread
corruption and distorted local tax practices, such as excessive fees or taxes in rural
areas and abusive land requisition. In the long run, good governance will be the
outcome of a more decentralized administrative and fiscal system that includes a
sound inter-governmental transfer arrangement,

of wider local political

participation and competition under free elections and, ultimately, of stronger
capital mobility across regions.
Third, the institutionalization of the central-local two-track tax administration is
not uniform across the nation. Diversity or irregularity in local tax administration
especially on sub-provincial levels evidences the cooperation between local
business and governments over time to architect a framework to evade central
control or switch upward more expenditure to serve local economic interests.
Moreover, if the central government has to collect localities into its fiscal
umbrella, local administrations may lose incentives to provide locally adequate
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public goods and services as long as more shares of transfers are assigned from
the central rather than for specific local needs.
Fourth, the inflated extra-budgetary and off-budgetary revenues represent local
efforts to seize resources outside of the central government's control and to keep
larger shares of local revenue for local development. However, the lack of legally
established institutions to streamline extra-budgetary and off-budgetary revenues
may simply exacerbate interregional economic disparities and rampant corruption.
This practice erodes the tax base and there is no institution to enforce
administrative efficiency in this area. However, further administrative and fiscal
centralization may bring more distortions in local government behavior.

VI.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the past six decades of tax law reform in China have developed
within the context of enormous economic development, legal reform, a socialist
political system, efficiency concerns, tax equity, cultural factors, assimilation to
internationally accepted accounting standards, and the fulfillment of WTO
principles and international tax norms. This varied context has contributed to the
evolution of a modern and internationalized tax system, albeit one with Chinese
characteristics.
First, each of the three major phases of tax law reform in China has improved the
structure of the Chinese tax law system. Meanwhile, the tax authorities reshuffle
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and an ever-growing need for transparent,

unifonn and impartial tax

administration poses vital challenges and opportunities for tax refonn.
Second, tax laws in China are designated to promote revenue collection with the
hope to enlarge the tax base and improve the standard of living of Chinese
citizens within sound enforcement and compliance regimes. At the same time, the
concerns of balancing the tax treatment of domestic and foreign enterprises and
minimizing interregional disparities imply fundamental dilemmas of tax law
administration, enforcement and fiscal transfers.
Third, the fiscal and administrative decentralization prompted a market economyoriented revenue sharing scheme with international inputs. Tax fanning by the
central government consolidated central fiscal authority and revenue collection,
even as it increased local autonomy by allowing provincial governments to
bargain toward an intergovernmental compromise. The central-local two-track tax
administration system,

however, does

not prescribe an

institutionalized

framework for managing the enlarged extra-budgetary and off-budgetary revenues.
The abolishment of rural tax and twisted local GDP development culture add
)

another layer of complexity to fiscal decentralization and transfers. In addition,
the large scale of China's economy makes the adoption of fiscal policies which
touch on matters of legislation, administration, judicature and internationalization,
particularly urgent.
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Chapter III

The Rule of Law and Legal Reform in China

I.

Introduction

Stepping into the 21st Century, the legal system, in which China's tax law and its
reform are embedded, has experienced its most dynamic period of evolution and
reform. 1 No other major modem society has endeavored to reconstruct its legal
system in such an expansive, novel, and globalized fashion for the past three
decades as China. 2 However, China's unprecedented, ongoing legal 3 reform is
intertwined with its enormous economic development, and more importantly,
burdened by a deep introspective ambivalence on the part of its reformers.
This analysis of the evolution of the Chinese legal system development shall not
be ahistorical. In truth, China's contemporary legal system is neither
1

See generally Benjamin L. Liebman, The 6dh Anniversary of the PRC: A Retrospective on the
Chinese Legal System, 23 Colum. J. Asian L. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Liebman: Retrospective].
2 !d.
3

See generally Zhongguo Fazhi Gaige Sanshinian [Thirty Years a/China's Legal Reform] ( ((r:j:l

00 i'M~ i:&.!'fi:~ +if)) ), edited by CPC Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, ( lf1 00 r:j:l ~~
tl ND ) http://www.cctb.net/zjxz/expertarticle/200912/t20091230_19604.htm (last visited on
March 15, 2011)
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fundamentally inherited from its imperial tradition nor entirely a western
transplant. 4 Historical eventful turning-points in the 20th Century are critical to
evaluating the progress and troubles arising from China's legal reform, and China
was not without such critical turning points in the last century.

5

It endured

massive foreign invasion and semi-colonization from the late nineteen century by
western forces, republican democratic revolution, various civil wars and wars
against Japanese fascists, Communist revolution 6 (civil war with the KMT
Regime), socialist construction and transformation

7

in the 1950s, Cultural

Revolution, opening to the outside world and consequent globalization, the
development of market economy, and accession to the WTO, among other major
transformations. Even so, several important elements of China's traditional legal
system

survived

this

century-and-a-half

of

uncommon

upheaval

and

transformation. 8
China's adoption of a "Socialist Market Economy" in 1992 and "protection of
property rights" in 2004 Amendments to the Chinese Constitution signaled a

4
see Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and
Development (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 83-85; see also Li Xiuqing,
Yuwaifa de Yinjie ji Falvren de Dandang [Transplantation of Extraterritorial Laws and Mission of
Chinese Jurists], presenting that the seventh stage of Chinese legal system development ( 1970present) is featured by enormous introduction and transplantation of foreign legal conceptions and
international norms, http://www.sinoss.net/2011/0215/30729 .html (last visited on March 15, 201 1)
5
See Id., Li, at 8-19; for a discussion of taxation system evolution in the Tsing Dynasty, See
generally in Shao-Kwan Chen, The System of Taxation in China in the Tsing Dynasty, 1644-1911
[1914), Cornell University Press (2009)
6
See Kathlyn Gay, Mao Zedong's China (21st Century Books, 2008), stating that the last three
years of the Chinese Civil War (1947-1949) is more commonly known as the War of Liberation
7
See generally in Peter J. Boettke, Why Perestroika Failed: The Politics and Economics of
Socialist Transformation (Routledge, 1993), discussing the impacts and rationales of socialist
transformation movements aiming to achieve communism in China and East European countries
in the 1940s and 1950s.
8
See Randal Peerenboom, The X-Files: Past and Present Portrayals of China's Alien "Legal
System "(2003) 2 Wash. U. Global Studies L. Rev.37 at 38-39 (hereinafter Peerenboom: X-Files]
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breakthrough in China's self-conscious westemization. 9 The CCP also officially
endorsed such notions in its Party Charter. 10 Meanwhile, political slogans such as
"performing in accordance with international standards" and "assimilation or
harmonization with international practice" materialized in the official propaganda
agenda and daily political and legal settings. China's WTO commitments have
driven China's immense, if disorganized, legal infrastructure increasingly into
compliance with a decidedly non-Marxist international legal order. Celebrating
ten years of WTO membership, China has rigorously overhauled its legal system
to a postural stability by incorporating both international and domestic norms.
Another important turning point in Chinese legal evolution is the triumph of"rule
of law " 11 (''fa zhi" ~)ft) over "rule of men" ("ren zhi'' A)ft). 12 The importance of

9

The evolution of China's Constitution has four stages. The first Constitution of the People's
Republic of China was promulgated in 1954. After two intervening versions enacted in 1975 and
1978, the current Constitution was promulgated in 1982. There were significant differences
between each of these versions, and the 1982 Constitution has subsequently been amended four
times since its promulgation
10
See generally, Mei Ying Gechlik (Veron Hung), The Chinese Communist Party's Leadership
and Judicial Independence (2003), discussing revision of the CCP Charter and its impact to
China's legal system,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=650 (last visited on
March 15, 2011)
11
See Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U.L. Rev. 781 {1989), at 783-91,
presenting the "instrumental" and "substantive" concepts of the rule of law; See also, Robert S.
Summers, A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law, 6 Ratio Juris 127, 135 (1993), presenting the
"formal" and "substantive" concepts of the rule oflaw; Other theorists have also made distinctions
between rule by law and the rule oflaw, particularly in the context of China. See also generally in
Chen, supra 4, at 135; Paha L. Heieh, China's Development of International Economic Law and
WTO Legal Capacity Building, 13 J. Int'l Econ. L. 997 (2010); Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in
China, 34 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 43 (2001) at 93-98, discussing the difference of rule by law and
rule of law. In particular, two conceptions between law and the state should be distinguished to
expedite discussion on the rule of law in China: 1) the rule by law, referring to a descriptive,
positive, and instrumental view of the relationship, in which law is used to govern by state; 2) the
rule of law, a prescriptive, normative, and political view, which refers limited government,
procedural justices and equality before law; Cao Jianming, Speech: WTO and the Rule of Law in
China, 16 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 379 (2002)
12
See XIAN FA art 5, (1982) (P.R.C.) (Constitution of the P.R.C.), stipulating that "all state
organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public organizations and all enterprises and
undertakings must abide by the Constitution and law". See also Aristotle (384-322 BC): General
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this development in China cannot be overstated. The CCP's commitment to
subject itself to law finally offers domestic reformers and foreign observers the
arena, in an authoritarian society, to advocate liberal ideals of limiting the
arbitrary use of power, establishment of the rule of law, and possibly dynamic
polity reform. The results of the CCP's commitment are not unequivocally
celebrated by international or domestic commentators. However, that China's
economic development has driven important rule of law reforms is undeniable.
Indeed, market economy development has been a crucial stimulus for creating the
rule of law in the contemporary Chinese legal system. From Deng's "reform and
open door" orientation to its WTO accession in 2001, China has arguably
implemented a setting in which "acting according to law" is conceived as the
"objective demand of a socialist market economy." 13 "The economic reform,
based on autonomy, equality, credit and honesty, and fair competition, needs to be
maintained primarily by legal tools." 14 Primarily, the market economy requires
"the establishment of legal rules governing the rights and duties of those carrying
out transactions." 15

Introduction Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. There are two kinds of rule of person. The first
kind is rule of the few persons, examples of which include tyranny and oligarchy. The second kind
of rule of person is rule of the many persons, an example of which is the ancient Greek
democracies. The common feature of rule of person is the ethos that what pleases the ruler(s) is
law. That is, under rule of person, there is no limit to what the rulers (the government) can do and
how they do things, http://www.iep.utm.edu/aristotl/ (last visited on March 15, 2011); Many
scholars have chosen to define the rule of law by what it is not, namely, the "rule of men," see, e.g.,
Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orienta/ism, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 179, 222-23 (2002); Teemu Ruskola, Law
Without Law, or Is "Chinese Law" an Oxymoron?, 11 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 655,655 (2003)
13
See Liberman, supra 1, at 32, stating that China's legal reforms aim to create a fair system that
serves both to further economic development and to address the rights and grievances of those left
behind by such development
14
Id.,at31
15
See Pitman B. Potter, The Legal Implications of China's Accession to the WTO, The China
Quarterly, at 593 and 602-603.
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It is clear that, for the past three decades, Chinese legal system development has

focused on absorbing westernized legal norms, modernizing practice, and
conforming to the demands of a globalized market-based order. An objective
assessment of China's legal reform, at this stage, must acknowledge the successes
of China's law reforms in laying the foundation for constructing the rule of law,
albeit "with Chinese characteristics."

16

Noticeably, China agreed to initiate

sweeping reform measures "designed to implement the WTO market access,
national treatment and transparency standards, to protect intellectual property
rights, to limit the use of trade-distorting domestic subsidies and to make other
changes to bring its legal and regulatory system in line with those of other WTO
members." 17 China has put tremendous effort into honoring such commitments.
Its efforts have been the subject of debates regarding how China will fulfill its
WTO obligations as well as establish "the rule of law" to promote the country's
economic growth and liberal democracy. 18
This chapter and the next will attempt to evaluate how the rule of law rhetoric and
WTO accession has impacted Chinese legal reform in the past three decades,
looking particularly at the post-WTO accession framework, and the major
implications of this impact. The Second subchapter begins with a critical but brief

16

See U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Annual Report 2002, at 1,
stating that "China has made important strides toward building the structure of a modern legal
system", albeit [a] wide gap remains between the law on paper and the law in practice,
http://ww.cecc.gov (last visited March 15, 2011); the same conclusion was also drawn by a few
other scholars, see also Jiangyu Wang, The Rule of Law in China: A Realistic View of the
Jurisprudence, the Impact of the WTO, and the Prospects for Future Development, Sing. J. Legal
Stud. 347, at 348, 359.
17
See United States Trade Representative, 2003 Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance,
at 3. Available at http://www.ustr.gov (words searched: Report 2003) (last visited March 15, 2011)
18
See generally in Potter supra 15. See also Wang, supra 16, summarizing a debate between
Professors Porter and Don Clarke, at 363-367
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overview of rule of law rhetoric developed by western jurists and philosophers, to
develop an understanding of the rule of law as a contested concept. 19 Then the
third subchapter provides an overview of China's legal reform for the past thirty
years is provided focusing on the evolution of the socialist rule of law construct,
and how the rule of law concept fits in the socialist legal system with Chinese
characteristics. The fourth subchapter concludes and introduces the impacts of
WTO accession which will be explored in more detail in chapter IV in terms of
China's WTO commitments, WTO principles of transparency, judicial review,
and impartial administration.

II.

The Western Rule of Law Rhetoric

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to rehash the voluminous debates regarding

the evolution and conception of the rule of law. 20 Bearing a western origin, the

19

See Radin supra 11, at 783-794
!d. Western conceptions ofthe rule oflaw trace their origins to the writings of Aristotle,
Montesquieu, Locke, who emphasized the importance of law in protecting society from the
potentially arbitrary and abusive authority of government. See also, Alvaro Santos, The World
Bank's Uses of the "Rule of Law ·• Promise in Economic Development, in The New Law and
Development: A Critical Appraisal, (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006), at 257. The rule
of law is viewed as necessary to the market economy and has been promoted in developing and
transition economies. The connection between the rule oflaw, markets, and economic
development is based in large part on the work of Friedrich Hayek, Max Weber, and, more
broadly, by the work of modernization theorists. Under this theory, efficient markets require the
protection of private property and freedom of contract. The rule of law was necessary to ensure the
integrity ofthese rights. Markets, in turn, fuel economic growth which leads gradually, according
to modernization theory, to the growth of the middle class and a demand for democracy; see also,
William P. Alford, Exporting "The Pursuit ofHappiness," 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1677, 1683 (2000)
(book review); John K.M. Ohnesorge, Asia's Legal Systems in the Wake of the Financial Crisis:
Can the Rule of Law Carry Any of the Weight?, in Neoliberalism and Institutional Reform in East
Asia 64-68 (Meredith Jung-En Wooed.) [hereinafter Ohnesorge: Asia's Legal Systems],
http://www.law. wisc.edu/mlhfwd3/risd_rule_of_law_northeast_asia_proofs. pdf; (last visited on
March 15, 2011); see also Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1944), formulating the rule of
law is largely limited to its instrumental aspect, and focuses on the power of law to limit the
actions of government. Rules, "fixed and announced beforehand," allow individuals to foresee
20
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rule of law concept is contested, 21 at times loosely interpreted, 22 and variously
described. The definition of the term "rule of law" has long been the object of
heated debate. All of the various interpretations include in the term the protection
of a correct balance ofrights and powers between individuals and the state.

23

In a

state embracing the rule of law, the society is governed by a complete and
functioning legal infrastructure which governs relations between private actors
and public authorities and among private sectors with the independent judge as
enforcer of rules and of privately bargained contracts?4 Further, and perhaps more
importantly, the rule of law presumes democracy, liberty and freedom. Like many
other philosophical ideals in the West, the concept of rule of law originated in
ancient Greece. 25 From Plato and Aristotle through the Roman jurists, the
medieval natural law thinkers, the neo-Stoics and modern natural law theorists,
Montesquieu and the American Founders, the nineteenth-century advocates ofthe

Rechtsstaat, and up to contemporary enthusiasts such as Friedrich Hayek and
John Rawls, Lon Fuller and Theodore Lowi, champions of the rule of law have

potential coercive intrusions of government authority, which in turn allows individuals to plan
their activities and regulate their behaviors accordingly
21
See Radin supra 11, at 784; see also Randall Reerenboom, Let One Humdred Flowers Bloom,
One Hundred Schools Contend: Debating Rule of Law in China (2002) 23 Mich. J. Int'l L. 471 at
472-3 [hereinafter Peerenboom: Debating Rule of Law in China]
22
See generally, Lawrence Solum, Equity and The Rule of Law, in Ian Shapiro (Ed.) The Rule of
Law: NOMOS XXXVI. (New York: New York University Press, 1994), noting that the rule of
law ... may be more accurate to understand as the ideal of the rule of law as a set of ideals
connected more by family resemblance than by a unifying conceptual structure
23
See generally in Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtues, in This thesisity of Law: Essays
on Law and Morality 210-29 (1979)
24
See John K.M. Ohnesorge "The Rule of Law, Economic Development, and The Developmental
States of Northeast Asia" in Law and Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia 91
(Christoph Antons, ed., 2003) at 93-94 [hereinafter The Rule of Law and Economic Development],
http://www.Iaw.wisc.edu/m/m2mgg/leiden_rol.pdf(last visited on March 15, 2011)
25
See Radin supra 11, stating that Plato and Aristotle instituted the tradition of thinking about rule
oflaw
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assumed the desirability or at least the ineliminable reality of extensive legal
orders and political rule ofhuman conduct.

26

The underlying complexity to define the rule oflaw is not completely canonical 27 •
The nineteenth-century British jurist, Albert Venn Dicey, to whom the
formulation of the term "the rule of law" may to some extent be credited,
elaborated three characteristics of the "the rule or supremacy of law": absence of
arbitrary power on the part of government; ordinary law administered by ordinary
tribunals; and general rules of constitutional law resulting from the ordinary law
of the land.Z 8 Similarly, in Germany a state of legality is Rechtsstaat (literally, a
law-based state or a constitutional state), it advocates rule of law, limited
government, substantive due process, reasonableness, equal protection, and a full
and fair hearing, which is similar to the Anglo-American rule of law and French
Etat De Droit, where the rule of law restrains the exercise of state power or
government power 9•

For developing thesis of this chapter, different categories of dichotomies of the
Rule of Law conceptions will be briefed in this subchapter, mostly, the
instrumental and substantive discussion, the "thin" and ''thick" model, and the

26

See generally, Richard Flathman, Liberalism and the Suspect Enterprise of Political
Institutionalization: The Case of the Rule of Law, in The Rule of Law 297, 302 (Ian Shapiro ed.,
1994) (discussing Plato's philosophy of law); see also Ernest J. Weinrib, The Intelligibility of the
Rule of Law, in The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology, at 59, 62-63 (arguing that for Plato law was "a
matter of convention" and "the rationality of law" depended entirely on the philosophical wisdom
and knowledge of the rulers), quoted by Orts, supra 20, at 78
27
See Radin, supra 11
28
See A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 179-92 (1908)
29
See generally in L. Heuschling, Etat de droit, Rechstaat, Rule of law, (Paris: Dalloz, 2002),
Michael Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1307-09 (2001), Susan Newman, Comparing Courts, Wash. U. Sch. of L. Magazine 8-9
(Spring 2002)
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Rule of Law and development rhetoric. The purpose of this discussion is to
introduce the discussion of how Rule of Law, which may serve as a model, may
impact the legal reform in China. More importantly, the goal is to develop a Rule
of Law- Tax Rhetoric, particularly for the reform of China's Tax Law system.

2.1 The Contested Definition-Instrumental vs. Substantive

Legal theorists have proffered various definitions for the rule of law, among
which Lon Fuller 30 and John Rawls 31 represent two of the most important
conceptualizations. Fuller articulates an instrumental conception of the rule of
law, 32 which advocates that the Rule of Law is a prerequisite for any efficacious
legal order. 33 Rawls's conception alternatively is substantive and holds that the
Rule of Law embodies tenets of a particular political morality. This distinction,
although it is overly simplistic and risky, is the core of our notion of a contested
Rule of Law.

2.1.1 The Instrumental Conception

Lon Fuller's instrumental conception advocates the "inner morality of law:" a
relative certainty and uniformity in the application, regular and impartial
administration of legal rules, 34 whereby a legal system is regarded as "the product
of a sustained purposive effort" fulfilling certain moral qualities. To this extent,

30

See generally, Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law. 33-94 (rev.ed.1969)
See generally, John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice 235-43 (1971)
32
See Radin supra 11 at 792, admitting that her reading of this characterization is oversimplified
because Fuller apparently include his formulation other values besides instrumental efficacy
33 !d.
34
See Rawls, supra 31, at 235 (1971).
31
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the state may use the institutions of law and the method adopting the enforcement
of legal rules as an instrument of policy where any separation or differentiation
between the legal system and state is not required. In this regard, Lon Fuller
outlined eight elements whereby to measure the Rule of Law, which represent
"the morality" that makes law possible: generality; 35 notice or publicity;

36

prospectivity; 37 clarity; 38 consistency or non-contradictoriness; 39 conformability; 40
stability; 41 and congruence. 42
Fuller's notion of generality requires that the rules encompass a broader sphere
than specific cases, and must be comprehended, subsumed, or covered 43 • The rest
of Fuller's list, however, can be boiled down to two categories "know-ability" and
"perform-ability." 44 Western scholars have added ninth and tenth elements, found
to be implicit in Fuller's formulation, that the affected parties must be rational

35

See Radin supra ll at 785, stating that "there must be rules, cognizable separately from (and
broader than) specific cases, such that the rules can applied to specific cases, or specific cases that
can be seen to fall under or lie within them". There is, of course, a major debate between Fuller
and Hart, among others, concerning whether Hitler's Nazi regime and other modern tyrannies may
properly be described as having "law." see Orts, supra 20, at 255-56, 270-72, discussing differing
views of the legality of the Nazi regime. Similarly, one may argue about whether the Cultural
Revolution resulted in a complete or only partial breakdown of rule by law. This thesis shares that
this debate should be more empirical and historical than conceptual. A regime may rule by law in
some areas of life and yet still employ other irregular methods for decisions in a wide array of
other important fields. The essential empirical and historical question is to ask about the extent to
which rule by law institutions had broken down or were overturned in the most important
~overnment decisions, such as the criminal law and the use of lethal force by government officials.
6
See Radin supra 11 at 785, stating publicity means that those affected party who are supposed to
observe the rules, at least to the extent necessary, are made available to the rules to conform
37
!d., stating that the rules must exist prior in time to guide future actions which may be judged by
them
38
!d., stating that the rules at least are sufficiently understandable to affected parties to follow
39
!d., stating that at least to some extent, completely contradictory rules are equivalent to no rule
or at least an arbitrary decision between two rules
40
!d., stating that The affected parties must be capable of following particular rules
41
!d., stating that, in some degrees, the rules must not change constantly so that affected parties
can follow or orient their actions toward rules
42
!d., stating that the explicitly promulgated rules must correspond with the rules enforced in
actual practice.
43
!d., at 786-787
44/d.
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choosers45 and suitably motivated by either penal sanctions or by compensation. 46
Given the gravity of Fuller's formulation, all (eight) elements should be "internal"
to law, 47 meaning that failure to comply with any one of those eight attributes
would jeopardize the state's ability to be called a legal system at all. 48
Fuller's explanation, however complex, does not explicitly raise substantive
ideals such as fairness or democracy, autonomy or dignity of persons, nor did he
exemplify democratic procedural traditions, like separation of powers or the
access to courts and jury trials, all of which are essential to the substantive
conception of the Rule ofLaw. 49

2.2.2. The Substantive Conception

John Rawls claims that the Rule of Law is formal justice which promotes liberty
and fairness. Derived from his seminal definition of a legal system, Rawls
believes that Rule of law is necessary for predictability, determinateness, and
certainty oflegal consequences. More importantly, as exemplified in his Hobbes's
Thesis and social cooperation, Rawls states that liberty is required for achieving
social justice, which underlies the Rule of Law. However, Rawls's conception is
not complete in that it misses, especially with regard to American jurisprudence,
commitment to the separation of powers, judicial review and constrained role of
judges. 5°

!d.
!d.
See generally, Fuller, supra 30
48 !d.
49
See Radin supra 11 at 787
50
Id, at 788-792
45

46
47
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A similar version of distinction is developed by Paul Craig, 51 who accents
Rawls's "substantive" conception with his own "formal" notion. Craig's formal
conception defines the rule of law as "the manner in which the law was
promulgated" 52 by responsible authorities under a properly authorized guideline.
The substantive version conceptualizes that certain substantive rights should be
derived from or based on the rule of law, "which are used to distinguish between
'good' laws, which comply with such rights, and 'bad' laws which do not." 53

The above discussion, albeit crude and oversimplified, suggests at least broadly
that the Rule of Law is a Janus-faced, deeply ambiguous and contested
conception 54 . The instrumental version emphasizes the role of a legal system in
structuring behaviors, whereas the substantive version necessitates fairness,
human dignity, freedom and democracy. 55 Putting this distinction into a broader
social-political context, the instrumental conception is a model of a general and
ahistorical nature where government achieves its ends by way of rules. The
substantive conception, on the other hand, bears a particular modem ideological
heritage which demands the government's ends be the goals of social contract:
liberty and justice. 56

51

See generally, Paul Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An
Analytical Framework (1997) P.L.467, cited by Wang supra 16 at 350
52
See Wang supra 16, 351
53 ld.
54Jd.
55
See Radin supra 11, at 791-792
56 /d.
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2.2. Rule of Law in Positivism and Natural Law

Denying the inherent or necessary connection between the requirements of law,
on the one hand, and ethics or morality on the other, modern legal positivism
centers on the "Separation Thesis. " 57It suggests that laws are rules made, whether
deliberately or unintentionally, by human beings, without questioning what is
good, right, or just. 58 Furthering the views of H.L.A. Hart 59 -- and influenced by
Max Weber -- Joseph Raz supports the distinction between the internal and
external points of view of law and rules. Rule of Law, as interpreted by Raz, is a
political ideal which a legal system may lack or may possess to a greater or lesser

°

degree. 6 For instance, although Raz in the end turns towards the substantive
conception of the Rule of Law, he proffers a slightly different version of the
instrumental conception of the rule of law and Fuller's eight principles 61 • Thus, as
57

See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, (2nd ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, I994) at 97-IOI and
250, which emerged from a set oflectures that Hart began to deliver in I952, and it is presaged by
his Holmes lecture, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, putting it simple, the
Separation thesis holds that having a legal right to do doesn't entail having a moral right to do it,
and vice versa; having a legal obligation to do something doesn't entail having a moral right to do
it, and vice versa; having a legal justification to do something doesn't entail having a moral
justification, and vice versa; etc. Largely, this thesis understands and draws this notion from
Professor Radin's analysis
58
!d. See also, Raz, supra 23, at 47-50
59
See Radin supra II, at 800-80I, stating that a distinction between the internal and external
points of view of law and rules, close to (and influenced by) Max Weber's distinction between the
sociological and the legal perspectives of law. Professor Radin further states that a distinction
between primary and secondary legal rules, where a primary rule governs conduct, such as
criminal law and a secondary rule govern the procedural methods by which primary rules are
enforced, prosecuted and so on; See generally, Hart, supra 57, Hart specifically enumerates three
secondary rules including the Rule of Recognition, the rule by which any member of society may
check to find out what the primary rules of the society are. In a simple society, Hart states, the
recognition rule might only be what is written in a sacred book or what is said by a ruler. Hart
viewed the concept of rule of recognition as an evolution from Hans Kelsen's "Grundnorm", or
"basic norm."
60
See Raz, supra 23, at 2II
61
!d., at 2I4-224 for original discussion by Raz; See also in Ronald Dworkin, The Practice of
Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory (book review), I15 Harv. L. Rev.
I655 (2002); see, Wang, supra 16, at 35I-352, summarizing legal positivism that law should be
prospective, open and clear, stable, that law-making process should be guided by open, stable,
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positivism views the law ultimately as a matter of human custom or convention,
i.e., the nature of law as a human institution, without touching the substantive
value of liberty, justice and fairness, the rule of law in legal positivism is mostly
featured as an instrumental conception.

Natural law contests the rivalry legal positivism's notion of law and its relation to
morality. It has evolved thousands of years featured great jurists and
philosophers62 and been cited as a component in landmark legal documents such
as the United States Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the
United States. Natural law holds that just laws are immanent in nature and emerge
by the natural process of resolving conflicts. More importantly, the content of law
cannot be determined except by reference to various moral principles. Influential
contemporary natural law jurist Ronald Dworkin, in attacking the legal positivists'
model of rules, i.e. the "rule-book conception" 63 , bifurcated the general category
of "standards" into "rules", on the one hand, and "principles, policies and other
sorts of standards" that "do not function as rules" on the other.

64

Dworkin argues

that there is a "logical difference" between rules and principles, 65 and "a rule can

clear and general rules, that judicial independence must be guaranteed, that judicial judgments
shall have the final binding force, that the principles of natural justice must be observed, that the
power of judicial review on legislation and administrative action is secure, that courts are
accessible to citizens, and that the discretion possessed by crime-preventing agencies should not
pervert the law
62
jurists and philosophers include Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Francisco Suarez, Richard Hooker,
Thomas Hobbes, Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, John Locke, Francis Hutcheson, Jean
Jacques Burlamaqui, and Emmerich de Vattel
63
See Dworkin supra 61 at 1660; see generally, Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 209-15 (1986),
presenting the relationship between law and rules
64
See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 14-80 (1977) at 22, referring to the "rulebook
model of community". See generally also Radin supra 11 at 803-06
65
!d., Dworkin, at 26-27
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be completely stated with all exceptions, but a principle cannot." 66 Moreover, the
use of principles determines one right answer to legal questions even though
principles lack formal actualization, because in using principles the judge should
apply the best interpretation of the entire body of past legal authoritative acts,
where that interpretation rests on the best political theory available to explain and
justify law as an expertise. 67 Therefore, the natural law conception of rule of law
is essentially the rule of certain rights or values that are inherent in or universally
cognizable by virtue of human reason or human nature, and for this instance,
conforms more to the substantive conception of the rule oflaw.

2.3. "Thin vs. Thick" categorization - an over-asserted dichotomy

The "thin" and "thick" categorization of the rule of law is principally championed
and explored for the case of China by Professor Randall Peerenboom, 68 and a
school of supportive scholars. The thesis obligates to mention that the thin-thick
rule of law model also appeared in Michael Neumann's treatise almost at the
same time as Professor Peerenboom raised the model. 69 This thesis respectfully
submits that, the thin and thick definition of the rule of law is not major but a
reinterpretation of Lon Fuller's theory. Although proponents of thin and thick
interpretations of rule of law rhetoric endeavor to label their construct in slightly

66

!d., at 25-26, Dworkin presents that legal positivists' model of rules does not describe what the
law is, because law also consists of principles; and that application of rules does not fully
document what judges do, because judges also use principles.
67
See Radin supra 11, at 806
68
See Randall Peerenboom: Debating Rule of Law in China, supra 21, and Wang, supra 11 for
detailed description of the thin-thick rule of law model. This thesis notes that wordsmithing does
not change the instrumental-substantive bifurcation of the rule oflaw interpretations
69
See generally in Michael Neumann, The Rule of Law: Politicizing Ethics (Burlington, T,
Ashgate Publishing, 2002) at 3
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different or heuristic ways, there is considerable common ground with Lon
Fuller's influential account that laws, in particular, a thin rule of law requires laws
be general, public, prospective, clear, consistent, capable of being followed, stable,
and enforceable/0 which are based on Lon Fuller's instrumentalist view.

Analogically, the thin version of the rule of law formulates the rule of law as "a
vision of judging that celebrates the systemic virtues of regularity, predictability
and certainty over the concern with substantive justice in particular instances:
formal rules are the most efficacious and legitimate way to protect substantive
values."71 Therefore, "it is possible for a legal system to comply with the rule of
law and still be undemocratic and/or unjust in general ... and in particular
instances." 72 On the other hand, the thick conception is more substantive built up
on those basic elements of a thin conception. The "thick" version of the rule of
law holds that law is inseparable from moral, (universal) values and politics such
as particular economic arrangements, forms of government or conception of
human rights, and that "the existence of pre-announced, objectively-knowable and
impartially-applied rules must be supplemented by tying such formal virtues to a
substantive account of democratic justice." 73 Arguably, comparing with the
antagonistic opposition between positivism and natural law, the acrimony
between "thin" and "formal" is less notable, and, to some extent, such

70

See Peerenboom: Debating Rule of Law in China supra 21 at 497
See Allan Hutchinson, The Rule of Law revisited: Democracy and Courts, in David Dyzenhaus,
ed., Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order 196 (Hart Publishing, 1999) at 199,
cited by Wang, supra 16
72 !d.
73 !d.
71
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resemblance pictures a parallel intergrowth for the establishment of the rule of
law. 74
A primary merit of the thin and thick categorization is that such definition rests on
the model of the rule of law explicated by Fuller and Dicey. The definition,
debatably, can be substantiated on two grounds and is encouraged to sustain.
First, 75 the "thin" version focuses on the "instrumental function" or "process
nature" of a legal system. Second, 76 in addition to meaningful restraints on State
actors, the inner morality of law pictures that a legal system meeting the
requirement of generality, 77 regularity, 78 transparency, 79 consistency, 80 clarity, 81
acceptability, 82 and good enforcement, 83 among others, are not likely to lead to a
moral legal system. 84 However, there are still barriers in fully addressing the thin
and thick conceptions.
The first setback with the thin and thick model is the insurmountable barrier
between the thin and thick models which features individual rights and liberty,
although the supporters of model argue that the thin model could develop into the
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See Radin supra 11, at 792-793, stating that the conception of the rule of law has not changed
over generations but scholars usually employ different re-interpretations for their own needs
75
See Wang supra 16, at 354-358, analyzing the jurisprudence of "thin" and "thick" theories in
detail
76 !d.
77
!d., Wang does not create any new conceptions of the rule of law but interpretatively states his
explanations of Fuller's rule of law elements, in particular, laws must not be aimed at a particular
~erson and must treat similarly situated people equally
8
!d., stating that laws must be relatively stable
79
!d., stating that laws must be made public and readily accessible
80
!d., stating that laws must be consistent on the whole
81
!d., stating that laws must be relatively clear
82
!d., stating that laws must be reasonably acceptable to a majority of the populace or people
affected (or at least the key groups affected) by the laws
83
!d., stating that laws must be fairly applied and enforced -- the gap between the law on the
books and law in practice should be narrow
84 !d.
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thick version. This barrier parallels the wide bifurcation of positivism and natural
law in structuring a legal system. Further, too much leeway has been granted the
supporters of the thin/thick model in their suggestion that the thin model might
develop into the thick. 85 Even Fuller's work suggests that the rule of law is a
"matter of degree." 86 The thick model, however obscure, was structured to
incorporate all elements of the thin model. However, it was also presented as an
opposite ideal to which thin model is incapable of being evolved to. If the thin
model is defined as similar to Fuller's instrumental conception or Raz's purposive
enterprise, the thick model would be difficult to resolve with Rawl's substantive
connection between the rule of law and the core value of liberty, justice and
fairness, let alone his sense of the American jurisprudence innovation. 87 Therefore
the thin/thick dichotomy is too aggressive theoretically unsustainable and not as
sophisticated as Rawls's and Fuller's theories.
Empiricaily, another obstacle for the thin and thick model overlooks the rule of
law as a political theory of limited government. As Hobbes argues, a sovereign
state or "Leviathan" 88 requires, first and foremost, that the rule of law necessitate
"a known and authentic legislator" who is "endowed with authority to create
obligations." Under the theory of the state, the rule of law "stands as a moral (not

85

Professor deLisie in his presentation at the University of Michigan in Fall 2010 stated that the
thin and thick model is only a pragmatic manner in structuring a discussion and this model is far
from representing a hallmark model, even for the purpose of analyzing China's legal reform (notes
on file with the author)
86
See Robert P. George, Reason, Freedom and the Rule of Law: their Significance in the Natural
Law Tradition (2001) 46 Am. J. Juris. 249, at 250
87
See generally, Radin supra 11
88
See generally Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 100 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1973) (1651)
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a prudential) relationship 89 , and needs a legal authority that is morally binding on
its citizens. 90 With such an omission in applying its model empirically, the thin
and thick model supporters evade the challenge of articulating the rule of law as a
political

theory,

especially

on

government,

the

judiciary

and

legal

institutionalization.

Another challenge to the thin and thick model is that, in transition economies,
China for example, it does not address the ramifications of the shifting social,
political, economic and international setting for its implementation and
application. As detailed later as to the rule of law - development rhetoric, a
comprehensive evaluation and outside force to the development of the rule of law
are indispensible and of pith and moment.

In spite of these theoretical and empirical obstacles and challenges to applying the
thin and thick model in defining the rule of law, and its tendency to be too
forcefully applied, it still can be accepted as a practical and modem means to
describe and analyze a legal system, especially for developing countries. Given
the lack of empirical value represented by the thin and thick model, it is far too
early to abandon the instrumental and substantive conceptions of the rule of law
prescribed by leading theorists. While analyses and reform propositions based on
the thick/thin model are still among the most important and realistic proposals for
restructuring a legal system, however, assertions propelled by this model

89

See Michael Oakeshott, On History? And Other Essays, Imprint Academic (January 2004) at

163
90

!d. at 170-171, cited by Ortz supra 20 at 84-86 and accompanying notes
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inevitably involves the connection between instrumental and substantive
conceptions.

2.4. The Rule of Law- Development Rhetoric

Over the past few decades, especially after the end of Cold war, the rule of law
rhetoric has experienced an impressive revival, not only in western academic
discourses, but also in a parallel reinforcement in the international sphere. 91 The
prevalence of western civilization, technology, capitalism, and globalization
inspired tremendous indigenous demand for law in the non-western world 92 and
developing countries. Among the newly spread disciplines reached by the rule of
law, the area of law and development has dramatically escalated and reshaped the
traditional rule of law discourse, normatively and practically. For international
financial institutions (IFis) - major drivers of this law and development rule of
law rhetoric 93

-

the rule of law is associated with economic development,

modernization and settings of market economy, rather than any rigid legal or
political ideal.

This new trend of expanding the conception of rule of law is driven by the
development assistance offered by IFis in a suddenly unipolar world with tactical
demands of reforming IFI borrower countries' legal systems. 94 In particular, IFI
client countries should adopt sets of rules that would enshrine the policy
91

See generally, Ohnesorge: Asia's Legal Systems, supra 20; see also, Ohnesorge, The Rule of
Law and Economic Development, supra 24
92
See generally, Li Xiuqing, supra 4
94

See generally Ohnesorge, supra 24, discussing the political movement such as the crash down
of Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union fall-down
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prescriptions of the Washington Consensus in their legal systems. 95 The rule of
law - development rhetoric envisions both positivist96 and formalist suggestions
that economic development at times may be prioritized over civil, social, and
political development which will predictably follow the sustainable economic
development, in particular, deregulation, privatization of state-owned sectors,
tight restrictions on bureaucratic discretion, stringent property rights protections,
enhanced protections for minority shareholders, a well-functioning tax system,
and independent judicature, amongst others. 97

The interpretation of the rule of law rhetoric has changed over time, experiencing
an ongoing expansion of its substance. Adopting an instrumental conception of
the rule of law as a start, IFI initially demands primarily a functioning legal
infrastructure that is capable of enforcing substantive rules.

98

In 1999, the

Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) proposed by the World Bank
envisioned a highly contentious 99 "all in" notion 100 of legal reform in a client
country, requiring that a client country protect "human and property rights," 101
and set up "a comprehensive framework oflaws," 102 reasoning that otherwise, "no
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See generally, Alvaro Santos, supra 20
See Ohnesorge, supra 24 at 94
97
For detailed analysis, review and critics about the Washington Consensus, See generally, Narcis
Serra and Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global
Governance (Initiative for Policy Dialogue) Oxford University Press, USA (2008)
98
See Ohnesorge: Asia's Legal Systems, supra 20, at 65
99
See Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (2002) challenging the neoliberal
orthodoxy based Washtington Censensus and its applicability. See also Kenneth Rogoff presents
an extraordinary open letter to respond Stiglitz's criticism,
http://www. imf.org/external/np/vc/200 1/070202. htm
100
See John Ohnesorge, The Rule of Law, Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 3:99-114 ( 2007) at 106,
quoting the new Comprehensive Development Framework proposed by World Bank President
James Wolfensohn on legal reform issues of developing countries
96

lOlJd.
l02Jd.
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equitable development is possible."

103

The CDF further demanded that a

government ensure "an effective system of property, contract, labor, bankruptcy,
commercial codes, personal rights laws and other elements of a comprehensive
legal system"

104

(emphasis added by the author), which are effectively,

impartially and cleanly administered by "a well-functioning, impartial and honest
judicial and legal system." 105 Apparently, this description of the rule of law was
too broad in its embrace of liberal values of democracy and justice. Values of
democracy, justice, human rights and limited government go over and above an
instrumental conception of rule of law, 106 which requires only elements such as
know-ability and perform-ability. 107

Echoing criticism and resistance from client countries, the World Bank in 2002
defined conditions of the Rule of Law in its Initiatives in Legal and Judicial
Reform: "(I) the government itself is bound by the law; (2) all in society are
treated equally under the law; (3) the government authorities, including the
judiciary, protect the human dignity of its citizens; and (4) justice is accessible for
all its citizens. 108 The rule of law requires transparent legislation, fair laws,
predictable enforcement, and accountable governments to maintain order,
promote private sector growth, fight poverty, and have legitimacy. 109 Legal and

Id.
!d.
1os Id.
106 Id.
107
See Radin supra 11, at 786
108
See generally, World Bank Initiatives in Legal and Judicial Reform (2002),
http://siteresources. worldbank.org/BRAZILINPOREXTN/Resources/3 8171661185895645304/4044168-1186409169154/18initiativesFinal.pdf (last visited on March 15, 2011)
109 !d., at 2
1o3

104
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judicial reform is a means to promote the rule of law." 110 We can perceive that, in
this definition, the World Bank aims its definition at the approval ofhuman rights
activists and dyed-in-the-wool internationalists. Without a doubt, this definition
raises the bar for the market economy development model as well as
infrastructure reconstruction for borrower countries, which are plagued by its
vague, generally articulated standards.

The rule of law rhetoric in the economic development context brings together
literatures 111 theorizing, in various ways, the relationship between legal reform
and economic development. 112The scholarship in this area mostly explicates two
essentials for a proper rule of law: limiting bureaucratic discretion on economic
governance, and promoting freedom of contracts and private property rights
protection.

Limitation of bureaucratic discretion

connotes transparency,

predictable administration, and anti-corruption. The second essential element,
ensuring freedom of contract and protection of property rights (including
intellectual property rights), is the foundation of market economy. In this sense,
rule of law rhetoric in the economic development context accords with Raz's

110

!d., at 3
Professor John Ohnesorge in the past years has summarized and been a major contributor on
the rule of law - economic development rhetoric. For discussion about the rule of law reform
dominated by western jurisdictions and IF Is, see also generally in Thomas Carothers, The Rule of
Law Revival, Foreign Affairs 77-95 (2006), Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law
Abroad: In search of Knowledge, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endow. Int. Peace, 2006); for
discussion of rule oflaw reform and development in other developing countries, see John Stanley
Gillespie, Transplanting Commercial Law Reform: Developing a "Rule of Law'' in Vietnam,
(Ashgate, Burlington VT, 2006), http://www.ejcl.orgl122/review122-l.PDF, See Paul Gewirtz,
The U.S.-China Rule of Law Initiative, William Mary Bill Rights J. 11 603-22 (2003); Kathryn
Hendley, Assessing the Rule of Law in Russia, Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L 14 347-91 (2006),
http://www.law. wisc.edu/rnlzgyzz/russian_style_rol.pdf; Professor Ohnesorge 's works are
http://www.law.wisc.edu/profiles/pubs.php?iEmployeeiD=184 (last visited March 15, 2011)
112
!d., Carothers, stating that the law and economic development also suffered from a fall from
grace in the 1970s and 1980s, at 22-25
111
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"Rule of Good Law," but also heeds the Hayekian definition requiring
predictability and private economic protections.
The rule of law rhetoric in the economic development is more favored by
politicians, who see rule of law reforms as part of a broader strategy to
micromanage the social and economic structures of IFI client countries, and
thereby to steer reform down a path of development, which caters to IFI policy
preferences. According to the ideal formula of IFI rule of law models, economic
development "spills over" into areas of sensitive political and legal issues, and
uses economic incentives to bring transition countries in line with IFI - especially
American- ideals of liberal democracy. The mark of American political and legal
ideology in this rhetoric is undeniable. IFis and international organizations such
as the WTO largely concentrate on the competency and autonomy of the judicial
and legislative sectors and on promoting administrative proficiency in member
states.

113

That these efforts conform to the United State's understanding of its own

political ideals and economic best interests is not a coincidence.

The rule of law rhetoric in the economic development phenomenon exhibits the
influence, enforceable upon developing states by developed states through
international organizations like IFis, used to conform developing states' legal
infrastructures to the requirements of the global market economy. Although
empirically the development of Northeastern Asian countries has not proven the
inevitability of the development of the rule of law, especially in the case of liberal

113

See generally, Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American
Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. Pa. J. Int'l
Econ. L. 179,217-18 (1999).
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legal values, 114 there is still an urgency in these countries to adopt the conceptions
of rule of law, in a pragmatic and realistic manner, which cater to their own
economic, social and legal needs. As will be discussed below, China's invitation
of the rule of law as impacted by its WTO membership, both charms and
frustrates domestic and outside commentators, albeit for widely varying reasons.

2.5 Summary

Having discussed major conceptions and arguments of the rule of law rhetoric,
bifurcations such as instrumental and substantive, positivism and natural law, the
thin and thick model, and the economic development rhetoric, this thesis aims to
prepare a reasonable, practical and realistic foundation to evaluate the progress of
the China's legal reform in the past three decades. Pushing this goal further, this
thesis tentatively submits- on the basis of the foregoing contemporary debates of
Rule of Law - a tailored, pragmatic and practical proposal for the tax reform
rhetoric under China's current legal infrastructure. This proposed rhetoric is
underpinned by instrumental notions of, inter alia, generality, clarity, consistency,
enforceability, stability and congruence, as well as substantive notions of judicial
independence, human rights and the limitation of bureaucratic government.

III. The Establishment of the Socialist Rule of Law with Chinese
Characteristics

Chronicling Chinese officials' discussion of China's rule of law conception is
essential, given its contested content within a complicated transitory "elite legal
114

See Ohnesorge, The Rule ofLaw and Economic Development, supra 20, at 95
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culture," 115and because the Chinese party-state devises and implements the legal
reform process. Below, therefore we examine the policies orientations taken by
senior politicians and cheered by scholars. In the past thirty years, three stages of
legal reform and development have taken place based on Deng's theory of
"socialism with Chinese characteristics" for economic reform.

3.1 Deng's Legal Theorems

Deng Xiaoping, facing a fragmented polity after the Cultural Revolution, first
focused on "institutionalization" (zhiduhua
(fazhihua

¥*i11Ht).

i!iU J.:t {t )

and "legitimatization"

In particular, Deng said, "to safeguard people's democracy"

and "to ensure the stability, continuity and full authority of.. .[the] democratic
system and laws", there must be "laws for people to follow, laws [must] be
observed, enforcement must be strict and lawbreakers must be punished." 116
These 16 words 117 are still enshrined in the minds of Chinese politicians and
academics as pillars ofthe socialist legal canon as to features of"to modernize the
law, to observe the law and act in accordance with law, equity before the law, and
to fortify laws as the utmost authority. 118"

115

See Pitman Potter, The Chinese Legal System: Globalization and Local Legal Culture
(Routledge Studies on China in Transition, 2001) at Preface and 115
116
See People's Daily, The Communique of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the
Central Committee ofCCP (December 22, 1978)
117
Deng's legal thoughts center on "there must be laws to go by, the laws must be observed and
strictly enforced, and lawbreakers must be prosecuted."("1f$PJ11X ' j:f$£;,{~ • tJL$!16'F ' ;(2

$!J6,JE")
118

See generally, Research on Deng Xiao Ping's Ideologies on Rule of Law,
http://www.yfzs.gov.cn/gb/info/xsll/2006-03/19/1950232785.html (last visited on March 15,
2011); Chuanguang Jiang Goujian Zhongguo Fazhi Shehui de Zhinan - Deng Xiao Ping Fazhi
Sixiang Yanjiu [Guidelines on Structuring the Rule of Law in China -Research on Deng Xiao
Ping's Ideologies on Rule of Law], (Anhui University Press, 2000)
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Likely reflecting wisdom gained in his personal political tribulations, Deng's goal
of "institutionalization" of law focused primarily on circumventing individual
arbitrariness, and the "rule of men." His goal of "legitimization" aimed at
improving legal awareness (/alii yishi ¥:!1*~i9-) and equity before law (/alii mian

qian renren pingdeng

¥:!1-lfi.m!W AA 3f-~). Pursuing these

goals however, Deng

was adamant that in establishing a stable political order, resistant to outside
influence, China should also achieve economic development.

119

We have to admit that Deng's institutionalization and legitimization ideals come
from an ideological standpoint that is radically different from that of traditional
rule of law conceptions. His political agenda demands that law, as an institution,
simply normalize a set of rules to buttress economic development and eradicate
political turmoil of the kind seen during the Cultural Revolution. On the other
hand, his legal theorems are constructed to solidify the ruling position of the
communists and not to vivify law in a role over and above the party-state. Deng's
alternative political interpretation of the rule of law is well evidenced by the One
Party rule and his refusal to adopt Americanized separation of powers in the mid1980s. 120

119

See generally, Deng Xiao Ping Wen Xuan Di San Juan [Selected Works of Deng Xiao Ping],
Volume III (2000) In Deng's famous notion that constructing economic development on one hand,
and law and socialist value on the other, with equal priority and commitments (liangshouzhua,
liangshou dou yaoying f!'l§-'f-tJK • fl'l§-'f-j!f/3~~), Deng again reiterated his concomitant goals to
achieve economic development and thwart westernized liberal invasion
120
!d. at 256, stating that Deng rejected a western mutually constrained system, stating "if
excessive emphasis is placed on a mutually limited system, it maybe still cannot solve the problem"
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3.2 Jiang's Development of Socialist rule of law

Although initially seen as a "puppet"

121

of Deng, Jiang Zemin made bold strides

to develop the socialist rule of law in the 1990s. The term "rule of law," in fact,
did not officially surface until 1997 at the 15th CCP Congress, where it was
presented as a part of the new phase of socialist market economy development. 122
In a 2005 editorial in Qiu Shi (Seeking Truth), an official publication of CCP
Standing Committee, Jiang proposed the rule of law to "renovate legal and
administrative system, improve 'for the people' ideology and modernize sqciety
to strengthen order and keep away unhealthy influences." 123 In essence, the
socialist market economy precipitated the shift away from Deng's rule by law to
Jiang's new rule of law conception. However, cautioning romanticized
expectations of the "socialist rule of law", Jiang further clarified in an Op-Ed
piece for the People's Daily that his regal goal in developing the rule of law was
"upholding and improving political system without copying any westernized
models." Indeed the rule of law was to be "decisive in sustaining the leadership of
the party" and the people's democracy."

124

Jiang further bulleted that

"administration in accordance with law unifies the Party's leadership ... and
121

See Edward Friedman, Jiang Zemin 's Successors and China's Growing, in China Under Hu
Jintao, Opportunities, Dangers and Dilemma, 97-134 (Cheng, deLisle and Brown, ed., World
Scientific, 2006)
See Cai Dingjian & Wang Chenguang, China's Journal Toward the Rule of Law (Koninklijk
Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands, and Social Sciences Academic Pres, Beijing, 2010)
[hereinafter "Cai and Wang"] at 15-16
123
See generally, Jiang Zemin, Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theor for all All122

Round Advancement of the Cause of Building Socilist with Chinese characterises into the 21'1
Century - Report Delivered at the 151h National Congress of the Communist Party of China
(Gaoju Deng Xiao Ping Lilun Weida Qizhi, Ba Jianshe You Zhongguo Tese Shehui Zhuyi Shiye
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http:l/news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/20/content 697189.htm (last visited on March 15, 2011)
124Jd.
-
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ensures the enforcement and implementation of the Party's basic policies ... to
ensure that the Party at all times play the crucial leading role in controlling the
full situation and coordinating all constituents." 125

Jiang's rule of law therefore may be read as a cogent recapitulation of Deng's
institutionalization and legitimization, for a more modem and globalized Chinese
economic and political situation. Jiang's formulation still prioritizes the political
agenda of the party-state and un-challengeable position of the One Party
sovereign. Westernized or Americanized ideals of separation of powers, judicial
independence, the supremacy of law, human rights and multiparty polity are
deemed "incompatible" with China's "overall situation" of socialism ("quanguo

daju" t±~±5C~OO:*:fi0). 126 The CCP and China's One Party system of rule,
during Jiang's era, faced severe challenges and pressures from domestic
dissidents and foreign governments and international institutions. Jiang's rule of
law was a response to domestic challenges to the party's legitimacy 127 and foreign
condemnations of China's sluggish reform process. 128 After abandoned the notion
of socialist rule by law (shehui zhuyi fazhi ;f±~.±xl!$0) in political reform
settings, Jiang further honors the rule of virtue (yide zhiguo ~ 1~ ¥§1
125

00)

to

!d. (omissions added by this thesis)
See People's Daily (overseas version), February I, 2001
127
See Jiang Zemin, "Resolutions in the CCP Central Committee Regarding Important Questions
on Promoting Socialist Ethical and Cultural Program," adopted at the Sixth Session of the 141h
CCP Central Committee Congress, October 10, 1996. Jiang warned about the deterioration of
moral standards, the practice of worshipping money, seeking pleasure and selfish individualism,
the revival of feudal superstitions, pornography, gambling and drug abuse, the production of
shoddy and fake goods and fraud in the market place, and rampant corruption, all of which are
seriously damaging the work of both Party and government. Furthermore, there is a vacuum in
people's faith in socialism and the ideal of honoring the state is weak. He claimed that all these
problems must be resolved through the promotion of ethical and cultural moralism. See generally,
Cai and Wang, supra 122
128
See generally CECC 2002 Report, supra 16
126
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supplement the rule of law to divert attention pushing on political refonn to legal
and administrative system refonn.

The "Three Represents" (sange daibiao

.:=:.1- 1~ *-.) 129

arguably is the most

remarkable theorized contribution made by Jiang to the socialism movement.
Although Jiang fought hard to insert the "Three Represents" as an amendment to
the Preface of Constitution and the Party Charter, together with the "rule of
virtue", it still fails to weld the political legacy and ideological vacuum
opinionated by the general constituents. Is the upholding of the "rule of virtue"
another resort to justify the inwardly sensitiveness of adopting the westernized
conception of rule of law, or to find Chinese ancient root for the rule of law
rhetoric to substantiate the legitimacy ofthe party-state? There is no clear answer
to this. However, the academia in China admits that rule of virtue marginalize the
debate and introduction of the traditional or western rule of law conception, even
the "rule of virtue" proclaims fair competition, creditability, self-respect and
cooperation with government.

Although Jiang boldly introduced the "rule of law" discourse into the social,
political and legal settings of China, the conception he articulated was to secure
the ruling of party-state and maintain the authoritarian status of the CCP, rather
than to implement checks on governmental powers. Jiang's rule of law is
therefore, in essence, a reformulation of Deng's legal theorems that aims to

129

See generally Larry Cata Backer, Chinese Constitutionalism, Sange Daibiao (the "Three
Represents''), and the Rule of Law, 16 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 29, 33-34 (2006) for a
detailed analysis of the rule of law reform and the "Three Represents"
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stimulate economic development and evade potential challenges to the part-state
legitimacy.

3.3 The Hu-Wen Harmonious Society Undertaking

Chinese President, Hu Jintao, and Premier, Wen Jiabao, are survivors ofthe first
arguably peaceful power transition in modem Chinese history, and its legacy
represents the ascension of China's fourth generation of leadership after the
Sixteenth CCP Congress held in November 2002. Unlike their predecessors, Hu
and Wen have been confronted with myriad domestic political challenges from
economic readjustments domestically and constant international calls for
economic and political liberalization, to managing the SARS epidemic and an
Olympic Games. The leaders, as a result of their WTO obligations in particular,
face difficult choices in carrying out their political agenda.

Hu and Wen advocate a "harmonious society" for promoting people's welfare

(minsheng, ~ :1:.) and balancing economic growth with social justice. In this
instance, Hu and Wen have plainly inherited the discourse of"socialist rule of law"
from Jiang, while concern for social welfare and reducing socioeconomic
disparity that have clearly affected their notion of the object of law. Hu and Wen
have mostly been "trouble-removers" and have faced complex a domestic
political setting after China's over two decades of economic growth and
participation in international orders. Cultivating their gross-roots allures, Hu and
Wen have concerned themselves and the party more with the plight of lowincome citizenry and countryside or agricultural welfares. Extensive corruption,
201

undisciplined local grandees, enlarged social disparity, a further deteriorated
environment, growing breakouts of worker unrest, and social imbalance all
contribute to Hu and Wen's policy deviations from their predecessors' focus on
economic development, SOE destruction and reform, and international outreaches.

As evidenced by the amendment to China's constitution in 2004, which includes
safeguarding human rights and private property rights as a primary focus of the
party-state, Hu and Wen have added more "substantive" or "thick" elements to
the official undertaking of the rule of law reform in China. It further accents the
economic development, WTO obligation fulfillment and the sense that the ruling
party-state cannot be preserved without promoting justice and fairness.
Substantial as the Constitution's rule of law development looks in its invocation
of employing laws as weapons to protect individuals' rights and liberties, citizens'
fair share of social wealth and corresponding social status, Hu and Wen mostly
purport seeking to achieve a harmonious relationship between GDP growth and
social welfare, with the ultimate goals of maintaining social stability and cooling
down hatreds towards the highest echelon of wealthy classes

(7t 'I Mi'm). Hu and

Wen's political vocabulary does not speak to political harmony or further
institutionalized legal structure, nor does its agenda ever manifestly proclaim the
rule of law. Thus, it is well recognized that Hu and Wen's focus, albeit using a
rule of law discourse, continues to try to secure CCP's rule status and maintain
social stability.

202

It is too early to analyze ideologies on socialist rule of law of Xi Jinping and Li
Keqiang, who are supposed to take over the mantle ofthe Hu-Wen legacy in three
years. However, given the perceptions of CCP's steady goal of securing partystate sovereign and traditional focus on GOP growth, a reasonable observation
would conclude that in the near future an overhauled upgrade of rule of law
reform is not attainable, especially under the decentralized and cliquey
factionalism of the inner-party system, which is now under heated debate.

3.4. Summary

In summary, the development of socialist rule of law rhetoric is a paradoxical
labor, being receptive to market economy principles and modernizing state and
private enterprises on the one hand, while remorselessly preserving an autocratic
form of socialism on the other. Such a paradox can only be described as "the
socialist rule of law with Chinese Characteristics", with vague description of
"characteristics" and re-interpretative conception of "socialism". Throughout the
three decades of economic reform and social evolution, and three generations of
CCP leaderships, China has consistently made overtures toward the goal of setting
up the rule of law order. However, ideological barriers still preclude adoption of
traditional rule of law conceptions, allowing only for strategic reinterpretations.
Minimum thresholds of traditional rule of law: protection of individual rights and
building up a "government under rule of law" (fazhi zhengfu 1t:.¥~ II;&

m)

or

"limited government" (youxian zhengfu :fr~~~}ff), still appear unachievable. The
development of socialist rule of law is heavily constrained by serving its political
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initiatives of maintaining social stability and securing the one party state. Even
bearing a "Chinese characteristic" or "socialism" stamp, which might lay
differences at the doorstep of legitimate sovereignty concerns, the legal institution
itself can hardly say as being embraced or centered as a modern means to
harmonize the society.

Any serious discussion of a viable rule of law rhetoric for use in China must
consider its domestic political and social needs to maintain social stability and its
demonstrated desire to maintain one party rule, in conjunction with new and
complex roles played by China in the international arena. The CCP's adoption of
new political slogans such as "doing things in accordance with international
standard" and "assimilation or harmonization with international practice,"
compels serious commentators to include in-depth examination of the impact of
international organizations, such as the WTO, in their reviews of China's socialist
rule of law rhetoric.

IV. The Implication of Rule of Law Conception to Contemporary China
4.1. Legal Reform in the Past Three Decades

Beginning in the late 1970s with an over-manipulated and shattered Constitution
that was essentially a complex assurance of the CCP's ruling status, established
institutions of socialist governance, and a limited number of vaguely worded
statutes typically derived from CCP's class struggle policy pronouncements (yi
jieji touzheng weigang l-;Uf1!&1J..!ft-~~), China has developed an extensive body
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of laws, regulations, and other legal enactments. 130This accomplishment has only
been possible with the parallel development of administrative infrastructure, as
well as the establishment of over 400 post-secondary law departments which have
graduated over 250,000 students. Professor William Alford's excellent summary
ten years ago on the achievements of China's legal system reform might shad
some lights on such promising and phenomenal progress 131 :
Over the past quarter century, China has been engaged in the most
concerted program of legal construction is world history. At the end of the
Cultural Revolution, China's modest legal infrastructure lay in near ruinwith but a skeletal body of legislation, a thinly staffed judicial system, and
a populace having scant awareness of law ... China now has an extensive
body of national and sub-national legislation and other legal enactment,
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The literature on China's legal reform in the past three decades in voluminous. See generally,
The 601h Anniversary of the PRC: A Retrospective on the Chinese Legal System, 23 Colum. J.
Asian L. (2009); China's Legal System: New Developments, New Challenges, The China
Quarterly (Special issue, September 2007) (Cambridge University Press) on China's legal reform;
For projects related to China's rule of law reform, See generally, Gewirtz, supra 111; Randall
Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law: Administrative Law Reform
and Rule of Law in the People's Republic ofChina, 19 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 161, 198-99 (2001);
Fred Bergsten, N. Lardy, B. Gill & D. Mitchell, The Balance Sheet in 2007 and Beyond,
(Conference held jointly by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Peterson
Institute for International Economics, Apr. 2007) (suggesting that "China is slowly establishing
elements of a 'rule of law' system"),
http:// www.chinabalancesheet.org/Documents/05RuleofLaw.pdf; (last visited on March 15,
2011); Randall Peerenboom, What Have we Learned about Law and Development? Describing,
Predicting, and Assessing Legal Reforms in China, 27 Mich. J. Int'l L. 823, 842 (2006); Randall
Peerenboom, Law and Development of Constitutional Democracy in China: Problem or
Paradigm?, 19 Colum. J. Asian L. 185, 187 (2005); Li Buyun, Ideal and Reality of the Rule of
Law in China, 3 J. Chinese & Comp. L. 40-59 (1997); Xianchu Zhang, Commentary on
"Legislating for a Market Economy in China," 191 China Q. 586, 588 (2007) (citing the Report on
Policy
of
the
World
Bank
Institute,
http://
Governance
and
Social
www. worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters4 .htm. (last visited on March 15, 2011)
131
See generally, Alford, supra 20, noting that Chinese officials proudly report the promulgation
in the past quarter century of more than 300 laws by NPC and its Standing Committee, more than
700 regulations by the State Council, more than 4,000regulations by sub-national people's
congresses and their standing committees, and more than 24,000 other legal enactments by the
ministries arrayed under the State Council and their sub-national counterparts
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concentrated on, but not limited to, economic matters, and has joined
major international agreements covering trade, the environment, human
rights, intellectual property and a host of other issues... The Chinese
judicial system now has a nation-wide presence, with specialized
chambers to address criminal, civil, economic, administrative and in some
instances, intellectual property law questions. Whereas a generation ago,
China had fewer than 3,000 lawyers and approximately a dozen law
schools, now there are over 125,000 lawyers and hundreds oflaw schools,
with law a very popular subject for university study and well over 150,000
candidates yearly taking the bar exam. Chinese citizens now avail
themselves of the formal legal system in an unprecedented manner ... 132
As noted above, the achievements of the past three decades of formal legal
development have been phenomenal. After a few controversial amendments,
China has developed an intricate Constitution that sets forth an institutional
regime for the protection of, inter alia, general economic social and cultural as
well as civil and political rights of individuals. The Constitution further
establishes the legal functions and statuses of central and local Congresses, courts,
and the Procuracy and other key administrative institutions. Basic laws (ji ben fa

£7-js:l:E) promulgated by the NPC Standing Committee implement and fill in the
rights and governance system outlined in the Constitution, detailing principles and
rules on commercial routines, contracts, civil, criminal and administrative
principle and procedure, enterprise, tax,

132Jd
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finance,

securities, labor, and

environmental protection, among other areas, many of which are in their fourth or
later revisions; and various laws and regulations in areas of investment,
corporations, health and safety, construction, intellectual property, and legal
profession. 133 The Constitution and laws therefore cover almost all major aspects
of social, economic and legal life in China. Moreover, China has extended its
international presence tremendously, as exemplified by its WTO membership and
improved discourse power in IFis, all of which contributes to and encourages
China's legal reform.
Notwithstanding the above accomplishments and ongoing legal reform, there are
still debates on how to reform China's legal system, and even suspicions on
whether China owns a separate and institutionalized legal system or ifthere exists
a "Chinese legal system" at all. A notably opinionated view along these lines
holds that Chinese historical, social, and political settings are so fractured and
inhomogeneous

from

modern

western

legal

system,

that

meaningful

transplantation or adoption of western legal ideals, e.g. a western polity, to China
is fantasy. 134 This view, although analytically it bears the merits of an in-depth
understanding of Chinese legal settings, showcases a certain deficiency in
historical materialism on which it theorized western legal tradition, and
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See generally, China's Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the Rule of Law, Information
Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (February 2008), stating that
China's promulgation efforts have also been coupled with unprecedented undertakings in training,
nominating and placing required personnel for the legal project. Moreover, China citizens are
increasingly engaging themselves in safeguarding rights and receiving basic legal assistance. The
awareness of Chinese citizen to understand, accept, and employ law has been improved and more
rooted in the population including farmers of more than 1 billion
134
See Donald Clark, Puzzling Observation in Chinese Law: When is a Riddle Just a Mistake? in
C. Stephen Hsu, Ed., Understanding China's Legal System: Essays in Honor of Jerome A. Cohen
(New York: New York University Press, 2003) at 93
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exaggerates the difference between the legal systems. First, the danger of this
view is to isolate western legal ideals in a self-congratulatory manner as a system
without referential needs from other legal systems. Second, legal reform in China
has, since its imperial era, been shaped by western legal norms. Republican era
China's laws were an almost direct translation of western norms. 135 Moreover,
China's contemporary legal reform also presents a strong absorption of westernize
legal ideas. Third, the impact of participation in the international legal sphere
cannot be understated. Finally, it causes illusion that supporters of this view
neglect international and domestic efforts to build a more accepted and
functioning Chinese legal system.
4.2. Rule of Law vs. Rule by law

It is essential now to revisit and appraise two conceptions of the possible
relationship between law and the state: rule by law and rule of law. These two
notions, although they are somewhat unsophisticated for the purposes of complete
normative comparison, outline basic sets of prerequisites for modern economic
development and legal infrastructures, especially in transitory and emerging
economies: an independent judiciary; and limited bureaucratic discretion and
administration. Both of these constructs assume away a third possibility of rule by
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See generally, Tay-sheng Wang, Legal Reform in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, 18951945: The Reception ofWestern Law (University of Washington Press, 2000)
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definition - the rule of men

136

and both are particularly appropriate to the

discussion ofvarious aspects ofChina's legal reform 137 •
Rule by law as a term in this thesis primarily refers to the instrumental aspect of
law: descriptive, positive, and thin. Rule of law as a term, given various
interpretations and for the purpose of comparing with the rule by law, represents a
prescriptive, normative, thick and political view that includes, but is not limited to,
separation of powers, fairness and justice, judicial review and embracing liberty
and freedom. 138 Given the substantial impacts that these two conceptions have had
on Chinese legal reform, it is necessary to briefly describe the difference between
these two terms.
Rule by law does not require separation of between the legal infrastructure and
the state. In this sense, rule by law aims at implementation of generally prescribed,
known, consistent, and enforceable rules by the state government over human
conduct.
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Value in this system is placed on uniformity, impartiality and

predictability 140 in application, which invites the regularity and consistency in a
legal system independent of spontaneous political and social interference. Of
136

See Yufan Hao, From Rule of Men to Rule of Law: An Unintended Consequences of
Corruption in China in the 1990s, 8 J. Contemp. China.(I999); See also Cai and Wang, supra 122
at 1-50
137
See Albert Chen, Toward a Legal Enlightenment: Discussion in Contemporary China on the
Rule of Law, 17 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. at 135
138
See Radin, infra 11, at 783-91, discussing the "instrumental" and "substantive" concepts of law;
see also, Robert Summers, supra 11, at 127, 135, briefing the "formal" and "substantive" concepts
of the rule of law. For discussions in Chinese, see generally, Zhu Haigen, From Rule by Law to
Rule of Law (Cong Fazhi Dao Fazhi, 2008),
http://www.chinacourt.org/html!article/200812/19/336712.shtml (last visited on March 15, 2011);
Cheng Liaoyuan, From Rule by Law to Rule of Law (Cong Fazhi Dao Fazhi) (China Law Press,
1999)
139
See Radin, supra11, at 785-786 and accompanying text.
140
See generally, Maimon Schwarzschild, Keeping it Private (2007), stating that legal stability
and predictability are a fundamental part of"what people mean by the Rule of Law"
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course, the minimum requirement is that there is a set up codified rules available
for administration and application. So, enforcement of rules can be merely
realized by legal staffs of a state's administrative and judicial apparatuses. Rule
by law is often criticized, because even an authoritarian legal system or a legal
system depraving human rights may qualify such relatively strict instrumental and
. . . th res h olds. 141
positivist
Rule by law is most similar to Fuller's eight fundamental characteristics
instrumental conception. 142 Meanwhile, formalist theorists also hearken back to
Fuller, 143 who also claims that formalism lies in the concept of decision making
according to law. 144 In this sense, a formalist view of rule by law centers on using
the promulgation and enforcement of law as a method of ruling. 145 Rule by law, in
terms of enforcement, envisions a method whereby legal rules are enforced as a
part of governance. However, rule by law as instrumental, descriptive and positive,
does not embrace fully the "inner morality" or values as preferred by Fuller.
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Rule of law, on the contrary, incorporates a normative and political theory of the
relationship between the state and law. In this sense, rule of law primarily refers
to a set of substantive and prescriptive values and political theories of limited
government, independent judiciary, how laws are used and how governmental
discretion is constrained by law. Rule of law, as discussed in the economic
development literature, has expanded to include almost all characteristics of
!d.
See generally, Fuller supra 30
143
See Summers, supra 11,at 135 (1993)
144
See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97, Yale L.J. 509-510 (1988)
145
!d. see also Radin supra 11 at 796
146
See Fuller supra 30 at 42-44, 96-97; see also Radin Supra11 at 795-96
141
142
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"good law" or "good governance." In this sense, the rule of law embraces a
constitutional structure in which government behavior is subject to review by
independent legal process, and possibly, limitations and punishment, i.e.,
government officials are monitored by judicial review. Therefore, a wellfunctioning judicial system including court, police, judges, qualified legal
professionals, and a set of normative procedures is required for the rule of law in
the economic development literature. Although Fuller's eight characteristics of
rule of law may also be broadly reinterpreted in a substantive and prescriptive
way, 147 other interpretations of rule of law cannot be missed. Among others, Raz
argues that ''judicial judgments shall have the final binding force", "the power of
judicial review on legislation and administrative action is secure", and "courts are
accessible to citizens, and that the discretion possessed by crime-preventing
agencies should not pervert the law."
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Therefore, rule of law in Raz's

conception, requires at least a judicial and legal infrastructure independent, at
least to some extent, of administrative interference.
In summary, in the context of Chinese legal reform, the development of rule of
law conception has been inextricably intertwined with polity evolution in China.
Following the Republic of China in adopting a westernized model, China's legal
reform in the past three decades gradually developed into a mixed yet promising
socialist rule of law catering to the needs of a globalized market economy. From
the beginning of China's contemporary legal reform, there has been consensus to
147

See William P. Alford, A Second Great Wall?: China's Post-Cultural Revolution Project of
Legal Construction, 11 Cultural Dynamics, 203-205, describing the forces encouraging an attitude
of"instrumental approaches to legality" in China,[hereinafter Alford: A Second Great Wall]
148
See Radin 11 at 788-789
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pursue the rule of law or rule by law rather than rule of men to circumvent
individual arbitrariness and personality cult. Moreover, given the heated debates
on which model of rule of law that China should undertake, the instrumental
characteristics of rule of law and a realistic understanding of China's political,
economic, social and international settings are commensurably essential.
Furthermore, rule by law and rule of law bifurcation on one hand shows the
China's promise to developing a law based market economy, and present arduous
commitments to China in developing a rule oflaw order on the other. Situating an
instrumental, descriptive and positive conception of rule of law as bottom line,
reasonable efforts to promote a normative and substantive conception of rule of
law would for sure escalate China's legal reform conforming to universally
accepted values and ideals of human rights protection, limited government,
functioning independent judiciary and impartial administration by bureaucratic
discretions. The analysis of this chapter shows that, putting aside the prioritization
on which rule oflaw model that China should embrace and adopt (assuming there
is one), the formal aspects of Chinese legal reform including its deficiencies and
problem need be identified and appraised. Needless to say, China's greatly
increased international commitments have made its need for domestic legal
reform more urgent.
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4.3. Incompetency of China's legal system

Chinese legal reform accomplishments deserve quality deliberations

149

but so do

various undertakings in which China's legal system continues to fall short of
expectations - either romanticized or widely accepted - of a modem, rule of law
state. In a substantive sense, China has substantially failed to protect legitimate
rights of all citizens, leaving groups such as rural seniors, unattended children,
migrant laborers, laid-off SOE workers, natural disaster victims, minority
nationals, and notoriously trafficked women, just name a few, without effective
legal recourse. The judiciary branch woefully is not privileged to be sufficiently
independent from the CCP and political authority, nor are its judges uniformly
competent or autonomous in their embrace of the rule of law and impartial
political ideals. Corruption, on both national and local levels and involving almost
all comers of economic and social fields, plagues the legal system abrasively.
Environmental protection protocols and low carbon guidelines are distorted in
application and encumber meaningful calculations in fighting pollution and
deterioration of ecological balance; administrative branch of government, though
improved under the new Information Disclosure Law in 2009, is still
characterized by its low efficiency, overstaffing, overlapping hierarchies of
command, and opacity. Although the legislative process has expanded to include
public hearings and opinion collection from a broader spectrum of interests, it
remains largely a top-down routine, typically falling short of implementing
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See generally, Liebman: Retrospective, supra 1
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formally provided opportunities for quality input from academics and popularized
comments by citizens, especially low-income constituencies.
Law enforcement, still manifests violence, dissonance, staffing shortages,
procedural confusion, 150 case nature misidentification, local protectionism and
retarded response mechanisms. The emergence of countless prison management
scandals has increased doubts about the competence of the penal system to uphold
the rights of accused and convicted individuals. 151 While China has accomplished
the formal articulation of a reformed socialist legal system, even the theoretical
and instrumental foundation articulated is not without problems. Indeed, one need
not hunt far to find limitations and vulnerability inherent even in the formal laws.
Even China's Constitution 152 has been the target of academic and public criticism.
Although China's Constitution has put forward panoply of basic rights of citizens,
some of which are not even explicitly stated in those of developed countries, the
difference between a constitution on the book and an enforceable document in
practice is so massive that western scholars and politicians have lost their faith in
a "qualified constitutionalism." 153 China's Constitution is not subject to litigation

°
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For example, see Cross-Provincial Detainment by Hubei Tongcheng Police Bureau [Hubei
Tongcheng Jingfang Kuasheng Zhuaren] May 30, 2009, Southern Weekend,
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2009-05-30/160517915790.shtml (last visited on March 15, 2011)
151
For example, the development of a popular lexicon deriving from these incidents, including
terms such as "peekaboo" (duomaomao), "soy sauce shopping" (dajiangyou), "pushing-up"
(fuwocheng), etc., which showcase the hazy and helpless mindsets of citizens
152
See generally, Marc Rosenberg, The Chinese Legal System Made Easy: A Survey of the
Structure of Government, Creation of Legislation, and the Judicial System under the Constitution
and Major Statutes of the People's Republic of China, 9 U, Miami Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. (200 1).
The precise role of the Constitution in Chinese law is subject to debate; Michael William Dowdle,
Of Parliaments, Pragmatism, and the Dynamics of Constitutional Development: The Curious Case
of China, 35 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. (2002).
153
!d., See also generally, Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs
(Columbia University Press, 1990), interpreting constitutionalism as comprising the following
elements: (1) government according to the constitution; (2) separation of power; (3) sovereignty of
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nor is it designed to serve as reference in judging cases - it is a nonjusticiable
document. Constitutionalism, in western traditional interpretations, means an
institution that denies the preeminence of the legislature but recognizes liberalism
and the realization of human rights and human nature. China's Constitution, 154 by
comparison, is relatively incapable of constraining the government's or authorities'
power or determining cases. Another defect ascribed to China's Constitution is its
amendments lack solid legal grounding; rather, those amendments are enshrined
as signifying the political supremacy of individual leaders. China's new 1982
Constitution has been amended four times over the past thirty years. Except a few
canonical amendments such as introducing the notion of a private sector economy,
market economy and the conception of rule of law, amendments are frequently
just juggling with terms in ways that suggest political manipulation rather than
legal reform is their impetus. For example, the forceful insertion of the "Three
Represents" into the 2004 Amendment did not even receive the supportive votes
in the NPC Parliament that seemed a foregone conclusion. It is well noted that
such unscrupulous political interference has heavily trampled on the stability and
authority of China's Constitution, which are minimum requirements of modern
Constitutionalism.
Considerable doubts about legislative upgrade of the Chinese legal system exist as
well. This old charge points to vagueness and obfuscation with regard to which

the people and democratic government; (4) constitutional review; (5) independent judiciary; (6)
limited government subject to a bill of individual rights; (7) controlling the police; (8) civilian
control of the military; and (9) no state power, or very limited and strictly circumscribed state
fower, to suspend the operation of some parts of, or the entire, constitution
54
See Marc Rosenberg, supra 152 at 225-226, arguing that China's Constitution is an aspirational
document lacking any binding legal force
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units of government, administrative organs or local authorities are appropriately
entitled to interpret and enforce any given cluster of laws and on what basis.

155

Ambiguity chronically consists in implementing standards and guidelines to
categorize various sources of laws, such as basic and other laws passed by the
NPC, regulations promulgated by state agencies by delegation or authorization,
and the enormous volume of interpretive notices and circulars enacted by nonjudicial administrative organs, to speak nothing of provincial and local decrees
and regulations.
Putting it simply, abstractions in legal language and inherent confusion within
Chinese legal system exacerbate the concerns aroused by of the inability to define
legal obligations and authoritative boundaries of administrations. Various
administrative agencies have failed to architect, annotate, and execute laws and
regulations promulgated by themselves, which are free of "riddle quizzing,"
deliberations and external reviews, particularly at times when unqualified,
obtrusive administrators intrude to chum out rules designed in part to superordinate their political symbol rather than serving underlying legislative
initiatives. 156 Moreover, Chinese legislative process is filled with stochastic inputs
that represent political motives and crisis interventions. It proceeds without a
formulated agenda to fill in legislation gaps, nor does it have an early-warning or
prefiguring process to identify fields of promulgation - many unplanned
regulations and laws are made on ad hoc basis - that lead to delayed remedies.
The Chinese legal system clearly needs an "ombudsperson," system or
155
156

See Alford: A Second Great Wall, supra 147 at 196
!d.
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coordination of networks that might help eradicate inadequacy or local protective
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Finally, the case or precedent record system has not been officially substantiated
throughout even the top judiciary reforms. As a so-called "civil law" system
bearing a former Soviet Union heritage, 158 Chinese courts are unpredictable in
creating or referring to precedents for adjudication or dispute settlement. This
attribute is no longer attributable to China's civil law origins, but rather, the
judiciary's lack of autonomy and confidence has prevented its embrace of the
precedents approach. Another censorable criticism of the Chinese judiciary is the
inconsistent qualification of judges and legal staff, which are crucial in realizing
the "predictabilities" of applying the "promulgated" regulations, an indispensable
characteristic for the rule of law conception. Such irregularity is inevitably more
evident when China's local courts hear cases featuring international norms and
foreign litigants, especially where, for example, the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism adopts a jurisdictional system in which case law and precedents
matter.
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See He Weifang, Three Supremes, Who is the Most Supreme? [Sange Zhishang Shui
Zhishang?], http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_488663200100atga.html (last visited on March 15,
2011)
158
This understanding is strengthened by Professor Whitmore Gray from the University of
Michigan Law School. Professor Gray noted that China in many aspects followed Soviet Union's
model for codification of important laws and such heritage still plays a huge part in jurisprudent
research settings (discussion notes on file with the author) See also Walter Gellhom, China's
Quest for Legal Modernity, 1 J. Chinese L. 1, 6 (1987), observing that China has relied heavily
upon Soviet Union for content of law, and training of judges, lawyers and legal staffs; for
discussions in Chinese, See generally, He Qinhua, Reexaminations of China's Transplantation of
Soviet Union Legal System (Guanyu Xinzhongguo Yizhi Sulian Sifa Zhidu de Fansi,2008),
http://www.china-review.com/sao.asp?id=2836 (last visited on March 15, 2011)
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4.4. Summary
The above plaudits and criticisms convincingly expose true facets of Chinese
legal reform, although the academic coverage has been much broader than it is
necessary for this thesis to examine. A balanced observer must admit the
significant strides China has taken, by reaping and absorbing advantages of
western liberal legality, in terms of its perceived capacity to buttress economic
growth, engage in the international legal order, upgrade existing legislation, and
reform its judiciary. On the other hand, given China's current authoritarian ruling
regime, too many social, political, historical troubles have thwarted and will
continue disturb China's legal reform process, making it fall short of meeting
certain instrumental requirements of the "rule of law" or creating a paradoxically
variant socialist rule of law system that heavily deviates from the original
initiatives of legal reform.

V. Prospects and Implications for China's Socialist Rule of Law

5.1. Is There a Necessity to Locate a Rule of Law Model for China?

One inescapable attribute squeezed into debates on China's legal reform is to
fantasize and mold a rule of law conception. This thought deserves further
consideration. Such approach is quite common in literature authored by western
jurists and theorists in the hope of creating and insinuating such a rule of law
model into the Chinese legal system. This methodological setting is not without
merits, but it risks ossifying a biased standard in mind in advance before making
quality evaluation. Drawing from the discussion and sources above, there are a
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number of categorizations of the rule of law model in general and formulations
for China's legal system in specific. For example, the instrumental and
substantive definitions, positivism and natural law ideals, the bifurcated thin and
thick models, views of futility in application or radical proponents of overhaul
reconstruction, all advocate different approaches to developing the rule of law.
This thesis submits that the priority of conceptualizing a perfect model of rule of
law for the whole legal system is not practical for China's current stage of
development or the current state of its legal system. Rather, a few
recommendations shall be made against retooling the Chinese legal system.

Democracy is still sensitive, but not untouchable, in China. Mostly, it depends on
how Chinese top politicians and reformers conceive of it. In the context of
contemporary Chinese political system and social orders, China does not enjoy
the luxury of the historical, religious, and philosophical traditions from whence
western or American models of democracy organically arose. In this sense, we
need a probing discussion of the relationship between democracy and the rule of
law, especially in the Chinese context. A normative conception of Chinese rule of
law should therefore be confined to an independent judicial and legal system,
while democracy has to be viewed from a historical and developmental
perspective. On the other hand, we should note that no single contemporary
western polity or society perfectly meets all criteria of their liberal rule of law
conception. 159 The rule of law as a political and democratic theory should not be
subject to exaggeration and abuse, and requires careful deliberation. After all,
159

See Radin supra 11 at 787
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empirically and conceptually, a full-scale Chinese conversion to a western style of
polity and democracy may not translate into a stable political and economic
order,

160

on which the establishment and development of rule of law is

conditioned. It is difficult to substantiate that a democratic government might
rather invite social turmoil and political chaos than fail to implement certain
political ideals or romanticized legal conceptions, so this thesis will limit its focus
on legal and judicial reform independent of democracy.

An often neglected or misunderstood feature about China's rule of law reform is
that such reform has strong inner political, economic and social drives and
support from top glitterati, growing middle class and broader constituencies
(farmers and low-income groups). The modem post-information society,
characterized by information advancement over6 the internet renders many old
tropes about China outdated and unwelcome to its citizens. Establishing the rule
of law means real business to China. Developmental goals such as limited
government, regularity of laws, transparency in procedures and administration,
and perform-ability of laws, are what generations of Chinese elites pursue and
fight for. Drawing from the above, this thesis proposes the following submissions,
some of which are shared by domestic policy makers and foreign commentators,
for upgrading the rule of law reform in China in general.
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See John Stanley Gillespie, supra 111, discussing the impact of rule of law reform in Vietnam;
See generally, Ohnersorge, Asian Legal System, supra 24, noting that IFI-dominated legal reforms
in Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, Latin American nations have various
problems such as social stability
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5.2. Prospects for Chinese Legal Reform

First and foremost, securing the independence of legal system as an institution,
even in a relatively self-sufficient manner, is the foundation for transformation to
the rule of law. Political barriers in China are evidently against reaching the
autonomy of the legal system. "Political science" and "law" conceptions (zhengfa

li&i'!) have never been officially separated in governmental reform agenda. One
notorious example of this lack of separation is that the "politics and law
committee" (zhengfawei ll&¥!~) controlled by the CCP is the highest authority in
the legal and judicial system administration. Professor Stanley Luhman observes
that Chinese legal system alone hardly has never enjoyed the same autonomy as
its western counterparts, 161 thus he expresses mixed pessimism towards the future
of China's rule of law reform. However, Chinese scholars find greater hope 162 in
their observation of the CCP's loosened control as over legal functions like
legislation, adjudication, and the procuracy while it pursues priorities of
deepening economic development. This thesis shares such optimism regarding the
development of autonomy and independence of an institutionalized legal system
for two reasons. First, reform over the past three decades has promoted a legal
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See generally, Stanley Luhman, Introduction: The Future of Chinese Law, 141 China Q. 1, 14
( 1995), noting that "a number of factors clouding the future of Chinese law reform, in particular
the continual intervention by political interests, growing weakness of the Chinese apparatus of
state' and declining power of the central government over the rest of the country"; quoted in
Professor Donald C. Clarke, Introduction: The Chinese Legal System Since 1995: Steady
Development and Striking Continuities, 191 China Q. 555, 556 (2007)
162
See Pei Minxin, Creeping Democratization in China, 6 J. Democracy 65, at 66 (1995); A
prominent Chinese law scholar, Professor Ma Huaide (the Vice-President of the China University
of Political Science and Law) notes that CCP has made receptive efforts in promoting legal reform
even the extent is subject to debate, see Ma Huaide, Kaohe Fazhi GDP, Tuijin Yifa Xingzheng
[Revaluation ofthe Rule of Law GDP, Promoting Administration in Accordance with Law (2011)],
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/14323193.html (last visited on March 15, 2011)
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culture of seeking remedies through legal process rather than personal favor or
connections, and such legal culture in turn sets political inference in the spotlight
and fosters judicial independence. Second, disputes arising from foreign
investment and international trade arena have lined up judicial procedural settings
which are not easily subject to political manipulations. In this sense, the Chinese
legal system as an independent infrastructure promises considerable reform
opportunities.

Second, transparency and public accountability are the catalysts for promoting the
publicity of laws, judicial decisions and administrative process. As Fuller notes,
the "publicity" characteristic of the rule of law characterizes that "those who are
expected to obey the rules must be able to find out what the rules are." 163 Chinese
laws and administrative regulations are at times not available to interested parties
or are subject to unclear processes of interpretation. Citizens sometimes are short
of access to information about legislative updates or trial hearings. For many
years the Chinese government launched rounds of "law dissemination campaigns"
(pufa yundong lliF~:iEZ9J) and received sound responses in the initial reform years,

but most of such campaigns ended up being mere formalities. The failure of these
law

dissemination

campaigns may have

resulted

from

the

somewhat

propagandistic method of dissemination itself, but another important account is
that the surfeit of laws, regulations, notices, and circulars promulgated by various
authorities create confusion thus leading to a public aversion to new laws. Public
accountability, on the other hand, requires public disclosure of legal information
163

See generally, Radin supra 11 and Fuller supra 30
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and procedures. Non-enforcement of bargained over contracts among individuals,
private and state enterprises often traps and hurts good will market participants.
Another annoying trap for foreign businesses is the government procurement
process associated with confusing administrative procedures. "Black box"
practice, backstage operation, affiliated trading and secret deals are popular and
have plagued the legal system in China for a long time. Transparency, in this
sense, as a normative requirement for transforming to the rule of law, demands
public disclosure and accessibility of important legal information.

The third prerequisite goes to the independence of the judicature system and the
autonomy of legal professionals in particular. Judges in China, especially those
presiding in lower courts face various unjustified influences from many sources.
Local courts usually are underpaid, understaffed, and undervalued. In this sense,
the natural justice requirement of the rule of law values that "judges must be
impartial and independent" and "trials must be fair, open, and not prejudiced by
public clamor." However, local judges at times have to yield to local interests and
reach imperfect legal reasoning and decisions. Given China lacks a historical
litigation culture, such surrender by local courts and judges may deteriorate what
remaining trust that litigants credit to them. Lawyers, on the other hand, suffer
similar hardships in performing professional roles in practice. They have to rely
on judges to benefit their clients and concede to the order ofbar association which
is controlled by the "politics and law" committee, let alone the top authority in
law firms is the CCP branch but not the partner board. As normative elements of
the rule of law in addition to know-ability and perform-ability, lawyers (on behalf
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their clients) must "be rational choosers", and "be suitably motivated, perhaps by
penal sanctions or opportunities for reward."
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Therefore, rationality, legal

sophistication and impartiality must be established in China to confonn the rule of
law basics.

Finally, a brief submission about the more sensitive role of human rights in
China's rule of law development: As discussed earlier, the human rights package
embraces a long, if not exhaustive, list of to-dos for structuring a socialist rule of
law rhetoric. The Chinese government claims that it acknowledges and respects
meaningful, universally accepted human rights and values, but caveats that
cultural, economic, historical and social settings must be considered together to
honor basic human rights. Probably due to both political withering and ideological
rigidity, the expansion of civil rights and liberties is often said to endanger and
impede China's economic development. However, this thought fails to identify a
balanced and healthy relationship among economic development, human rights,
and related substantive nonns of the rule of law. Human rights can be interpreted
in various ways, but at a minimum level - for example, a citizen's ability to
contribute to and benefit from the economic behaviors she chooses - a citizen has
the right to know into which area her taxes go and how they are distributed.
Flexible and strategic interpretations of human rights can therefore be a boon to
efficient administration and contract enforcement protection. Therefore, for the
purpose of this thesis, a list of pragmatic and proactive taxpayers' rights walks a
middle ground on the issue of human rights, which might be both morally
164

See Radin supra 11 at 787-88

224

defensible and politically viable. Criticisms of China's protections of human
rights without consideration of both morality and the political viability of such
protections may not help promote the rule of law in China; rather, they might
worsen or endanger its nascent system of basic human rights.

VI. Summary

This chapter summarizes the theoretical debates on conceptions of the rule of law,
the evolution of the Chinese socialist rule of law rhetoric, and progress that
Chinese legal reform has made to date. One goal has been examination of the,
often paradoxical, forces exerted on China's rule of law development by its
historical roots, ideological interferences, economic development, and dynamic
reformers in the past thirty years. True, this young system suffers infrastructural
deficiency, domestic political intrusion, understaffing, and difficult demands from
the outside world. On the other hand, it has already embraced many traditional
rule of law characteristics, albeit in a somewhat unique socialist rearticulation,
respectfully acknowledging universal basic human rights, improving room for
scholastic submissions and debates, and more importantly, inviting foreign
observation and attempting compliance with international norms.

This chapter has further sought to show that an institutionalized Chinese legal
system does exist in both a normative and an instrumental sense, despite valid
critiques, which must be respected and accommodated. Solutions and upgrades
are essential to tackle technical misidentification, and implementation (zhixing jj;1.
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1r)165 and

enforcement have priorities in nursing difficulties arising at all times.

'
For policymakers and entrepreneurial leaders in the West, perhaps especially in
the United States, an objective assessment of China's historical, political and
social traditions is necessary for targeted, objective and meaningful promotion of
China's rule of law reform.

"'
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Professor Jacques deLisle, in his speech at the University of Michigan, specifically mentioned

the difficulty in law enforcement, i.e. zhixingnan (fAIT$). For similar and detailed discussions,
see generally, Cai and Wang, supra 122, Huang Yanzhong, Is the Chinese State Apparatus Being
Revamped?; in China Under Hu Jintao (in Cheng, deLisle and Brown), supra 2 at 49-52,
discussing the divergence between the law promulgation and enforcement
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Chapter IV

WTO Accession and its Implications for the Rule of Law Reform in China

I.

Introduction

A close examination of China's legal reform for the past ten years reveals that it
has been heavily shaped by China's accession to the World Trade Organization
(WT0). 1 Although China has implemented Deng's "Reform and Open Door"
paradigm since the late 1970s, China's WTO membership has wrought equally
influential dynamic changes in social, economic and regulatory areas in a much
shorter time. While China's commitments in its accession agreement (the
"Protocol") 2primarily involve in liberalizing its trade, foreign investment, tax and
dispute resolution laws, the impacts exerted by WTO go well beyond the
economic and trade regimes by requiring transparency, uniformity and
impartiality of its domestic governance and legal system.

1

See generally, Nicholas R. Lardy, Integrating China into the Global Economy (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002) [hereinafter Lardy: Integrating China]
2
Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432 (1 0 November 2001)
(the Protocol), which incorporates by reference selected paragraphs of Report of the Working
Party on the Accession of China, WT/MIN(01)/3 (10 November 2001) (WPR). The texts of the
Protocol and WPR are
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/ChinaAccessionProtocol.pdf (last visited on March 15, 2011)
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The Protocol is China's first treaty adopted containing explicit provisions against
discrimination, and the WTO is the first international economic organization to
which China has acceded to supervisory and adjudicative oversight. As evidenced
by commitments enclosed in Protocol, China gave extraordinary concessions in
its accession to WTO in terms of intensifying economic reform, improving
administrative efficiency, training qualified agents, localizing international norms,
and removing trade barriers. In this sense, WTO accession is considered a
milestone for its domestic reform agenda wherein China, for the first time, openly
incorporated foreign minimum requirements and international norms into its legal
reform project. China accepted much higher accession standards than any other
member country to date. The underlying rational is that Chinese top leaders take
advantage of external forces and international norms to further develop its
economy and upgrade institutionalization of its system to keep China as a whole
competitive and sustainable in fostering development. This is particularly true
given China's endeavor to overhaul its legal system in preparation for and
compliance with the accession. During the three years prior to formal accession,
the Chinese government abolished and revised thousands of laws and regulations
that were in conflict with WTO principles, meanwhile, investing tremendous
resources and tireless efforts to promulgate new WTO-compliant laws and ensure
local synchronization of WTO practices. More importantly, WTO principles such
as transparency, consistency and trade promotion were introduced to and
employed by the Chinese public in their daily lives. "Gearing to WTO norms and
integration into international markets" (yu shimao he guojia shichang jiegui .!=3t!t
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was among the most popular phrases in the common

vocabulary at the end of the twentieth century in China. All these social, cultural,
regulatory and institutional overhauls stimulated by the general public's
receptivity and WTO membership have contributed astoundingly to further
development of China's economic and legal reform.

China has been a beneficiary, albeit not without some bitterness, of its accession
to WTO. In the last 30 years the rate of Chinese economic growth has been
miraculous, averaging 9.3% growth in GDP per annum, while the GDP growth
since accession to the WTO has averaged 9.7% with GDP reaching approximately
$5.08 trillion by 2010. From 2001 to 2010, China's foreign trade increased nearly
six times. 3 At the same time, China's post-accession development has witnessed
serious issues arising like increased disparities in rural and urban livelihoods,
fluctuating trade scale, 4 increasing domestic needs, stock market bubbles and
shock, an increasingly dissatisfied migrant labor force, overexpansion of
infrastructure construction, environmental degradation and shortages of natural
resources. Although the Chinese government has downplayed its role gradually as
both market economy regulator and participant, vigilant observation shows that it
has tightened monitoring measures to ensure a steady and stable development.

3

The total value of China's imports and exports was approximately $509.5 billion in 2001 and
$2,900 billion in 2010, respectively. For a detailed data analysis, see infra Chapter I
4
China's exportation volume was severely hacked by the SARS in 2003 and the financial crisis in
2008. See generally, Wayne M. Morrison, China and the Global Financial Crisis: Implications for
the United States, Congressional Research Service, June 3, 2009, discussing the impact of
financial crisis on Sino-US trade balances, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22984.pdf; (last
visited on March 15, 2011); Tung Chen-yuan, SARS Impact on China's Economy, Taipei Times,
July 05, 2003, p. 8, presenting that the heaviest impact SARS had on the Chinese economy was on
demand, or, to be more specific, on consumption
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Chinese government realistically has prepared for the political, economic and
social costs of its international obligations. It even has outlined a tentative reform
agenda before putting signatories on the Protocol. The abolition of the notorious
agricultural tax, the overhaul of pension and social security system, better
promotion of regional equality in economic development, a nationwide
educational program to familiarize talented actors with WTO rules, and predesigned anti-monopoly and anti-money-laundering legislations, all evidence
China's preparatory works and political precautions. China's institutionalized
reform has a longer list of international pursuits and domestic ambitions which
increased its participation in the international legal order and created new
domestic legal reform targets as a result of its WTO commitments. While it is
certain that full compliance with WTO norms will improve China's legal system;
evasion of its WTO responsibilities, intentionally or recklessly, is not entirely
unlikely given the significant extra obligations China agreed to and the
experiences of other member states after their accession. In this sense, the chapter
aims to brief China's WTO commitments on market access and domestic
adoption of WTO rule of conduct.

China's integration into the globalized trade system arouses heightened
complaints on national treatment and fair competition from both foreign and
domestic enterprises. One charge against the Chinese government is that it
engages in protectionism, economic nationalism and constrained profits transfer
in favor of domestic state and private enterprises in order to compete with foreign
capitalist rivals. On the other hand, perceptions of foreign capital invasion and hot
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money manipulation have required the Chinese government to cool down
indigenous anger. For the context of Chinese legal reform, certain areas of legal
reform may be accelerated and concentrated, but disciplines of the international
business norms should be prioritized essentially for a healthy economic setting. In
a political instance, the accession to WTO helps Chinese government remove
stubborn obstacles on its domestic reform agenda, while it induces other sets of
unforeseen impediments to deepen a deliberate development regime.

Focusing on China's fulfillment of and uncertainness associated with WTO
commitments, this chapter firstly briefs obligations conditioned in the Protocol,
then summarizes their ramifications on Chinese legal system, in particular,
foreign trade and investment, constitutional order

5

,

domestic governance,

judicature, WTO dispute practices, and more importantly, the final subchapter
summarizes impacts that WTO possibly injects into the rule of law reform and
related profound domestic policy orientations.

II.

Overview of China's WTO Commitments

The WTO represents a self-regulatory global trading system for promoting
international trade and breaking down barriers to the trade of goods and services,
cross-border investments, and controversial intellectual property protection. In
this sense, two major areas under WTO jurisdiction are market access and

5

The constitutional function of the world trading system is commonly understood. See generally
Frider Roessler, The Constitutional function of the multilateral trade order, in Essays on the Legal
Structure, Functions & Limits of the World Trade Order (London: Cameron May, 2000), at 10953. See generally, Ten Benefits of the WTO trading system, http:// www.wto.org (last visited on
March 15, 2011)
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international principles of conduct for member countries. Market access is subject
to negotiation while WTO principles of conduct bear consistency and uniformity
applicable to all member countries. By periodically reviewing trade policies, the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism is essential to implementing WTO
jurisdictional guidelines, such as notification requirements, and enforcement of
binding rulings and trade sanctions to avoid trade wars or retaliations. China as a
WTO member Country will have to comply with both the market access and
WTO principles requirements. 6

As discussed earlier, China's commitments in terms of market access are
unprecedented. In certain sectors the commitments are much more extensive than
those highly developed countries, 7 and China agreed not to adopt many special
treatment provisions granted to other developing countries. The depth and scope
of those commitments enclosed in Protocol are tremendous for China as a
developing country. In particular, the Protocol subjects all tariffs to unusually low
statutory rates, and sets up an aggressive agenda for foreign access to sensitive
service sectors such as telecommunication, banking, natural resources, and
distribution, etc. This remarkable level oftrade liberalization is further intensified
by China's accession to special rule obligations - its so called "WTO-plus" and
"WTO-minus" obligations. 8 In this sense, "WTO-plus" obligations in particular

6

See generally, Cass, Williams and Barker, China and the World Trading System: Entering the
New Millennium, Cambridge Press (2003)
7
See Aadiya Mattoo, China's Accession to the WTO: the Service Dimension, J. of Int'l Econ. L,
Vol. 6, No.2, (2003), at 299 and 302-04
8
See generally, Julia Ya Qin, WTO-plus Obligations and Their Implementations for the WTO
Legal System- An Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol," Journal of World Trade, Vol. 37,
No. 3 (2003), at 483-533 [hereinafter Qin: WTO-plus Obligations] (Professor Julia Qin from the
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raise issues about the condition of China's market economy, foreign investment
and

domestic

discriminatory

governance,
measures

while

against

the
Chinese

"WTO-minus"
exports.

provisions

order

These "WTO-minus"

obligations allow an importing member to lower WTO standards in applying trade
remedies (antidumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard measures) against Chinese
exported products. Although some "WTO-minus" rules are restrained with phaseout dates, all "WTO-plus" obligations are permanent. 9

A special transition review mechanism ("TRM") was specially designed to
monitor China's compliance with its extensive WTO commitments. Under this
review mechanism, for the first eight years of accession, annual review of China's
performance is conducted to evaluate China's policy changes and economic
settings. In addition, at the end of the tenth year of accession, a final review is due
to summarize China's over-all performance and compliance. No other WTO
member Country has acceded to such a strict watch by the WTO and international
community. Furthermore, all the market access and rule obligations are subject to
compulsory jurisdiction and possibly binding sanction of the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism.

To summarize, China's undertakings of WTO obligations and principles are
tremendous and unprecedented. Undoubtedly, these market access and WTO
principles obligations have powered China's market economy development to
achieve greater compliance with international standards, yet they have done so at
Wayne State University Law School is one of the topmost contributors in reviewing the China's
accession to the WTO and commitments enclosed in the Protocol)
9
!d. at 496
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the cost of explicitly discriminatory tenns and unequal treatments.

10

This swift

liberalization by way of international legal commitments has brought dynamic yet
astringent changes and reform to China's legal system on the whole, and in a few
areas of law in particular.

III.

Impact of WTO Accession on the China's Legal System

WTO's jurisdictional outreach presents many unique challenges to the Chinese
legal system. An underlying question is whether the WTO agreements are selfexecuting, since the Chinese Constitution does not define the legal status and
applicability of international treaties, nor does it prescribe meaningful procedures
as to directly adopting compulsory jurisdiction of treaty obligations. 11 Such a
"muddled account" is not unintentional. One reason is that the accession
negotiation timeline was too tight for China to calculate a comprehensive system
of domestic execution of such a large number of obligations enclosed in Protocol.
Another reason is that top Chinese political leaders, using external forces to
transfonn the state economy, simply wanted to foster and impinge a consensus

10

Leftists in CCP specifically characterized the accession to the WTO as the New Eight Power
Allied Force, which was one of the stigmas in the latest Chinese history; see China Should be a
Utility Infielder upon Accession to the WTO (Zhongguo Jiaru Shimao Ying Nenggong Shanshou)

( { Jtl ~ :J.m .A tit~ .fi)z ~I~ ff ~} ), http://www.gdyjzx.gov.cn/xxhw/99.files/wto05/05.htm (last
visited on March 15, 2011)
11
See Bing Ling, Is China's Accession to the WTO Legally Valid? (2002), http://bingling.page.tl/.
Professor Ling of the Chinese University of Hong Kong argues persuasively that the ratification
procedure was defective - the validity of China's accession, in spite of any procedural defects,
seems unquestionable as a matter of international law under Articles 45 and 46 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties; although the National People's Congress Standing Committee
granted a before-the-fact authorization (on August 25, 2000, long before the accession protocol
had taken its final form and been signed by the Chinese government's representative), not an afterthe-fact ratification; Professor Donald Clarke shares the same concerns, see Donald Clarke,
China's
Legal
System
and
the
WTO:
Prospects
for
Compliance
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/dclarke/pubs/wto_china.pdf (last visited on March 15, 2011)
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that all international agreements obligations must be endorsed and implemented
through domestic legislation.

3.1. Market Economy

On a basic level, the "market economy" commitment requires aU parties including
the Chinese government, state and private sectors, and foreign investors to
participate market activities equally. For instance, the prices of goods and services
are result of fair competition and calculated choices. "WTO-plus" obligations to
China also demand that prior state-controlled import-export business

~ectors

must

open to foreign investors within three years of accession 12, and that SOEs have to
carry out its own commercial decisions without any administrative and political
interference.

These "market economy" related obligations are also of constitutional importance.
A milestone development in this connection is the fourth amendment to the 1982
Chinese Constitution which embraces two major symbolic additions: "the State
respects and preserves human rights" and "citizen's lawful private property is
inviolable." With strong suspicions, legal scholars and political theorists still
believe that these constitutional amendments evidence an ideological inclination
to deepen China's legal reform. One example is the enactment of the Property
Law in 2007 which details operational guidelines and rules for protecting various
ownership forms. In this sense, the Property law stipulates the equal status of state

12

Such overwhelming market access has a few exceptions, especially in those "prohibited
industries" contained in the Catalog
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and private property in terms of decision making, corporate governance and
minority shareholder protection.

13

Moreover, securing the acknowledgement of the "market economy" designation
challenges and discomfits the Chinese government and state economy sector. The
government has to transform from a state regulator and property owner to a
market participant and an authority constrained by law. This undertaking commits
the Chinese government itself into a globalized system. The liberation of trading
rights and state interference of commercial activities are among top complaints
from other WTO member countries. Therefore, the Chinese government has to
behave in a "market economy" manner to serve China's membership in the WTO,
and as a result, to subscribe itself to a multilateral and balanced setting of
uniformity and fairness.

3.2. Dispute Settlement and China's WTO capacity building

The jurisdictional significance of binding decisions and sanction against
noncompliance of WTO commitments has place the Chinese government under
an unprecedented external judicial enforcement system. The dispute settlement
mechanism at the same time calls for China to develop its capacity to participate
in modem legal order and litigate before international tribunals. The accession has
immediately prompted governmental and scholarly interest in studying the WTO
13

See generally, Andrew L. Stoler, Treatment ofChina as a Non-Market Economy: Implications
for Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures and Impact on Chinese Company Operations in
the WTO Framework, presented at the Shanghai WTO Affairs Consultation Center (December
2003), discussing how the market economy system may influence investment decisions,
http://www.iit.adelaide.edu.au/docs/Shanghai%20Speech.pdf (last visited on March 15, 2011)
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system and the domestic ramifications its dispute settlement mechanism. During
the first few years after the accession, the international community seemed to be
flexible and patient waiting for China to honor its commitments, however, due to
rapidly growing trade deficits with China, partners like the U.S. and EU have
more aggressively used the WTO judicial framework to influence China.

Since the US filed the first WTO case in 2004 against China regarding the
exemption of VAT rebates for domestically produced semiconductor products, as
of June 2010, five countries- US, EU, Canada, Guatemala and Mexico- have
initiated 18 complaints against China, 11 of which were filed by joint
complainants. The growing number of complaints filed against China has mostly
resulted from the trade deficits western countries have with China and the
beginning of China's commitments in the services sector at the end 2006.
Moreover, internal politics and financial crises in 2008 intensified the pressure
faced by US and EU to initiate actions against China.

China has not, by any means, been exclusively a respondent before the WTO
dispute settlement board. Since China filed its first WTO complaint in 2007,
China has initiated seven complaints, all of which were against the US and EU.
These complaints brought to the WTO mostly concerned the designation of nonmarket economy treatment of anti-dumping and safeguard regulations that China
resented. In addition, China, as a co-complainant, has joined other member
countries in filing 67 cases as a third party. All these litigation efforts evidence
that China is gradually withdrawing its passive mindset by participating

237

international disputes and inserting its own role with singular voice. However,
China has been very diplomatic in resolving trade crises with its trading
partners,

14

and has taken meaningful steps in cooperation with domestic

enterprises in resolving disputes before cases are brought up against China in
formal procedure since the settlement process is resource intensive and time
consuming. 15

Overall, the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO has helped China in
honoring its commitments by privileging its trading partners with opportunities to
challenge the incomplete implementation of commitments. It also arms China to
safeguard its exports to sustain economic development and to avoid harmful
invasion of foreign trade routines over Chinese domestic enterprises. China has
implemented WTO education campaigns to promote anticipation of possible
WTO related disputes on the local and regional level. Given China's growing
experience as a complainant, third-party complainant and respondent in WTO
disputes, it is meaningful to theorize about the more assertive roles China may
play in defending its economic and political interests before the WTO.

14

16

See Julia Ya Qin, The Impact of WTO Accession on the Chinese Legal System: Trade,
Investment and Beyond 189 The China Quarterly (Special Issue, September 2007) (Cambridge
University Press) at 739, http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/cf_dev/ AbsBy Auth.cfm?per_id=625173 (last
visited on March 15, 2011)
15
See Pasha L. Hsieh, China's Development on International Economic Law and WTO Legal
Capacity Building, l3 J. lnt'l Econ. L. 997, [hereinafter Hsieh, China's WTO Capacity Building]
at 1010
16
Id., at 1017, discussing that China's passive mindset has been slightly changed to take a more
assertive role in defending its interests
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3.3. Foreign Investment Law

WTO accession has brought tremendous expansion of FDI of all sources and
contributed unprecedented increase of foreign trade surplus to China. 17 Since
WTO accession, China's foreign trade has increased about three times which
nearly two thirds were derived from imports and exports by foreign invested
enterprises (PIEs). 18 China's market access commitments in service sectors,
preferential

treatment

of foreign

capital

and

administrative

efficiency

improvement all foster foreign investment flows into China. However, ten years
after China's accession, there has been a trend of tightened government
interference and control, beginning after the "accession honeymoon," as discussed
below.

3.3.1. National Treatment

WTO accession gives China a quite different set of requirements for national
treatment, some of which are "WTO-plus" obligations beyond the scope of WTO
national treatment provisions. In particular, the national treatment rules in the
Protocol demand that China give foreign investors market access in the services
sector, the right to engage in the import-export business, and favorable conditions
concerning foreign investors' operations and production. These favorable

17

See generally in Qin: Impact ofWTO Accession, supra 14 at 735-738, from which this sentence
is mostly drawn
18
See infra Chapter I for data analysis
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conditions have powered a huge influx of foreign investment entering into various
.
.
. 19
fi1eld s of the Chmese economy smce accessiOn.

Ironically, compliance with the national treatment provisions has created an
interesting battle initiated by Chinese domestic enterprises claiming their rights
and market status are too disadvantaged and engulfed thus losing their reasonable
share in the market. According to national treatment and most favored nation
provisions, China is directed only to provide foreign interests "no less favorable"
treatment than those offered to domestic interests. This requirement, however,
does not substantiate Chinese public misunderstanding of national treatment that
foreign interests must be taken care with preferential treatment.

The complaint from Chinese domestic interests is not surprising, especially given
that China, during the twenty years prior to accession, adopted remarkably
different policies towards foreign and domestic, and state-owned and private

°

enterprises. 2 Foreign and state-owned enterprises are too privileged in terms of
income tax rate, resource allocation, and operational assistance, and there have
been public calls to remove foreign preferential policies and to create a fair
competition environment for all enterprises, especially private enterprises. 21 The
promulgation of the new Enterprise Income Tax Law passed in 2007 presents an

19

See Qin supra 8 at 492-96, discussing the details ofWTO-plus obligations that China has agreed
to take. This thesis benefits from Professor Qin's analysis on understanding of WTO's impact on
China's legal reform, especially as to SOEs subsidies and detailed documentations of China's
WTO accession
20
!d., at 490
21
See Qin supra 14 at 740-741
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example of such efforts at unifying different policies toward foreign and domestic
enterprises.

3.3.2. Tightened Control Associated with Protectionism

WTO accession commitments on market access to a broader scope of industries,
removal of trade barriers and reduction of tariffs to a low level have created other
issues commonly associated with fair competition between foreign and domestic
enterprises in China. Following the WTO accession, foreign investors
increasingly steered their investment towards acquiring local Chinese companies.
An increasing number of mergers and acquisitions conducted by foreign
companies heightened China's government's and general public's concerns that
its industries might be dominated, or even controlled, by foreign companies. At
the same time, there has been an intensified aversion grown among China's
domestic enterprises that foreign investors have benefitted from too many
preferential policies for the past three decades, and that now they are cornered
into very disadvantaged positions in the market. All those worries arose when
many local name-brands were acquired by foreign interests, and some of those
acquisitions were completed at considerably discounted prices. Domestic
enterprises complain that such foreign investment inappropriately seized valuable
state owned assets and transferred profits overseas without providing promised
technology transfers and human capital development. These domestic interests
blame the shortsightedness of government policy in allowing these foreign
acquisitions.
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Cautiously, Chinese government adopted a few regulations and guidelines to
circumvent mergers and acquisitions by foreign investments in sensitive sectors.
For this instance, MOFCOM may investigate and deny 22 the foreign acquisition of
domestic enterprises after national security review. Furthermore, responding to
concerns on protecting domestic enterprises from "foreign capital invasion," the
Chinese government has accelerated the promulgation of China's first AntiMonopoly Law passed in March 2007 (together with the Unified Enterprise
Income Tax Law), which induces arrears from foreign investors of being targeted
as monopoly practice. Moreover, with China's attraction on foreign investment,
Chinese government has upgraded its national strategy focusing on the quality
rather than quantity of foreign investment 23 , and diverting more attention to highend, technology-based, research-orientated and environmentally friendly foreign
investments. 24

It might be over assertive to claim Chinese government's tightened supervision on

mergers and acquisitions evidence nationalism against foreign investment. There
are still overwhelming needs for foreign capital in the hinterlands of China 25 •
China's economic scale, pressure on appreciation of Chinese currency, shortage
of measure to watch capital mobility, and so forth, are legitimate arrows in
China's quiver of responses to charges of nationalism or protectionism. Given the
pressure on China's government to push back against market access, WTO
22

See Guanyu Waiguo Touzizhe Binggou Jingnei Qiye de Guiding [Provisions on Mergers and
Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprise by Foreign Investors], jointly issued by MOFCOM and five
other state ministries, effective as of September 6, 2006
23
See Liyong Waizi "Shiyiwu" Guihua [The 1th Five- Year Plan for Utilizing Foreign Investment],
issued by the National Development and Reform Commission of the P.R.C, November 2006
24 !d.
25
As evidenced by Chong Qing Liangjiang and Tian Jin TEDA SEZs
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commitments of market access to various industries remain an important source
of monitoring, and incentive to China's compliance and reform progress.

3.3.3. Eliminating Performance Requirements

China has adopted unprecedented commitments on eliminating performance
requirements. Under the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures
(TRIMs), China must eliminate certain performance requirements or supervisory
measures against foreign investments. Those performance requirements usually
include foreign exchange controls, export performance controls, and import
substitution, all of which restrict free trade and limit capital mobility. Further,
China agreed in the Protocol not to condition foreign investment on "performance
requirements of any kind," including "the transfer of technology" and "the
conduct of research and development in China," going significantly over and
above the TRIMs requirements?6

To honor these remarkable commitments, the Chinese government has abolished,
revised

and promulgated various foreign

investment related

laws and

regulations. 27 One vivid example is that previous compulsory requirement on
technology transfer is removed from approval of foreign investment planning and
operation except with regard to certain prohibited and restricted technologies
prescribed. However, the Chinese government maintains a cautious strategy by
gradually eliminating certain performance requirements for specific industries.
For example, all tax benefits and other incentives offered to foreign enterprises
26
27

See Qin supra 14 at 732-33
See Potter, supra 1 at 597-598

243

were upheld until 2010, and in 2007 the Environmental Protection Administration
required foreign investments in chemical products and petroleum drilling to be
environmentally friendly and supported by sound research and development
controls.

3.3.4. Entry Restriction

It is worth emphasizing that China made extensive market access commitments in
services. According to the national treatment principle and the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), once a member country pledges
commitments in a particular service sector, it will have to guarantee national
treatment to all foreign investments, subject only to negotiated service schedules
based on GATS. After WTO accession, the Chinese government has substantially
revised the Industry Guidance Catalogue for Foreign Investment (the Catalogue),
which outlines specific requirements and the scope of industries in which foreign
enterprises may invest. According to the latest 2007 Catalogue effective as of
December I, 2007, the number of encouraged industries increases to 351 from
257 in the 2004 Catalogue, aiming to control resources exploitation, lower energy
consumption and upgrade industries and monitor real estate investment. For the
other three industry categories, i.e. permitted, restricted and prohibited categories,
the adjustments were designed to convert more permitted category industries to
encouraged category industries, and ease the barrier between restricted and
permitted categories. For example, in September 201 0, Chinese government
solicited revision proposals from foreign investors to further its endeavors to open
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as many industries as possible while balancing its hinterland development
policies? 8

As per the Protocol, China has agreed to open nine out of twelve service sectors
according to GATS provisions. The market access commitments cover crucial
areas

such

as

distribution,

construction,

transportation,

banking

and

telecommunications. One important aspect of China's implementation of its
commitments is the opening of the banking service sector - foreign banks can
now operate fully in Chinese territory without any geographical, client base and
ownership strings. This is remarkable given the tight controls imposed on the
banking sector by Chinese government since 1979?9 However, the future of this
bold policy is unclear especially when all four major state-owned commercial
banks have completed their public offerings in overseas stock markets.

3.4. Trade Law Regime

China's foreign trade law regime has been overhauled and liberalized after WTO
accession. Important legislation concerning foreign trade such as the Foreign
Trade Law (2004), the Custom Law (2001), trade remedy regulations,

30

intellectual property protection, administrative procedures and rules, has been
reviewed, evaluated and revised to make the foreign trade sector WTO28

See generally, Waishang Touzi Chanye Zhidao Mulu [Industry Guidance Catalogue for Foreign
Investment (2007)] GH{ijt9:1JfF.illL:J=§~ § ~(2007 if-{~iT)} , released by MOFCOM effective
as of October 31, 2007, http://www.hb.xinhuanet.com/zhuanti/2008-04/1 O/content_12931826.htm
(last visited on March 15, 2011)
29
See generally, Peng Yuanyuan, The Challenges of WTO Entry to China's Banking Industry,
http://faculty. washington.edulkaryiulconferlbeijing06/papers/peng.pdf (last visited on March 15,
2011)
30
See Qin supra 14 at 727
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compliant. 31 In addition, the Chinese government has liberalized control over
importation by substantially reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers and opening
broader service sectors. As discussed above, although protectionism may arise in
the course of trade regime liberalization, China's foreign trade regime, as a
system, is institutionally capable of ensuring compliance with accession
commitments and WTO principles.

China has been rigorously compliant with its commitments to lower its tariffs to
statutory binding rates and remove non-tariff barriers such as quotas and licenses
to attainably minimum level. State trading especially state procurement through
commercial means should be transparent and the scope of state trading is subject
to review by MOFCOM. Notification requirements by WTO also demands timely
updates of any adjustments or changes made to the list of state trading in the
Protocol.

China has been aggressive in responding to charges on trade remedies initiated by
other member countries. 32 For example, China has implemented revised antidumping and anti-subsidy measures and a new safeguard regulation, promulgated
in 200 1, all of which follow the WTO standards but lack certain operational
details. The key reason is that the U.S., EU, and certain other countries designate
China as a non-market economy, and such designation allows those countries to
abuse anti-dumping measures against Chinese producers or imported products
31

See generally, TPR Report, Appendix, Table A.Il.2. For updates and changes of China's trade
regulations, visit MOFCOM official website http://www.mofcom.gov.cn. (last visited on March
15, 2011)
32
See Hsieh supra 15 at 1030-31 and Table A1, summarizing that China became the third largest
antidumping user after India and the United States according to the WTO Anti-dumping Statistics
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from China. It is likely true that some anti-dumping measures imposed on China
were purely a product of internal political interests rather than in the spirit of
promoting free trade. Moreover, the Protocol stipulates that designation of China
as a non-market economy may persist until December 2016 for anti-dumping
purposes, and permanently for anti-subsidy purposes. The Protocol further
permits an importing member Country to categorize China separately for
safeguard measures. All these discriminatory measures have aroused China's
export practices especially after China has realized lowering tariffs and removal
of non-tariff barriers.

Another branch of laws affected by WTO accession is foreign trade laws and
regulations. For example, China, in 2004, replaced a ten-year old foreign trade
law with a WTO compliant one. The new Foreign Trade Law switches the preWTO approval system to a registration system removing tedious procedures for
most forms of foreign investment by agreeing to issue registration within five
days if stipulated procedures are followed. As to technical standards applicable to
specific areas of economic sectors, such as those in healthcare, chemical and
technology fields, China has revised most relevant laws to assure a legitimate
objective and impartial and non-discriminatory implementation. However, since
many industries fall into restrict or prohibited categories of the Catalogue, China
has gradually taken more cautious procedures and tightened import and export
controls in safeguarding technical interests of domestic enterprises. One example
is that in 2007, China promulgated new rules regarding importation of certain
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metalwork scrape such as copper and lead, for which traders from the US and EU
submitted their complaints to local import authorities and customs. 33

Last but not least, the foreign trade regime gives great attention to the protection
of intellectual property according to requirements of Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Inadequate protections for intellectual
property has been a complaint in China for many years due to the rampant
violation of IP rights and China's weak enforcement against infringers. TRIPS
designs a wide-ranging set of detailed regulations for its member countries to take
action, including a comprehensive list of minimum requirements for civil,
criminal and administrative procedures and undertaking to be inserted into the
domestic legal system. Without a doubt, China has made great efforts and
achieved quite remarkable circumvention against IP rights violations. However,
China's IP rights protection remains one of the most troubling factors for foreign
investors in carrying out commercial activities and in refraining Chinese domestic
competitors from reverse engineering or "fortifying" (shanzhai

*) their

W

innovations and products.

The Chinese government, in this regard, has made amendments to almost all laws
and regulations concerning IP, including but not limited to, crimes of IP violation
in the Criminal Code (1997), the Trademark Law (2001), the Copyright Law
(200 1), computer software protection measures (200 1), lay-out designs of

33

See generally Qin supra 14, providing a summary of major foreign trade related laws and
regulations since China's WTO accession
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integrated circuits protection regulations (200 1), and the Patent Law (2000). 34
Overall, China has been fundamentally WTO-compliant in IP rights protection
although its efforts are still a cause for grumbles by trade partners who find them
incomplete and ineffective. The US's opinion to this extent resulted in an official
complaint filed with the WTO in April2007. 35

3.5. WTO's Normative Impacts

WTO accession not only brings specific legislative revisions in an "instrumental"
sense in almost all major areas of economic arena, but it also sets out significant
normative challenges to the Chinese legislative and institutional systems. China
has gradually accepted the basic values and obligations of WTO membership,
such as transparency, uniformity and impartiality and judicial review and
incorporated them into the legal system, in which the tax law reform is embedded.
There has been remarkable progress made in terms of introducing WTO related
commitments to academic debates and public awareness. WTO principles have
stepped into the daily lives of Chinese people in commercial and political settings.
Chinese scholars have also given support to WTO principles of promoting and
enforcing constitutionally significant ideas such as property rights, as the

34

See generally, Omario Kanji, Paper Dragon: Inadequate Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights in China, 27 Mich. J. lnt'l L. 1261, 1270 {2006); Aaron Schwabach, Intellectual Property
Piracy: Perception and Reality in China, the United States, and Elsewhere, 2 J. Int'l Media & Ent.
L. 65 (2008); Joseph A. Massey, The Emperor is Far Away: China's Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights Protection 1986-2006, 7 Chi. J. lnt'l L. 231, 235 (2006); Donald Harris, The
Honeymoon is Over: The US-China WTO Intellectual Property Compliant, 32 Fordham lnt'l L.J.

96
35

See generally, WTO: China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, DS 362 (April 16, 2007), charging that China's criminal law does not provide
appropriate criminal punishments for IP violtions, and the denial of copyright protection under the
censorship review is not compliant with TRIPS
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foundations of a market economy.

36

Such discussion was largely inconceivable

before accession. The normative implications of WTO accession for the Chinese
legal system are thus political, philosophical and institutional.

3.5.1.Transparency

The transparency commitment in China's Protocol is a quite comprehensive rule
of law requirement. The concept of transparency is central to the WTO
agreements as well as to the construction of the rule of law. According to GATT
Article X, GATS Article III 37 and TRIPS Article 63, laws, regulations, judicial
decisions and administrative decisions in connection with trade of a member
country should be made public before their implementation and enforcement, and
any change in such laws should be notified to the WTO. In the Protocol, China
has agreed to undertake extra transparency obligations that are stricter than
regular transparency requirements. Admittedly, public disclosure and the
availability of legal decisions promote the rationality as well as the legitimacy of
the rule of law. 38 It is also important in order for citizens and foreign investors to

36

See generally, Frieder Roessler, Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral Trade
Integration, in Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? Vol. 2: Legal
Analysis 22-27 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996), Roessler is an ex-GATT Legal
Advisor (United States--Measures on Alcoholic and Malt Beverages and United States--Taxes on
Automobiles cases)
37
!d. Roessler wrote that the central issue considered by dispute settlement panels in determining
whether two products are "like products" for purposes of Article lli "is whether the product
categories under which they fall have been distinguished with the intent and effect of affording
protection." see also, Frieder Roessler, Should Principles of Competition Policy be Incorporated
into WTO Law Through Non-Violation Complaints?, 2 J. lnt'l Econ. L. 413,421 (1999).
38
See Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law 33-94 (rev.ed.1969) at 49-51 and 79-81, discussing the
need for "promulgation" and "constancy of law through time"
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be informed of the "rules of the game" and to enable investors to get reliable
advice. 39

Although the definition and scope of "transparency" is subject to debate, the
Protocol provides clear and operational guidelines on the "transparency"
•
J:'.
reqmrement
10r Ch'ma 4o :

1) China shall make public all relevant laws, regulations and other measures

before they are implemented or enforced; China will only enforce those
laws that are published and made readily available to other WTO members,
individuals and enterprises;
2) China shall establish or designate an official journal dedicated to the
publication of all relevant laws which should be made readily available to
the public;
3) After publication of laws in such a journal, China shall provide a
reasonable period for comments to be made to the appropriate authorities
before such measures are implemented;
4) China shall establish or designate an entry point where the published laws
can be obtained and requests from the public can be replied to in an
authoritative way.

39

See generally, James Zimmerman, China Law Deskbook: A Llegal Guide for Foreign-Invested
Enterprises (2004); see also Donald Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The
Enforcement of Civil Judgment, 10 Col urn. J. Asia L. 1 (1996) at 82, discussing various factors
that drive judicial decisions without robust basis of statute, regulation, or even policy.
40
See Protocol, supra 2 Part I. para. 2. (c) on details of transparency requirements
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Features of "transparency" include fair notice and hearing provisions, public
promulgation of legislation, and the availability of the legal information necessary
to meet reasonable expectations for a person to find out what the law is and to
behave in accordance with it. 41 Foreign investors continually complain of the
unfairness of being plagued by inaccessible internal or unpublished regulations
(neibu guizang

P3 $;};J\l~),

which discourage investment and trouble business

operations. Moreover, many ministerial rulings and regulations, internal or public,
are hard to track and record when issued given their ad hoc nature. Following
China's commitment to transparency, most trade-related legislation is classified
and edited by a central publishing authority, i.e., the MOFCOM. However, some
local regulations are still hard for investors and courts to locate and rely upon, in
spite of the fact that the issuing authorities give those regulations binding force. In
addition to certain encouraging progress on transparency made since accession,
such as the publication of "Gazette of the MOFTEC of the PRC," annual
publication of collections of new law, and electronic databases of administrative
laws and regulations available to the public, the Chinese government has
promulgated a series of laws and regulations to facilitate implementation of the
transparency requirement, such as the Legislation Law's (2000) requirement of
appropriate forms of public hearing and comments collection, and the Law on
Administrative Permission's (2003) prohibition of using unpublished documents
as a basis for denying or granting administrative licenses.

41

See Fuller, supra 38 at 63-65 and 81-91, discussing the clarity of laws and congruence between
official action and declared rules
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In summary, China's implementation of the transparency requirement is
remarkable but incomplete given the large number of laws and regulations
promulgated every year and complex details of local procedural filing.
Transparency concerns still trouble foreign investors in making commercial and
operational decisions. However, observers should have an optimistic perspective
regarding the prospect of further improvements to transparency in legislation,
administration and procedural compliance.

3.5.2. Uniform and Impartial Administration of Laws

China agreed in the Protocol to apply and administer all WTO-related laws,
regulations, and other measures in a "uniform, impartial and reasonable
manner." 42 Actually, the major legal challenges confronting China's WTO
accession lie in its application and enforcement of the law

(#1.1-J jJ Jl'), 43 which

presumes the existence of enforcement institutions with clear lines of authority
and the capacity to render neutral decisions according to the law. 44 The Protocol
seeks to apply WTO agreements to the entire territory of the PRC, including all
the areas in the complex political map such as border trade regions, minority
autonomous areas and various special economic and development zones, among
others. The Protocol further demands the administration "in a uniform, impartial
and reasonable manner" at both central and sub-national levels with a reporting

42

See Protocol, supra 2, Part I, para. 2. (a);
Id., Part I, para.2(a)-2
44 Id.
43
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system where noncompliance of this requirement in trade regime is brought to
attention. 45

In reality, compliance with the uniform administration commitment mostly
depends on the political determination of central and local governments to
implement it. Therefore, it is premature to evaluate and examine to which extent
the uniform administration is carried out on the local level, in that China today is
plagued by distorted local protectionism and the failures of its decentralization
strategy. The Chinese central government should stress the importance ofuniform
administration to local governments, since WTO agreements permit a petitioner
country to submit complaints on breaches of uniformity and impartiality
requirements at a local level.
3.6. Judicial Review 46

An independent, effective and true judicial authority is essential to compliance
with China's WTO commitments. The Protocol mandates the establishment of
tribunal, contact points and procedures for the prompt review of all administrative
actions relating to the implementation of the laws, regulations, judicial decisions,
and administrative rulings of general application referred to in the WTO rules.
Meanwhile, the tribunals must be independent of administrative organs and thus
are required to be "impartial and independent of the agency entrusted with
administrative enforcement and shall not have any substantial interest in the

Jd.
See Article X, 3(b) of GATT, stipulating that member countries should establish a judicial
review infrastructure

45
46

254

outcome of the matter." 47 The tribunals may be administrative or judicial,
however, right to appeal must be granted if the case is originally submitted for an
administrative review following due process.

Effective judicial review is comprised of four essential pillars: a capable court
system, a group of judges with reliability and proficiency, judicial review
empowered by law, and full judicial independence 48 • Although China's judicial
system has been subjected to significant criticism with regard to its independence
and competency, positive trends suggest that the situation is gradually improving.
In addition to the Legislation Law (2000), and the Law on Administrative
Permissions (2003), the Supreme People's Court of China issued three judicial
interpretations to detail the scope and standards for judicial review of WTOrelated cases, for example, the SPC authorizes courts at the intennediate or higher
level to take the initial review of international cases to ensure impartial and
uniform judgment and avoid unexpected external influence on judgments.

Overall, it is not realistic to expect China to set up a judicial review system
similar to the western or American routines, however, the judicial review
requirements under WTO agreements give a strong push to modernize China's
judicial system to ensure impartiality and unifonnity in administration, and to
foster judicial independence and the quality of its judges. It also subjects the
government to a limited scope of judicial review if possible to avoid
administrative discretion. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect the judicial-review-

47

48

See Protocol, supra 2 Part I, para. 2(d)
!d.

255

related reforms will be embraced, especially in areas such as tax law, as a means
to perfect the functioning of the legal system.

IV. The Impact of WTO Accession on Rule of Law Development in China

WTO accession has brought comprehensive changes to the political, economic,
legal and international settings for the ongoing development of the rule of law in
China. As summarized above in this chapter, WTO accession politically is viewed
as a forceful external incentive to implement and promote domestic institutional
reform and shut down opposition to reform. Substantive characteristics of rule of
law, such as transparency, uniformity, impartiality, judicial review and procedural
justice, which once were hard to implement due to ideological barriers, have been
forcibly incorporated into Chinese legal reform through the adoption and strict
implementation of similar WTO principles. Moreover, China has made
remarkable progress in institutional reforms to comply with its WTO
commitments- it has abolished, revised and promulgated almost 3,000 national
and local laws and regulations. Normatively, WTO accession has promoted the
rule of law awareness and fostered education on WTO principles and rules. Any
conscious commentator would acknowledge the influential impacts on the rule of
law development in China encouraged by the WTO and its dispute settlement
mechanism.

Moreover, WTO accession has strengthened China's efforts in promoting judicial
independence, even over and above its Protocol commitments, advancing judicial
review of administrative discretion on both national and local levels. Promising
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signs such as using case as precedent and rigorous pursuit to safeguard national
interests through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism also boost China's
favorable implementation of national treatment and most favored national
principles. Another significant lesson learnt from China's role and participation in
WTO capacity building is China's gradual adoption of traditional rule of law
requirements such as due process, predictability, and the supremacy of law in
governance.

The impacts of WTO accession on the rule of law development in China, however
debated, have been profound. The force of WTO principles and rules is sharp and
straightforward in conforming China to both instrumental and substantive
conceptions of the rule of law: legal institutions, transparency, uniformity,
impartiality, judicial independence, limited government, and a culture seasoned
with "common law" routines of case precedent and judicial review. Although
such impacts should not be exaggerated or over-romanticized, it is meaningful to
incorporate these positive implications into studies of specific sectors of Chinese
legal reform. This thesis will do so in developing a practical and suggestive rule
of law - tax law reform rhetoric particularly for China's post-accession legal
reform.
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ChapterV
WTO and China's Tax Law Reform-Tax Legislation Reform

I.

Introduction

As one of the newest members of the WTO, China is unique in a number of
aspects as the largest developing economy and communist regime. The
accession to the WTO marks China's commitment to further opening up to the
globalized regime and its priority of embracing a market economy as a more
dynamic economic growth engine. This aspiration was evident in the global
financial crisis of 2008. The trajectory of China's economic development in
the past three decades has shown its WTO accession as to be profound
influencing its rule of law development and judicial reform with remarkable
progresses. 1
Literature regarding the implications of WTO accession for China's economic
and legal reform is voluminous,

2

but opinions vary widely across the

1

See generally , MOFTEC China International Trade White Paper, released on August 31,
2000
2
See Cass, Williams and Barker, China and the World Trading System: Entering the New
Millennium, Cambridge Press (2003); Aadiya Mattoo, China's Accession to the WTO: the
Service Dimension, J. oflnt'I Econ. L, Vol. 6, No. 2, (2003), at 299-339 and 302-04; Julia Ya
Qin, WTO-plus Obligations and Their Implementations for the WTO Legal System - An
Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol," Journal of World Trade, Vol. 37, No. 3 (2003), at
483-533; China Under Hu Jintao, Opportunities, Dangers and Dilemma, 97-134 (Cheng,
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literature. Some discussions fantasize that the WTO's influence will result in a
complete overhaul of the Chinese legal system to conform to a rule of law
construct or western ideals of multi-party democracy. Some are more
instrumentally oriented, focusing on changes of finely textured details m
specific areas of law such as transplanting banking regulations or
environmental protection measures. The same mixed discourse applies to
China's tax laws. Moreover, the traditional distinction between trade law and
tax law is vague under multilateral trading agreements such as the WTO or
NAFTA. Meanwhile, China's tax legislation is administrative in nature -the
line between tax administration or tax legislation is somewhat blurred in
China. This chapter submits that the Chinese tax law reform embodies the
WTO principles in a visible but constrained manner, however the normative
value of those WTO is applicable to China's tax reforms as well - it richly
applies to China's tax legislation, which is embedded in its tax administration.
Two points should be made about the Chinese tax legislation framework. First,
starting from the pre-WTO massive regulatory clean-up, tax legislation reform
was focused in trade related areas, such as lowering tariffs or non-tariff
barriers, turnover tax reformulation, income tax compliance updates, and
transplantation of international tax practices. Without doubt, this aspect of tax
legislation is popular for scholars concentrating on WTO or trade related
areas. Although certain tax legislation updates have proven not to be ideal and
have been subject to frequent change, tax laws generally remain stable and
enforceable. Second, modem tax policies should be adopted in a more vibrant

deLisle and Brown, ed., World Scientific, 2006); Cai Dingjian & Wang Chenguang, China's
Journal Toward the Rule of Law (Koninklijk Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands, and Social
Sciences Academic Pres, Beijing, 2010) [hereinafter "Cai and Wang"] at 439-495
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way. For example, advanced pricing agreements for curbing tax evasion
should be employed or actual enterprise tax payment should be lowered. It is
without merit or political substantiation to take cautious steps in transplanting
modem tax conceptions. However, experimental trials in appropriate localities
or industry lines are a more reasonable means of honing these transplants.
Given China's marvelous expansion in revenue collection over the past three
decades, the time is ripe to introduce reform measures on certain types of
taxes. 3 Another dissonance in tax legislation is the irregular orientation of tax
administrative documents. Some scholars argue that tax administrative rulings,
notices or directives are true "legislation,"4 however, the administrative nature
of China's tax system and centralization efforts somewhat validate the
enforcement of tax legislation given China's nascent tax judicature system.
This chapter discusses the tax legislation sector, which is intertwined with tax
administration. Subchapter II reviews the impacts of the accession to WTO on
the tax system in general, its principles and the dispute settlement procedures
associated with tax law areas. Subchapter III discusses the tax legislation
updates since China's accession to the WTO, including enterprise income tax,
individual income tax and turnover tax. Subchapter IV summarizes tax
legislation from the perspectives of administration and compliance.
China's dual status as the largest developing country with an inheritance of
centralized economy and communist sovereign underlies commentators'
worries about China's market economy orientation. This dualism partially
explains China's acceptance of supervisory and adjudicative oversight from

3

See Warrick Smith, World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate for
Everyone, World Bank at 95-171, discussing potential new tax legislations in China
4
See generally, Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, Am. J. ofComp. L. 42:4,711759 (1994)
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the WTO by acceding to WTO-plus obligations. Taking WTO's demands into
account, in many aspects, the tax laws system manifests extraordinary
concessions
administrative

in terms

of intensifying

efficiency,

reforming

legislative

updates,

improving

compliance

practice,

localizing

international norms, and removing trade barriers.

II.

Overview of WTO Principles Affecting the Tax Laws
System

The WTO institutionalizes a unified structure for international trade, and the
significance thereof is renowned and profound. 5 The WTO agreements is an
umbrella agreement with four annexes and a series of agreements 6 including
the GAIT and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 7 and
covenants which contain the substantive obligations of member countries.
Two important principles are dominant in the WTO agreements: the nondiscrimination principle and the principle against trading subsidies, in
particular, the following rules are usually considered as primarily affecting the
domestic tax policies ofWTO member countries.

5

See John Jackson, Preface, in Cass supra 2, at 16-18
For an introduction and overview of the WTO framework and international trade regime, see
generally, Michael Trebilcock, Robert Howse, and Antonia Eliason, The Regulation of
International Trade, (Routledge; 2"d Ed., 1999)
7
See GATT, Article I, para. I, the Most-Favored-Nation Treatment reads as "with respect to
customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or
exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and
with respect to the method oflevying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and
formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters
referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in
or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties"
http://www. wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt4 7_ 0 I_e.htm (last visited on March 15, 20 II)
6
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The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Annex IA)
incorporated the rules of the GATT 194 7. Mostly, these rules cover
customs duties and procedures, and, to a narrower extent, to indirect
taxes. The objective of the GATT is to liberalize trade within WTO
member countries by non-discrimination principle and the reduction of
barriers.
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM
Agreement) is one of the 12 agreements that further detail or clarify the
GATT 1994. In particular, the SCM Agreement elaborates the
obligations of member countries associated with subsidies and designs
a comprehensive code regarding the application of countervailing
duties.
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, which is also known as the "Dispute Settlement
Understanding" (DSU), sets forth the procedural requirements for
dispute resolution under the WTO and establishes the Dispute
Settlement Body to administer the procedures.

2.1.The non-discrimination Principle

The non-discrimination principle consists of two specific rules: the mostfavored-national (MFN) and national treatment principles. Under the MFN
principle, in particular, products and services provided by member countries
must be treated alike. 8 Under the national treatment principle, once import

8

/d., GATT, Article III, National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation
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duties have been paid, imported goods and services must be treated no less
favorably than domestic products and services.

9

The national treatment principle demands that member countries not impose
internal taxes or adopt other measures to protect domestic production.

IO

Obviously, this principle principally affects indirect taxes including excise
taxes, VAT, and sales taxes imposed on imported goods. These types of taxes
may not exceed those imposed on similar domestic products or be applied in a
protective manner to domestic production.

2.2.Principle against Export Subsidies

Subsidies have been debated for a long time as a trade issue where they enable
domestic producers to compete unfairly in international (foreign) markets. For
example, export subsidies have been distorted in many ways especially for
agricultural products. Article XVI of the GATT 1994 forbids export subsidies
other than those for primary products and provides for consultations if such
subsidies are applied by seriously damaging the interests of other member
countries. II
The SCM Agreement, on the other hand, stipulates explicit rules and
guidelines on subsidies. The SCM Article 1 defines "subsidy" as a "financial
contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a
member ... whereby ... government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or

9

!d., GATT, Arts. Il.l and III.2
!d., GATT Article XVI, Subsidies
11
See SCM Article 1, Definition of A Subsidy
10
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not collected ... and a benefit is thereby conferred." 12 Therefore, tax reductions,
exemptions and refunds are clearly "subsides" according to the SCM
Agreement.

13

Furthermore, the SCM Agreement classifies subsidies as

prohibited subsidies, actionable subsidies, and non-actionable subsidies.
Specifically:
- Article3.1 of the SCM Agreement provides that, with the exception of
agricultural products, prohibited subsidies are "(a) subsidies contingent, in
law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon
export performance; (b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of
several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods."
A prohibited subsidy must be specific. Article 2 of the SCM Agreement
defines that a subsidy is specific to an enterprise or a group of enterprises
or industries if access to it is limited to certain enterprises or to certain
enterprises within a designated geographical region;
- Actionable subsidies are those that cause injury to the domestic industry
of another member country, nullify or impair the benefits of the GATT
1994, or cause serious prejudice to the interests of another member country;
and
- Subsidies are non-actionable if they are given for certain purposes that
are recognized as legitimate, such as regional aid, environmental
protection, or (within certain limits) the promotion of research and
development. 14

12
See Illustrative (e), SCM Annex I, Illustrative List of Export Subsidies "The full or partial
exemption remission, or deferral specifically related to exports, of direct taxes or social
welfare charges paid or payable by industrial or commercial enterprises"
13
See generally, Yariv Brauner, USA Report, in The WTO and Direct Taxation (Michael Lang,
ed.), Kluwer Law International (2005)
14 !d.
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Obviously, the meaning of"Contingent" is subject to meticulous interpretation.
The Appellate Body expatiated on this word in the recent US FSC case,
explaining it to mean "conditional" or "dependent for its existence on
something else":
In other words, the grant to the subsidy must be conditional or
dependent upon export performance. Footnote 4 of the SCM
Agreement, attached to Article 3.l(a), describes the relationship of
contingency by stating that the grant of a subsidy must be "tied to"
export performance. Article 3.l(a) further provides that such export
contingency may be the "sole" condition governing the grant of a
prohibited subsidy or it may be "one of several other conditions".
The contingency upon export performance may be in law or in fact. The
Appellate Body interpreted "contingency in law" in Para. 112 as follows:
A subsidy is contingent "in law' upon export performance when the
existence of that condition can be demonstrated on the basis of the very
words of the relevant legislation, regulation or other legal instrument
constituting the measure... For a subsidy to be de jure export
contingent, the underlying legal instrument does not always have to
provide expressis verbis that the subsidy is available only upon
fulfillment of the condition of export performance. Such conditionality
can also be derived by necessary implication from the words actually
used in the measure. 15

15

!d., summarizing that the most important segment of trio was ruled upon by the AB in
February 2000 that the FSC (foreign subsidiary of U.S. corporations) regime constituted a
prohibited subsidy under Art.3(l)(a) of the SCM Agreement. The FSC regime, enacted in
1984, replaced the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) regime which provided
indefinite deferral to a portion of such corporations' export earnings. The DISC provisions
were immediately attached by the European Commission, and in 1976 ruled as contradictory

265

Furthermore, the SCM Agreement incorporates a specific "illustrative list" of
measures into the definition of prohibited subsides, including some tax related
measures: "the full or partial exemption, remission, or deferral specifically
related to exports, of direct taxes ... " 16 This item is explained in footnote 59,
which provides that: ( 1) if appropriate interest is collected on deferred revenue,
the deferral does not constitute an exports subsidy; (2) the arms' length
standard applies to this analysis, and it implies that deviation from this
standard may indicate a subsidy; (3) measures to avoid double-taxation of
foreign sourced income are exempted from scrutiny as a subsidy.
According to footnote 4 of the SCM Agreement, the standard for determining
whether subsidies are in fact contingent upon export performance is met when
the facts demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy, without being made
legally contingent upon export performance, is in fact tied to actual or

to the U.S. obligations under Article XVI (4) of the GATT 1947. At the same time, the U.S.
challenged some of the European territorial income tax system. The panel disapproved of
these too, but in 1981 the GATT council cleared these in a decision that served as a de facto
roadmap for the FSC legislation as part ofthe U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1984. The FSC regime
followed the same purposes of the DISC regime, attempting to adjust it to the council
decision's language that permitted non-taxation of extraterritorial income. However, it still
exempted a portion of export related corporation's foreign source income from U.S. tax that
would have otherwise applied in contrast to the normal U.S. policy of worldwide income
taxation. In November 1997, European Commission initiated the challenge against this second
regime, followed by an official request filed on July I, 1998 to the dispute settlement panel,
based on violations under Arts., 1.1, 3.l(a) and the SCM illustrative list. The Panel issued a
final report against the U.S. in October 8, 1999, finding that the FSC constituted an export
subsidy inconsistent with the SCM Agreement. The U.S. appeal was rejected on February 24,
2000. In response, the U.S. designed a third regime- the ETI regime, which as designed to be
in compliance with decision, but achieve similar consequences to the FSC regime. It purported
to incorporate to the U.S. worldwide income system, territorial aspects, which had been ruled
compliant with the GATT. The EU promptly responded, arguing that ETI did not comply with
FSC ruling and panel was established and reported against the U.S. on August 20, 2001. The
U.S. appealed and was rejected on all grounds by the Appellate Body on January, 14, 2002.
The U.S. conceded then this battle, but Congress has not yet succeeded in repealing the ETI
regime, which prompted EU retaliation as of March I, 2004. Probably the most important
aspect of this final ruling is its firm support of the logic that each country has a baseline
normative tax system that could be established as a benchmark for an inquiry into a specific
measure that is suspected as tax subside, and a deviation from such benchmark would indicate,
technically, that a tax would be "otherwise due."
16
See SCM Annex I, Illustrative List of Export Subsidies
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anticipated exportation or export earnings.

17

In this regard, a number of

China's tax incentives may constitute discriminatory measures or prohibited
export subsidies. There is little doubt, such tax incentives are subject to
discretionary review under the WTO agreements or may be challenged by
other member countries, which will lead to actions before the dispute
resolution body.

2.3. The dispute settlement process under the WTO

While the GATT 1994 and other multilateral trade agreements are important
for their substantive provisions on international trade, the agreements
ultimately rely on the dispute settlement process to regulate compliance.

18

Member countries are entitled to safeguard their interests by following the
dispute settling mechanism to ensure compliance with WTO agreements.
According to the DSU, only the legitimate government of member countries
has standings under the procedure, and no individuals or organizations are able
to file related requests even when their interests are affected by the resolution
of the dispute. The DSU disallows member countries from unilaterally

17

See SCM Art. 15, Determination oflnjury; for export performance related details, see SCM
Art. 15.5, stipulating that it must be demonstrated that the subsidized imports are, through the
effects of subsidies, causing injury within the meaning ofthis Agreement. The demonstration
of a causal relationship between the subsidized imports and the injury to the domestic industry
shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities. The
authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the subsidized imports which at
the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors
must not be attributed to the subsidized imports. Factors which may be relevant in this respect
include, inter alia, the volumes and prices of non-subsidized imports of the product in
question, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive
practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in
technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry
18
See John Jackson, supra I at 15
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determining the liability, designing corrective measures, or judging whether
their benefits are impaired or nullified under the WTO agreements.
According to the DSU, the settlement of a dispute begins with a request for
consultations, which takes, at most, 60 days. If a dispute is not resolved
through consultations, the complaining party may request a three-person panel
to adjudicate the case. The panel's decision may be appealed by the parties to
the WTO Appellate Body, a permanent institution established by the Dispute
Settlement Body. The appeal is limited to the issues of law in the panel's
report and the legal interpretations issued by the panel. If a panel or the
Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with WTO
agreements, it will recommend that the country that lost the case bring the
measure into conformity with the agreement, and it may suggest ways for
doing so. If the recommendations are not implemented within a reasonable
period of time, the Dispute Settlement Body can authorize the suspension of
concessions or other obligations to implement its rulings.

19

In cases of

prolonged non-compliance, Dispute Settlement Body may also authorize the
winning party or the plaintiff member to impose trade sanctions against the
defendant member country. For instance, the DSU procedures and operations
may be understood by a primary and most developed dispute - the
development of DISC/FSC/ETI saga, which comprises three consecutive and
closely related cases brought by the European Union against U.S. 20 The saga
of U.S. and European fights over U.S. domestic income tax policies help us
draw two conclusions: firstly, WTO agreements, as multilateral trading
agreements, influence legislation and enforcement of domestic policies as
19
20

See generally, Michael Trebilcock & Robert Howse, supra 6
See generally, Brauner, supra 13
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enforced by the dispute settlement process; secondly, the terms of WTO
agreements are not incorporated automatically. For instance, it was not wellequipped to deal with income taxes based on the widespread use of elections
of deductions in income tax system at member countries. 21

III.

Overview of the impacts ofWTO Principles on China's tax
laws system

China's tax law system is not isolated. Rather, it functions as part of a legal
system intertwining with other sectors of law. The objective of this subchapter
is to brief the impact of WTO agreements on China's tax governance order,
which can be viewed from two angles: a public law perspective and a private
sector perspective, focused on due process and judicial protections. This thesis
tentatively addresses the first set of fundamental but key questions, such as:
"is WTO law binding on China?"; "does it form a legitimate component of the
Chinese legal system, and if so, to what extent?" and "is it supreme over other
parts of Chinese law, including China's tax law system?". Answering these
questions in the affirmative, this thesis later turns to a more practical
question: 22 "Will the Chinese judicature system resolve inconsistencies in the
administration of tax laws?" It further considers how the Chinese tax
judicature system might meaningfully resolve tax related disputes". This
chapter attempts to connect these two perspectives by discussing how the tax
legislation system may fulfill the requirements of WTO membership.

21
22

!d.
See infra Chapter VI
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3.1. The binding effects of WTO agreements on the tax law system

When elaborating the influence of WTO agreements on China's tax
governance, the first question concerns the binding effect ofWTO agreements.
The answer rests mainly in a well known principle of, "pacta sunt servanda"
("treaties must be abided by"), and China is bound by the international treaties
it concludes, including WTO agreements. As a result, the binding nature of
WTO agreements requires that any inconsistent acts against the WTO
agreements may expose China to the WTO dispute settlement process. Such
process usually includes consultations, requests for the establishment of a
panel, panel decision within established deadlines, possibility of appeal, and a
final Appellate Body decision within established deadlines. Such dispute settle
processes may bring in binding recommendations from the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) for readjusting domestic policies to ensure WTO compliance.
The second question is to which extent the WTO agreements bind China with
regard to its tax order. In practice, there are two main ways to apply
international treaties. One is the transformational -- to revise domestic law in
order to comply with the treaty. The other is direct application, requiring no
change to domestic law. Some countries adopt the mixed approach depending
on the nature of the treaty. However, the Constitution of China is not clear as
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to how to apply international treaties in China. 23 It seems it is neither against
direct nor transformational application.

24

Taking one step further, the third question deals with the possible direct effect
of WTO provisions regardless of the approaches of adopting WTO principles
-this is particularly evident in the Chinese tax context. This question shifts the
challenges entirely to the tax legislation and related tax judicature system by
which the private sector may seek to relief. Therefore, tax legislation has to
identify and incorporate the possible direct effect of treaty articles to assure
provisions at issue are sufficiently clear and precise for administrative
interpretation or judiciary application.
Being mindful of three questions above, impacts of the WTO agreements on
China's tax law system necessitate two lines of inquiry: firstly, under the
WTO general principles which affect China's legal reform in general, such as
transparency, impartial and uniform administration, and judicial review, what
are the direct implications of WTO accession? Second, what does China need
to do to accommodate those implications? Apparently, these two queries
should be addressed by the tax legislation reform at the first place.

23

See Bing Ling, Is China's Accession to the WTO Legally Valid? (2002)
http://bingling.page.tll(last visited on March IS, 2011), arguing that the ratification procedure
was defective - the validity of China's accession, in spite of any procedural defects, seems
unquestionable as a matter of international law under Articles 45 and 46 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties; although the National People's Congress Standing
Committee granted a before-the-fact authorization but not an after-the-fact ratification;
24 ld.
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3.2.Implication of the WTO agreements to China's tax laws
reform in General

The essential function of the WTO has been described as providing a means to
"resolve conflicts of interest within, not between, nations." 25 "[A] more vivid
analogy, along these same lines, characterizes the WTO as a "mast to which
governments can tie themselves to escape the siren-like calls of various
pressure groups. " 26 Equally illustrative is the impetus derived from the WTO
on China's rule of law construct. Undertakings of WTO accession, in addition
to trade liberalization commitments, impose a special commitment that aims to
promote transparency, predictability and faimess. 27 This includes, in particular,
obligations on the public availability of trade-related laws, including tax
legislation, uniform administration of the laws where tax administration and
related procedural consistency are concerned, and the establishment of an
independent and impartial system for reviewing administrative decisions -the
tax judicature reform.

3.2.1. Transparency

Transparency is a crucial, basic WTO principle, which requires that all WTO
members publish and administer, in a uniform, impartial and reasonable

25

See Friender Roessler, The Constitutional Funtion of the Multilateral Trade Order, in
Essays on the Legal Structure, Function and Limits of the WTO, 109 (Meinhard Hilf & EmstUlrich eds., 2000) (emphasis added)
26
See Frieder Roessler, The Scope, Limits and Function of the GATT Legal System, 8 World
Econ. 289-98 (1985).
27
See generally, Jianming Cao, WTO and the Rule of Law in China 16 Temp. Int'l & Comp.
L.J. at 379
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manner, all of its laws, administrative regulations and foreign trade policies.
Its main function is to prevent and eliminate any discriminatory treatment by
members through unpublished laws, regulations and other measures or barriers,
and to monitor the implementation of WTO agreements by all the members.
The transparency requirement applies to the tax laws context in a singular way.
In the Protocol, 28 China agreed that not only would WTO-related law,
regulations and other measures that are published and readily available to
other WTO members be made public, but also that drafts of all such
documents should be provided beforehand for comments prior to official
release and implementation 29 • China must also establish or designate an
official journal for the publication of WTO-related rules, regulations, and
other measures and to make copies of the journal readily available. 30 Moreover,
China agreed to designate an enquiry point where all WTO-related
information may be obtained.
As to tax laws reform, since 1990, China has gradually published all of its
laws, regulations, and policies related to tax administration and public finance
management. 31 Still, its efforts fall short of transparency requirements during
the process of policy and law development and opinion collection before final
promulgation. Usually, the SAT or the MOP does not disclose "internal" or
28

China's accession terms are contained in the WTO Report of the Working Party on the
Accession of China, supra 2, and in World Trade Organization, Accession of the People's
Republic of China, WT/L/432 (Nov. 10, 2001)
29
Currently, according to the Law of Legislation, all legislations at basic law level or above
are found beforehand or soon after official release, typically in the gazette of Ministry of
Commerce that issue the legislation and sometimes in the national daily newspaper.
30
See Karen Halverson Cross, China's WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political
Implications, B. C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. Vol. 27, No. 2 (2004), at 349, SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1082546(last visited on March 15, 2011)
31
The publication usually is reterred to as the "Blue Book" for tax professionals. Originally
being edited into a one-volume collection, nowadays it is mostly edited as two-volume or
three-volume collection of selective tax ruling, notices, directives or regulations, part of which
is accompanied with an official translation in English
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"sensitive" documents. Ironically, sometimes foreign scholars even receive
legislative documents earlier than local critics. 32 A robust example of the
importance of transparency in cases where China does submit draft laws for
public commentary is the intense debates cross-fired to determine the exact
threshold for the new individual income tax deduction 33 before it was signed
into enactment on January 1, 2006. 34 Despite the efforts China has made in the
past decade, many new problems have arisen from its blurred hierarchy of
legislative power. The clearest example is that, in the case of certain tax
policies, no disclosure was made beforehand to enterprises and no information
on implementation details was exchanged afterwards. Foreign investors may
not become aware of the new policy or amendments to laws until they are
faced with a particular problem in actual management and daily operation.
Furthermore, there is an amorphous category of tax administrative documents
referred to as rulings (guizhang or banfa) notices (tongzhi) and directives
(zhishi or wenjian) that are released jointly or separately by the SAT, the MOF,

and provincial tax authorities. Although the use of those administrative
directives has decreased gradually due to various complaints it never
disappears. As a result, there exists reckless or manipulative inconsistency or
irregularities in the implementation of tax laws and policies in different
localities. To preemptively restrict legislative actions in this regard, the SAT
imposed stricter rulemaking procedures on the issuance of generally
32

See infra Chapter VIII, noting that Professor Karla Simon even published a Jaw review
article commenting China's Charity Code before most of scholars knew about the draft which
was never published in any media in China
33
See China to Raise Deductible Income Rate for liT to RMB3,000, China Briefing, March 7,
20 II, noting that the threshold has been a good example of manipulating liT but also showing
progress in legislative opinion collection and public hearing, http://www.china(last
briefing.com/news/20 II /03/07 /china-to-allow-more-income-deduction-for-iit.htm I
visited on March IS, 20II)
34 /d.
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applicable rules by tax agencies or those tax-related regulations by releasing
the Administrative Measures for Formulating Normative Documents in
Taxation.

35

However, the implementation of the "New Measures for

Normative Documents" remains unclear.
An additional obstacle in honoring the transparency requirement is that, other
than

tax

authorities,

various

administrative

apparatuses at different

hierarchical levels issue overlapping and less formal notices, supplemental
circulars, and interpretative opinions affecting taxpayers' behavior and
creating nuances. 36 Following the guideline that administration in accordance
with the rule of law, China's Legislation Law demands the publication of all
legislation

including

the

NPC-level

basic

laws

and

amendments,

administrative regulations, local and regional regulations, ministerial rules and
local level rules. 37 Only a few normative documents or circulars are exempted
from the requirement. Of course, to fulfill requirements of WTO as a
multilateral trading system, China may "undertake only those laws,
regulations, and other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods,
services, TRIPs, or the control of foreign exchange that are published and
readily available to other members, individuals, and enterprises, shall be
enforced. 38 " In addition, China is obliged to make available to WTO members,
upon request, all laws, regulations, and other measures pertaining to or

35

SAT Decree No. 20, published Feb. 10, 2010, effective Jul. I, 2010, [hereinafter "New
Measures for Normative Documents"] «f:it45r!sW.m·t1)CftflliUJ:Ei'II1J-rt» , rnl*f:it*.~.fiij
4-~ 20 %(2010)
36
An example is a notice issued by the State Administration of Industry and Commerce on
redefining the status of Permanent Establishment, which arouses disputes on its tax treatment
and international tax implications.
37
See e.g., Regulations for Registration and Management of Representative Offices of Foreign
Enterprises, effective as of March I, 2011, issued by the State Administration oflndustry and
Commerce ( UrOO::&.illt;lt~:±f~7&m~!liC.i'II~i7u» )
38
See Halverson, supra 30, at 351
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affecting trade in goods, services, TRIPs, or the control of foreign exchange
before such measure are implemented or enforced. In emergency situations,
laws, regulations, and other measures shall be made available at the latest
when they are implemented or enforced. 39 However, given the meticulous
reach of tax legislations, it is always hard and impractical to pick out specific
tax terms stipulated in widely scattered administrative regulations.
Another practical obstacle to compliance with China's tax laws is that they are
not easily accessible. Although the protocol specifically requires China to
publish an official journal and establish a single enquiry point for WTOrelated materials under paragraph 2(C) of the Protocol, 40 accurate and reliable
information on tax legislation is often not provided to individuals and
enterprises. Even the official website of the SAT or the MOF, which is
supposed to be most authoritative hub on China's tax laws, does not provide
all major tax related laws and regulations, let alone various administrative
rulings, notices and directives. 41
An additional note is that secrecy and lack of transparency in the tax
legislation system are not merely accidental. Rather, they stem from China's

39

!d., at 352
Article X of the GATT 1994 stipulates that laws, regulations, policies, and decisions,
including judicial decisions, pertaining to foreign trade "shall be published promptly in such
manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them. See China to
Open Official WTO Website, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 12, 2002, LEXIS, News
Library, Xinhua File. TRIPs also prescribes that laws and regulations, and final judicial
decisions and administrative rulings of general applications, made effective by a member
pertaining to the availability, scope, acquisition, enforcement, and protection shall be
published by each member; see Halverson, supra 30 at 350-352, establishing an official WTO
website could greatly facilitate the ability of outsiders to gather legal information. The website
at least purports to make current information regarding the WTO accessible to the public,
provides links to China's WTO-related laws and regulations, and allows visitors to ask
question
40

41

For instance, for the first 6 months of 2010, around 310 "SAT Correspondences" were
issued, of which only 53 are currently publicly available; 64 "SAT Issuances" were adopted
but only 36 are currently publicly available from the SAT official website
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn (last visited on March 15, 2011)
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basic hierarchical organization structure. China's tax governance is essentially
administrative. Most tax laws and regulations, national or local, would be
better characterized as commands running down a bureaucratic hierarchy from
superiors to subordinates. If laws and regulations are alien to the
administrative hierarchy, it is not surprising that those laws are subject to
ineffective implementation. The result is that tax laws and regulations passed
by legislative bodies are rarely very meaningful without administrative
articulation and implementation.

3.2.2. Uniform and impartial administration of tax laws and
regulations

As required by Article X ofthe GATT 1994, China agreed, in the Protocol, to
apply and administer all WTO-related laws, regulations, and other measures in
a "uniform, impartial and reasonable manner." 42 Scholars of Chinese law
express a mix of skepticism 43 and optimism 44 regarding the possibility of
China's fulfillment to this obligation, which demands enforcement institution
with clear lines of authority and the capacity to render neutral decisions. 45
However, as this requirement applies to the tax context, there are several
problems that might jeopardize the neutrality and predictability of their
administration. 46

42

See the Protocol, Part. I, Para 2(A)(2).
See generally Halverson, supra 30
44
See generally Cao, supra 27
45
See Halverson supra 30 at 352
46
/d., at 353
43
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First, Chinese tax legislation usually tends to fall into one of two extremes.
Those drafted in vague terms or in direction by "political guidelines or spirit,"
and those drafted with too many details applicable only to specific issues.
Both extremes are lacking in jurisprudential value. 47 Those undefined, policyorientated, broadly worded tax laws and regulations create a mixed authority
and provoke discretionary decision-making on the part of local tax authorities
interpreting their specific meaning. 48 This is particularly problematic, because
many local tax authorities are incompetent to exercise this discretionary
capacity. Second, tax authorities as lawmaking institutions usually are short of
modern legislation techniques. 49 This results in a proliferation of overlapping,
repetitive, ambiguous or contradictory laws at various hierarchical levels.
Finally, various extra-legal factors impede the neutral and just implementation
of tax laws. Those factors include political intervention, corruption of local tax
officials, social stability concerns, imbalanced development strategies,
minority unity, and the traditional Chinese notion of guanxi or influence
peddling.
Moreover, China has been criticized for local protectionism that manifests
in certain localities through legislation and enforcement of tax regulations
and rules associated with unfair implementation and treatment. For
example, China's tax system suffers from discriminatory measures such as
actual higher tax rates, refusal to issue tax registration licenses, overly
strict administration against non-local products or services. It is clear that

47

See Luhman, supra 1 at 147, describing the techniques that characterize Chinese legislative
drafting, including "the use of general principles, vagueness and ambiguity, undefined terms,
broadly worded discretion, omissions and general catch-all phrases"
48
See Halverson supra 30 at 352
49
!d., at 3 54
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unless local protectionism is destroyed, the national market as a whole will
be impeded and trade disputes will arise. Meanwhile, it should be noted
that the NPC, its Standing Committee and State Council have power to
annul the administrative regulations that contradict the Constitution, laws
and major regulations promulgated by legislative bodies in a higher
hierarchy. This is in line with China's agreement to improve the uniform
administration echoing the requirement under the Article X of GATT
1994. 50

A few other aspects of China's tax law system militate against its impartial
and predictable administration. First, except a few nationwide basic laws or
regulations issued by the NPC, the MOF and the SAT on tax, many areas of
the tax law or administrative regulations are not covered or promulgated,
although some are available in vague or tentative terms. For example, the
discussion centered on gift and estate tax has been kept for over a decade,
however, there are no rules in this area. Courts or tax authorities have to resort
to general provisions in the Civil Law Code or Contract Law to resolve
disputes arising in this connection. Second, the tax authorities are comprised
of officials of varying qualifications. Ironically, jobs in tax administration are
viewed as safe, career positions. Job security is not premised on increasing
sophistication of one's capacity to implement new tax provisions. So, there is
no guarantee that the implementation and interpretation of tax laws will be
consistent across localities. Third, China's economic structure and policies
favoring coastal areas further undermine uniformity and predictability. When
local officials' promotions and political sponsorship are staked on local
50

See Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and
Development, at 107-109 (1999).
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economic performance, it is without doubt that ill-defined, ambiguous and
contradictory tax laws and regulations are implemented for local benefit,
which causes inconsistency and unpredictability. Notably, the administration
of tax laws and regulations in special economic zones are in general
illustrative of the above summary. Through the end of 2008, over 7,000
special economic zones have been set up in China since 1979, of which nearly
300 zones are of national level and the rest is of provincial or local level. The
rapid increase of special economic zones caused irregularity and insufficiency
to tax legislation and administration. Moreover, a considerable portion of local
rulings, notices and directives (either published or non-published), are in
conflict with laws and regulations from the central government. Meanwhile,
the task force for tax administration is in short supply and a significant portion
of available tax professionals do not possess adequate training and
qualification to secure impartiality and independence. An additional note is
that not all special economic zones have an independent judicature for
determining administrative cases, which in tum exacerbates irregularity and
the manipulation of tax related disputes.

3.2.3. Review of Administrative Decisions

One difficulty that plagues the Chinese legal system is the inability to provide,
on a consistent basis, truly independent judicial review of administrative
actions. 5 1 Tax administration is not an exception to this dilemma. According to

51

See infra Chapter VI on details about tax judicature reform discussions. This section briefly
reviews the overall picture of the administrative system that may concern tax legislation and
judicature.
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Article X of GATT 1994, Article VI of GATS and other related WTO
agreements, China has committed itself to establishing and maintaining
"impartial and independent tribunals, contact points and procedures" for the
prompt review of all administrative actions relating to the implementation of
the laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general
application referred to in the WTO transparency rules. 52 Article II (d) of the
GATT 1994 requires that review procedures be included with the opportunity
for appeal, without penalty, by individuals or enterprises affected by any
administrative action subject to review. If the initial right of appeal is to an
administrative body, there shall in all cases be the opportunity to choose to
appeal the decision to a judicial body. Notice of the decision on appeal shall
be given to the appellant and the reasons for such decision shall be provided in
writing. The appellant shall also be informed of any right to further appeal. 53 ·
This thesis notes that China has made remarkable progress in creating a
national jurisprudence examination and reforming its judiciary institutions.
The Supreme People's Court ("SPC"), during the process of constructing the
rule of law as incorporated in Chinese Constitution, has served as a dominant

52

China's official press is replete with examples of officials announcing the importance of
transparency and rule of law in light of the country's WTO obligations. See, e.g., Timetable
Set for China's Entry to WTO, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 3, 2001 (trade minister
quoted as saying that the "most important" change resulting from China's WTO entry will be
improving transparency of laws); Meng Yan, Legislative Efforts Benefit WTO Accession,
CHINA DAILY, Jan. 7, 2002 (NPC representative observes that "transparency and public
participation" have recently been emphasized during the NPC's legislative process after
China's WTO entry); Shao Zongwei, Judicial Rules to Comply with WTO, CHINA DAILY,
Feb. 26, 2002 (senior prosecutor pledges that China's procuracy will incorporate WTO
principles of"openness, integrity and transparency").
53

See Protocol, supra 2 pt. I, para. 2(D)(2). The Protocol also requires that the relevant
tribunal provide written notice of the decision on appeal, including the reasons for such
decision; see also Working Party Report, supra 2 para.78, requiring that the tribunals
responsible for judicial review be "impartial and independent of the agency entrusted with
administrative enforcement" and have no "substantial" interest in the outcome
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intervening force in judicial review reform.

54

In view of the powerful

bureaucracy and political interference in China, however, a key issue is what
degree of independence China's judges exert with regard to their delegated
authority to review and correct administrative decisions, let alone the
incomplete or absent tribunals in several important economic areas such as tax,
international trade and bankruptcy.
Although in some aspects China's judiciary system may fall short of
expectations or the commitment listed in its Protocol, the efforts and progress
demonstrate a capable framework in place that comports with the Protocol's
obligation for reviewing administrative decisions with tribunals for appeal. In
addition to judicial review of WTO-related laws and administrative

54
See Halverson, supra 30 at 360-363, summarizing that SPC's authority to promote judicial
independence is circumscribed both by the supremacy of the CPC and by specific statutory
limitations on its authority to interpret law. Constraints undermining the judiciary
independence include political influence and the continued involvement of CPC, lower status
of judges vis-a-vis administrators, financial interests in court decisions at the local level (i.e.,
the interconnectedness of local government and the private sector), dependence on local
government to enforce judgments, the hold-backs of guanxi, and outright corruption. Crucially,
funding of courts at the local level is supported by local revenues. More generally, the
weakening authority of the CCP, along with the growing importance of wealth as a measure of
success, has left a moral vacuum, which exacerbates corruption and complicates efforts to
promote neutral and objective decision-making. These factors will operate impeding effective
implementation of China's WTO obligations, in particular, the commitment on judicial review
of administrative decisions. Significantly, the SPC has emphasized China's WTO
transparency-related obligations as a means to promote judicial independence in cases
affecting international trade. However, The SPC's authority to promote judicial independence
is circumscribed both by the supremacy of CPC and by specific statutory limitations on its
authority to interpret law. The requirement of the rule of law encompasses not only
transparency but also judicial independence and the notion that no person, including a
government official, is above the law. Even Beijing has expressed a commitment to promoting
judicial independence in a narrow sense of the phrase -WTO-related cases (including review
of administrative acts) should be determined on the basis of international obligations - as
opposed to being influenced by guanxi, corruption, incompetence of professionalism or
political inference at the local level, it is unrealistic that such change will expand courts'
power or authority vis-a-vis the CPC or certain administrative apparatus; for more discussion
on the SPC, See generally, China's Legal Reforms (Stanley Luhman ed., 1996) (containing
papers by various authors); The Limits of the Rule of Law in China (Karen G. Turner et al. eds.,
2000) (containing papers by various authors addressing rule of law related issues in China);
Stanley B. Luhman, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China After Mao (1999); Pitman Potter,
The Chinese Legal System: Globalization and Local Legal Culture (2001); Randall
Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of the Law: Administrative Law
Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China, 19 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 1 (2001)
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decisions, 55 there are a number of other channels that are worth highlighting
for the review of administrative actions, including tax administrative decisions.
First, Chinese law provides an internal but extra-judicial supervisory authority
for reconsideration system of administrative decision-making, which is
conducted from within the administration. 56 An evident limitation to this
review, is its lack of independence. Usually, such a supervisory or
reconsideration system serves political concerns of keeping potential conflicts
of interests within the administrative system. Second, incomplete though it
may be, the 1996 Administrative Punishment Law ("APL") outlines basic
elements of a comprehensive law or an administrative punishment code, which
imposes procedural requirements on administrative agencies. 57 The APL was
developed to remove arbitrariness and overlapping exertions of jurisdiction in
the imposition of an administrative "penalty" per se. The APL is distinctive in
its incorporating procedural safeguards, including replacing inappropriate
administrative clerks, establishing a right to know and the right to a hearing a
certain cases. 58 Third, as it applies to tax litigation, limited judicial review of
"concrete" tax administrative cases is available. However, influences imposed
on judges by tax authorities may distort its judgment by favoring tax
authorities. China's tax judicature does not embody the "common law"
principles of stare decisis to handle judicial review. Although the 1989
55

See Protocol, supra note 2, pt. I para 2.
Id.
57
See generally The Administrative Reconsideration Law of the P.R.C.; Administrative
Supervision Law of the P.R.C. ( 1997); Administrative Penalties Law of the P.R.C. ( 1996)
[hereinafter APL]; State Compensation Law of the P.R.C. (1994); Administrative Litigation
Law of the P.R.C. (1989) [hereinafter ALL].
58
See Chen supra 50 at 139-151. Noting that the right to hearing applies when "serious"
penalties are at stake. In addition, the APL provides that (i) penalties may only be imposed
and enforced by authorities that are specifically authorized to do so (Articlel5), (ii) a penalty
may not be based on rules contained in internal, or unpublished, documents (Article4), and (iv)
no administrative body may impose fines for the same offense twice (Article24), quoted by
Halverson supra 30 at 365
56
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Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) enriched China's judicial review system
by allowing suits against administrations, 59 some drawbacks are associated
with the narrowly designated ALL - namely, judicial review is limited to
specific or concrete acts of the government such as imposing a fine or
invoking a license. However, courts are not permitted to review abstract
administrative actions, including for example the appropriateness or
reasonableness of local tax administrative rulings or guidelines. 60
Generally, judicial review of tax administrative cases involves similar efforts
and difficulties as discussed above, but also has a few specific problems. First,
tax administrative cases suffer from a high withdrawal rate. Foreign investors
or individuals are typically not privileged to updates on consistent-changing
local tax laws, regulations, and court procedures. Even though they are
afforded representation by lawyers, a calculated cost-effective analysis may
prevent them to do so and taxpayers are disincentivized from using it. Second,
in contrast with civil or criminal law areas, judges in China are short of
competency and expertise in handling administrative tax cases. More tax
specialists are employed by tax authorities but fewer serve as judges for tax
cases. It is not surprising that courts may seek suggestions from tax
administration to determine tax cases, which in tum causes conflict of interests.
Third, local courts lack financial independence and usually they are entirely
funded by local revenue. As a result, judges are more cautious and unwilling
to rule against the local tax administration or large local SOEs which may
threaten their financial needs. This concern has been described as a "growing

59

See Wang Hanbin, Explanation of the (Draft) Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC,
Delivered at the 2nd Session of the Seventh NPC (Mar. 28, 1989), translated in 3 CHINESE
LAW AND GOVERNMENT 35, 35-36 (1991), quoted by Chen, supra 50 at 147
60
See Chen supra 50, at 155
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tumor" for China's tax judicature reform. While other areas of the law are
affected, the lack of judicial independence affects tax cases specifically.
Finally, overlapping and contradictory local tax laws and incentives put judges
in the position of relying on uncertain legal sources - sometimes a vacancy of
related laws or regulations.
To this end, the active role of SPC for fulfilling WTO obligations and
promoting tax judiciary competence may be extended to the proposal of
establishing a Chinese tax court system. SPC, as the most important and active
interpretation authority in China, functions both as a tribunal and as supervisor
of an imaginary tax court system. 61 The desirable tax court system structure is
to adopt a circuit tax courts framework exercising both original (conditioned
first instance) and appellate jurisdiction, sitting permanently in six to eight
regions covering the entire Chinese territory, and reporting to the SPC Tax
Tribunal based in Beijing. The designated High Tax Tribunal is an SPC
subsidiary and should have ultimate appellate jurisdiction over tax cases
appealed from circuit tax courts and provincial high courts, and perform tax
court system administration or management. The transitory, costly and
overhauling midlist "spin-off' structure should be denounced based on tax
policy routines.
3.2.4. Summary
China's tax governance is essentially administrative. The binding effect of the
WTO agreements on the tax governance can be summarized by three WTO
principles: transparency, impartial and uniform administration, and judicial
review.
61

See infra Chapter VI

285

The transparency principle implies three separate issues. The process of tax
legislation as to policy orientation and opinion collection before the final
promulgation mostly is not open to public. Inconsistency and irregularity in
the implementation of tax laws and policies in different localities create
further ambiguity. Although the SAT imposed stricter rulemaking procedures
on the issuance of generally applicable rules by tax agencies or those taxrelated regulations

by releasing the ''New Measures for Normative

Documents," the implementation of which remains unclear. Moreover, other
than tax authorities, various administrative apparatus at different hierarchical
levels issue overlapping and less formal notices, supplemental circulars.
Secrecy and the lack of transparency in the tax legislation system partially
stem from its basic hierarchical organizational structure.
Uniform and impartial administration requirements raise the bar high for
China's tax system especially for its tax legislation. China is required to apply
and administer all WTO-related laws, regulations, and other measures in a
"uniform, impartial and reasonable manner" to accord with neutrality and
predictability requirements. However, tax authorities are usually vested with
incompetent capacity to administer ill-designed tax laws: those drafted in
vague terms or in direction by "political guidelines or spirit," and those drafted
with too many details applicable only to specific issues. Tax authorities as
lawmaking institutions usually are short of modem legislation techniques, and
this leads to a proliferation of overlapping, repetitive, ambiguous or
contradictory tax laws at various hierarchical levels. Various extra-legal
factors also impede the neutral and righteous implementation of tax laws, such
as political intervention, corruption of local tax officials, and local
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protectionism. In addition to the marginal qualification of tax officials,
China's favorable economic policies towards coastal areas undermine
uniformity and predictability. When local economic performance is combined
with economic pressure, ill-defined, ambiguous and contradictory tax laws and
regulations are implemented for local benefit which induces disparity and
unpredictability.
The judicial review requirement creates specific issues in the Chinese tax
context. A key issue is to what extent China's judges can independently
execute their delegated authority to review and correct administrative
decisions. Although certain extra-judicial means, such as administrative
supervision or reconsideration, may be used to resolve adverse tax decisions
made against taxpayers, tax administrative cases suffer from a high
withdrawal rate due to unfamiliarity with tax laws and court procedure as well
as a calculated cost-effective analysis.

Judges hearing tax cases lack

competency and expertise. Their financial dependence on local revenue drives
courts to be more cautious and unwilling to rule against local tax
administration or large local SOEs, which control their monetary allocations.
Meanwhile, overlapping and contradictive local tax laws and incentives
present judges with an unfavorable situation of facing vacancy or ambiguities
of related laws or regulations. Although the debate regarding the tax court
system is popular, the system, as imagined, is not in a position to replace the
rest of the judicature reform. 62

62

!d.
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3.3. WTO's impacts on the Chinese tax law system - a normative
perspective
China's tax reform is one of the most important components to bringing China
into compliance with obligations enclosed in the Protocol and related WTO
principles. China's tax law system is not isolated from macroeconomic and
political constrains. Many of China's tax policies, laws, regulations and
procedures have higher reform priority than other areas of law. The objectives
of China's tax policies are to raise revenue and stimulate the economy by
encouraging exports and foreign direct investment. However, less emphasis
was put on tax equity and neutrality. In contrast with counterparts in Western
tax jurisdictions, China's tax law system is plagued by the lack of impartial
administration and judicial review. Although some outdated tax legislation
was reformed before the accession to WTO, coupled with the unfinished
business of establishing an institutional tax governance structure for liberating
trade and capital mobility, a few areas in China's tax law remain necessary
steps to accord with China's obligations the WTO accession. This section
introduces necessary tax legislation updates based on two closely related WTO
principles- the national treatment and most-favored-nation (MFN) principles.
3.3 .1. The national treatment principle

Article III (1) of the GATT stipulates the equalization of foreign with
domestic products in the field of internal taxes and charges, as well as legal
provisions. Although the definition of "product" is not found in GATT, it is
reasonable to consider a product to be tangible and moveable. This general
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rule is further explained by Article III (2) of the GATT, the first sentence of
which states that "the products of territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of
those applied, directly or indirectly, 63 to like domestics products" (emphasis
added by the author).

64

Identical products are not required, but "likeness" is

sufficient. Moreover, as the GAIT Analytical Index states, a situation falling
under the scope of Article III (2) of the GATT has to fulfill two requirements:
first, it must be a competition situation; second, there must be a directly
competitive or substitutable product which has not been similarly taxed.
Another crucial feature is that Article III of the GATT prohibits discrimination
of not only a de jure, but also a de facto nature - in any case, the measure must
be protective. Mere marginal differences are subject to the de minimis
principle and, therefore, do not prove a violation. 65 Although scholars debate
whether or not Article III (2) of the GATT applies to direct taxation, 66 one
cannot deny the Appellate Body's decisions in the FSC/ETI case, which
recognize the applicability of Article III (4) of the GATT to direct taxation. 67
In summary, tax measures of a WTO member country have to meet the
requirement of national treatment under Article III ofthe GATT as long as the
tax under consideration is levied on the profits arising from import
transactions. Additionally, if tax measures protect domestic products
exclusively, such measure may violate Article III of the GATT.

63

See Article III (2) of the GATT
See Brauner, supra 13 at 143
65 /d.
66 /d.
67 /d.
64
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Whereas the GATT regulates trade in goods, the GATS is applicable to the
trade in services. Article XVII of the GATS sets forth the principle of national
68

treatment for the trade in services: "[E]ach member shall accord to services
and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting
the supply of services, treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its
own like services and service suppliers". Moreover, there are exceptions to
this rule provided that the difference in treatment is aimed at ensuring the
equitable or effective imposition or collection of direct taxes or the measure
falls in scope of international agreements relating to the avoidance of double
taxation. 69
China's tax measures, especially those associated with foreign investments,
have to comply with national treatment principle under Article III of the
GATT and Article XVII ofthe GATS. To violate Article III ofthe GATT, the
taxation of importing enterprises must be disadvantageous. This may include
those sources which are not taxed in the comparable domestic situation, which
are taxed at different or higher tax rates, which are denied or offered lower
deductions and so on. After a painful process of negotiation and opinion
collection, China has made quite good pointed tax legislation progress. For
example, the following pre-WTO measures promulgated in various tax laws
on the nation level were removed or adjusted based on recent updates
including the 2008 new Enterprise Income Tax Law.

68

69

See GATS Article XVIII(1)
See Brauner, supra 13at 143-145
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Income tax reduction for export-oriented enterprises: Article75 of the
Rules of Foreign Enterprise Income tax Law (FEITL) 70 provides that:
after the application of a regular tax holiday, an enterprise exporting
more than 70 percent of its sales is eligible for a 50 percent income tax
reduction, but the reduced tax rate cannot be less than 10 percent.
Although this measure is designated to benefit foreign investment,
other WTO members may treat it as an export-subsidy measure;
VAT and Income Tax Incentives for buying domestically made
equipment: to encourage the use of locally made equipment specified
in a qualifying list, VAT tax refund and income tax credits are granted
to those who take advantage of this policy. For this instance, domestic
enterprises (DEs) and foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) are allowed
for an income tax credit equal to 40 percent of the purchase price of
domestically made equipment. Such credit can be used to offset the
incremental portion of the enterprises' current income tax liability over
the preceding year. Unused income tax credits can be carried over for
five years (seven years for FIEs eligible for a tax holiday). Purchasers
may also depreciate the equipment based on the original purchase price
and can receive a full VAT refund for tax paid on the equipment. This
policy, obviously, could be viewed as discriminatory against
manufacturers using imported equipment. Moreover, its application to
DEs and FIEs could be considered inconsistent; 71

70

the FEITL was replaced by the new Enterprise Income Tax Law which became effective
from January 1, 2008
71
See generally, Alan Tsoi, China Goes for Equality, International Tax Review (July 2001)
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Income tax exemptions for domestic enterprises: a two-track enterprise
tax system 72 was introduced in the early 1980s. It included a Westernstyle tax system for FIES and another system for DEs. Several
incentives, however, are available only to DEs to encourage the growth
of specific industrial sectors. First, income derived from domestic
research institutes for transfers of research results, technology training,
consultation, and services are exempt from enterprise income tax.
Second, DEs in agricultural production, fisheries, forestry, and
husbandry will receive a general income tax exemption. However,
FIEs engaged in the same industries will receive only a five-year tax
holiday. Third, A two-year, tax free holiday, from the date of an
entity's establishment, is provided for firms engaged in law,
accountancy, auditing, technology, taxation, information consulting,
transportation, shipping and communication. A one-year tax holiday is
offered to enterprises engaged in the travel sector, restaurants, storage,
education, and healthcare. However, only FIEs located in special
economic zones that have registered capital of at least $ 5 million are
entitled to a three-year tax holiday. Again, this income tax exemption
arrangement puts DEs and FIEs in different position;
VAT incentives for Domestic Enterprises: various VAT reductions and
exemptions have been granted to DEs under special scenarios. First,
DEs that utilize waste gas, waste water and solid waste as major
production inputs. Second, newly established enterprises in remote
regions, poverty-stricken regions or regions with ethnic groups. Third,
72

The two-track enterprise income tax system was removed by the new Enterprise Income
Tax Law in 2008
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enterprise that receive income from transferring technologies or from
related services such as technology consultancy or training. Fourth,
enterprises that suffer from disasters and Acts of God. Fifth, newly
established TVEs that create a significant number of new jobs. New
jobs contribute over 60 percent of task force. Finally, enterprises that
sell self-developed software effectively pay VAT at a 6 percent by
refunding a portion of the tax paid already. All the above VAT
incentives, among others, may induce national treatment issues when
FIEs find themselves in a disadvantageous position due to higher VAT
burden;
Deductibility of Management Fees: China's tax authorities have not
dealt favorably with inter-company charges and cost sharing
arrangements, which are a common practice of multinationals. In fact,
FIEs are not allowed to deduct management fees. However, DEs are
allowed to deduct (by conditional approval) management fees paid to
parent companies and affiliated companies. Obviously, FIEs may view
such deduction measure as distorting operation process and putting
them into a competitive disadvantageous position;
Tax consolidation: FIEs with multiple entities m China are not
encouraged to file consolidated returns, but DEs may act differently,
especially domestic banks, insurance companies, airlines and power
companies. This consolidation practice is under review following
national treatment principle;
Depreciation: DEs are granted a salvage value of up to 5 percent ofthe
original fixed-asset costs, however, FIEs cannot set the salvage value
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below 10 percent of cost, unless the tax authorities approve so.
Therefore, when compared to domestic counterparts, PIEs must keep 5
percent more of fixed asset cost in the balance sheet, as opposed to
claiming that amount as a current tax deduction.
Individual income tax: although WTO principles deal solely with the
trading of goods and services, the current system of individual income
tax has experienced a few rounds of review under the national
treatment principle. The monthly deduction for individual taxpayers
has been increased from RMB 800 to RMB 1,600, and is expected to
be raised further. The RMB 4,800 monthly deduction for foreign
individuals remains valid based on a RMB3,200 adjustment. There are
a number of other scenarios that Chinese nationals and foreigners are
treated differently, but it is beyond the scope of this.

In summary, implications of the national treatment principle to China's tax
law system probably are not as profound as observers may expect, however,
certain inconsistencies with this principle exist even after a few major tax
legislative pieces came into place in the past decade. However, certain
irregular treatments for Chinese domestic enterprises exist with merits, mostly
because foreign investments rarely get into certain industry lines such as the
low-profit-margin but environmentally friendly waste recycling business
dominated by domestic enterprises. With more emphasis put on the "green
technology" industry by the Chinese government, this treatment may change
as more foreign capitals are interested in entering into the environment
protection business. Overall, although in many ways the Chinese tax system
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has been reformulated and to certain extent has been successful after the
accession to the WTO, the benchmark has to be upheld that the national
treatment principle by large serves to restrict, not to enlarge the state's taxing
power.

3.3.2.

The most-favored-nation (MFN) Principle

The most-favored-nation (MFN) principle is embodied in Article I of the
GATT that each country is obliged to accord immediately and unconditionally
"any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party
to any product originating in or destined for any other country... to the like
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting
parties." 73 Moreover, this applies "with respect to customs duties and charges
of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation or
imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and
with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with
respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and
exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in Articles III (2) and III
74

(4)." Although GATT provisions apply the MFN treatment to specific issues
only/ 5 the terms "advantage, favor, privilege or immunity" are not defined
precisely, but they are interpreted broadly. An additional requirement is that
the benefit is granted immediately or unconditionally rather than gradually but

73

See Article I, GATT
74/d.
75
See Brauner, supra 13 at 156
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it may be partially granted. If this requirement is fulfilled, the same benefit
should be offered to other member countries.
Article II of the GATS, like Article I of the GATT, contains a MFN clause for
trades of services. It states that "each Member shall accord immediately and
unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member
treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like services and services

suppliers of any other country" (emphasis added by the author). 76 The term
service includes any kind of services and the production, distribution,
marketing, sale and delivery of services. 77 It has to be mentioned that services
in the form of a "commercial presence" also include direct investment and,
therefore, also include a freedom of establishment, either in form of a branch,
or by purchase of shares in an existing enterprises. In reference to the
determination of which treatment is more favorable it is forbidden to resort to
the national treatment provisions of Article XVII of the GATS or Article III of
the GATT. Because of the different wording, it cannot be concluded that the
contracting parties had a common meaning in mind. However, the Appellate
Body recognizes similarities between the MFN clauses of Article II of the
GATS and Article I of the GATT. Both provisions prohibit a de jure as well as
a de facto discrimination.
Under the MFN principle, China is not prohibited from offering its trading
partners more favorable tax treatment than that provided to domestic
enterprises. For example, China could approve more tax incentives to FIEs
with investment in specific geographical areas. As a matter of compliance,

76
77

!d., at 159
!d.
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China needs to review not only rules violating WTO principles but also those
provide preferential treatment based on capital resources of enterprises. On the
other hand, when more and new business activities emerge after accession to
the WTO, both FIEs and DEs must be aware of updated tax and financial
implications caused by modifications of tax laws and regulations. To honor the
commitments in the Protocol, the following pre-WTO measures in practice
were removed or adjusted based on the mass pre-WTO legislation clean-up
and recent tax legislative updates.

Significant tariff reduction: According to U.S - China Market Access
Agreement, the tariff rate is subject to significant reduction based on
China's actual accession date. Although China has been reducing tariff
rates since its accession to WTO the current average tariff rate for imports
to China is around 12-15 percent which is substantially higher than the
average of developed countries - 3.8 percent - and even developing
countries, which is 10-11 percent. Some imported items are still running
on a quota or import-permit system. In particular, i) for agricultural
products, China already has a lowered its average tariff rate on U.S.
agricultural products from 31 percent to roughly 14 percent by January
2004; foreign producers have already begun using newly created tariff-rate
quotas; ii) for industrial products, China has cut its tariff rate to around 10
percent. Foreign companies are able to market, sell and distribute
industrial goods freely and role of previous import and export agencies is
fading harshly; iii) regarding automobiles, since mid-2006 China has
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reduced its tariff from the original rate of 80-100 percent to 25 percent.
Tariffs on auto parts reduced to 10 percent already.
Foreign banks or financial institutions: according to the market-access
commitment in the Protocol, China has acknowledged full market access
(no geographic and customer restrictions) to foreign banks or financial
institutions after end 2006, i.e., five years after the WTO accession. As
foreign banks are granted substantially the same rights as Chinese banks,
the reforms in tax law in this connection should be closely watched under
the MFN principle;
Reinvestment refund: a tax refund is available if an FIE reinvests the
profits derived from China for at least five years. The standard refund rate
is 40 percent. A full refund is allowed if the profits are reinvested for
establishing or expanding an export-oriented or technologically advanced
enterprise. Although debates had been made over whether this incentive
should be refined, Chinese tax authorities believe in its control over it with
a tightened approval processes for technologically advanced enterprise;
Tax treatment on dividends: dividends paid by FIEs are not subject to
withholding tax, and foreign nationals (corporate and individual) can
receive dividends tax-free. Domestic enterprises are allowed to offset
income tax based on attributable shares of the tax paid by the invested
enterprise on the dividends. However, the tax credit may not be fully
utilized if the applicable tax rate of the investors is lower than that of the
invested enterprisers. Unlike foreign individual investors, dividends
received from FIEs by Chinese individual investors are subject to income
tax. This requirement is under review for amendment.
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Bad debt: FIEs may claim a bad debt deduction for debts outstanding for
more than two years and only financial institutions can establish bad debt
reserves. Moreover, if an enterprise does not establish a reserve in books,
it can deduct a bad debt only if the debt has been outstanding for more
than three years. In contrast, domestic enterprises can claim a bad debt
reserve and a bad debt deduction on an ad hoc basis. Although China has
adopted an updated set of accounting rules, the bad debt extrudes the
different treatment over books and details of accounting practice.
Therefore, Chinese tax authorities will have to detail such differentiation
under the MFN;
Surtaxes and Surcharges: DEs usually are required to pay a city
maintenance and construction surtax at rates varying based on enterprises'
locations (e.g. 7 percent for urban area and 1 percent for town or other
areas) and a 3 percent education surcharge is imposed on the same tax base
additionally. However, FIEs are exempt from the above surtax and
surcharges which means domestic enterprises effectively pay 10 percent
more of turnover tax than their FIE counterparts. Certain surcharges
nowadays are applicable to FIEs as well.
Overall, China has made tremendous efforts through tax legislation to identify
and reform inconsistencies with MFN principles in the tax context even the
definitions of many key words or commonly accepted practice under the MFN
principle are subject to broad interpretation. A mix of different tax treatments
towards FIEs and DEs are caused by two main factors. First, the economic
structure and development priorities invite flexible treatments towards specific
industry lines or preferential tax treatments. To a substantial extent, foreign
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interests are treated more favorably than domestic interests. Tax preferential
measures are direct and enforceable in driving the free trade of products and
services without discrimination. Second, arising complaints from foreign
investors are about the non-transparent government procurement process
associated with negotiation and protectionism. To foreign investors, a "Black
box" practice may imply preferential tax treatments that are not available to
them in negotiated procedures with competition bidding for government
contracts. Although the government's practice to nurture domestic interests is
common to many WTO member countries, the tax implications of the
government procurement process are not given enough attention according to
the MFN principle of eliminating barriers to facilitate the mobility of goods
and services among member countries.

3.4. Implications for the Tax Administration System

The foremost effect of WTO accession for China's tax administration reform
has been completed through an important piece of tax legislation. An amended
The Law of Administration of the Levy and Collection Tax ofPRC (the "Tax
Collection Law" or "TCL") was passed in April 2001, in response to the
requirements of WTO accession. The Tax Collection Law marks a major step
in China's tax legislation for conforming to WTO requirements. It articulates
the rules for the administration of tax collection, stipulates various taxpayers'
rights, identifies clear standards for tax collection at both the national and
local levels, and establishes penalties for various violations of tax collection.
More importantly, the Tax Collection Law sets forth clear rules for combating
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inconsistency in tax collection that have long plagued the certainty and
reliance of tax administration. It also improves transparency to assure
investors of predictable tax consequences of specific transactions.
Without doubt, establishing clear-cut standards for tax collection is prioritized
by Chinese tax authorities to fight against local protectionism and corruption
that drains revenue and distorts competition. The Tax Collection Law, along
with its implementation regulations, largely prohibits cross-regional barriers
and to certain extent combats tax evasion. It also helps consolidate domestic
industries to improve competitiveness and operating efficiency. However, two
major problems are unresolved. First, even the TCL stipulates various
taxpayers' rights, the degree that tax administrations honor protection thereof
remains uncertain. Rather, the TCL internalizes tax disputes within the tax
administration system itself and to improve the internal management in the
hope of monitoring the decentralization efforts of local tax bureaus. Second, 78
the tax administration is not matched with a full-bodied tax judicature system
in reaching impartial judgment on tax cases increase. Issues such as irregular
judgment of similar tax controversies, shortage of tax expertise of judges
hearing tax cases, and intervention from various authorities all impede the
uniformity and impartiality of tax administration, let alone the vacancy of a
tribunal designated exclusively for tax cases. Tax judicature reform, again,
constitutes a break-through point against which Chinese tax authorities need to
testify its commitment under WTO.

78

See infra Chapter VI
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3.5. Summary

China's tax law system is not isolated; rather, it intertwines with other sectors
of law. China's tax governance is essentially administrative. This subchapter
has outlined the normative impacts of the WTO agreement on China's tax
governance order from the tax legislation perspective in the hope to bridge the
WTO principles and the tax administration system in terms of fulfilling the
requirements raised thereof Tax legislation also contributes to improving tax
administration and protection of taxpayers' rights through the Tax Collection
Law, which sets forth clear rules for combating inconsistency in tax collection
and promoting transparency to assure predictable tax consequences of
transactional behaviors. In addition, it requires an improved tax judicature
system to review tax administrative decisions and legislative actions.
The binding effect of the WTO agreements on the tax governance could be
addressed with attention paid to three WTO principles: transparency, impartial
and uniform administration, and judicial review.
The transparency principle implicates three ongoing issues in China's legal
reform: (1) secrecy and lack of transparency in the tax legislation system
partially stem from China's basic hierarchical organization structure. The
process of tax legislation as to policy orientation and opinion collection should
be open to pubic before final promulgation; (2) although the SAT released the
"New Measures for Normative Documents", reckless or manipulative
inconsistency or irregularities in local tax legislations in different localities
still create ambiguity; (3) intervention from other administrative agents at
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different hierarchical levels also complicates tax legislation reform by issuing
overlapping and less formal notices and supplemental circulars.
The uniform and impartial administration raises the bar high for China's tax
system, and especially for the tax legislation. Tax authorities usually suffer
from incompetent discretionary capacity to administer ill-designed tax laws.
Modern legislation techniques somewhat are missing in local tax legislation
which lead to a proliferation of overlapping, repetitive, ambiguous and
contradictory tax laws at various hierarchical levels.

Various extra-legal

factors impede the neutral and just implementation of tax laws, including
political intervention, corruption of local tax officials, and local protectionism.
China's favorable economic policies toward coastal areas bring in unbalanced
uniformity and predictability. Given the political stakes put on local economic
performance, many ill-defined, ambiguous and contradictory tax laws and
regulations are enforced for local benefit, which causes inconsistency and
unpredictability.
The judicial review requirement creates specific issues in the Chinese tax
context. A key issue is the extent to which China's judges can exert
independence in their delegated authority to review and correct tax
administrative decisions.
This subchapter further discusses implications of the national treatment and
the most-favored-nation principles. First, certain inconsistency against the
national treatment principle is diagnosed even after a few major tax legislative
pieces came into place in the past decade. However, the inconsistent treatment
of Chinese domestic enterprises may have its merits. The benchmark is that
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the national treatment principle by and large serves to restrict, not enlarging to
enlarge the state's tax power. Second, overall, China has made tremendous
efforts through tax legislation in accordance with the MFN principle even the
definitions of many key words or commonly accepted practices thereunder are
subject to broad interpretation. Two inferences are made based on a mix of
different tax treatments towards FIEs and DEs: (1) the economic structure and
development priorities invite flexible treatment toward specific industry lines
or preferential tax treatments. Ta.X preferential measures are direct and
enforceable in driving free trade of products and services without
discrimination; (2) arising complaints from foreign investors on the nontransparent government procurement process may imply preferential tax
treatments that are not available to foreign investors in negotiated procedures
with competition bidding for government contracts. The tax implications of
the government procurement process are not given enough attention according
to the MFN principle of eliminating barrier to facilitate the mobility of goods
and services among member countries.
Based on the normative general binding impacts of WTO's principles on the
tax governance order, the next subchapter provides an overview of progress
made as to specific areas of tax laws after China's accession to the WTO.

IV.

Implications to the tax legislation reform - a formal
perspective

Contemporary tax governance discourses require a balance of formal and
normative perspectives. In particular, a dynamic between focusing on specific
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areas of tax legislation as unique entities in the tax mix firmament, and a
substantiation to the values of WTO principles under the globalized context
for liberating trade and capital mobility. As discussed in subchapters above,
for the Chinese tax legislation reform, the normative implications of the WTO
accession enjoy some salutary effects. Accession requires a more sophisticated
understanding of WTO agreements, draws focus to the substance of China's
current tax system, and accentuates the interrelationship of China's tax
governance structure and taxpayers' rights. Paradoxically, an over-emphasis or
vague transplant of WTO principles may make tax reform somewhat less
relevant than the specific legislation that gives them meaning in the Chinese
context. Many of the proposals offered based on WTO principles are not
practical for China's taxpayers or its tax administration, but, rather, could be
manipulated to reach political or local empowerment. Indeed, many of values
embodied in WTO principles are the same as those that make up a rule of law
order. However, when stepping into details of tax laws reform in China, much
of the intellectual application for WTO principles converges with the
promulgation and enforcement of tax laws. This subchapter, therefore,
discusses a few formal implications of WTO principles to specific areas of tax
laws to evidence the progress and problems associated with tax legislation
reform.
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4.l.lmplications for the turnover tax system

4.1.1. Value-added Tax (VAT)

Perhaps the most significant impact of China's accession to the WTO for
foreign investors will be the opening of many industries previously closed to
foreign investments, such as pharmaceuticals, high-end chemicals, banking
and minerals. A key implication of WTO principles is the reform of turnover
tax system, of which VAT is the most important turnover tax type. By
definition, VAT is imposed on the importation and sales of goods, and
provision of processing, repair, and replacement services. Currently, China has
a production-type of VAT under which input VAT tax paid on the purchase of
fixed assets cannot be used to offset output VAT on sales. As a feature of
production-type of VAT, the non-creditable VAT on fixed asset investment
played a role in reducing capital investment. Moreover, production-type of
VAT regime favors low-tech, labor-intensive industries and penalize hightech, capital-intensive industries that employ a large amount of fixed assets.
Inevitably, a production-type of VAT reverses the original objective of
promoting capital-intensive, high-value-added industries. As a result, China's
tax authorities should value the impact and merits of allowing the recovery of
input VAT incurred on fixed assets, especially in those industries closed to
foreigners, to yield more profound economic benefits under WTO principles.
The second issue with VAT reform is the expansion of VAT basis. Chinese
tax authorities have had discussed this topic even before the WTO accession.
The idea is to include certain service industries that are currently subject to
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business tax into the scope of VAT, such as finance, construction,
communication, transportation, hotels, and restaurants. Proponents claim that
those service industries, which attract most of the foreign investment after
China's accession to WTO, thus expanding the scope of VAT to high-margin
industries, will help generate more tax revenues. However, this thesis suggests
two caveats to this basic notion. First, expanding VAT vase will further
complicate the current multifaceted VAT regime - it currently lacks methods
to incorporate business tax items into the VAT. Second, in practice, the VAT
is a state tax while the business tax is a local tax. Pending on current VATshare formula, such expansion will reduce local revenues and require a
readjustment of the share formula. The likely result is that this proposal will be
rejected or manipulated by local authorities.
Another implication of VAT reform is a change in the percentage of VAT
refund to exported products. According to international practices, exported
goods are entitled to full refund of VAT. However, export VAT refund in
China is calculated at rates ranging from 5 percent to 17 percent. Only certain
exports related to machinery and equipment, electrical items and electronics,
transportation equipment, instruments, and clothing are currently enjoying the
full refund rate, but VAT on most other exported goods is still not subject to
full refund. Obviously, such practice of partial export VAT refund
disadvantages and weakens the competitiveness in certain industry lines. To
this end, this thesis shares the position that the VAT refund mechanism should
consider incorporating an actual-payment system for three reasons. First, there
is a consensus among many tax officials and scholars that a consumption-type
VAT should be supplemented to the current production-type VAT regime. The
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actual-payment system helps avoid the underlying difference between the two
types of VAT. Second, the actual-payment system is unresponsive to the
difference among industries, which saves the burden of differentiating
industries and simplifying the collection system; third, for China to attract
foreign investments, the actual-payment system, especially if it is associated
with consumption-based VAT, is more acceptable and accommodating to
general international practice on VAT refund of other WTO mem hers.
In addition to the proposals of incorporating the production-based VAT with a
consumption-based VAT and restructuring the export rebate mechanism, with
respect to VAT taxpayers, the definition of "small scale" taxpayers should be
reconsidered. "Small scale" taxpayers in China are posited awkwardly due to
the conflict of credit and deduction during the transactions with their
counterparts - "regular" taxpayers.

79

The services sector dominated by

disadvantaged small-scale taxpayers represents a higher and growing
proportion of China's fast GDP growth. Actually, small scale taxpayers
account for much of local economy growth, increased employment
opportunities and resourceful utilization of capital. Revenue from the services
sector is essential to China's dynamic economic growth. As the small-scale
taxpayer find hard to issue VAT invoices, output VAT cannot be offset against
input VAT and the tax base for small-scale taxpayers is the VAT exclusive
sales value. 80

79

See Article 2, Provisional Regulation of VAT of the P.R.C., stipulating that small-scale
taxpayers engaged in selling goods or taxable services shall use a simplified method for
calculating the tax payable
80
The VAT exemption and refund policy also applies to goods exported for contracted
engineering projects and repair and maintenance services. However, as stipulated by a
Circular issued by SAT on 24 March 2005 (Guoshuihan [2005] No. 248), export enterprises
exporting products purchased from small-scale taxpayers must present a VAT invoice to
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Due to China's labor-intensive advantage and enlarged market opened under
WTO, refining the status and management of small-scale taxpayers has to be
in line with similar rules of other WTO member countries. 81 For instance,
small-scale taxpayers would benefit from tax simplification of VAT, and the
importance of small-scale taxpayers must be valued by tax administration in
revenue collection given the potential tax bases.
Therefore, one issue here is to redefine the status of small-scale taxpayers to
crystallize the tax bases. Then, considerable tax administrative resources for
VAT collection should be assigned to design an appropriate framework to
control the number of small-scale VAT taxpayers, and to transform them to
regular or ordinary VAT taxpayers. That being said, the following questions
should be considered in future VAT legislation, although approaches to
resolve them are in debate: (1) which kind of a "single tax" might be designed
for small-scale taxpayer; (2) if there is a need to eliminate the "small-scale"
taxpayer category, what are the meaningful and practical standards to classify
small-scale and ordinary or regular VAT taxpayers or any particular social and
political ramifications; (3) does tax administration overestimate the tax
evasion channeled through small scale taxpayers; and ( 4) is there any
alternative to address the small scale taxpayers within the current VAT
structure or an overhaul is necessary. All of these concerns complicate the
post-WTO tax legislation reform as to VAT.

obtain a VAT refund. In such cases, the small-scale taxpayer can request the tax authorities to
issue a VAT invoice for products sold to export enterprises
81
Public perception of small businesses has been changed radically over the last decades in
China. During the first 15 years of China's opening economy, small businesses were
perceived as marginal to the mainstream of economic activity, and were typically cast as
habitual tax avoiders and evaders
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4.1.2. Consumption Tax

As an excise tax, the Chinese consumption tax is a means for the government
to influence consumer spending behavior in terms of tax equity. Since the
consumption tax was introduced in 1994, many commodities then categorized
as "luxury" now are considered basics of daily urban life, including
automobiles, cosmetic products, wine, and authentic Louis Vuitton handbags.
Hence, an enlarged, open market under the WTO regime and increased
citizens' purchasing power would drive Chinese tax authorities to redefine the
subjects and tax rates of consumption tax - many then "luxury" now "basic
needs" goods should be excluded from the consumption tax basis. On the
other hand, the scope of consumption tax basis should include certain
"luxurious" services such as high-yield personal banking services or recreation
activities. Moreover, this thesis submits that to nurture domestic interests, tax
authorities should also consider imposing a reasonable consumption tax rate
on certain goods that are currently not produced locally or, even those
products can be produced locally, but the standards of domestic products
might not reach those imported ones. This may help enrich the market by
saturation of both domestic and foreign products.

4.1.3. Business Tax

Business tax is imposed on provisions of services and transfers of immovable
and intangible assets in China. As Business tax and VAT are mutually
exclusive, a reform to VAT will inevitably lead to reduction of scope of
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business tax. For those important domestic service industries that will be
opened to foreign investors following China's accession to WTO, the tax
authorities should consider imposing an even lower business tax rate on
insurance and financial industries to drive the growth into a true "market" with
healthy competition and easy entrance. However, the timing is not ripe to
combine the business tax with the VAT. One important reason is that the VAT
is a state tax under a central-local sharing formula, but the business tax is
collected by local tax bureaus. Such combination may induce a readjustment
of the sharing formula between central and local governments. Given the
potential of reduced local revenues, very likely such combination will be
rejected or manipulated by localities.

4.2. Implications for Enterprise Income Tax

The implications of China's accession to the WTO on the income tax regime
centers on two major WTO non-discriminatory principles: the national
treatment and most-favored-nation principles. The current Chinese income tax
law framework derives from the tax system overhaul conducted in 1994. One
of the foremost income tax legislation reforms is the enactment of the new
Enterprise Income Tax Law effective as of January 1, 2008. The new
Enterprise Income Tax Law (the "2008 EIT Law") actually is one of a series
of updated legislative efforts catering to principles of the WTO and the rule of
law order. Other major legislations include the new Corporation Law (2006),
the Anti-Money-Laundering Law (2007), and the Anti-Monopoly Law (2008),
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all of which were engineered and devised to follow an international practice in
related areas.
The 2008 EIT Law unified a bifurcated enterprise income tax treatment in
force since 1994. Prior to 2008, China enterprise income tax law system
consists of two parallel sections which regulate income tax on Chineseinvested enterprises (DEs) and income tax on enterprises with foreign
investment and foreign enterprises (FIEs), respectively. Undoubtedly, China's
two-track structured income tax law system has provided an easy platform for
enhancing China's economic stability, safeguarding national economic
advantages, and coordinating between DEs and FIEs. However, with China's
WTO accession and the need to expand revenue collection, drawbacks of a
dual-track income tax become readily apparent. In addition to various
compliant from foreign investors on confusing treatment of different types of
corporate entities, intensified administration on tax collection, frequent tax
evasion, and compliance with WTO's national treatment rule all contribute to
the urgency of the China's need for the newly promulgated the 2008 EIT Law.

4.2.1. The pre-2008 bifurcated enterprise income tax treatment

The bifurcated enterprise income tax system for DEs and FIEs is historically
rooted and well established in China. 82 Briefly, the track of DE income tax
system evolved through the painful process of SOEs reform and a changed the
balance between state-owned and private sectors in terms of economy scale
and revenue contribution. The development of the FIE income tax law system

82

See supra Chapter II.
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mirrors China's tax preferential policies embracing foreign investment and
international coordination. However, tax collection deficiency and global trade
bring the drawbacks of China's dualism in its enterprise income tax law
system to the fore in enforcement and administration. The following are major
problems in the old "dual track" enterprise income tax system that led to the
promulgation of the 2008 EIT Law.

4.2.1.1. The costly dividing criteria ofDE affecting tax efficiency

Based on China's hierarchical tax administration structure, the 1994 enterprise
income tax regime classified DEs into two groups with regard to income tax:
those directly subordinate to the central government, and those to local
governments. Accordingly, DE's income tax liabilities are controlled some by
the central and some by local governments. Characterized by the discord and
rigidity of a traditional command economy, such a tax-sharing structure lead
to a distorted relationship between various tax authorities on partitioning
revenue collection, and impeded an appropriate fiscal structure. A deep-rooted
administrative loophole is that every level of tax authority aims to control the
direct administration and collection of the income tax. Some SOEs are
privileged to enjoy particular incentives conditioned on types of enterprises
and this leads to designated preference and unfairness. Since the revenue
partitioning and administrative hierarchy make the tax collection and tax law
enforcement come under various levels of administration, the costs of tax
collection are increased and uncertain. Worse is that the competent level of the
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state treasury to collect a given tax is unclear and enterprises are bedeviled by
cross collection and administration at will.

4. 2.1. 2. Ill-designed tax collection and administration system

The DEs enterprise income tax collection and administration are full of
misapprehension and confusion. First, tax collection implementation has
historically been subject to distortion. The old Provisional Regulations for
Enterprise Income Tax provided that enterprises with independent books and
accounting should pay taxes locally, yet it also provided that the sectors of
railroad, civil aviation, postal service and banking should be collected on an
industry basis. This mixed industry and hierarchical collection approaches
added another double-layer to the dual track system, especially when many
restricted markets were opened after the WTO accession. Second, irregular tax
collection activities lead to inconsistency in administration and weaken the
controlling role of tax authorities. 83 Third, although theoretically state and
local tax authorities carry out uniform measures for the income tax collections,
a parallel structure was set up to apply separate rules.

4.2.1.3. Taxable income vs. accounting income

Under the

Accounting Standards

for

Business

Enterprises

(ASBE)

promulgated by the MOF in 1992, a set of accounting rules specifies the

83

for Chinese-invested enterprises, to which the authority of collection and administration of
the income tax on the non-state-owned ones is allocated to the local tax authorities, whereas
the income tax on the state-owned enterprises, nominally collected and administrated by tax
authorities, is actually controlled by different levels of administrative organs.
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categories and differences between taxable income and accounting income.
However, the gap therein makes it more difficult for tax authorities and
taxpayers, especially DEs, in practice.

84

A prime example of this is the lack of

a uniform standard for the deduction of salary and donation, depreciation, tax
auditing, bad-debt clearance and conflicts between provisional rules and local
policies applied to the state-owned enterprises.

4.2.1.4.Narrowly defined enterprises income tax incentives

Despite the purpose of attracting foreign capitals with advanced technologies
and developing infrastructure of bottleneck industries, the old FIE income tax
incentives do not live up to national treatment and MFN standards. First, the
industry lines of foreign investments are too narrow. The overall quality of
foreign investment is relatively concentrated on labor-intensive nature instead
of technology-focused or capital-intensive orientation. Second, the disparity
and imbalance in economic development aggravate the loopholes in enforcing
tax incentives. The preferential policy has evolved into an uneven FIE income
tax policy. From special economic zones, to coastal economic development
zones, and further to hinterland regions, the tax rates become progressively
uneven. Such tax rate structure inevitably creates unfair competition and
further worsens preferential policy shopping.

84

The Provisional Regulations for Enterprise Income Tax and the Income Tax Law
Concerning FIEs and Foreign Enterprises have both stipulated that when, applying to its own
accounting method, the accounting income of a taxpayer is not agreeable to the applicable
provisions of tax law, the income tax shall be determined by the applicable provisions.
However, there are some practical concerns in implementing such general provisions
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4.2.1.5./rregular tax rates applied

The tax rate is the core of tax legislation in terms of simplicity, enforcement,
transparency and fairness. The old two-track enterprise income tax system
imposes the same tax rate for DEs and PIEs- a nominal rate of33%. However,
due to various exemptions, stipulated tax holidays, and local tax incentives,
the actual tax rate for FIE income is substantially lower than that of DEs. It is
estimated that PIEs were actually charged at rates ranging from 17% to 27%.
This difference aroused complaints from DEs about their disadvantaged
position in market competition and reinvestment. Moreover, quite often
domestic capital takes a "detour" overseas to be coated as foreign capital to
enjoy tax preferential policies, which leads to draining of revenue and
complicated tax administration. Considering the international trend of
lowering corporate tax rate, a uniform tax rate applying to both DEs and PIEs
was highly pledged by domestic interests.

4.2.1.6. Summary

As noted, the pre-2008 income tax law system complicated preferential tax
treatments on enterprises of different ownership or capital sources, in different
regions, and on different industries and productions lines. 85 As a result,
enterprise income tax reform in large part centered on the unification of the
bifurcation tax treatments for DEs and PIEs. First, the tax efficiency
consideration drove the removal of irregular administrative activities
85

See, Jinyan Li, The Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and Implications for
International Tax Debates, 8 Fla. Tax Rev. 669, at 675
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associated therewith. Vertically, the structure of revenue partitioning between
the central and local on DEs income tax was not well formulated. Horizontally,
even at the same hierarchical level, two separate systems for DEs and FIEs
created nuances in tax collection practice. Second, the difference between the
actual income tax rates for DEs and FIEs was with highly disparate. A uniform
tax rate, regardless of capital sources or ownership, is necessary. Third, the
accounting standards imposed by ASBE and modernization of SOE reform
require similar tax treatment for DEs and FIEs such as deduction, appreciation,
and booking practices. Fourth, complaints from DEs were partially based on
the national treatment principle, with which they sought to remedy their
disadvantaged position in market share and competition.

86

The promulgation of the 2008 EIT Law also conditioned on the WTO
principles. The unification of enterprise income tax treatment would help
create fair competition and investment conditions. In light of commitments
made in the Protocol, tax preferential policies should be adjusted for assurance
and supervision with transparency and uniform administration, especially for
regions or industry lines that are badly in need of FDL The tax authorities
should continue benefiting FIEs in an encouraging but careful way, for the
purpose of complying with the national treatment and MFN principles. Certain
innovation in enterprise tax laws should be incorporated following
international practice - attention should be paid to balance exacerbation of
disparity which might create political sensitivity in China.

86

/d., at 676-682
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4.2.2. The 2008 EIT Law

Given the challenges raised by the bifurcated tax treatments and deficiencies
in tax administration, the 2008 EIT Law incorporates both corrective measures
and modern corporate tax conceptions. In terms of tax rate, taxpayer
categorization, taxable income determination, tax credit, tax preference, tax
evasion, and tax administration, the 2008 EIT Law provides a better income
tax framework with an emphasis on international tax.

4.2.2.1. An improved unified tax rate?

The tax rate 87 is essential to revenue collection and central to the dynamic
balancing taxpayers and the state in terms of private property rights. Enterprise
income tax rate is even more evident or decisive in regulating taxpayers'
transactional or planning behaviors. Therefore, the design of an enterprise tax
structure reflects the status of overall economic development and rule of law
considerations. According to the 2008 EIT Law, the statutory tax rate for
regular enterprise taxpayers is stipulated as 25%, a tax rate of 20% for smallscale enterprises and 15% for state-sponsored high-tech enterprises.
It is well noted that the uniform 25% rate is a compromised number after

evaluating various factors. First and foremost, the 25% rate reflects the
effective or actual tax rate applicable to FIEs under pre-2008 tax treatmentno extra burden is created considering the tax preferential treatments
87

See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Corporate and International Tax Reform: Long-, Medium-, and
Short Term Proposals, http://law.bepress.com/umichlwps/olin/artl 06, discussing the global
trend on corporate tax rate reduction (last visited on March 15, 2011)
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grandfathered under the old FIE tax treatment. Moreover, the tax burden of
DEs is reduced to an acceptable level for carrying on business and generating
reinvestments. Second, although the 25% rate is higher than that of Hong
Kong (16.5%-17.5%), it is quite competitive comparing with statutory rates at
peer neighboring tax jurisdictions such as Japan (20%), South Korea (27.5%),
Vietnam (28%) and Malaysia (28%) as well as statutory rates adopted by
developed tax jurisdictions in U.S. (35%), France (33.3%), Germany (25%),
U.K. (30%), Italy (33%). This comparative advantage was highly valued in the
legislative opinion collection process for two causes: (1) the rate should allow
the Chinese market to remain competitive and attractive to FDI; and (2) it
shall not substantially jeopardize the scale of national revenue collection.
Third, from the perspective of tax collection and administration, the uniform
25% rate facilitates compliance and cross-regional consolidation of tax
liabilities.
However, the benefit of a uniform tax rate should not be exaggerated. It is too
early to claim such a uniform rate will improve tax equity and efficiency in a
modem sense. Ultimately a uniform statutory rate only prevents tax inequality
or cures deficiency. The inefficient partitioning formula between the central
and local government still exists. The effective tax rates for DEs and FIEs in
large extent are still different -the 2008 EIT somewhat only helps narrow the
divergence. Moreover, although the nominal tax rate drops by 8 percent from
33% to 25%, this decreased rate is only reflective of existing effective tax rate
in practice. From a microeconomics point of view, the tax burden is not, in
fact, lowered as much as the rate change shows. From the revenue collection
perspective, given the limited fiscal contribution made by the enterprise
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income tax sector, a lowered uniform tax rate with expanded taxpayer base
does not substantiate tax authorities' position that extra-intensified compliance
control should be implemented for revenue collection.

4. 2. 2. 2. Clearer categorization of enterprise taxpayers

The 2008 EIT Law classifies taxpayers as "resident" and "non-resident" 88
taxpayers in accordance with international standards of "place of incorporation"
and "effective management." The outmoded categorization based on sources
of capital, i.e., the two-track DE and FIE bifurcation, 89 was repudiated to
expand the scope of taxpayers to include all units and organizations 90 with
business operation and income in China - but individual proprietorships and
partnerships are excluded. Overall, this clearer categorization is wise for three
reasons.
First, the Marxist ideological delineation of "socialist ownership by all people"
still plagues the tax system. The line between socialist collective or commune
ownership and "private ownership" is blurred given the overall economic
situation and establishment of modem corporate governance structures
comprising publicly held corporations and shareholders. Sticking with
stereotype classification would only perplex tax administration and impede tax
collection. In this sense, the revised classification based on commercial
88

See Art. II, The EIT Law of the P.R.C.
Jd, Art. I, stipulating that the taxpayer for enterprise income tax is "any enterprise except
for individual proprietorship and partnership, and other organizations which has income."
90
See infra Chapter VIII, noting whether the organization should include non-profit
organization is still in debate. Different from the U.S., which has the UBIT, the tax treatment
of income generated by nonprofit organizations is not clear
89
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profitability and business entity is a forced move rather than voluntary
progress. Second, the exclusion of individual proprietorships and partnerships
from the EIT application looks like a cautious makeshift. One probable reason
is that China does not have a modem piece of comprehensive tax legislation
for either individual proprietorships or partnerships. The other reason is that
the EIT compliance system is not able to synchronize individual income tax to
consolidate income generated by individual proprietorships and partnerships.
Third, the classification of "resident" and "non-resident" enterprises is a
perfect example of borrowing concepts from the individual income tax context.
The advantage of this approach is that it simplifies tax administration based on
standards of "place of incorporation" and "effective management". In this
sense, this classification embodies an improvement in tax equity solely for tax
collection purposes and in tax efficiency by identifying and administering
presence of commercial benefits.
4.2.2.3. Coordination of standards for taxable income and accounting
income

Progress made by the 2008 EIT Law includes a better coordinated taxable
income calculation from the ASBE perspective. For the first time, the 2008
EIT Law stipulates that taxable income in each taxable year is derived by
deducting non-taxable income, exempted income, various deductions and
remaining sum from covering losses in the previous year from the total income.
The non-taxable income and exempted income actually are tax accounting
concepts attaining more economic sense for tax auditing purposes. The 2008
EIT Law also unifies standards for deduction calculation in determining
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taxable income. 91 For instance, reasonable expenses actually incurred in
production, management and other relevant business activities, such as costs,
expenses, taxes, losses, and other miscellaneous expenses, can be deducted in
calculating taxable income. In this sense, tax equity is better realized by
honoring the principles of the ability to pay and accrual basis.

4. 2. 2. 4. A more centralized framework of tax incentives for investment

Tax preferential policies stipulated in the 2008 EIT Law reveal considerable
controversy over whether those incentives are effective or desirable, 92 i.e., for
which incentives that the Chinese government would take the loss the revenue
as a tradeoff. 93 In the 2008 EIT Law, different modes of amending previous
c.
. 1 po 1'tctes
. are k ept, 94 expanded,95
.
.
. - some o ld pre1erentta
tax mcenttves
co-extst

modified 96 or even voided. 97 A careful reading of tax incentives would

91

See Article VIII, The EIT Law of the P.R. C. (2008)
See generally in David Holland and Richard J. Vann, in Victor Thuronyi ed. Tax Law
Design and Drafting, 986-1020
93
See generally in Alex Easson, Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment, BIFD 266
(July 2001)
94
See Art. 27, the EIT Law of the P.R.C. (2008), stipulating that for tax preferences for
investment on agriculture, forestry, husbandry and fishery industries, and public infrastructure,
and Article 28(1) provides that tax preference is still reserved for small-sized enterprises with
meager profit
92

95

Articles 31 and 34, the EIT Law of the P.R.C. (2008), eliminating the regional tax
preference limitation confining to high-tech industries the low tax preference of 15%, adds tax
preference for venture investment, expands investment tax credit applicable from environment
protection equipment and water conservation facilities to equipment of environmental
protection, water and energy conservation and safe production etc.
96
Articles 30(1) the EIT Law of the P.R.C. (2008), changes direct tax preferences into indirect
tax preferences, such as wage paid for disabled people by labor service enterprise, welfare
enterprise; Article 33 provides that income earned by products in conformity with industrial
policy produced by resource comprehensive utilization enterprise, Article 30(1) allows
research and development fees to be added up and deducted, and Article 30 permits
accelerating depreciation, or shorten depreciation time of fixed asset in the enterprise
97

Some old preferential tax policies were repudiated, such as the preferential policy providing
periodic tax reduction or exemption to newly-established production-oriented foreign-invested
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disclose that the central government is strongly favored with a controlling
position in designing tax incentives. Incentive legislation policy power, once
delegated to regional tax authorities, was centralized to integrate industryoriented or region-preferred schemes. The merits of this development are three
fold. First, it strengthens a nationwide tax incentive scheme to ensure a
balanced and improved development framework for various industries. For
example, the 2008 EIT Law prioritizes environmentally friendly and high tech
sectors. Second, centralized control helps circumvent local protectionism and
cross-region tax incentive shopping by foreign investors, which may lead to
interregional development disparity. Third, an integrated incentive framework
is advantageous to simplifying the tax administration, and more importantly,
to increasing efficiency in revenue collection.

4.2.2.5. Development in international tax - tax credits and antiavoidance system

The 2008 EIT Law incorporates the long-awaited international tax credit
system. 98 Briefly, for income originated offshore which has already been
charged tax in the source country, the tax paid should be deducted from tax
liabilities in China, if the deductible amount is lower than that of tax
calculated under Chinese tax laws. The tax credit system marks one of very
few developments in the international aspects of Chinese tax legislation in

enterprises or to enterprises after the transitional period ends, and preferential policy which
levies only half the tax on export-oriented foreign- invested enterprises. For details, see
Jianwen
Liu,
Eight
Innovations
of
the
New
EfT
Law,
http://www.cftl.cnlshow.asp?c- id=550&a- id=6948 (last visited on March 15, 2011)
See Articles 23 an 24, the EIT Law of the P.R.C. (2008)

.
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recent years. Undoubtedly, it constructively avoids international double
taxation and advances principles of tax equity.
Another march that the 2008 EIT Law advances is the insertion of antiavoidance measures. 99 Three prongs of consideration prompted the validation.
First, after 30 years of accommodating FDI, thin capitalization and profits
transfer after exploitation of tax incentives by foreign investors endanger the
revenue collection at various fronts. In addition, increased capital mobility
incentivizes exploiting tax havens for round-tripping which acerbates the
draining of collectable tax payment. As a shared practice, tax avoidance
measures are adopted to safeguard revenue sources. In this connection, the
2008 EIT Law catches up with international routines. Second, the arm's length
principle is established for transfer pricing and advanced pricing agreement
practices. This is an encouraging move made in the 2008 EIT Law for
modernizing tax administration. Since many multinationals treat the China
market as indispensable for global profitability, the growing commercial
expansion requires China's tax administration to master basic tax rationales to
guarantee safe tax sovereign and revenue collection - the adoption of the
arm's length principle provides a perfect example. Third, a few modern
corporate law elements are embraced in the 2008 EIT Law. Tax treatments for
closely-held corporations are detailed as to tax payments consolidation and
compliance. One reason for this change is that irregular tax planning activities
exploit the loopholes in cross-region tax administrative coordination. The
other reason falls on the expertise and competence shortage suffered by local
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See generally, Section IV "Special Tax Payment Adjustment", the EIT Law of the P.R.C.
(2008)

324

tax officials. A nationwide EIT law would leverage more discretion in
handling complicated corporate structure issues.

4.2.2.6. Increased support for tax administrative discretion

Under the 2008 EIT Law, administration is in line with the classification of
taxpayers based on "place of incorporation" and "effective management"
principles. 100 The old enterprise income tax system evidenced a deficiency in
this connection. Two lines of tax administrative discretion are evident. First,
the consolidation of tax payment is administered more collectively. Taxpayers
are not required to consolidate books of branches, representative offices, and
subsidiaries to reach a final tax payment. Meanwhile, the headquarters may
serve as the liaison point to fulfill tax liabilities. Second, the 2008 EIT Law
honors the principle of non-retroactivity in administration, i.e., tax incentives
would be grandfathered for taxpayers which have enjoyed tax incentives based
on the old enterprise income tax system. Therefore, the solution of old
enterprises old way, new enterprises new way should be enforced for FIEs

concerning preferential tax treatments. According to Article 57 of the 2008
EIT Law, an enterprise established before the promulgation of the new law,
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See Articles 3(2) and 3(3), the EIT Law of the P.RC. (2008), if a non-resident enterprise
obtains income, the office or the site where the income occurs is considered as place of tax
payment. If the non-resident enterprise has two or more than two offices or sites in China, the
main office or site shall be chosen to pay enterprise income tax; if a non-resident enterprise
acquires income, the place of the withholding agent is considered as the place of tax payment.
As for headquarters and branches, if a resident enterprise set up business establishment of
non-corporate status, enterprise income taxes of the headquarters and branch should be added
up and calculated on a consolidated basis
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which enjoyed a preferential tax rate according to the old tax law or tax
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4.2.2. 7. Summary

Overall, the 2008 EIT Law is a hopeful piece upgrading the tax legislation and
administration system in China. It not only is in line with the WTO principles
and international tax practice on transparency, improved administration, and
non-discrimination, but also helps establishing important elements of the rule
of law order in terms of consistency, non-retroactivity and clear-cut obligation.
Given the rich modern tax concepts embodied therein, it showcases improved
legislative techniques in the tax context in terms of a unified tax rate, clearer
categorization of taxpayers, synchronization with ASBE standards, tax credit
and anti-avoidance measures.

It is continually significant to mention that it still aims for revenue collection
and internalizing administrative discrepancies. The 2008 EIT Law is not
without limitations under the revenue-sharing formula between the central and
local governments. The consolidation of tax payments and compliance still
suffers from a shortage of detailed rules on approval and tax auditing
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See Article 57, the EIT Law of the P.R.C. (2008), enterprise which enjoys periodic
reduction and exemption of income tax can continue to enjoy the preferential treatment after
the implementation of the Law. But if the enterprise did not enjoy preferential treatment
because of non-profitability, the preferential period will be calculated from the year of
enforcement of the Law. High-tech enterprise which needs key support of the State in regions
of economic cooperation and technology exchange with foreign countries, and in regions with
special policy as prescribed by State Council, can enjoy transitional preferential treatment of
the transitional nature. Other enterprises whose establishments are encouraged by the State,
can enjoy tax reduction and exemption preferences according to regulations prescribed by
State Council
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procedures. The arm's-length principle adopted for transfer pricing and
advance payment agreement is not often initiated or applied for domestic
cross-region tax planning. Meanwhile, a centralized control on tax incentives
promulgation may over-tailor a non-applicable nationwide administration
practice. All these problems will emerge coupled with incompetency in tax
administration.

4.3.Individual income tax (liT)

Over the past three decades of economic development and livelihood
improvement, although the liT legislation has been amended five times, 102 the
current liT Law 103 remains nascent and incomplete. Generally, the Chinese liT
adopts tax jurisdictions based on "residence" and "source" principles - a tax
resident 104 is liable to the liT on her worldwide income whereas a nonresident
is liable for her Chinese-source income. Given the turnover tax dominant tax
governance structure, liT either for revenue contribution or as the main tool of
redistribution suffers from less attention. Introduced firstly in 1980 105 for
imposing an income tax to foreign individuals employed in China, the liT is
102

Five amendments were made in 1993, 1999, 2005, and 2007 (twice), see SAT official
website; http://www.chinatax.gov.cn (last visited on March 15, 2011)
103
Individual Income Tax Law ofthe People's Republic of China, adopted by the 4th Session
of the Standing Committee ofthe 8th National People's Congress on October 31, 1993, and
promulgated by the president on the same date. Implementing Regulations for the Individual
Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China, issued by the State Council on January 29,
1994
104

This thesis uses the term "individual" referring to as a "physical person" or "natural person"
The Individual Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China was enacted by the 3rd
Session of the 5th National People's Congress and promulgated September 10, 1980. Detailed
Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the Individual Income Tax Law of the
People's Republic of China were approved December 10, 1980, by the State Council and
promulgated December 14, 1980, by the Ministry of Finance
105
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more symbolic than fiscal to the international community that the Chinese tax
context is compatible with the market economy and conducive to international
investment. Mostly, Revenue collection contributed by the liT

w~

not

significant enough and the liT bases were too narrow to actually influence
redistribution. Although it increased eight-fold from 1980 to 2010 as a
percentage of total tax revenue,

106

the liT does not perform as a meaningful

tool of redistribution like its counterparts in western tax jurisdictions. On the
other hand, although revenue contributed by liT is insignificant comparing
with turnover taxes, 107 the amount of liT revenue increased rapidly.
Since China's accession to the WTO, however, the fiscal and redistribution
functions of liT have become more evident and recognized. There are three
prongs of causes. First, for the past decade, the enlarged income disparities
among taxpayers have greatly acerbated the tension between the wealthy and
the low-income groups in both urban and rural regions. 108Second, with private
property rights established in the Constitution and the stringent liT compliance
requirements, the awareness of individual taxpayers' rights focuses more on
the equity and efficiency of liT. The requirements of compulsory withholding
and voluntary tax compliance for high-income taxpayers lead to questioning
on redistribution function of liT when larger share of their income are
106

In 1980, revenue contribution by liT is approximately CNY 0.1 million, accounting for less
than 1 percent of total tax revenue; in 2010, approximately CNY653 billion, accounting for
more than 8 percent of total tax revenue, State Administration of Taxation, Tax Statistics.
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn (last visited on April. 10, 2011).
107

For example, the combination of revenue from VAT, Business Tax and Consumption Tax
accounts for approximately over 62% of total tax revenue in 2010.
http://202.1 08.90.130/n8136506/n8136593/n8137633/n8138832/1 0637226.html (last visited
on March 15, 2011)
108
See generally, People's Daily: Disparity oflncome Worsens the "Disadvantaged Mindset"
of Citizens (November 11, 2010), (A~ !:H&:l&.A.iU§.:bU::k~l1~"~~~'l)J!"Jl~),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-ll/lllc_12760474.htm (last visited on March 15,
2011)
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taxed. 109 Third, tax administrative deficiencies in liT collection dishonor the
tax credit and international coordination. Although various bi-lateral tax
treaties have been contracted to avoid double taxation, given the increased
cross-border mobility of labor and capital, liT collection actually complicates
the tax administration in favor of tax authorities. Having noted the above, the
liT legislation itself is left far behind from reform.
The Chinese liT mostly is a scheduler and largely gross-basis taxation. Its
collection usually is completed by direct source withholding from the source
for easy calculation and administrative control. In this sense, tax authorities, in
large measure, rely on employers to complete liT collection. However, the
Chinese liT system suffers from the lack of tax equity and efficiency which
arouse media attention and popular protest against current liT Law.
First, based on the principle of "ability to pay," the liT fails to meet vertical
equity with a progressive tax rate schedule, i.e., higher income is charged with
higher tax. Taxable individual income is not measured on an annual,
comprehensive basis; rather, liT calculation adopts a scheduler basis and is
determined monthly or for each payment. Joint-filing is not allowed in Chinaa taxpayer's household income is not valued and no relief is given familial
obligations, such as child-care, education, and medical expenses.
Second, in terms of horizontal equity, i.e., same tax liability for taxpayers with
the same dollar, under the current Chinese liT Law, only employment income,
such as salary, dividends and service charges, and certain business income are
109

See generally, Chang'an Li, The Poor's Contribution Outshines the Wealthy? CHINA

SOCIETYPERIODICAL2005(30)(**3l:: ~1;!!11'-m: ~A.:Vt~*T"Ji.A. ?~!;!!It±~
~TIJ) (2005)
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subject to the high progressive liT tax rates schedule. Income from other
sources is not taxable at the same rate or even not subject to tax. Because quite
large portion of personal income is obtained from self-employment, capital
investment or even "black-box" sources by those high-income earners, the liT
sources are short of control. Moreover, liT for foreigners and Chinese citizens
are calculated under different formulas and deduction arrangements which
create nuances in tax administration.
Third, tax efficiency is heavily impaired by the current liT Law. As to the
collection system structure, China does not have an liT return filing system
available. Although the SAT stipulates that individual taxpayers with annual
income of RMB 120,000 must file an liT return, the administration of this
filing regime is weak. The liT system lends itself to manipulation by welldesigned tax planning activities or specific arrangements to avoid tax. The
administrative efficiency is distorted by the draining of liT revenue and leaves
opportunities for corruption of bribing partial liT payment.
Overall, China's liT system contains biased and oversimplified rules with
insufficient tax administration. Surprisingly, other than playing a symbolic
game of increasing the liT deduction threshold a few times, there are weak
political pressures and reform proposals calling for a more neutral and
efficient liT law system. Meanwhile, the deficiency in liT administration
demands transparency and impartial administration with predictability. Almost
no individual taxpayer would seek judicial review to challenge controversial
liT collection. Returning to a jurisprudential analysis, the liT legislation
should be reexamined to better realize the efficiency and redistributive
functions of liT. For example, in terms of consistency, each of five
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amendments would waste tremendous legislative resources. The liT Law
should play a more proactive role in redistributing social wealth and resolve
tensions caused by income disparity.

4.3.1. Drawbacks

China's liT Law has been quite passive in taking care of issues popping up
from time to time. Therefore, it is plagued by many issues such as monitoring
high income taxpayers, liT thresholds, measures to increase taxpayer
awareness, and inconsistency with international practice. Drawbacks of the liT
regime are summarized as below.

4.3.1.1. Inadequate scheduler arrangement

China adopts a scheduler system and a flat rate to facilitate liT withholding at
source. Income from employment is subject to a progressive rate schedule
ranging from 5 percent to 45 percent, while itemized income such as royalties,
interest, dividends, bonuses, lease of property, transfer of property and like
kind income that is not paid for the labor, is subject to a flat rate of 20 percent.
However, individual taxpayers' income portfolios have become much more
enriched than in the early 1980's when the scheduler system was designed.
Flourishing capital investment and private wealth aggregation make people
rely less on income from employment. In this sense, the current liT scheduler
system does not honor the "ability to pay" and "tax equity" principles by
leaving a great gap to locate legitimate bases for revenue collection - the
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direct withholding at sources cannot remedy the loophole or create tax
evasions through unethical accounting practice. On the other hand, taxpayers
generally do not file a tax return to report tax liability unless they receive
income from multiple sources or tax is not withheld by the payer. This leaves
a large portion of income unreported and untaxed. Given the shortage of tax
compliance culture in China, the scope of the liT system is no longer
compatible with diversified and expanded income composition.

4. 3.1.2. Ill-proportioned structure of tax rate

A progressive liT tax rates schedule is widely recognized as an international
practice.

110

Usually, income that cannot be itemized should be taxed at

differentiated proportioned rates. In contrast with reforms adopted in western
tax jurisdictions which support lower liT tax rates, reduction of the number of
grade of tax rates and widening tax base, China's liT tax rate schedule remain
highly progressive with the highest bracket as 45%. Three corrections should
be made to the current liT tax rate schedule. First, the classification of
progressive rates applied to income in excess of threshold amount is too
complicated. In addition to liT imposed on sole proprietorship and
partnerships, this classification complicates collection with a four-category
rate structure, which is even further differentiated. Second, there are too many
brackets of progressive rates on non-itemized income such as salary, and the
marginal rate between grades is unreasonably high. Third, the standards of
110

See generally, Victor Thuronyi, Tax Law Design and Drafting, IMF, Preface, noting the
U.S. and other OECD countries adopting a progressive liT gradually since the late 1980s
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establishing progressive rates are incoherent between different brackets of tax
rates. For example, no statistical study substantiates a RMB20,000 difference
for the tax rates from 25% to 35% within 3 brackets. This imposes an
unnecessary tax burden and complicates the liT calculation, especially for
income from remuneration for personal service and intellectual property (e.g.
royalty);

4.3.1.3.Illogical design of expense deductions

Another common complaint against China's liT is the frustration as to unclear
rules on expense deductions. Briefly, there are two measures of deduction
under the Chinese liT Law: quota deduction and rate deduction. Income from
wages and salaries shall be on quota deduction, while the concession for
intellectual property, the remuneration for personal service and like kind
services shall be taxed by combining quota deduction and rate deduction. In
practice, the deduction measures complicate tax liability determination by
overlooking actual burden on the taxpayers. The diversified portfolio of
personal income through education, housing and social security makes it
difficult to apply a reasonable expense deduction schedule to accommodate
various aspects of economic well-being. On the other hand, the monthly
deductible amount for income from wages and salaries remains symbolic
although it has been amended quite a few times. Such revision is not without
its merits considering the inflation and social wealth redistribution. However,
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it manifests a shortage of legislative techniques on deciding deduction
measures.

4. 3.1. 4. !IT collection and administration:

Source withholding (and remitting) and filing (reporting) tax returns are two
major ways realizing tax collection. However, voluntary tax return filing only
applies to high income earners. Due to the incompleteness in tax return filing
computerization, deficiency

in tax audit and inspection, and weak

synchronization of enterprise income tax with liT, a modern collection and
administration system is not available in China. This deficiency might be a
good thing for many high income earners given the lack of tax compliance
culture in China. However, in a long run, the weak administration of liT
would jeopardize revenue collection and acerbate wealth disparity. First, the
process of tax return filing is not standardized. No practical and integrated tax
filing rules and compliance standards is available, nor individual income
reporting, self-assessment tools and investigation system are established.
Second, due to voluminous cash transactions in practice pushed by the loose
banking transactional control, tax authorities are confronted with the dilemma
of choosing between weak monitoring of high income groups and setting up a
check system of all taxpayers. Third, the method of withholding and remitting
tax is not comprehensive. Although it is stipulated that the enterprises (units)
or persons must withhold and remit taxes and make special notes for the future
audit, there are no systematic and feasible measures to assure or improve
fulfillment of this obligation and, pertinent tax laws become a dead Jetter.
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4.3.2. Refonn proposals

The refonn of individual income tax laws should focus on tax equity and
efficiency principles with efforts to improve neutrality and transparency. The
legislation refonn of Chinese liT Law should be overwhelming. Priorities
should be given to broadening tax base, adjusting preferential policies and
fighting against tax evasion. In light of the WTO principles of transparency,
unifonn and impartial administration, China's commitment in Protocol, as
well as basic elements enclosed in a rule of law order, the following measures
should be emphasized if a new liT Law is in expectation.

4.3.2.l.Refining the scheduler system

Transition to a comprehensively classified income tax system is necessary for
Chinese liT system. Income tax is usually imposed by "definitional structure"
(scheduler or global) based on the concept of income (accretion, source or
thrust concept). 111 Among three major kinds of income taxation systems: itemcategorized income tax system, comprehensive income tax system and
comprehensive item-categorized income tax system, 112 the third should be
adopted in the Chinese liT system.

113

111

The rational is simple: the item-

See Victor Thuronyi Comparative Tax (Kluwer Press, 2003) at 233
The standpoint of item-categorized income tax system is that income of different nature is
taxed differently for the convenience of controlling tax administration and saving cost of
collection. Yet it is suspected to discord the principle of levying tax on ability-to-pay.
Although the comprehensive income tax system meets the principle of levying tax based on
the actual paying ability of taxpayers, the collection process would be very complicated and
may lead to unforeseeable tax evasion.
113
Historically, the 1980 Individual Income Tax Law of China, first income tax law of
China's opening economy, once took advantages of such comprehensive item-categorized
112
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categorized tax system, though easy to implement, does not pay proper
attention to the taxpayer's actual paying ability, and the comprehensive
income tax system. The comprehensive item-categorized income tax system
combines advantages of the above two systems, i.e. regrouping wages, salaries,
income from contracted or subcontracted operation of enterprises or
institutions, income from lease of property, and income from transfer of
property into a comprehensive income, at progressive rates after a reasonable
expense deduction. As to income from other sources, a proportional tax rate
should remain applicable.

4.3.2.2.Introducing the family-taxpayer practice

The principles of transparency and tax equity demand the treatment of
individuals and families as taxpayers. 114 In terms of equity and efficiency,
treating the family as a taxpayer is a rather proper way to tax incomes from
other sources than labor, including interest, dividend, bonuses, concession fees
and so on. The source ofthe withholding would overlook various factors that
might potentially impact the tax burden when only an individual is treated as a
taxpayer. On the other hand, in terms of improving the deduction measures,
many reasonable deductions will be grouped together to justify household
income before paying tax. This practice has the U.S. system as precedent to
follow. In terms of efficiency, treating an individual as the taxpayer may
influence her investment choices, while treating a family, the basic unit of the
income tax system. Yet the 1987 Provisional Regulations on Individual Regulatory Income
Tax used item-categorized income tax system and later the amended Individual Income Tax
Law kept item-categorized income tax system.
114
Treating an individual or a family as a taxpayer mainly depends on the purpose of
individual income tax at a particular time
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society, as a taxpayer helps ensure that revenue collection will not be
encumbered by considerations of expenses. In terms of social wealth
redistribution, treating a family as a taxpayer somewhat increases mobility of
capital and increase labor force. The thesis submits that the liT compliance
system reform should prioritize expenses deduction for seniors and children.
Moreover, under the current social intensity from unemployed college
graduate and laid-off workers, treating a family as a taxpayer will comfort
low-income families and mitigate disturbance arising from the unemployment.

4.3.2.3.Broadening the liT bases

Broadened tax bases lead to enlarged tax revenues. Given the large population
in China, liT tax bases should be given a dominant role in running the liT
system. Although the SAT provides various measures to solidify tax bases,
consideration should be given to the following goals.

(I) The scope of

itemized income should be expanded to include personal gains from various
forms of investments. For example, earnings of stock trading from overseas
stock exchanges and private mineral production should be included; (2)
Expense deductions against some categories of income, such as income from
contracted services or real estate leasing operation should be voided or
decreased; (3) Preferential deduction measures applicable to foreign individual
taxpayers should be given to Chinese taxpayers for the same categories of
income. Moreover, lowering tax rate and reducing the number of grade of tax
rate must be taken into account. Current Chinese liT Law imposes a 9-scale
tax rate schedule which is against its legislative intent of simplifying tax laws.
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Income from personal services and employment income are taxed at different
tax rates which is inconsistent with the tax equity principle.
Another issue is about the synchronization of corporate and shareholder tax
liabilities. However, this double taxation scenario is not fully attained by
Chinese legislators. Similarly, individual proprietorships and partnerships are
not separated from individual taxpayer liT treatment. For example, sole
proprietorships' income derived from public sector infrastructures are only
subject to a 5-scale tax rate comparing with the 9-scale liT rate structure.
Therefore, the enlarged self-employed sector may exploit advantages of this
discrepancy promulgated 25 years ago to evade tax liability. Meanwhile, the
partnership tax law is not in place.

4.3.2.4. Normalization ofthe expense deduction

Deduction for the purposes of liT is covered by a comprehensive set of
measures. Reasonable expenses, the livelihood standards, marital status, and
social settings should be put together based on the "ability to pay" principle. In
this sense, the deduction system is a symbol of tax mix quality for living and
investments. Although the SAT and local tax authorities have released various
provisional rules and circulars on deduction categorization and timing limits,
the Chinese liT legislation is expected to formulate the following aspects: (1)
the same income may mean different costs to different taxpayers. Therefore,
the deduction method should be used uniformly in view of the imbalance of
development; (2) a properly differentiated deduction index should be adapted
to reduce income disparities; (3) China's one-child policy for the past thirty
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years has forced the fourth and fifth generations of Chinese to face
unprecedented pressure of supporting three families by a couple. Although
China is in the process of establishing a pension system as well as social
security mechanism to accommodate and prevent future restlessness, expense
deduction should be awarded to families supporting seniors and children. In
this sense, the expense deduction stipulated in the individual income tax
should be flexible; (4) inflation, exchange rate variance, purchasing power,
cost of living and labor mobility should also be considered in localizing
deduction measures. (5) A unification of deduction measures for Chinese and
foreign individuals should be considered following WTO principles of
liberating trades and capital mobility.

4.3.2.5.Improving liT compliance and administration

The current liT administration of combining source withholding and an
auxiliary tax declaration should be improved in the liT legislation. This thesis
submits that current source withholding measures should be maintained in
consideration of administrative efficiency. However, the scope of tax
declaration should be prioritized to a simplified annual return filing and
encouragements to synchronize annual tax credit and non-withheld taxable
income. Given the lack of tax compliance culture and manipulated booking
practice, tax credit should be considered on an annual basis. Therefore,
individual taxpayers have incentives to consolidate expenses to lower tax
liability or to get refund. This is in line with compliance practice in many tax
jurisdictions. Gradually, the liT should consider transforming source
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withholding to self declaration for specific categories of taxpayers, but the
digitization of compliance system must enable this measure.
A system of tax audits should be incorporated, and the U.S. provides a good
precedent in handling related issues such as solidifying tax bases and avoiding
tax evasion. This thesis submits that, if confidentiality or privacy is sensitive
to individual taxpayers, a system of Individual Economic Identity Cards
(IEID), even on an annual basis, would help tracking income tax for both
Chinese and foreign individuals. Meanwhile, measures such as credit card
monitoring, individual account checks, and a real-name banking deposit
system will enhance the transparency and help administration.

4.3.3. Summary

The list above is far from complete. The reform of liT legislation under
China's WTO accession cannot be simplified as a few unifications or adding
corrective administration approaches. Rather, a comprehensive study should
be involved for the restructuring and streamlining of liT legislation system in
general. The liT functions for revenue contribution and social wealth
redistribution must be valued based on considerations such as taxpayers' right
awareness,

acerbated

income

disparities,

enterprise

income

tax

synchronization, individual proprietorships and partnerships, personal gains
from various forms of capital investments, and out-of-control underground
gains. On the other hand, international investors are concerned with liT more
because it is the most tangible and visible sign of robustness in a country's tax
system. Equally important is the question of how to incorporate basic
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requirements of the rule of law on legislation such as generality, regularity,
transparency, consistency, clarity, acceptability and enforceability, among
others, into the forthcoming liT legislation reform. Only after fulfilling these
instrumental requirements can the liT legislation reform better embody WTO
principles of transparency, uniform administration and judicial review for
taxpayers' rights protection. Meanwhile, flexible approaches should be taken
in building up a computerized liT compliance system and administration
embracing both source withholding and self tax declaration.

4.4. Case analysis

WTO Constraints on China's Tax Law

Reform

4.4.1. The Semiconductor Case against China

Export tax rebate (exemption) is a major concern for most foreign enterprises
in China because the policies and declaration procedures affect the cash flows
of enterprises in the country. On the other hand, policies on export tax rebates
are practically complex in terms of resulting in different export methods and
tax rebate declaration processes, leading to differing tax rebate amounts and
affecting profitability. Foreign enterprises may legally use appropriate tactics
to get more tax rebates over a short period oftime. 115

115

Therefore, choosing an experienced tax consultant and get valuable advice at an early stage
has become an important success factor for most foreign enterprises. In view of the fact that
the relevant policies are changing frequently, and that officers from tax authorities may hold
different opinions over regulations thus giving different interpretations, this is an area that
needs careful analysis and attention
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Export tax rebate refers to rebate of the taxes, including the VAT, business tax,
and special consumption tax, that are incurred during the processes of
domestic production and circulation for exported products - the purpose of
export tax rebate is to encourage exportation which composes large portion of
China's GDP growth and foreign currency reserve. For foreign-invested
enterprises in China, such rebate usually refers to VAT rebates only, based on
current stipulations of zero rate of consumption tax for FIEs. An
understanding of relevant VAT policies and legislative background is a must
to appropriately take the advantage of Chinese export tax rebate polices.

4.4.2. Factual background

Reform of China's VAT legislation has a major point of contention between
the U.S. and China in the past years, especially involving the semiconductor
industries. On March 18, 2004, U.S. (together with Semiconductor Industry
Association) filed a complaint with the WTO claiming that China's VAT
treatment of integrated circuits (semiconductors) was discriminatory against
foreign semiconductor manufacturers and designers and, therefore, in breach
of the national treatment principle. This was the first complaint against China
since China's accession to the WTO and has been regarded as an experiment
to test China's ability to respond as a WTO member. These complaints
eventually escalated into a trade policy dispute between the U.S. and China
governments, which reached a negotiation together in Geneva on July 14,
2004. China agreed to stop certifying new semiconductor products and
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manufacturers for the VAT refunds and to stop providing the refunds to the
current beneficiaries by April 1, 2005. China also promised to terminate the
tax refund for semiconductors that are designed locally, produced abroad and
then imported into China. In turn, U.S. withdrew its complaint to the WTO.
However, whether the same result would come out of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) itself is uncertain.
An additional factual point is that the Chinese government provides a rebate of
the VAT burden in excess of 3% for certain semiconductors manufactured
within China, while it imposes the full 17% VAT on imported semiconductors.
Although there is an argument that such VAT rebate constitutes a subsidy to
domestic semiconductor industries, and was exempted from application of the
national treatment requirement prescribed under GATT Article III, issues also
come up for China's tax authorities as to what really constitute subsidies as
interpreted under the WTO agreements.

4.4.3. Analysis

A subsidy under the SCM Agreement should fulfill two requirements. First, it
must represent a cost to government and a benefit to the recipient. Second, it
must be specific and applicable to a specific industry, a group of enterprises,
or even an individual enterprise. There seems to be no issue that the VAT
rebate program meets these two criteria. By definition, the VAT rebate is
construed as a "direct transfer of funds" in accordance with Article I(l)(a)(i)
of the SCM Agreement, and it is for a specific industry which will receive
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benefits under this rebate program. However, being a subsidy is not
necessarily illegal under the SCM Agreement, which categorizes subsidies
into three categories: prohibited (Article III), actionable (Article V), and nonactionable (Article VIII). As per Article VIII(2)(a) of the SCM Agreement, a
non-actionable subsidy mostly refers to certain types of assistance for research
activities conducted by firms or higher education entities on a contract basis.
Apparently, the factual background of the export VAT rebate does not fall into
the non-actionable subsidy category. Moreover, Article VIII ceased to be
effective by December 31, 1999 due its conflicting provisions with other SCM
Agreement articles such as Article XXXI. Therefore, prohibited subsidies and
actionable subsidies are the only two categories left for analysis.
According to SCM Agreement, a subsidy is prohibited if it is 1) either
contingent (in law or in fact, solely or partially) upon export performance or 2)
contingent (solely or partially) upon the use of domestic over imported goods.
For the first factor, Article III(l)(a) of the SCM Agreement explicitly states
that subsidies contingent on export can be either de facto or de jure. For VAT
rebate, although one of its goals is to increase exportation, no tax regulation
particularly requires that export performance is indispensable for obtaining
such rebate. China authorities, therefore, can easily show such a VAT rebate is
not contingent upon any export performance. Additionally, the plaintiff bears
the burden of proof to establish such contingency, but the chance of
substantiation is slim. Another contingency to support prohibited subsidy is
under Article III( 1)(b) of SCM Agreement which is about encouraging the use
of domestic goods over imported ones. China's rebate program is
advantageous to China's domestic importers that import semiconductor parts
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designed in China. The issue then is left on whether the VAT rebate is
contingent on the procurement of domestic design services over life services
from foreign countries. China, therefore, can easily save the VAT rebate
program from being deemed prohibited.
As to the third and last category of subsidy, actionable subsidy under Articles
V and VII of the SCM Agreement composes the last weapon for protesting
China's VAT rebate program. The SCM Agreement tolerates an actionable
subsidy unless it creates an "adverse effect" for the interests of other WTO
member countries. In a meticulous way, Article V of SCM Agreement
enumerates the types of adverse effects: (a) injury to the domestic industry of
another Member; (b) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly
or indirectly to other Members under the 1994 GATT in particular the benefits
of concessions bound under Article II of GAIT 1994; or (c) serious prejudice
to the interests of another Member. As to first type of adverse effect, in order
for any complaining country to assure a domestic industry injury, an
investigation following Article XI of the SCM Agreement should be
conducted to access the level of injury. For the second type of adverse effect,
it would be a "robust" nullification or impairment of benefits if more details
and cases of WTO requirement were examined.
Lastly, serious prejudice as the last type of adverse effect should be put
together with Article VI of the SCM Agreement, which lists a number of
scenarios where serious prejudice occurs and situations where serious
prejudice does not apply. The challenging party must prove any of the four
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effects according to Article VI(3) of the SCM Agreement. 116 Based on factual
background of China's export VAT rebate program, without any robust
substantiation, the WTO judiciary body will not approve the request of filing
the VAT rebate as an actionable subsidy.
4.4.4.

Summary

Based on analysis above on China's VAT rebate program, the
substantiation of subsidy that emphasized by numerous WTO treaty
provisions and precedents is not easy. However, the Complaint filed by the
U.S. showed that, even if China may discharge itself from a dispute before
the WTO tribunals on substantive and procedural grounds, the risk of
improperly reforming VAT system and practice is that it would fail to
comply with WTO rules. Under the big WTO "umbrella", the narrow
consideration of domestic interests may bring tremendous challenges. This
also raises the need for better legislative techniques in designing VAT or
other tax legislations. The legislative intent has to embody or address
standardized practices under WTO agreements.
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Article VI (3) of the SCM Agreement includes (a) the effect of displacing or impeding the
imports of a like product of another Member into the market of the subsidizing Member; (b)
the effect of displacing or impeding the exports of a like product of another Member into a
third country market; (c) the effect of a significant price undercutting by the subsidized
product as compared with the price of a like product of another Member in the same market or
significant price suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same market; or (d) the
effect of any increase in the world market share of the subsidizing Member in a particular
subsidized primary product or commodity as compared to its average share during the
previous three year period and where this increase follows a consistent trend over a period
when subsidies have been granted
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4.5. Limitations of the WTO's Constraints

As a multilateral trading regime, the WTO's impacts on domestic tax policies
is constrained in many aspects, which are found in the interpretation of WTO
rules, rules affecting taxation, the dispute settlement process, and the
enforcement mechanism. Returning to a jurisprudential analysis, WTO rules
are designed to liberate trade and capital mobility, but not to influence the tax
system specifically. Other than WTO rules affecting tax laws, China has
sovereignty to determine its tax legislation and structural reforms on each
type of tax. Even for tax subsidies, the WTO principles do not seem to
prohibit China from using them.
The first limitation of WTO 's constraints comes from the approach of treaty
or WTO rules interpretation. According to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, three major approaches to treaty
interpretation are pointed out: subjective or intentions, textual, and
teleological methods. However, Vienna Convention rules essentially
emphasize the objectively ascertained intention of the parties as manifested in
the text of the agreement, i.e. the expressed intent rather than the subjective

intent of the parties. 117 To this end, impacts of WTO rules are limited to the
non-teleological interpretation in applying to the tax regime.
Second, application means limitation. WTO rules affecting taxation
traditionally focus on domestic tax obstacles to trade in goods and trade-
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See Michael Lennard, Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agreements, 5 J. of
lnt'l Econ. L. (2002) at 17-19.
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distorting subsidies. 118 As discussed earlier in this chapter, three prongs of
WTO provisions are relevant in the tax area. The first is the nondiscrimination principles prescribed in Articles I and III GATT which
includes the most-favored-nation principle
principle.

120

119

and the national treatment

The second is the widely defined prohibited or actionable

subsidies under Article XVI GATT and the SCM Agreement, including tax
incentives. The third is based on GATS. All measures that may affect services
or service suppliers may therefore apply to income taxes. 121
Taxes that do not implicate the WTO rules above are imposable by Chinese
tax legislations. For example, if a VAT export rebate is less than or equal to
the VAT levied on business inputs, the rebate is not a prohibited export
subsidy. Theoretically, as long as the export rebate rates are below the
nominal VAT rates, China may elect to allow a full VAT rebate for exports
without violating WTO rules while stimulating exports.
Third, the enforcement of WTO appellate decisions has limitations due to the
nature of the multilateral regime -specifically the problem of sovereignty. 122
Mostly, the execution of WTO principles depends on domestic policies and
bilateral agreements. Usually, enforcement is more likely to happen or lead to
settlement when the economic venture is tremendous, e.g., the US FSC/ETI
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See generally Servaas van Thiel, General Report, in M. Lang, ed., WTO and Direct
Taxation, Linde Publishing Inc. (2005) at page 13-48
119
!d., noting the MFN principle prohibits higher internal taxes or more burdensome
regulation on products imported than on similar imports from other members
120
/d., the national treatment principle prohibits higher internal taxes or more burdensome
regulation on products imported on similar domestic products
121
Id, at 25-28, noting, in particular, it applies to services that are supplied by means of cross
border establishment in the form of a branch or a subsidiary (mode 3) or by means of the
cross-border movement of economically active professionals (mode 4)
122
See Reuven Avi-Yonah, The WTO, Export Subsidies, and Tax Competition, in Lang Ed.,
pl!5-l3l,supra 13,at 130
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case (over USD 4 billion per annum) or the political stakes are high, e.g. the
Sino-U.S. semiconductor case. Actually, the impact on domestic policy
usually causes retaliation which is against the intent ofWTO Agreements.
The fourth limitation goes to transparency for two reasons. First, the WTO
arguably is "non-transparent" and lacks "democratic legitimacy".

123

Second,

the transparency requirement scattered in various provisions of the WTO
Agreements may require the accessibility and publish of all tax legislations,
but the extent of transparency is somewhat subject to negotiation.

4.6. Summary

This subchapter discusses the impacts of WTO accession to China's tax
legislation system from a formal perspective. In particular, rules and principles
of WTO Agreements call for China's turnover tax, enterprise income tax and
individual income tax legislation and reform to incorporate non-discrimination
principles and the transparency requirement. However, a careful review of tax
legislations in China reveals that some basic elements of the instrumentalist
concept of the rule of law are missed. This is specifically evident in the liT
legislation reform. Meanwhile, even though the 2008 EIT Law in many
aspects embodies modern tax concepts, it remains unclear how to realize both
tax equity and efficiency by balancing central and local tax authorities.
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See generally in Robert Green, Anti-legalistic Approaches to resolving Disputes Between
Governments: A Comparison of International Tax and Trade Regime, 23 Yale J., Int'l L. 79
(1998)
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Another aspect of Chinese tax legislative reform is setting up a tax
administration system with efficiency.
Although WTO's principles and rules impose constraints such as the adoption
of export subsidies and enforcement of AB decisions, as long as a member
country may provide same economic benefit by manipulating domestic tax
policies, WTO regime is weak in pushing tax legislative reforms. Lessons
learnt from the US FSC/ETI and Sino-US semiconductor case exemplify the
inherent weakness or distorted tax rule-making.

V.

Conclusion - Tax Incentive Policies under the WTO
Regime

Following the accession to the WTO and legal system reform, the tax
legislation reform has endured a painful process. From the 1994 tax system
overhaul in incorporating WTO principles, the tax legislation has experienced
simplification, unification, and the revenue sharing scheme. Because tax
legislations mostly attempt to encourage FDI with provisions such as tax
holidays, rate reduction, export subsidy, reinvestment encouragement,
exemption of the withholding tax, and accelerated depreciation, the structure
of tax legislation is imbalanced from the very beginning in a way that harms
tax equity and efficiency. For example, the dual-track enterprise income tax
system frustrated both DEs and PIEs. The design of liT Law does not manifest
revenue contribution and social wealth redistribution as it should be. Even
though turnover tax dominates tax revenue in China, the structure of VAT and
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Business Tax is still plagued by a few fundamental issues such as the
transition to a consumption type VAT.
China's tax legislation reform is further complicated by rules and principles
under WTO Agreements and the rule of law order. In particular, rules and
principles of WTO Agreements call for China's turnover tax, enterprise
income tax and individual income tax legislation and reform to incorporate
non-discrimination principles and the transparency requirement. However, a
careful review of tax legislation in China reveals that some basic elements of
the instrumentalist concept of the rule of law are missing. This is specifically
evident in the IIT legislation reform. Review of tax incentives to ensure
transparency and proper judicial review is also imperative. Even the 2008 EIT
Law in many aspects embodies modem tax concepts, it remains unclear how
to realize both tax equity and efficiency by balancing central and local tax
authorities. Another aspect of Chinese tax legislative reform is setting up a tax
administration system with efficiency.
Although the WTO's principles and rules impose constraints such as on the
adoption of export subsidies and enforcement of AB decisions, as long as all
member countries are provided the same economic benefit by manipulating
domestic tax policies, WTO regime is not without limitations in pushing
forward tax legislative reforms. Lessons learnt from the US FSC/ETI and
Sino-US semiconductor case exemplify the inherent weakness in tax rulemaking.
As proposed by Avi-Yonah, answers to fine-tune China's tax legislation
system might be found in an international tax arena through a multilateral
solution. Essential is that the fundamental goals of taxation and WTO
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principles should be achieved in terms of revenue collection, social wealth
redistribution, transparency, uniform and impartial administration, and judicial
review. Equally important is to incorporate elements of the rule of law order as
well as to integrate China's tax legislation with an international perspective of
facilitating development and institutionalization of the tax system.
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Chapter VI

Tax Judicature System Reform- An Identity Loss

I.

Introduction

The reform of Chinese tax judicature system has been a complicated
undertaking, which China's tax administration, its Chinese general judiciary,
and its taxpayers have endured in equal measure. 124 "China's tax judicature
must account for China's social and economic development situation before
introducing pragmatic reform proposals," 125 and China should develop "a
long-term goal of establishing a Chinese tax judicature system, in particular, a
tax court system." 126 Moreover, given the current overhaul the Chinese
administrative legal system, the tax judicature reform in China has garnered
unprecedented attention from both tax authorities and Chinese taxpayers. In
general, the tax judicature structure incorporates two layers: a dispute
settlement mechanism for disputes between tax authorities and taxpayers as to
124

See infra Chapter VII, for detailed discussion on China's taxpayers' right protection
See Xu Shanda, Zhongguo Shuiquan Yanjiu [China Tax Jurisdiction Research], (China
Taxation Press, 2004) Preface
126
The establishment of the Chinese tax court is heatedly debated among Chinese tax scholars
and tax administrators. See e.g.• Liu Jianwen, Chairman of China's Tax Law Society, in the
evaluation conference of the World Bank project on China Tax Law Reform proposed the
potential of setting up the Chinese tax court system (notes on file with the author)
125
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an assessment of tax; and, if a settlement is not achieved, a cause of action in a
Chinese court to appeal the administrative decision. Different from a common
law system such as the United States, tax controversies in China are mostly
litigated as administrative cases, supplemented by civil and criminal
proceedings as necessary. 127 Given the small number of tax lawsuits in China,
however, the tax judicature reform is usually one-sided. Chinese tax
authorities dominate related reform proposals, while taxpayers are relatively
innocuous in advocating for the protection of their rights. Meanwhile, there is
a legitimate need to advance the reform in terms of fulfilling the WTO
principles, to which China has committed itself, in a manner consistent with its
socialist rule of law construct.
China's tax judicature system, like China's judiciary in general, is permeated
with controversies and deficiencies. Just as procedures for rights protections
against administrative agencies mean less in light of China's problems with
administrative impartiality, judicial review, and a system of elaborated rights,
remedies, and procedures for taxpayers are of little use to China's taxpayers
when there is no independent, impartial and competent judiciary. However,
the reality is that the independence of the Chinese tax judiciary is inextricably
linked to that of its formal courts. The independence of China's judiciary has
been notoriously plagued by the judges' insecurity of tenure as well as the
judiciary's own traditions of knowledge, integrity, and expertise and the law
of contempt. Therefore, for China's tax judicature properly to exercise its
jurisdiction requires that it have at least three interrelated features: technical
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Due to space limitations, this chapter focuses on administrative tax lawsuits. For
discussions on criminal and civil aspects of tax lawsuits, see generally supra 2. This thesis
also shares Professor Wei Xiong's concern that the reform for Chinese tax judicature is not
highly prioritized by tax administrations
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competence, commitment to the rule of law, and finally, institutionalized
independence to embrace domestic causes and international demands such as
WTO principles. Regretfully, none of these three features is unequivocally
present or identifiable.
As to China's tax judicature reform, this Chapter considers the following
questions: ( 1) what is the procedure for administrative and judicial appeals and
how likely is it to process a reasonable case? (2) Is all or a portion of the tax to
be paid pending appeal, and if so, how secure is the taxpayer in obtaining
relief from this requirement? (3) Is there any realistic need to establish a
judicial tribunal for tax cases specifically, and if so, why and in which format?
(4) Is the appeal process undermined by corruption? Subchapter II introduces
general policy concerns and rationales for improving the tax judicature system,
especially under the requirements of the rule of law. Subchapter III offers a
brief description of the evolution of the tax court system in the United States.
The goal is to summarize considerations for structuring a tax judicature system
from tax authorities' and taxpayers' perspectives. Subchapter IV reviews the

status quo of China's tax judicature system, and summarizes an interesting
debate by Chinese tax scholars on tax judicature reforms, such as whether a
tax court should be introduced and by which institution. Subchapter V further
contributes several proposals for reform for China's tax judicature reform.
Subchapter VI concludes.
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II.

Rationales for structuring the tax judicature system

2.1. The application of basic principles of administrative law

An established modem tax system in a socially just society embraces tax
policies of efficiency, equity, transparency, simplicity and administrability 128
in terms of both substantive and procedural law. Revenue collection by a
government and the extensive reach of the tax laws into taxpayers' actions
necessitate a sound system of tax administration. In this sense, the tax
judicature system presupposes dynamics between the tax administration and
taxpayers. Tribunals thus must be available to taxpayers in the hope to resolve
potential discrepancies in administrative assessment of taxes due or conflicting
analyses of the tax laws. Therefore, many basic principles such as the principle
of legality under China's administrative law more generally apply to the tax
context.
One example is the principle of fairness or public trust which underpins a
functional tax administration. The tax authorities are restricted from exploiting
unreasonable advantages in their interactions with taxpayers. This principle
concerns the horizontal equity ofthe tax system. Taxpayers comparatively are
a group of disadvantaged citizens, which do not anticipate direct conflict with
the government. Entrusted with administering a fair and impartial system, tax
authorities should perform in a logical and jurisprudential manner and be
bound by judicial interpretations of the tax law. A taxpayer should receive
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See Government Accountability Office, Publ'n No. GA0-05-1009 SP, Understanding the
Tax Reform Debate: Background, Criteria & Questions (2005),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d051009sp.pdf (last visited on March 15, 2011)
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prompt notice of any action conducted by tax authorities concerning her and
have guaranteed access to prescribed procedures in litigation.
The principle of the ability to pay requires and expects tax legislators to
account for taxpayers' means and relative ability to support government
operation. In this sense, this principle is based on the vertical equity of a tax
system, i.e., those with a greater ability to pay should pay a larger amount. The
enforcement of the tax laws is not supposed to overtake or interfere with the
exclusivity and ownership of individual property rights. The principle of the
ability to pay also requires appreciation of taxpayers' compliance costs,
because voluntary self-reporting is so often one-sidedly persuaded by tax
authorities for the purpose of reducing tax collection costs. Similar to the
principle of ability to pay is the principle of proportionality, which enshrines
protections of taxpayers against excessive tax obligations.
Another principle centers on taxpayers' reliance on tax authorities'
administrative application and interpretation of the tax laws. If tax authorities
erroneously interpret legislative intent or inaccurately administer related tax
laws, and taxpayers rely on such rulings or decisions, it is without question
that taxpayers should be free of charges for wrongful tax behaviors. Returning
to a jurisprudential analysis, the principle of nonretroactivity shares the same
reasoning of efficiency: tax consequences of taxpayers' behaviors should be
predictable based on available knowledge. To this end, changes in the tax laws
should be updated publicly and consistently in a timely manner. The principle
of nonretroactivity also contributes to cost-efficient tax collection- when tax
disputes arise, tax authorities are obligated to substantiate their administrative
decisions and thus have to avoid abuses of discretion, which generate
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compliance costs. This also helps reduce the likelihood of creating disputes
thus minimizing tax litigation.
An additional adaptive principle of administration law is that the
reconsideration and appeal should be subject to fair hearing or due process.
There are a number of rationales supporting the protection of due process.
First, a fair hearing requires that the judge or a member of the administrative
tribunal is neither personally or professionally prejudiced nor biased in
conducting prescribed proceedings. In the tax law context, the independence
of the tribunal from the larger tax authority in the reconsideration or review of
administrative decisions is vital to protecting taxpayers' property rights and
the efficiency of State revenue collection. Second, due process supports the
right to legal representation by a qualified agent, usually, a lawyer. However,
given the special nature of tax return filing and tax payment calculation, a
CPA or a certified tax agent can replace a lawyer representing taxpayers
before tribunals. Third, due process implies procedural equality, whereby both
taxpayers and tax authorities have legitimate standing to represent and argue
their cases. A palpable implication for taxpayers is the right to information, i.e.,
evidence and clear procedural rules, for understanding a tax administrative
decision, because the dominant authority of tax administrative bureaus might
otherwise unduly dominate the taxpayer in a grievance process. Tax
authorities must comply with procedural requirements without interference
with the independence of judicial review.
Finally, an administrative system should safeguard the right to review and
appeal, either by administrative or judicial recourse. A taxpayer needs this
right as a last resort to receive a final decision to avoid circumvent any undue
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interference in her property rights, especially outside of any intervention from
the tax authorities. Administrative laws often involve the more banal
operations of civil affairs, such as healthcare and education, and disputes
therefrom are relatively straightforward and clear-cut. In the tax law context
however, the right to review or appeal entails complexities - in particular,
does the taxpayer need to prepay the tax due prior to commencing litigation?
The answer varies in different jurisdictions, 129 but Chinese tax laws control
this requirement as legal regimentations.
Overall, tax judicature is intertwined with tax administration, which falls in
the general administrative law framework. As a result, major drawbacks of an
administrative law system manifest in the tax law contexts discussed above.
For China's tax judicature, this feature is even more evident, because China's
system inherits the imperial tradition of the over-reaching arm of
administration. Taxpayers' inheritance in this context is a cultural history of
obedience. This deeply-rooted cultural orientation dictates pragmatism over
ideology in the judicature reform design.

2.2.Judicial review and the rule of law

China's tax judicature system is an indispensable component of the state's
judicial review framework. Judicial review is doctrinal and imperative in
modem legal systems and requires that legislative and executive proceedings
or decisions be subject to review, and possible invalidation, by an independent
judiciary. Tribunals with judicial review power should invalidate state actions
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See Victor Thuronyi, Comparative Tax (Kluwer Law International, 2003) at 215-218
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that violate a higher authority, such as a written constitution or prescribed
procedures. Usually, judicial review exemplifies the separation of powers in a
modern governmental system but is subject to various interpretations based on
variations in the hierarchy of government structures. The procedure and scope
of judicial review is also a case-by-case adaption based on different social,
economic, political and legal settings.
Regarding judicial review, A. V. Dicey emphasized three aspects in phrasing
the rule of law: 130 (1) no one can be punished or made to suffer except for a
breach of law proved in an ordinary court; (2) . . . [e]veryone (including
government agencies) is equal before the law regardless of social, economic,
or political status; and (3) the rule of law includes the results of judicial
decisions determining the rights of private persons. 131
Joseph Raz shares Dicey's last notion and further contends that the rule of law
entails minimizing the danger of the exercise of discretionary power in an
arbitrary manner. In particular, Raz details that, (1) laws should be prospective
rather than retroactive; (2) laws (and interpretations thereof) should be stable
and not changed so frequently as to prevent one from being guided by them
(principle of consistency); (3) rules and procedures for making laws must be
clear (right to know); (4) the independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed;
(5) the right to fair hearing must also be guaranteed; (6) the judicial review
power of an independent tribunal; (7) the courts should be accessible and (8)
the law enforcement and crime prevention should not be discretionary. 132 Raz
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See generally, Albert Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution
(1885)
131
See S. A. Palekar, Comparative Politics and Government at 64-65 (PHI Learning 2009)
132
See Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and It's Virtue, The Law Quarterly Review, volume 93,
at 195 (1977), reprinted by Keith Culver, Readings in the Philosophy of Law, at 13
(Broadview Press, 1999).
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further presents that judicial review should not be "confused with democracy,
justice, equality (before the law or otherwise), human rights of any kind or
respect for persons or for the dignity of man". 133
As China strives to build up a socialist rule of law order, its tax judicature
system must be incorporated and upgraded. But there are should not be any
over-romantized expectation that the tax judicature reform can proceed ahead
or outside of the general judicial framework that is also full of flaws and
discrepancies and in need of reform. The tax context has its singularities, so do
other areas of law. The tax judicature reform, therefore, should proceed in a
pragmatic fashion without dominating judicial reform in any sense.

2.3.Development of a market economy

China's ongoing efforts to structure a socialist market economy system and
the rule of law order create an abiding need for an improved judicial system in
general and an improved tax judicature system specifically. As remnants of the
planned economy fade, transactional routines and corporate management
structures become progressively complicated and tax is implicated from the
planning to the wrapping-up. The market economy construct requires a
functional tax judicature system embracing a set of standards and principles to
regulate taxpayers' behavior as well as an independent, fair, and efficient
tribunal system to enforce those standards. An underlying driver in this
context is the shifting identify to the market participant in China. The roles of
government agencies, enterprises, and individuals are not restricted by their
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!d., at 195-97
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stereotypes as administers, SOEs, and low-income constituencies, respectively.
Rather, a balanced dynamic is expected to operate for the revenue collection
and redistribution of social wealth. Tax judicature system, in tum, provides
standardized protection to enforce this undertaking with substantive and
procedural components.

2.4. Pressure from the tax legislation reform

The development of the Chinese judicial system is colored by political
demands, or as a tradeoff, by interference from the party-state. It seems naive
to describe how democratization of Chinese politics develops over the past
three decades, but at least comparing to the Cultural Revolution and the
planned economy era, remarkable progress has been witnessed. Meanwhile,
the dispute resolution system has lagged far behind the progress of legislation
reform in terms of structuring an authoritative framework catering to
diversified economic concerns and social needs. Echoing the overwhelming
tax legislation reform in the past three decades, a tax dispute resolution system
remains oversimplified and has therefore not caught up to tax legislation yet.
New legislation in tax related areas poses unprecedented challenges to China's
tax judicature system. Tax issues usually are intertwined with other economic
matters, for example, banking, foreign trade and investment, which
incorporate international elements as well as SOEs reform pressures. 134 Many
localities at the same time promulgate local rulings, notices and directives
based on local self-interests. Therefore, inappropriate handling of tax dispute
134

See Chunlin Zhang, Revisiting China's SOE Reform Strategy (World Bank, 2009),
http://www.hongfan.org.cn/file/upload/2009/ll/02/1257972368.pdf (last visited on March 15,
2011)
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resolution would spread unwelcoming implications to areas other than tax
fields. The complexity of transactional behaviors rarely finds simplicity in the
tax field, whereas it is on better footing in other areas of economic law.
Therefore, tax legislation as to the growingly complicated economic
transactions and diversified interests calls for ex post application of law by a
robust tax judicature to compose an organized tax law framework as part of
the whole legal system.

2.5. Taxpayers' rights protection awareness

135

The awareness of taxpayers' rights has fashioned China's tax law reform in
the past decade. Vocabularies such as the principle of legality and "no
representation, no tax" were introduced to substantiate a latest wave of
taxpayer consciousness movement to challenge the rights protection status quo
in China. A fair and efficient tax judicature system is one of the most popular
reform areas raised by taxpayers. China has been called the most miserable
Asian country in terms of taxes, 136 and this issue is particularly important
because the increase of Chinese tax revenue has been greater than its GDP
growth in the past decade. Coupled with the inflation, rising housing prices,
and high CPI experienced by Chinese taxpayers who are burdened by various
forms of direct or indirect taxes, a reform of the tax system has naturally
become a top priority for many Chinese citizens. Compliance requirements
encourage taxpayers to examine the public benefits they receive compared
135

See infra Chapter VII
See China ranks the second in Forbes Ta:x Misery Index and accompanying discussions at
http://forum.globaltimes.cn/forum/showthread.php?t=l0043 (September 2009) (last visited on
March 15, 2011); see also e.g., The Forbes Ta:x Misery Index 2009,
http://pdf.forbes.com/medialpdfs/Tax:Misery.pdf (last visited on March 15, 2011)
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with the level of tax they pay, and inevitably seek rights protection against
contribution without payback. Accordingly, the public's perception of the Tax
Court may also affect its perception of the tax system as a whole, and thereby
affect tax compliance. 137 For instance, a pragmatic and proactive approach to
taxpayers' rights promotion is essential to construct a well-established,
taxpayer-friendly tax judicature system which is politically viable and helpful
to human rights protection.

2.6. A catch-up to international routines

The convergence of cross-border tax administration, enforcement, and
cooperation has entailed two impacts on the tax judicature refonn push in
China. First, foreign investors, which have experienced better-structured rights
protection from their home tax jurisdictions, have legitimate expectation and
needs to receive similar procedural justice from Chinese tribunals, especially
its tax authorities. Second, there is a consensus that a robust tax judicature
system creates a strong competitive advantage in the international market. The
WTO exemplifies a robust multilateral regime embracing capital mobility and
free trade, as well as prevention against discretionary interference from tax
authorities. Rights exercised by taxpayers demand that an accommodation of
international protection standards be incorporated into China's tax law system
to safeguard revenue collection and to fuel economic development.
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See generally, Tom Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990), arguing that procedural
fairness is critical in maintaining the legitimacy of authority, and that legitimacy affects selfreported compliance with laws
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2.7. Summary

Chinese tax judicature reform is substantiated by various legitimate drives.
The administrative law system reform expects tax authorities' discretion to be
efficiently limited by a functional judicial review process. Taxpayers'
awareness creates pressure to find a more taxpayer-friendly and just judiciary
for rights protection. At the same time, legislation in the tax area is
overwhelming, over-meticulous and more all-rounded, and thus adds to the
need for an upgraded judicature system for the proper enforcement of new
laws. More importantly, the market economy and the rule of law order urge
the tax judicature to accommodate diversified economic interests and social
needs in a fair, impartial, accessible, efficient and clear-cut manner. Pressures
from international interests such as the WTO raise the bar for Chinese tax
judicature reform. In addition, a tax judicature system contributes necessary
competitive advantages to China's overall economy for seeking foreign
investment and improving revenue collection.

III.

Takeaways from the U.S. experience

A typical question for the Chinese tax judicature reform is which model it
should follow, however, there are no right or wrong answers to this query, and
there is no perfect model for all tax jurisdictions. The tax judicature system is
so varied due to diversified economic, social and cultural of each state, and
there are substantial differences in review or appeal procedures in terms of the
administrative and judicial systems that take tax cases. This subchapter
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tentatively draws on the U.S. experience, in particular, its tax court system.
The goal is not to offer detailed structural proposals but to illustrate
appropriate considerations or standards that should be reflected on in
designing an upgrade of Chinese tax judicature reform.

3.1.The evolution of the U.S. Tax Court system 138

3 .1.1. The current tax judicature system

The current tax judicature system in the U.S. mainly has two prongs: the
federal system and the tax court system. 139 As to the federal system, 140
disputes between a taxpayer and the IRS regarding the amount of tax payment
due or a decision on the tax consequences of a transaction can be tried in the
138

Section 3.1. was written based on a careful reading and review of description of U.S. Tax
Court history and procedures presented in voluminous writings and critics. See e.g., David
Laro, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal, U. Ill. L. Rev. (1995); W.
Patrick Cantrell, Federal Tax Procedure for Attorneys (2008) ABA General Practice, Solo &
Small Firm Division; Christopher M. Peitruszkiewicz, Conjlating Standards of Review in the
Tax Court: A Lesson in Ambiguity, 44 Hous. L. Rev. (2008); Danshera Cords, Administration
law and Judicial Review of Tax Collection Decisions, 52 St. Louis U. L. J. 429 (2008);
Leandra Lederman, Equity and the Article I Court: Is the Tax Court's Exercise of Equitable
Powers Constitutional, 5 Fla. Tax Rev. 357 (2001); Leo P. Martinez, The Summons Power
and tax Court Discovery: A Different Perspective, 13 Va. Tax Rev. 731 (1994); Leandra
Lederman, Tax Appeal: A Proposal to Make the United States Tax Court More Judicial, 85
Wash. U. L. Rev. 1195 (2008); Andre L. Smith, Differential Review of Tax Court Decisions of
Law: Promoting Expertise, Uniformity, and Impartiality, 58 Tax Law. 361 (2005); Harold
Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis, Part III: The Revenue Act of
1926- Improving the Board of Tax Appeals, 40 Alb. L. Rev. (1976), reprinted in Harold A.
Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis at 113 (1979), Camilla E.
Watson, Tax Procedure And Tax Fraud in a Nutshell (Nutshell Series) (Thomson West,
3'ct.Ed., 2006)
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See generally id., there are four different trial-level courts hear federal civil tax cases in the
United States: the U.S. Tax Court, U.S. district courts, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, and
U.S. bankruptcy courts. Professor Douglas Kahn also noted that the U.S. bankruptcy courts
usually do not put too much focus on tax cases unless the bankruptcy cases are closely
involved in tax factors. By a large margin, most tax cases are filed in the Tax Court, but the
thoughtful advocate planning tax litigation carefully considers all available options
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See Leandra Lederman, Tax Appeal: A Proposal to Make the United States Tax Court
More Judicial, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1195 (2008), at 1198, presenting that management of
federal courts is decentralized so that each court is largely self-governing, federal courts are
served and overseen by centralized bodies, including the United States Judicial Conference
and the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts (AOUSC)
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federal system. Taxpayers may elect to pay their taxes and file a refund
request in the United States District Court for the district in which they reside
or in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 141 Appeals of the district court decision
then can be filed to the circuit court of appeals governing that district. If the
Court of Federal Claims presides over a tax controversy, appeals are to the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. It is noted that tax payment usually
should be paid in full in the first hand before filing a case in the federal system.
Federal courts referred to here are all Article III (of the U.S. Constitution)
courts. 142
Alternatively, if the taxpayer chooses to litigate the controversy before paying
in full, i.e., in a pre-assessment proceeding, she usually prefers a redetermination by the Tax Court. 143 A Tax Court decision may be appealed
either in the court of appeals in the circuit where the taxpayer resides or the
principal place of the taxpayer's business, at the time she filed her petition to
the United States Tax Court (Tax Court). All cases may, as a final matter after
grant of certiorari, be heard by the Supreme Court. 144 The Tax Court resolves
the overwhelming majority of all tax controversies, but after the financial
crisis the U.S. Bankruptcy Court has become a more common forum for tax
cases as well.

3.1.2. The U.S. Tax Court system

The United States Tax Court represents the type of court that only hears
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See generally Watson (Nutshell), supra 15
See Lederman supra 17 at 1198-99
143
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disputes between taxpayers and the government agencies, i.e., the IRS.
Although a choice of forum is available to a U.S. taxpayer as discussed above,
it is more hypothetical than real because the Tax Court is the only tribunal that
allows taxpayers not to first pay the amount in dispute, and approximately
ninety-five percent oflitigated federal tax cases are filed in Tax Court. 145
According to the holdings in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 146 and the
Sixteenth Amendment, 147 in 1924, the Congress created the Board of Tax
Appeals, which was later renamed as the Tax Court of the United States, to
provide a tribunal for challenging tax deficiencies decided by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, the predecessor of the IRS. The Board of Tax Appeals was
designated as "an independent agency in the executive branch of the
Government." 148 Findings of fact by the Board of Tax Appeals were "prima
facie evidence ofthe facts therein stated." 149 Appeals of decisions ofthe Board
of Tax Appeals were firstly limited to the federal district courts, but later
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Professor Douglas Kahn noted that there have been various reasons that created the current
dispute resolution system for tax cases, and many historical accident Jed to the evolution of the
U.S. tax judicature system. Morever, Prof. Kahn noted that in many occasions the filing
requirement and strategies for tax cases may depend on specific cases or litigation skills. The
author thanks Professor Doug Kahn's comments; see Laro, supra 15, at 17-18
146
See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895), aff'd on reh'g, 158
U.S. 601 (1895), the Supreme Court determined that taxes on income from property were
unconstitutional as direct taxes that were not levied apportionately
147
On February 25, 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified by the necessary threequarters of the states, reversing Pollock and making unapportioned federal income taxes
constitutional. See Carlos E. Gonzales, The Logic of Legal Conflict: The Perplexing
Combination of Formalism and Anti-Formalism in Acijudication of Conflicting Legal Norms,
80 Or. L. Rev. 447, 449 n.105 (2001) ("The ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment was the
direct consequence of the Supreme Court's 1895 decision in Pollock, holding Congress's
attempt to tax incomes uniformly throughout the United States unconstitutional."), see also
Peitruszkiewicz, supra 15, footnote 12
148
The author submits that this initial status of the U.S. Tax Court has plenary informative
reference value to China's tax judicature reform. See id, Peitruszkiewicz at 1342-43 (quoting
Leo P. Martinez, The Summons Power and Tax Court Discovery: A Different Perspective, 13
Va. Tax Rev. 731, 743-44 (1994) (contending that the Board ofTax Appeals was created for
three reasons: "(1) to establish a pre-assessment forum for hearing tax controversies, (2) to
create an adjudicating body which would be independent from the Internal Revenue Bureau's
collection function, and (3) to initiate a forum which would increase efficiency and streamline_
judicial procedure for the growing number of tax cases")
149 !d.
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expanded to the various circuit courts of appeal. The circuit courts may
modify or reverse a decision ofthe Board of Tax Appeals only "ifthe decision
of the Board is not in accordance with the law."

150

In 1969, the "United States Tax Court" took its current name and was
reclassified as a legislative court under Article I of the U.S. Constitution. The
Tax Court is granted jurisdiction to adjudicate specific income, excess profits,
estate, and gift tax disputes prior to payment of taxes by a taxpayer. 151 The
Tax Court is a "court of record" 152 or a "court of law" 153 in that it engages in
purely judicial functions. However, the Congress has left the Tax Court out of
the administrative framework to which most federal courts belong. As a result,
it is "neither fish nor fowl." 154 It is neither an agency nor a member of the
judicial branch of government. Thus, the Tax Court is not served by the
AOUSC or otherwise subject to the Judicial Code. Because it is not an agency,
it is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or the agency
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 155
The Tax Court is based in Washington, D.C., though it conducts trials in cities
nationwide. All of the Tax Court's cases involve disputes between taxpayers
and the IRS. 156 The Tax Court's core jurisdiction involves IRS assertions that
the taxpayer understated the correct tax liability, resulting in a tax
"deficiency." 157 Generally, "pretrial procedure before the Tax Court is similar
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to that applicable in most trial courts," 158 i.e., the taxpayer files a petition, and
the IRS must file an answer. "Discovery is available in Tax Court, though its
use is more limited than in the district courts, and the parties are required to
stipulate to the facts of the case to the fullest extent possible." 159
By statute, Tax Court trials are bench trials. Nineteen judges serve in the Tax
Court for a fifteen-year term.

160

The Tax Court judges are "appointed by the

President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate," 161 and they come
from an array of backgrounds. 162 Judges may be elected as senior status. 163 In
addition, the Chief Judge has the power to appoint Special Trial Judges (STJs),
who are somewhat analogous to magistrate judges, though they are employees
at will. 164 STJs are permitted to hear any Tax Court case involving amount less
than $50,000, i.e., mostly the "small tax cases," 165 which are cases with
limited amounts in dispute, are decided under an informal procedure. 166
For Chinese tax judicature reform, the U.S. Tax Court's evolution is quite
informative from a legal historical perspective. Starting its tenure as an agency
with doubts about its independence, the development of the U.S. Tax Court
experienced a number of unsuccessful efforts to become an Article III court.
With authorized expansion of its jurisdiction by the Congress, it ultimately
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See generally Joseph Cook & Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical
Analysis, Part V:Pretrial procedure, 40 Alb. L. Rev. 639-41(1976), reprinted in Harold A.
Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis, 113 (1979).
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See Lederman, supra 17, at 1200; see also generally Watson, supra 15
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See generally, Thomas Greenaway, Choice of Forum in Federal Civil Tax Litigation, 62
Tax Law, at 313
161
I.R.C.§7443(b)
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for background of judges, senior judges and special trial judges, see U.S. Tax Court, Judges,
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov (last visited on March 15, 2011)
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I.R.C.§7447
164
For role played by STJ, see http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/rules/title_xviii.pdf. (last visited on
March 15, 2011)
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I.R.C.§7443
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I.R.C.§7663. The author respectfully notes that description about STJ is quite similar in
most literatures available, and is primary based on I.R.C.§§7443 and 7663, see generally
supra 15
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became an Article I court. Yet, the Tax Court retains vestigial attributes of an
administrative tribunal, and it continues to face "allegations of bias in its
decision making" 167 as challenged by legal critics.

3.2.Considerations for structuring a tax court system

The factors outlined below are selected in the hope of providing a reference to
the Chinese tax judicature reform, in particular, the tax administrative
reconsideration procedures and the tax court construct in the future. When
considering how the U.S. Tax Court system emerges as the major tribunal for
taxpayers' suits, there are a number of reasons that provide much to do about
judicial review and independence, which is particularly significant for any tax
system including China. One perspective - focusing on the taxpayers, not the
tax administration or IRS - is the deliberation on choice of forum in
advocating taxpayers' rights or cost-efficiency concerns. Another problem,
also from the taxpayers' perspective, is on how to handle increasing complex
cases in the tax context. In this sense, it is imperative to formulate necessary
considerations that taxpayers, as the petitioner against IRS, may put forth
invoking the tax court jurisdiction. Otherwise, tax court is of no jurisdictional
value or structural contribution in the judicature system.

3.2.1. Discretion ofthe Tax Court

The statute of limitations on assessment is suspended when a case is pending
167

See generally Lederman, supra 17. Professor Lederman has been quite critical in reviewing
the status of tax court and suggests a reform proposal to include the Tax Court under
management of AOUSC
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at the Tax Court. 168 Usually, due to the workload and complexities of the cases,
the IRS sometimes does not come to all issues in its examination. The
jurisdiction of the Tax Court covers reviewing all items in the taxable period
at issue in a deficiency case, so the amount of deficiency may increase before
making a final decision. 169 However, the Tax Court usually considers whether
an increased deficiency jeopardizes a taxpayer's financial interests and IRS's
capacity to take more burdens of proof. 170

3.2.2. Timeline 171

Similar to the statute of limitation, timing is a foremost jurisdictional issue that
both tax authorities and taxpayers attain. A taxpayer may take time to locate
available tax-optimal methods in filing a suit while the IRS has to figure out a
reasonable time for revenue collection. Failure to petition at the Tax Court in a
timely fashion after the issuance of the notice of deficiency may foreclose the
taxpayer's options. Passing the 90-day unextendable deadline

172

will

inevitably invite a motion to dismiss from the IRS Office of Chief Counsel,
which usually will be granted by the Tax Court. For a refund request of
overpaid tax, a taxpayer must file an administrative claim within three years of
filing a return or within two years of payment, whichever comes later. 173 Then
a refund suit may be filed within six months after the claim is filed and ending
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I.R.C.§6Sll(a)
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two years after the denial of the claim by the IRS. 174 Usually, the statute of
limitations begins running when the IRS denies the claim.

3.2.3. Complexity of the case

Another factor in evaluating the role played by the Tax Court is the
complexity of the case. Usually, straightforward claims filed require less
coordination between taxpayers and the IRS, but complex cases often
encourage settlement before the Tax Court makes final determination. The
virtue of settlement is significant - as long as revenue collection is realized in
a cost-efficient way - as the IRS usually views complex cases as a bother
rather than a bonus. 175

3.2.4. Cost-efficiency

The Tax Court does not require a full payment of taxes due before filing a suit
against IRS's assessments, but full payment of tax liabilities is necessary for
filing refund claims before a district court or the Court of Federal Claims.

176

The financial ability to pay a potential assessment if the Tax Court makes a
final decision is a key factor in the taxpayer's calculus before filing a petition.
Having this in mind, a taxpayer should weigh her financial capacities and the
potential costs with the merits of the case and market interest rates as
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See Greenaway, supra 15, at 311, 318, noting that the "full payment" rule also applies to
estate and gift tax refund suits but not to refund suits litigated in bankruptcy
175

373

compared to underpayment an d overpayment rates.

177

3.2.5. Discovery 178

A key element in the U.S. discovery process is the taxpayers' right to
confidentiality. Business secrets and corporate operation privacy are
particularly sensitive to petitioners when filing a tax claim. Taking this a
concem, the Tax Court may encourage mutual consulting and collaboration
between the IRS and taxpayers in the discovery process for stipulating a
reasonable judgment before the case is made to pubic. However, depositions
are rarely taken in the Tax Court except in complex cases where the parties
depart. Discovery practice in refund litigation at the district courts is more
formalized than discovery in Tax Court, and deposition practice is common in
refund litigation.

3.2.6. Settlement

Adjudicating a settlement between a taxpayer and the Office of Appeals of the
IRS is an important part of tax judges' daily routine. Unless the IRS Chief
Counsel purposefully designates a case or an issue within a case for litigation,
a taxpayer may opt to settle with the Office of Appeals. Moreover, any refund
or credit greater than $2 million, whether triggered by an accepted
administrative claim, an overpayment in the Tax Court, or refund litigation, is
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/d., quoting GE v. United States, 103 A.F.T.R. 2d 2009-858, presenting the importance of
overall consideration of financial capacity and merits of the case, especially under the
financial crisis settings
178
See generally Cantrell, supra IS
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subject to review by the Joint Committee on Taxation at the Tax Court. 179

3.2.7. Trial

Tax Court judges mostly make final determinations based on stipulated facts:
either the case is adjudicated by a Tax Court judge, or the case is submitted for
decision fully stipulated under Rule 122. 180 Is a trial the most efficient way in
resolving a dispute? The answer varies. As long as a trial is necessary for the
benefits of the taxpayer and the IRS, yes. Complex cases often lead to either a
settlement or on motion, however. The Tax Court does not have a jury trial but
the litigation in district court is before a jury.
Trials in the Tax Court are relatively short, even summary judgment is often
used. Given the Tax Court's emphasis on stipulation, most Tax Court judges
have little patience for laborious trials where trial counsel attempt, through
testimony or unstipulated exhibits, to introduce evidence susceptible to
stipulation.
Proceedings in the Tax Court are conducted under the Tax Court Rules, while
the trial of the "Small Tax Case" ("S-Cases") where the amount in dispute is
less than $50,000 has specific procedures. 181 The advantages of "S-Cases," as
they are colloquially known, are several: more choices as to the place of the
trial, less discovery, and relatively informal procedural and evidentiary
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I.R.C.§6405(a)
See generally Honorable Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., Tax Court Trials: An Updated View
from the Bench, 47 Tax law 587 (1994) as quoted in footnote 112 by Greenaway, supra 15
181
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standards at trial.

182

3.2.8. Appeals

Appeal is probably the last resort for the taxpayer or the IRS, but it happens
often. A key factor for appeal is how the case is adjudicated by the Tax Court,
and under which controlling precedent or in stipulation. However, the right to
appeal has to be given to either party to guarantee procedural justice.

3.3. Summary

The above description of the U.S. tax judicature system obviously is
oversimplified and selectively tailored. It is not the goal of this thesis to
furnish a critical review of the U.S. tax judicial construct. However, all factors
have to be put together as reference in submitting a proposal catering to
potential reform needs of China's tax judicature system. Taxpayers and the tax
authorities share similar concerns, such as discretion of the court, timeline,
cost-efficiency, complexity of the issue, settlement potential, trial and appeals.
And these issues should be considered under the general framework of the
judicial system, overall financial capacities of taxpayers and social policy
needs. Again, there is no uniform model that can be globally applied in tax
judicature reform. Rather, a few commonly acceptable factors should be
considered in designing a reform.
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See generally Tax Ct. R. 174(b)
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IV.

A triple whammy- prospects of Chinese tax judicature reform

Improvements of the Chinese tax judicature system in the past three decades
have been characterized by irregular adaption of the general administrative
procedures in the tax context, a lack of thoughtful attention to taxpayers, and
obstinate interference from political and administrative actors. The tax dispute
resolution has taken on problematic deficiencies similar to those of the general
administrative judicature framework into which it is embedded. Therefore, the
Chinese tax judicature reform falls into two areas: the peculiarities of the tax
system and the upgrade of the overall Chinese judiciary. Due to space
limitations, this subchapter focuses on the flaws in and debates over the
current tax judicature. It considers the second prong, i.e., the competence,
autonomy and independence of the Chinese judiciary in general, much more
briefly. After all, it is continually important to note the substantial differences
in the procedures in terms of administrative and judicial bodies that hear tax
cases in different systems.

4.1.A system full of peculiarities

The tax dispute resolution system in China looks similar to many other
established frameworks: taxpayers have the right to appeal an adverse decision
of the tax administrations. Since tax authorities are party to a dispute,
approaches that are often adopted in civil disputes such as negotiation,
mediation, and arbitration rarely are applicable. Chinese tax disputes are
therefore mostly administrative in nature. Tax disputes generally fall into two
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categories

based

on

their

resolution

methods:

tax

administrative

reconsideration and tax administrative litigation. The former is usually
conducted by the tax authority one level up within the administrative hierarchy,
and the latter is governed by the jurisdiction of the Chinese administrative
court. Criticism of the Chinese tax judicature often fastens on the following
aspects.

4.1.1. A pre-trial tax administrative reconsideration

Tax litigation on collection of tax is occasioned by a required pre-trial tax
administrative reconsideration. In general, an aggrieved taxpayer who refuses
to accept an official administrative decision has a straightforward choice of
forum: filing an application for an administrative reconsideration, or invoking
a lawsuit directly with an administration court seeking relief such as the
repudiation or adjustment of the administrative decision. 183 Sharply different
from administrative litigation in other areas of law, before initiating a tax
dispute arising from the tax collection, a taxpayer is required to file an
application for an administrative reconsideration. Only when a taxpayer
refuses to accept the administrative reconsideration can she file a law suit.
However, it is noted that for disputes based on punishments, asset secured
measures, or mandatory enforcement by the tax administration, a taxpayer has
forum selection options similar to other administrative cases, i.e., either filing
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See Articles 37 and 38, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa [The
Administrative Procedure Law ofthe People's Republic of China] ~$AJ:~jtifiJ001ri!&i!fi!~
~(effective as of October 1, 1990)

378

an application for an administrative reconsideration or directly filing a lawsuit
with the court.

184

This conditional afflicting procedure of a pre-trial reconsideration is not
without merits. First, from the administrative efficiency perspective, the
implementation and enforcement of the tax laws fluctuates in different
localities. Externalities resulting from varied competence and understanding of
the tax laws render a tax administrative reconsideration efficient by filtering
out obviously erroneous tax decisions and easily settled controversies. In
addition, this should limit the number of frivolous tax suits. Second, from an
enforcement perspective, the reconsideration is usually made by a tax
authority of the next level in the administrative hierarchy. This internalization
of tax disputes serve taxpayers interests in terms of ensuring the tax expertise
of the decision-making body. Reconsideration normally results in a settlement
between tax authorities and taxpayers; therefore, the enforcement of a
reconsideration decision is clear-cut. Third, based on the doctrine of equitable
recoupment, the pre-trail reconsideration can better guarantee revenue
collection, which dominates tax authorities' behavior. Bad taxpayers may take
advantage of a court dispute process to drag the payment process out longer
and avoid paying taxes on time. An administrative reconsideration, in this
sense, drives taxpayers to fulfill compliance without hindering the pace of
collection.
In spite of these perceived merits of the Chinese system however, its many
drawbacks overwhelm its benefits. A primary concern is whether tax
authorities' discretion is too expansive to avoid arbitrary administration. In
184

See Article 15, the Rules for Tax Administrative Reconsideration of the P.R. C. (Trial
Implementation) [hereinafter "Tax Administrative Reconsideration Rules"], as amended
effective as ofMay 1, 2004
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reality, other than restrictions on the physical freedom of a taxpayer, Chinese
tax authorities probably have jurisdiction governing almost all aspects of
taxpayers'

activities:

registration,

administration,

audit,

investigation,

collection, imposing penalties, asset secured measures, enforcement, and
reconsideration. According to a Chinese judge, the reconsideration may be
viewed as an expansion rather than a control on tax authorities' discretion. 185
Furthermore, the independence of the agent making reconsideration decision is
subject to serious doubt. The extensive relationship between lower and higher
level tax authorities may impair objective measurement and the trust given by
taxpayers. Sometimes, this dualism drives the reconsideration unit to act as a
"coordinator" rather an "administrative magistrate".

In addition, the

jurisdiction of reconsideration units at different localities may conclude
different tax decisions on the same issue. This raises a jurisprudential question:
is there any need to establish a national "appeal" reconsideration unit? How to
correlate the tax administration and the court taking tax cases? Last but not
least, returning to a jurisprudential analysis, tax disputes involving the other
types of tax administrative decisions such as punishments, asset secured
measures, or mandatory enforcement are not conditioned with this pre-trial tax
administrative reconsideration. If the unwritten speculation that a tax
administrative reconsideration is imposed mostly for revenue collection
purposes turns out true, the stake of imposing an additional barrier to
taxpayers on seeking legitimate relief is against constitutional protection of
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See Wang Song, Nashuiren Quanli Baohu Shijiao xiao de Shuishou Sifa Gaige [The Tax
Judicial Reform from the Point of View of Protection of Taxpayers' Rights] (£:f'~, «~l'JtA
tVl'Ui~Hf'f.miH ri¥11'5/.i&:fbi'ti:&.!J)) (2006)), Tax Judicial Reform Proceeding, pp74-77, at
77. Wang Song is a judge from the He' nan Provincial High Court and is in charge of tax
disputes in China
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taxpayers' property rights. The legislation of this due process pre-trial
requirement would therefore be a matter of fierce debate.

4.1.2. The full payment rule

By statute, a taxpayer must first pay or remit tax payments, surcharges, and
late fees (if applicable) due or provide a guarantee of payment before filing an
application for the tax administrative reconsideration or a lawsuit. 186 This full
payment rule has been vehemently criticized by judges and scholars in China.
First, the criticism is based on the principles of equity and ability to pay. Cases
that could be accepted for an administrative reconsideration encompass a wide
variety of issues. The unilateral jurisdictional acts conducted by tax authorities
include the identification of the taxpayer, subject of tax, applicable tax rate,
tax deduction, tax exemption, tax refund, tax basis calculation, tax jurisdiction,
timing, and tax collection method. In this sense, tax authorities can singlehandedly use any of those factors to substantiate the issuance of an initial tax
decision. Tax authorities may over-assess the tax liability borne by taxpayers.
If a taxpayer fails to pay an over-estimated assessment due to limited financial
capacity, she may never go through the due process to file claims and seek
relief. And tax authorities cannot rule out the possibility of making erroneous
decisions. Therefore, the full payment requirement jeopardizes taxpayers'
186

See Law concerning The Administration of Tax Collection of the P.R. C. (hereinafter Tax
Collection Law), effective as of May I, 2001; see Article 88(1) of the Tax Collection Law
provides that "if any tax dispute between the tax authority and a taxpayer, withholding agent
or tax payment guarantor occurs, the taxpayer, withholding agent or tax payment guarantor
must first pay or remit the taxes and the late fee in accordance with the decision on tax
payment made by the tax authority, or provide corresponding guaranty, and then after may,
apply for an administrative reconsideration in accordance with the law. If they object to the
decision made after the administrative reconsideration, they may bring a suit in the people's
court in accordance with the law"
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legitimate rights to plead, appeal and gain legal relief. Meanwhile, if two
taxpayers have similar cases but one petitioner withdraws the case due to
financial incapacity, the equality of taxpayers cannot be realized in the tax
system, and taxpayers' rights protection becomes inequitable.
Second, from the point of view of the principle of proportionality, the full
payment rule adds the burden of proof on the taxpayers' side, and this worsens
the already imbalanced bargaining position between taxpayers and tax
authorities. An excuse that tax authorities in assessing tax liabilities is that
taxpayers hide authentic book and corporate records in a tax audit or
investigation which leads to a wrongful determination. This defense, however,
does not remove the burden of proof from the tax authority side in reaching a
reasonably adjudicated assessment. Equally misleading is that tax authorities
may manipulate an over-estimated tax liability as a measure to "squeeze"
taxpayers for tax payments. Aside from charges of selective and corrupt tax
audits, this approach clearly violates the principle of proportionality of tax
liabilities.
Third, the full payment rule is an improper inference of the variance doctrine,
which is applied to circumscribe refund suit jurisdiction. It is important to
mention that the full payment rule adopted in China deals with disputes
relating to collection of tax only. But the variance doctrine prevents a taxpayer
from presenting claims in a refund suit that substantially vary from the legal
theoretical and factual bases set forth in the tax collection claims presented to
tax authorities. Given the charge by tax authorities that taxpayers may conceal
authentic tax-related information, as long as a taxpayer does not file a refund
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claim, it lacks the jurisprudential basis to subject a taxpayer to a quasi-penal
tax payment.
Is this condition of full payment exclusively applicable to unfortunate Chinese
taxpayers only? Absolutely not. In the U.S., the Tax Court and bankruptcy
courts usually are prepayment forums, as the statutes and case law demand full
payment of tax liabilities before a district court or the Court of Federal Claims
may take jurisdiction over a refund suit. 187 The "full payment" rule also
applies to estate and gift tax refund suits but not to refund suits litigated in
bankruptcy. 188 However, the key difference must be identified here - a full
payment of tax assessment is required only if a taxpayer files a refund suit.
The reasoning is quite straightforward - a taxpayer cannot get a refund
without paying it first. As to China's full payment requirement for disputes
arising from tax collection, other than fiscal policy considerations of
guaranteed revenue collection, there is no basis in law or policy for such a
provision.

4.1.3. Competence of judges adjudicating tax disputes

When a tax dispute is filed at a court, the expertise and competence of the
judge hearing tax case is of great significance. Competence of judges in
adjudicating tax disputes refers to their ''technical expertise ... in evaluating
factually and legally complex disputes."
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See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(l) (2006); see also Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145
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See Nicolas C. Howson, Judicial Independence and The Company Law in the Shanghai
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Peerenboom, Ed.), Cambridge University Press, PP 134-153) at 137
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tradition of low professionalism in the Chinese judiciary, judges that
specialize in corporate, securities, or tax laws are hard to find, especially in
hinterland or less developed provinces. This is not surprising. Although China
has made unprecedented efforts to build the competence of its judiciary, such
as recruiting graduates from university law schools, requiring the passage of
the Jurisprudence Exam and the promulgation of the "Judge Law", the
competence of judges still undermines the Chinese judiciary. This deficiency
is even particularly salient in the tax judicature system.
First, the training of tax law expertise in university law schools has been weak
or rudimentary. Law graduates majoring in tax usually prefer working in the
fiscal or tax sectors. Second, as the talent pool is so concentrated in the tax
authorities, given the close connections between courts and administrations,
judges are not willing or particularly incentivized to develop tax expertise.
Rather, they take tax authorities' opinions as authoritative guidelines or
instructions. This in turn damages taxpayers' interests unilaterally. Third, due
to the prerequisite tax administrative reconsideration, judges are not given
enough opportunities to adjudicate tax cases, most of which are filtered by tax
authorities. In this sense, the judgment of tax disputes may remain somewhat
unsophisticated, since the tax administration is unlikely to challenge itself by
encouraging taxpayers to file tax lawsuits in courts. Tax cases usually are filed
at the lowest-tier court in the system, at which complex cases are neither
anticipated nor common. Finally, the number of tax cases of first instance filed
has been consistently low. For example, for the years 2002, 2003, and 2004,
the number of tax cases of first instance accepted nationwide was 1496, 803,
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and 1032, 190 respectively. The complexities of cases also diverge. Without a
significant number of cases available to adjudicate, the judges cannot build
their competence in this area.

4.1.4. Summary

Chinese tax disputes are administrative in nature, and they include two
avenues: tax administrative reconsideration and tax administrative litigation.
However, the tax judicature system is plagued by several systemic flaws, in
practice. The requirement of pre-trial tax administrative reconsideration
renders tax authorities' discretion too expansive to avoid arbitrary
administration. The full payment requirement for disputes arising from tax
collection is poorly justified from the perspective of justice and efficiency and
receives vehement criticism from both judges and scholars. Moreover, due to
limited number of less complex tax cases accepted by the administrative court,
the competence of judges in tax laws has not markedly improved, nor has
robust application of the doctrine of stare decisis. All these defects, coupled
with tax authorities' adamant efforts to increase revenue collection, call for an
upgrade of the Chinese tax judicature reform.

190

See generally, China Statistics Yearbook (2002-2004)
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4.2.An interesting debate - the Chinese tax court

To many commentators' surprise, the proposal to set up the Chinese tax court
system was first raised in the mid-1980s.

191

However, different from the U.S.,

China's tax judicature system still does not contain a court that hears tax cases
only. But the debate on whether China should establish a tax court and follow
which model has gone on for the past decade between and among tax
academia and judges from the administrative courts that hear tax cases. 192 In
general, there are three distinguishable views regarding establishing the tax
court in China: (1) an opposition, which suggests it is too early to set up a tax
court given the current political and legal situation in China; (2) a supportive
position that a tax court system should emerge to further the tax judicature
reform; and (3) a middle path, somewhat vaguely defined, that a special tax
tribunal within the current court system for tax disputes, similar to the
questions perpetuae for criminal cases, would be best. Based on less than 30
available articles and conference papers on the tax judicature reform written in
Chinese, this section aims to summarize those major positions on this topic
and offer a few observations on the flaws of China's general judiciary system,
which are manifested in the tax context.

191

The author, when attending Review Conference of World Bank 4th Phase Project- China's
Tax Law Reform held in Beijing in May 2005, remembers that then SAT Vice-Governor Xu,
Shanda mentioned that the proposal of setting up a Chinese tax court was raised in an IMF
report in the mid 1980s
192
Professor Douglas Kahn from the University of Michigan Law School noted that there are
at least two concerns to be considered prior to setting up a tax court system: first, the
uniformity of judgment and how to select a panel of judges for tax cases; second, the tax court
system may require a separate court of appeals for tax cases as necessary (notes on file with
the author); See generally in the Proceedings of International Conference on "Harmonious
Society and Tax Judicial Reform in China", Peking Univ., May 2006 (hereinafter " Tax
Judicial Reform Proceeding")
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4.2.1. Open-minded oppositionist's view

Opposition to the establishment of a tax court system of any type is based on
the following arguments.

193

4. 2.1.1. The current tax judicature functions well

China's current tax judicature system operates well in meeting taxpayers'
needs

for

challenging

adverse

tax

assessments

by employing tax

administrative reconsideration and tax litigation. True, there are flaws in
policy orientations, legislation, and enforcement in tax governance, but overall
the system does not materially dampen taxpayers' rights. Therefore, specific
amendment of problematic rules, such as the full-payment requirement as
discussed above, is preferable to the overhaul of the judicature system
entirely. 194

4.2.1.2. Very limited caseload oftax disputes

193

There are two major groups of oppositionists: 1) judges presiding or supervising tax
disputes in practice. See Wang supra 62 and 2) tax scholars who have firsthand experience in
legislation and practice, see e.g., Xiong Wei, Zhongguo you Biyao Jianli Shuiwu Fayuan rna
[Does China need Tax Courts Right Now?] flHl~,
9=t OO:ff 16'JfJt.1zJ.liJH*Jl3t~? )) Tax
Judicial Reform Proceeding, ppl78-185. Xiong is a professor of tax law from Wuhan
University, China.
194
Id., Wang at 77

«
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The caseload of tax disputes brought to the lowest-level courts is too
limited,

195

inter alia, tax disputes can be appropriately handled and

adjudicated by judges on board already, and "the urgency of establishing a
court dealing with tax disputes only is nebulous." 196 However, such small
caseload of tax disputes deserves deliberations before concluding that
taxpayers are satisfied with tax administration.
Consistent commercial operation: consistent business operation in the
same tax jurisdiction demands the enterprise taxpayers keep a sociable
and secure relationship with tax authorities without initiating conflicts
through tax disputes, which may invite revenges from tax authorities;
Judicial autonomy and independence: taxpayers usually distrust the
autonomy and independence of a court in adjudicating tax disputes
against the tax authority defendant. "Many cases are simply not
accepted due to public or internal bureaucratic direction or precisely
because of the case's political coloration, or even if initially accepted,
such cases are not subject to adjudication again for fear of bumping up
against extralegal power." 197 In particular, 1) the tax expertise of
judges hearing tax cases sometimes is guided by tax authorities'
technical support, so the judgment of a tax dispute may be distorted
against taxpayers' rights;

198

2) the relationship of court and tax

administration is intertwined. The connection of the two falls along
two axes: the budget and spending of local court is supported by local

195

!d. see also Xiong, at 179
See Xiong supra 70 at 176-77, presenting that from 1998 to 2004, the overall tax caseload
accepted at the first phase decreased from 2,069 to 1,032
197
See Howson supra 66 at 138, summarizing his understanding and watch on case
acceptance or dismissal in China's court
198
See Wang supra 62 at 77
196
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fiscal revenue, and local People's Congress is responsible for rejecting
or approving court administrative budgets. 199 The court, for the sake of
local revenue collection and interests of itself, may reach unfavorable
decisions against taxpayers. Meanwhile, local judges, especially the
chief judges of the adjudication committees and judges in key
tribunals, are appointed or at least approved by the local peoples'
congress.

200

This bureaucratic undertaking might compose an

important factor in adjudicating a tax dispute. Another source of
political influence comes from the fact that the People's Congress
exercises stipulated "individual case supervision". According to the
Supervision Law passed in 2007, local People's Congress may
supervise courts by investigating specific issues, appointing and
dismissing judicial officials. In practice, the supervision may lead to
indirect intervention to the adjudication process.
The expansive discretionary power of tax authorities: according to the
Tax Collection Law, tax authorities are entitled to impose a penalty
ranging from 50 percent to 5 times of tax assessment due for behaviors
such as tax evasion or improper handling of unsecured assets. 201 Such a

199

See Xiong supra 70 at 180
See generally Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Jiancha Fa [The Law on
Administrative Supervision of the P.R. C.] [hereinafter Supervision Law ofthe PRC] ((9=J:$.A
~;J:tiflllil1'fii;l(~~¥*» , effective as ofMay 9, 1997, as amended on June 25,2010
201
See e.g., Article 63 of the Tax Collection Law, stipulating that [t]or a taxpayer who evades
taxes, the tax authority shall pursue the payment of the taxes unpaid or underpaid, the late fee,
and impose a fine with the amount from 50% to five times of the taxes unpaid or underpaid;
Article 64 of the Tax Collection Law, "Where a taxpayer does not file tax returns, or does not
pay or underpays the taxes payable, the tax authority shall pursue the payment of the taxes
unpaid or underpaid and the late fee, and impose a fine with the amount from 50% to five
times of the taxes unpaid or underpaid."
Article 65 of the Tax Collection Law, "where a taxpayer fails to pay the taxes payable, or
hinders the tax authority from pursuing the payment of the taxes unpaid by means of
transferring or concealing the properties, the tax authority shall pursue the payment of the
taxes unpaid and the late fee, and impose a fine with the amount from 50% to five times of the
200
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wide range of discretion inevitably leads to potential corruptions and
unethical collection routines. Moreover, tax authorities may violate the
principle of legality because to a large extent tax collection is based on
administrative quota or budgetary order but not on legitimate
. o f tax )"1ab"l"
caIcuIatwn
1 Ity. 202

The full-payment rule: by statute, a taxpayer must first pay or remit tax
payment, surcharge, and late fees (if applicable) due or provide
guarantee in the first place before filing an application for the tax
administrative reconsideration or a law suit.

203

This rule bars

financially incapable taxpayers from exercising the right to access to
seek relief through administrative or judicial tribunals.
As noted by oppositionists, the case load of tax disputes does not warrant the
establishment of a separate tribunal to accept and adjudicate tax cases only.
Seeking relief through tax litigation is even an inefficient approach disliked by
taxpayers; rather, settlement usually is reached at the tax administrative
reconsideration stage. The flaws of the judicial system manifest in the tax
judicature operation as well, such as its lack of independence and autonomy.
Moreover, this thesis seconds oppositionist' notion on the demand-supply
logic between tax cases and establishment of the tax court. In this sense, it is
clear that setting up a tax court does not necessarily encourage filing of tax
taxes unpaid; if such acts constitute an offence, criminal liabilities shall be investigated in
accordance with the law."
Article 68 of the Tax Collection Law, "where a taxpayer or withholding agent which has been
ordered by the tax authority to pay, within a prescribed time limit, the amount of taxes which
should be paid or remitted but have not been paid or have been underpaid within the time limit,
fails to pay the amount of taxes within the time limit, the tax authority may, in addition to
pursuing the payment of the amount of taxes the taxpayer or withholding agent has failed to
pay or underpaid by the mandatory measures as prescribed in Article 40 of this Law, impose a
fine of 50% or more of the amount of taxes which have not been paid or underpaid but not
more than five times of the said amount."
202
See Xiong supra 70 at 181
203
See Article 88(1) Tax Collection Law of the P.R.C.

390

disputes, rather, tax cases should prompt the institutionalization of the tax
court system.

204

4.2.1.3. The nebulous architect ofthe proposed tax court system

Another argument put forward by those opposing a tax court is that no
practical architect is available for the tax court system. The establishment of
the tax court, they argue, is more theoretical than practical. According to
oppositionists, the tax court system would be complicated by the following
factors.
The supervision of the tax court: both supporters and oppositionists
agree that tax authorities or the SAT must be kept from supervising the
tax court. Therefore, the Supreme People's Court of China should
supervise the operation and management of the tax court, but no details
have been provided regarding how this would work; 205
The setting of the tax court: if the tax court is part of the judiciary
system, is it a separate sub-system paralleling the current structure with
four tiers of court hierarchy, or just a tribunal paralleling
administrative, civil and criminal tribunals? Is it necessary to have tax
tribunals in all levels of court?206 If it has a principal office location,
are tax court judges able to sit "at any place within China" and travel

204

See Xiong supra at 183. The demand-supply logic centers on one of the divergence
between oppositionists and supporters
205
!d., at 182
206 !d.
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nationwide to conduct trials in various designated cities, as is U.S.
practice? 207 How to appeal a tax court decision?
Competency oftax court judges: given the specialty oftax laws, judges,
have expertise in the tax laws, and are tasked to "apply that expertise in
a manner to ensure that taxpayers are assessed only what they owe, and
no more. " 208 The same rationale applies to future judges of Chinese tax
court as well. Therefore, aside from general requirements under
China's Judge Law, how to select, appoint, manage, train, evaluate and
compensate qualified judges is unclear. How, for example, can China
guarantee the tax expertise, rotation, and tenure of judges? Will the tax
court recruit judges from "the pool of tax officials" 209 or from
elsewhere?
Right to representation: a consistent supply of lawyers litigating tax
cases is a vital component of U.S. Tax Court operation. China,
however, does not have this luxury. Even as the number of qualified
lawyers in China has increased 800 fold over the past thirty years
reaching over 200,000 by the end of 2010,210 there remains an urgent
need for qualified and well-trained tax practitioners, and there will for
the foreseeable future. 211 Therefore, is it necessary to entitle CPAs and
CTAs the representation under the tax court jurisdiction? How to
standardize the tax professionalism?
207

I.R.C§ 7445
For more detail, see http://www.court.com/article/view/united-states-tax-court , (last visited
on March 15, 2011)
209
See Xiong supra 70, at 182
210
For a summary of development of Chinese legal profession for the past 30 years, see
generally http:l/china.findlaw.cn/law/506581/viewspace-22221 (in Chinese) (last visited on
March 15, 2011)
211
See Li Jiyou, Three Restrictions against the Development of the Tax Planning Practice
(Tax Judicature Reform Proceedings, 2006) at 522
208
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4.2.1.4. Summary

As noted, those opposed to the establishment of a tax court treat the idea as
impracticable under the current political and judicial situation in China. The
establishment of the tax court system may lead to an overhaul of the overall
judicial system and reform 212 including the civil and criminal court systems. In
addition, the idea of a tax court system needs approval from the NPC Standing
Committee. 213 However, it is important to mention that any major judiciary
reform originates from social and political needs. 214

4.2.2. Supporters' over-romanticized view

Supporters of establishment of the Chinese tax court system are hardly a
minority in the Chinese tax academia. 215 Their substantiation for the tax court
stands on three basic propositions: (1) taxpayers rights would be better secured
by the tax court system; (2) the tax court system helps realize judicial
independence and autonomy; and (3) the tax court system would make more
consistent the current tax adjudication practice, which suffers from
inconsistency nationwide. However, proposals supporting tax court construct
212

See Xiong supra 70, at 178
See Article 29, Zhongguo Renmin Fayuan Zuzhi Fa [The People's Court Organization Law
ofthe People's Republic ofChina] ((J:fOO.AJ~d*I~Hil~.>H*» , effective as of May I, 1979,
as amended on October 31, 2006
214 !d.
213

215

Among all articles and conference papers reviewed on tax judicature reform complied in
the Tax Judicial Reform Proceeding, 10 out 28 articles support the establishment of a tax court
system, 13 oppose and 5 prefer a midlist view of setting a tax tribunal in the existing court
system
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remain more hypothetical than realistic. In responding to the challenges of
skeptics, the following arguments are raised.

216

4.2.2.1. Proposed organizational structure ofthe tax court system

According to supporters, the setting or organization structure of the tax court
should follow current geographic economic essentials and development
prospect rather than sticking with current nationwide administrative hierarchy.
In this sense, tax jurisdiction nationwide will be divided into five or six
regional tax jurisdictions. The tax court should be headquartered in Beijing
under the direct supervision of the People's Supreme Court, and be structured
in three tiers handling two levels of adjudications: the first trial and an appeal.
Within each regional tax jurisdiction, tax court judges may travel to different
sites to adjudicate tax disputes.

4.2.2.2. Enlarged scope ofcases accepted

In addition to regular tax assessment or enforcement decisions, supporters
boldly suggest expanding the scope of tax judicial review to cover local tax
rulings and notices that are released by lowest hierarchy of tax bureaus. This
proposal is extraordinary. By statute, Chinese administrative courts should
dismiss petitions asking courts to overrule administrative actions with
216

See Zhu Daqi and He Xiaxiang, Lun Woguo Shuiwu Fayuan de Sheli [About Establishing
the Tax Court System in China], Vol. 21, No.3 pp17-22 Contemporary Law Review, May
2007 [hereinafter Zhu and He] **~' 1PJiEH-F, H~fltOOm1Ht~JGI¥Ji9:J'l.)) ~1~¥t~~
21 ~m.:=.M. The author notes that supporters are cautious in safeguarding their positions in
terms of the speculative proposals they have. Zhu and He probably contribute one of
persuasive pieces in this connection. Zhu is a professor of tax law from People's University of
China
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generally binding force,

217

such as binding administrative regulations or

rulings passed by administrative organs that are authorized or delegated by the
legislature. Therefore, subjecting local tax rulings to dispute in courts would
add to tax judicature reform an unintended shift in established legal
hierarchies.
This proposal is nevertheless supported in two ways. First, corruption and
irregular tax administrative acts usually are based on unsophisticated or
otherwise perverse local tax rulings. Even with nationwide or provincial
guidelines, local tax bureaus may twist policies for unstated rationales. Those
supporting the establishment of tax courts point out that this sort of
administrative arbitrariness leads to a large portion of controversies or
disputes.

218

Second,

complaints

about

uncontrolled,

expansive

and

manipulative local tax policies are harsh. Aside from regular revenue
collection, equally important is political pressure to increase local GDP for
personnel promotion and inflate resources in developing local economy.
Therefore, local-specific tax rulings are employed to "squeeze" as much tax
payment as possible and reallocate financial burdens to taxpayers. To this end,
distorted tax administration and uncontrolled or manipulative local tax rulings
are supposed to be regulated by the envisioned tax court system.

217

See generally Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa [Administrative
Litigation Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China] (effective as of October 1,
1990).[hereinafter "the Administrative Litigation Procedure Law"] «9=t $A ~;tli;fll 00 1Jll;5(
Vfi'~$)) . In particular, Article 2 of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Law proscribes
"If a citizen, a legal person or any other organization considers that his or its lawful rights and
interests have been infringed upon by a specific administrative act of an administrative organ
or its personnel, he or it shall have the right to bring a suit before a people's court in
accordance with this Law." However, Article 12 (I) the Administrative Litigation Procedure
Law provides that "The people's courts shall not accept suits brought by citizens, legal
persons or other organizations against administrative rules and regulations, regulations, or
decisions and orders with general binding force formulated and announced by administrative
organs"
218
See Zhu and He supra 93 at 20
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4.2.2.3. Small Tax Cases

Another concept proposed is the definition of small tax cases, which is pretty
in line with the U.S. Tax Court handlings. As noted above, special procedures
on trial of the "Small Tax Case" in the U.S. cover disputes for less than
$50,000. 219 Usually, the trial of"S-Cases" entails less discovery and relatively
informal procedural and evidentiary standards. 220 Regrettably, supporters
discuss this point very briefly.

4.2.2.4. Reduction of intervention by administrative reconsideration

According to supporters, the procedural advantage of tax administrative
reconsideration is over-emphasized and thus should be abolished. In this
respect, supporters' position is more aggressive and clear-cut while the
opposition still have pragmatic ideas of keeping the administrative
reconsideration mechanism as a filter to remove externalities caused by
disputed tax assessment.

4.2.2.5. Summary

A key dividing line between supporters and oppositionists is whether the tax
court system invites tax disputes or not. Supporters are more optimistic while
those who oppose it are not. Paradoxically, there is no right or wrong answer
219
220

I.R.C.§7463
See Tax Ct. R. 174(b)
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to this question. Although supporters propose a different mechanism for
reform, the two groups share similar criticisms. First, the full-payment rule for
seeking administrative or judicial relief should be abolished. Second, the tax
administrative reconsideration is not appropriate. Third, taxpayers need more
realistic protection of their rights. In this sense, conflicting views of two
groups display like a fair charge but are not incompatible.

4.2.3. A midlist view

An intermediate position between the opposition and supporters proposes
inserting a tax tribunal into the current court system, parallel to China's civil,
criminal and administration tribunals. The tax tribunal would, by definition,
hear tax cases only and sits in each hierarchy of the court system, i.e., from the
Supreme People's Court to lowest-level People's Court. 221 However, there are
many complications to this plan despite its merits. 222
First, how could China structure the appeals of lower tax court judgments?
Would they go to an upper level of the tax court, an upper level administrative
court, or would either suffice? This question is left largely unanswered.
Second, a waste of judicial resource such as judges, administrative forces and
operational spending is inevitable if the tax tribunal appears in every court on
each level. After all, the need to set up a tax tribunal is not clear at each level
of the courts given the limited, irregular, and widely dispersed tax caseload.
Third, although setting up a tax tribunal in the current court system does not
need approval from the NPC Standing Committee, but it is unlikely that a
221

See Xiong supra 70, at 183 (quoting Zhai Jiguang, who is an adamant supporter of the
middle ground)
222
See Zhu and He supra 93,at 17
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nationwide tax tribunal system would escape the scrutiny of the Supreme
People's Court, which is heavily colored by issues of institutional
independence. In this sense, the intermediate proposal seems to avoid
shortcomings in the arguments of supporters and the opposition. However, it
invites harsher challenges on eradicating the dilemma of its transitory nature
and has its own issues of impracticality. To this end, the tax tribunal
proposition somewhat suffers from illiberality of twisting the Confucian gold

rule of mean for reforming the tax judicature construct in allowance towards
catering to both supporters and oppositionists. As a result, ultimately this
middle path has some theoretical merit, but little present pragmatic value.

4.2.4. Summary

As noted above, three factions of thoughts co-exist in proposing agenda of
establishing the hypothetical Chinese tax court system, and each has its merits.
Equally important is that they share similar reform proposals such as the
removal of the pre-trial administrative reconsideration mechanism and
abolishment of the full-payment rule. Overall, the opposition prefers a mild
but pointed plea without inviting an overhaul of the current system. The
supporters, on the other hand, are more aggressive or optimistic in seeing the
tax court as a rare opportunity to reform both the judicial system and tax
administration. A middle path approach is attractive at first glance, because it
seems to avoid obvious problems in each of the other two positions. But its
transitory nature and over-conformism misidentifY a few key considerations in
construct a compromise constrained by impracticality. Again, there is no clear
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answer to the speculative pursuit of tax judicature reform. The establishment
of the tax court system ultimately seems a proxy for political and social
policy 223 debates rather a solemn pursuit on the Chinese legal reform
agenda.224

4.3. A legitimate need of tax administration

China's tax judicature reform is a three-front battle, as it must orient itself
simultaneously toward tax administration, the general judicial system, and
China's taxpayers. In China, tax law remains heavily reliant on tax
administration. The enforcement and reconsideration of adverse decision of
the tax administrations are inherently hierarchical. Subordinate tax officials'
position in the tax administrative hierarchy determines for them the simplest,
most direct, or most cost-efficient manner to seek relief. Therefore, tax
administrative reconsideration is historically rooted in China's general
administration framework. China does not have a court hearing tax cases only;
rather, the administration tribunal within the People's Court system is the only
available channel to seek judicial remedies. The taxpayers' position is
disadvantaged given the dominance and authority of tax administrations. In
spite of various prescribed rights, taxpayers are hindered in filing tax disputes
against tax authorities in terms of procedure, financial capacity and political
pressure. Therefore, the tax judicature reform is determined by these three
pillars. Due to the limited space, the prospects of tax judicial review will be
introduced in the following two sessions, and the taxpayers' right protection is
223

See generally Xiong supra 70
See Zhaodong Jiang, The Administrative Use of Law in China: The Baori Golf Club Tax
Case, 12 Colum. J. Asian L. 191, at 193-95

224
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detailed later this thesis.

4.3.1. Irregularity in local tax administration

Tax administration must accommodate both national guidelines and local
interests and needs. Even though tax laws and regulations promulgated by
NPC, the State Council, or the tax administrative apparatus 225 are applicable
nationwide, various local tax rulings, notices, and directives give effect to and
define the content of these laws in practice. 226 This local particularism is
amplified by the local need to deal with new issues that have not been
considered

by the

SAT or MOF.

227

These local

tax documents

jurisprudentially are "entitled to respect" to the extent they "have the power to
persuade".

228

First, not all local tax documents accurately convey the

administration intent enclosed in superiors' order or instructions. Local selfinterest and discrepancies in understanding cause uneven enforcement of same
legislation. Local tax administrations are also understaffed, underpaid, and
undervalued. The tax administration embodies a reverse triangle hierarchical
structure in terms of staff forces and enforcement of tax policies thereof.
Today, over 1,000 officials work at the SAT in Beijing, hundreds of tax
officials on the provincial level, over a hundred on the city level while only
less than a hundred at the basic or county level. Given the fact that over 2,000
226

See generally two circulars issued by the Ministry of Finance: (86) Cai Shui Zhi No. 143,
and (86) Cai Shui Wai Zi, No. 170. Government ministries, such as, the Ministry of Finance,
and departments, such as the State Administration of Taxation, may issue orders or directives
and promulgate rules within their respective ministerial or departmental jurisdictions
227
See Article 90, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo xian fa ["XIAN FA"] [the Constitution of
the P.R.C. (1982).] Ministerial pronouncements refer to directives and rules issued in the
name of government ministries or departments, such as the SAT and the MOF
228
See generally, Del Commercial properties Inc. v. Comm 'r., 251 F.3d 210, 214 (D.C. Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 903 (2002)
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rulings, notices and legislative interpretations form the law which must be
applied by basic tax bureaus, local tax officials are short of expertise, time and
uniformity in their enforcement.

229

The over-expansive discretion of local tax

bureaus may induce these underpaid tax officials to manipulate tax assessment
to solicit unreasonable remuneration or bribes by trading tax assessment for
unlawful personal gains. These irregular tax administrative actions all
contribute to adverse tax enforcement or decisions.

4.3.2.

Concerns regarding tax administrative reconsideration

Expertise and independence are two of the foremost issues involved in the
critique of the administrative reconsideration mechanism. Tax expertise at the
superior level usually is stronger than its subordinate tax officials. However,
given the extensive scope of discretion entertained by the tax authorities in
general, it is dubious that superior tax official may reach an overall just
consideration in reviewing the controversy filed. For example, for tax
collection only, determination of issues such as identification of the taxpayer,
subject of tax, applicable tax rate, tax deduction, tax exemption, tax refund,
tax bases calculation, tax jurisdiction, timing, and tax collection method are all
unilaterally controlled by tax authorities. In this sense, any single item may
again be reviewed against taxpayers. Moreover, the expertise of tax officials is
constrained by the shortage of up-to-date training to identify legitimate tax
planning activities. Often, decisions on tax evasion made by local tax official
229

See Xiao Zhumei, Shuishou Sifa Piruan de Zhengzhuang, Bingyin ji Zhenzhi Fang'an [The
Manifestation, Causes and Countermeasures of Judicature Weakening in Taxation] ~ t'f:fij
«#t~~'ijjjt;;J1UXI¥J1.JE:tl\, :W!!Effi&i~¥&:1J~)) , Tax Judicial Reform Proceeding, pp87-91, at
89
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manifest a crude understanding or ignorance of justifiable enterprise tax
. method s. 230
p lanmng
The independence of the tax administrative reconsideration unit faces distrust
from taxpayers. Usually, local tax officials take internal reporting channels to
seek their superiors' understanding and support even before they decide
special tax issues. Taxpayers are given little room for argument and this
dualism renders the reconsideration only a formal process rather than an
independent review as anticipated. Records of such hierarchical internal
communication such as reports, requests, instructions and directives largely
kept from public circulation. To this end, taxpayers, when facing an adverse
enforcement decision, often deem it more cost-efficient or administratively
safer to seek settlement with either the tax administrative reconsideration unit
or its subordinate officials. Political pressure and local GDP development
needs also compose critical roles in reaching reconsideration decisions.

4.3.3.

231

Advance rulings

There is always ambiguity in the application of tax law to specific transactions.
Even the SAT and the MOF publish voluminous notices, ruling, guidelines
and directives on dealing with tax issues arising from specific scenarios or
transactions. Chinese tax laws in general remain inherently ambiguous and
incomplete. In line with modem tax administrative practice, taxpayers
especially those involved in foreign investments may desire to consult the tax
consequences of a proposed transaction so that controversial issues may be
230

The author, when practicing tax law in China, remembers that a district local tax bureau in
Beijing erroneously issued a penalty notice based on unsubstantiated legal reasoning
231
See Xiong supra 70, at 183
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avoided or negotiated beforehand. Tax authorities may advise generally but
such "unofficial" opinions usually are not legally grounded or reliable, nor
may they be raised in proceedings against the tax authority if controversy
arises. Therefore, the practice of advance ruling is preferred by taxpayers
wishing to obtain legally binding instructions from tax authorities. This
practice is increasingly common in the U.S. and many OECD countries, which
formally recognize the binding effect thereof.
Chinese tax administration, however, has been fairly conservative in
employing the practice of advance ruling until recently. In limited
circumstances, Chinese tax authorities may approve advance rulings upon
application by taxpayers, but the scope of applicable transactions is quite
narrow.

232

A few recent cases adopting advance rulings sort out pricing

agreements for cross-border transfers of goods and services among
subsidiaries of multinational companies which have a large commercial
presence in China. 233 Advance rulings may create procedural peculiarities such
as applications to two or more tax jurisdictions234 and careful tax planning to
avoid pricing discrepancies. Due to technical and procedural formalities, the
232

See generally Guanlian Qiyejian Yewu Wanglai Yuyue Dingjia Shishi Xize (Shixing)
[Rules for Advance Ruling of Closely-held Enterprise Transactions (Trial Implementation)]

(guoshuifa) No. 118, 2004, issued by the SAT G~!l*~.!lki13l.ill!.~H!*f9W~~ift~tli~J!Ij
(litrr)} (Ciil~t~[2004]118-'%), see also Guanlian Qiye Wanglai Shuiwu Guanli Guicheng
[Guidelines on Tax management of Closely-held Enterprises Transactions] (guoshuifa) No. 59,

1998, published by the SATCiil~m~~Jiiij O~~~.!lk.!lk~tt:*m~~i!~m> [Ciil~t~
( 1998)59~ ], prescribing that upon application, tax authorities may approve advance ruling on
a case-by-case basis"
233
From 1998 and 2008, there are at least 6 advance rulings are negotiated between the SAT
and multinationals, such as the Walmart ruling in 2007 and the Toshiba ruling in 2005. See
Zhongmei Dacheng Shouli Shuangbian Yuyue Dingjia Xieyi [The First Advanced Ruling
Concluded by China, U.S. and Walmart] ~ ~ 34 pX, ~ '19~ ~ U2 JY! t~ ~ '1ft ~ ~ ,
http://news.cnnb.com.cn/system/2007/01112/005235319 .shtml (in Chinese) (last visited on
March 15, 2011)
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!d., Walmart submitted dual application to the IRS in the U.S. and the SAT in China;
Toshiba submitted applications to Japan, the SAT in China and at least two local tax
jurisdiction in China
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application and approval of advance ruling usually drag a long time ranging
from six months to a year. The term of the advance ruling usually is two to
four years and is extendable up to five years.
Advance ruling is an increasingly accepted practice in China, usually
conducted between taxpayers and the SAT. However, the use of advance
ruling in China is still primitive and sometimes the SAT may refuse to even
consider issuing a ruling on a case-by-case basis. Rarely there is any advance
ruling approved by provincial or local tax authorities, because local tax
officials are largely risk-averse and usually fail to match professional tax
advisors in terms of tax expertise and tax planning tactics. In this connection,
tax authorities should be more open in embracing and reviewing advance
ruling from local enterprises or at least offer written opinions prior to
transactional activities in the hope to avoid potential tax controversies.

4.3.4.

Summary

Today, the tax administration is the most important part in structuring
modernization of China's tax system. Despite some progress, efforts at its
reform have failed in several ways. First, the irregular enforcement of tax laws
and regulations applicable nationwide creates discrepancies which invite tax
dispute. Moreover, provincial and local tax bureaus are entitled with too much
discretion in handling tax collection and dealing with taxpayers. Second, the
expertise and independence of tax authorities is subject to challenge and
improvement in many ways. The dualism of superior and subordinate tax
officials may make taxpayers' rightful claims futile and impractical. Records
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of such hierarchical internal communication such as reports, requests,
instructions and directives have mostly been kept out of pubic availability.
Therefore, taxpayers' right to know is severely discounted by tax authorities'
persuasion to accept settlement. Third, China's tax administration is
resourceful in preventing tax controversies. The issue is how adamantly and
flexibly it wants to honor taxpayers' legitimate requests. Advance ruling, in
this sense, exemplifies one of the cost-efficient approaches available to
China's tax administration.

4.4. Judicial review through the lens of tax judicature

Dicey defines the rule of law in terms of judicial review that requires thaf
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only an ordinary court can punish law breakers and equality must be
guaranteed regardless of social, economic, or political status in terms of
substance and procedure. 236 Raz further details that uniformity, independence,
transparency and procedural justice should be established in the judicial
review system to effectuate the rule of law. Meanwhile, an independent,
effective and true judicial authority is essential to compliance with China's
WTO commitments. The Protocol mandates the establishment of tribunal,
contact points and procedures for the prompt review of all administrative
actions relating to the implementation of the laws, regulations, judicial
decisions, and administrative rulings of general application referred to in the
WTO rules. Obviously, the tribunals must be independent of administrative
organs and thus are required to be "impartial and independent of the agency
235
236

See generally Dicey, supra 7
See generally Palekar, supra 8
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entrusted with administrative enforcement and shall not have any substantial
interest in the outcome of the matter."

237

The tribunals may be administrative

or judicial, however, right to appeal must be granted if the case is originally
submitted for an administrative review following due process.
The tax judicature system is vital to China's general judicial framework. As
noted above, judicial review of tax administrative discretion is doctrinal.
Tribunals hearing tax cases with judicial review power should examine tax
authorities' actions that are incompatible with constitution, written tax laws
and regulations, and related procedures. Meanwhile, the tax judicature system
is a key component of modem tax governance. As China does not have a
strong institutionalized separation of powers, the tax judicature reform
implicates changes in the relationship between courts and the administrative
structures created by and for China's one-party state. There should be a
realistic expectation of the role that can be played by the tax judicature in this
context. The tax context has its peculiarities. This section would take tax
judicature as an example to briefly analyze flaws embedded in China's general
judicial review structure, and submit proposals for its reform. Again, it is
continually important to mention that the procedure and scope of judicial
review is a case-by-case undertaking by each country based on different social,
economic, political and legal settings.
The past three decades have witnessed an improvement of China's judicial
structure in many ways. It remains to be seen whether such progress will entail
broader application. However, many scholars still keep a skeptical, albeit
optimistic, view of China's judicial review mechanism. Among the reasons
237

See Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432 (Nov. 10, 2001), Part I, para
2( d), http://www.uschina.org (last visited on March 15, 2011)
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given by these academics for their skepticism, the following particularly
implicate China's tax judicature reform which has a longstanding emphasis on
stipulation and enforcement. China's judicial review system suffers from nonuniformity, political intervention, impartiality, deficiency of expertise, and
narrowed scope of case load. Non-uniformity in the tax judicature system is a
consistently

recognized

problem.

Political

interference

is

notorious.

Impartiality primarily refers to the dynamics among taxpayers, tax
administration and judicial tribunals. Tax expertise demands deliberation in
terms of the complexity and caseload of tax disputes and even more so when a
proposal for summary judgment is posted. Overall speaking, discussing flaws
specifically associated with the tax peculiarities is crucial. Equally
contributive for this thesis is to introduce proposed thoughts that should be
considered for improving competency and legitimacy of the system.

4.4.1. Uniformity

As noted, the consistently asymmetrical enforcement of local tax bureaus
prolongs the problem of non-uniform enforcement of tax laws nationwide in
China. The same rational applies to local courts hearing tax disputes. In theory,
tax laws should subject all taxpayers to equal treatment. Because tax
adjudication falls to whichever local administrative tribunal has jurisdiction,
there is an opportunity to have divergent applications of the same tax laws
governing similar issues. The principle of equality requires that courts
nationwide adjudicate similarly situated people on analogous basis. Otherwise,
the tax administration would be arbitrary in and abusive of entitled discretions.
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Moreover, given the cross-region or even cross-border mobility of capital and
labor as well as simultaneously conducted commercial operations, for the
same taxpayer, a selection of different tax jurisdictions, i.e., the administration
courts, may invite quite different judgments for the similar tax dispute at issue.
This mess may be interpreted as either bad or good. It is bad in that it may
create tax jurisdiction shopping which may be manipulated as an incentive to
attract outside investments. It is good in that it may promote vigorous
competition of expertise or adjudication techniques among judges on a shared
bothersome tax issue for the benefit of taxpayers or the tax administration. If
the good aspect turns out valid, any appeals in this connection then have
opportunity to get into uniformity.
Is national uniformity on adjudicating similar tax issues a possibility? Yes.
Two types of efforts can bring this about. First, a top-down approach is
employable by the People's Supreme Court or the SAT to release a uniform
official standing on the issue, and a tax scholar may serve as ex officio
endorsing the reasoning. Second, a spill-over process is taken by the taxpayer
to bring in an acceptable judgment to other tax jurisdictions might promote
consensus among all jurisdictions involved. The need for uniformity may also
promote the development of a national tax court with exclusive jurisdiction,
which, if established, could render better uniformity.

4.4.2. Political intervention into judicial independence

Obstruction by political influences is an acknowledged complication for
judicial independence reform in China. Courts hearing tax cases are no
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exception to this affliction. For example, one of most recent political
impositions on judicial independence has resulted from the "Three Supremes",
which holds that the undertaking of the Party, the interests of the people, and
the Constitution and laws (in the order as originally stipulated) must all be
given the utmost consideration in law enforcement and adjudication. 238 But the
"Three Supreme" actually makes only the "Party Supreme"239 insofar as "the
Party's exclusive supervision over the court system must be guaranteed."240 In
addition, commentators raise the following charges as to political intervention
into judicial independence in China.

The expenditure and budgetary line of local judicial tribunals and
compensation of local court judges are funded by local governments or
authorities in sectors concerned. This is particularly noteworthy
because local tax bureaus or public finance bureaus are directly
responsible for disbursing funds to local courts. It is very likely local
tax bureau tool its "treasury" role in influencing adjudication of tax
disputes where the local tax bureaus is the defendant. The local tax
bureau may even hold a better position than other administrative
apparatuses in persuading local tribunals to award the winning to the
local bureaus.
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See Hu Jintao's Speech at the National Conference on procuratorial, judicial and public

security work (December 26, 2007) (~~;;lJ1fi:§!IiS()!IfF~iSUri!5.t~} (in Chinese)
See He Weifang, Sange Zhishang Shui Zhishang [Three Supremes, Who is the Most
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Supreme?] ~]lJJ' {.=:1'-~...t."it:?iU:.?} ,
http://blog.sina.com.cn!s/blog_488663200 I OOatga.html (in Chinese) (last visited on March
15, 2011)
240
See generally • Deepening the Theoretical Research on the "Three Supreme" Guideline :It!
-~;~1c" == 1'~J:."fE!~ JGJJ'Jtt!"lfltt~~ ·
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200906/26/362750.shtml (in Chinese)(last visited on
March 15, 2011)
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The judges of local judicial tribunals are appointed by the local
People's congress at the same hierarchy, which forces the courts to
subject judicial review to the desires of the local political organ;
The adjudication or case handling of local judicial tribunals is subject
to supervision of the local People's congress at the same hierarchy. As
per the China Supervision Law, the areas of supervision include (1)
reviewing annual and specialized work reports submitted by courts; (2)
investigating the enforcement of laws and regulations; (3) filing and
reviewing

judicial

interpretations

and

other

normative

legal

documents; ( 4) questioning judicial personnel about relevant cases; (5)
investigating specific issues; and (6) appointing and removing judicial
officials. Therefore, almost all elements of judicial independence are
supervised or monitored by the local People's Congress, which is
under the direct leadership of the Party-state.
Returning to political economy studies, tax policies sometimes
represent or reflect social or political policy orientations, directly or
indirectly. Therefore, the adjudication of tax issues may relate to
promotion or public signal on specific public policy issues. The
constraints from general political and social settings cannot be
understated for tax judicature.

4.4.3. Impartiality

As noted above, there is always ambiguity in the application of tax law to
specific transactions, and Chinese tax laws in general remain inherently
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ambiguous and incomplete. This invites deliberation of tax laws by both tax
authorities and courts hearing tax disputes. Therefore, it is of high legitimate
significance to examine whether the tax judicature system can honor
impartiality in adjudicating tax disputes between taxpayers and the tax
administration. This part aims to briefly review the current system and suggest
proposals for its reform.
Administrative tribunals adjudicate tax cases prejudicially. Empirical evidence
clearly confirms that tax administration wins more often than the taxpayer.
Numbers discover that impartiality is nearly nonexistent given the sharp
disparity as shown below. In 2009, out of all administrative cases at the first
phase from the "Other Cases" category which includes tax disputes, cases in
favor

of the

defendant administrative body,

i.e.,

cases "affirmed,"

"invalidated," "fulfillment of administrative responsibilities," and "dismissed,"
account for over 25% and cases "settled" account for 20%; while cases in
favor of petitioner. The "annulled" and "awarded administrative compensation"
cases only compose less than 2% of the total case load. This empirical simple
empirical observation at least shows the scarcity of impartiality in the tax
judicature system. There are a number of causes of the evident proadministration bias in the Chinese tax judicature system.
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4.4.3.l .Legitimate reasons for disparity

The burden of proof and the merits of tax disputes may somehow
proffer better litigation leverage to tax administration. Generally, the
burden of proof as to tax cases at the administrative tribunals falls on
the tax administration. The tax administration may present better
evidence to persuade judges to favor its position, while taxpayers
usually manifest deficiency m submitting evidence to prove tax
authorities' errors. Chinese tax laws and regulations are quite
straightforward, and not as intricate as those in western jurisdictions.
The issues of tax cases are sometimes without merit. Rather, they may
arise out of a misunderstanding of the law, poor advice from an
associate, the stubbornness of a corporate management, or simple
obstinacy by the taxpayer. Some taxpayers are either unable to pay or
simply want to take the chance of litigating to reduce tax liability if at
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all possible.
Experience matters. With a larger and better trained staff, the tax
administration usually is more experienced in litigating tax disputes,
while a single taxpayer may have limited tax knowledge or
unfamiliarity with the administration tribunal. Even though a taxpayer
might consult a lawyer the cost-efficiency concern of fighting the local
tax bureau may prevent her doing so. Even if the taxpayer wins in the
first trial, the tax administration usually chooses to appeal and often
still has good chance to win the case. Having said the above, how the
administration tribunal applies the tax laws is still a factor in weighing
experience.
The discretionary strength of the Chinese tax administration may
persuade the administrative tribunal judges to accept the government's
position in many ways. As to tax collection cases, tax authorities'
unilateral administrative construction embodies a wide range such as
the subject of tax, applicable tax rate, tax deduction, tax exemption, tax
refund, tax bases calculation, statute of limitation, and tax collection
method. Any single act derived from this long list howsoever may arm
the tax administration to use equitable judicial doctrines for its own
favor.

4. 4. 3. 2.Judicial Independence

The obvious lack of judicial independence in many cases may make a taxpayer
skeptical of benefit of pursuing a claim. Aside from the political intervention
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in the financial security of local judges as noted above, local administrative
tribunal judges are inclined to coordinate a settlement rather than releasing a
one-sided judgment. This is a tacit and ever-present manifestation of the desire
to promote social harmony and keep a healthy relationship between the
government and taxpayers. Meanwhile, the political hierarchy sometimes
drives local judges to have the mentality that the government and judiciary are
on the same team, in opposition to taxpayers. Local judges may also have a
mentality to enforce tax administrative decisions for local benefits, given the
contribution of tax revenues to local GDP growth.

4.4.4. A deficiency of expertise

Another burden impairing the autonomy and independence of judicial system
is the deficient expertise of judges. 241 This problem is particularly applicable
in the tax judicature context. Since the state's power to tax fundamentally
limits the scope of taxpayers' private property rights, tax expertise employed
in adjudication for interpreting and substantiating this power must be
competent and proficient. In terms of judicial autonomy, tax adjudicators'
expertise guarantees the just legitimacy and functionality of China's judicial
system. As to judicial independence, tax expertise would empower
adjudicators with neutral and decisive judgments and restrict the tax
administration from interfering with the administration of justice. Moreover,
tax expertise of local tribunal judges has been criticized and somewhat
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See generally, Donald C. Clarke, Introduction: The Chinese Legal System Since 1995:
Steady Development and Striking Continuities, 191 China Q. 555, 556 (2007), discussing the
expertise of judges impedes further development of the Chinese legal reform
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doubted by both taxpayers and tax administration. There are a few factors
contributing to this deficiency.
First, usually local judges are not trained in the specialty of tax. Rather, when
tax disputes are filed, the tribunal appoints a judge who is familiar with the
transaction where tax issues arise. A judge presiding a tax dispute may be
appointed just because she is more acquiescent with the tax administration or
the taxpayer. This is sharply different from the U.S. practice where judges at
the Tax Court are chosen from among former IRS employees and veterans of
tax private practice.
Second, most tax experts are employed by the tax administration. Since the
talent pool is so concentrated, given the bureaucratic connection between
courts and the tax administration, judges are willing to seek advice from
experts within the administration - a major conflict of interest in the minds of
many observers of the system. Taxpayers question the autonomy of local tax
judges in terms of influence from tax authorities. Often, judges hearing tax
cases take tax authorities' opinions as authoritative guidelines or instructions.
Third, the continual tax training of local tribunal judges is not significant.
Rather, since tax disputes mostly are filtered through the tax administrative
reconsideration mechanism, tax disputes before courts are of one of two types:
simple issues with answers identifiable without much judicial deliberation, and
vexing issues that are beyond the expertise of local tribunal judges. When
adjudicating cases in the second category, judges have no choice but to seek
expert opinions, which is not wrong by itself, but creates a conflict of interest
when the expert is from tax authority. Moreover, the caseload of tax disputes
is limited. Such shortage even gives judges less exposure to cutting edge tax
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issues. For example, very few judicial staffs may be capable of articulating a
working knowledge as to tax avoidance, tax evasion or tax planning.
In summary, deficiency of tax expertise in local judiciary leads to an
impairment to tax judicature. The autonomy of tax adjudicators is weakened
by the tax administration and its own incompetency. Moreover, an
independent opinion on tax a tax dispute can be unattainable due to tax
administration's dominant position in interpreting the tax laws. Regretful is
that this deficiency is unlikely to change in the near future given the
prescribed pre-trial administrative consideration for tax disputes.

4.4.5. Narrowed scope ofcaseload

The scope of judicial review in China is arguably narrow. In China, general
rules made by administrative agencies are not excluded from judicial review,
such as local administrative rulings, notices, and directives. This means that,
even if a local tax notice or enforcement procedure is based on a distorted
understanding of superior administrative orders, taxpayers have nothing to do
unless upper level of tax authorities repudiate it by way of an internal order.
This is particularly sensitive to taxpayers as it often results in the unjust taking
of their property. Moreover, taxpayers' right to know is limited with regard to
access to forthcoming local rules, which would help taxpayers proactively
conduct tax planning and corporate management.
Further, too many local administrative rulings, notices, and directives under
guidelines and instructions flood into the judiciary. This propensity toward
complexity and uncertainty in the implementation of the law is partly caused
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by the lack of a mechanism for judicial review. The extensive local
administrative documents on one hand dilute administrative efficiency, and
create irregular local actions on the other. Local administrative tribunals may
be distracted by relatively meritless cases. To this end, there should be a
"quality control" mechanism to identify legitimate cases, concerning specific
administrative acts, for judicial review. Not all administrative adverse
decisions should be unconditionally allowed to be submitted for litigation even
for those which have completed the administrative reconsideration procedure.
Although criticism about pre-trial tax administrative reconsideration is widely
shared, there are fewer consensuses about the value of the "filtering" function.
The

outstanding issue

is about how to control the administrative

reconsideration but not the pre-trial procedure itself

4.4.6. Summary

This subchapter briefly reviews flaws of tax judicature system and, to a
limited extent, drawbacks in the general judicial review system in China.
There are a few factors attached to China's tax judicature deficiencies. First is
non-uniformity. Distorted understanding and peculiarities of the tax laws and
the influence of local interests create non-uniform adjudication of tax disputes.
Cross-jurisdiction irregularity in judgment may be brought against the same
taxpayer and lead to jurisdiction shopping. However, national uniformity
might be achievable under the supervision of the Supreme People's Court and
the SAT. Second is about political intervention entailed in supervision from
local People's Congress, local tax authorities, and general political and social
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policy arrangements. Third refers to the impartiality in terms of the flawed
disparity in favor of tax administration in the adjudication practice. A few
factors contribute to such disparity such as burden of proof, merits of tax cases,
litigation experience and techniques, and over-expansive discretion enjoyed by
the tax administration. Fourth involves in the tax expertise of local tribunal
judges. Deficiency of tax expertise is caused by weak training, shortages of
cases, irregularities in the caseload, and the dominance of expertise
concentrated within the tax administration. Finally, the arguably narrow scope
of judicial review in the tax context is another potential focus for reform. The
scope should include abstract administrative acts such as local tax rulings,
notices and directives, ifthey clearly violate laws of higher authority. Further,
tax disputes derived from overly extensive local tax administration acts should
not be unconditionally filed. The "case-merit control" should be incorporated
but not limited to an upgraded pre-trail tax administrative reconsideration
"filter".

4.5. The Taxpayers' rights perspective

The third and last cornerstone of a robust tax judicature framework deals with
taxpayers' rights protection. 242 In any modern tax government, taxpayers have
the right to appeal an adverse decision of the tax administrations. Tax
judicature in turn delivers just decisions by performing a judicial review of tax
authorities' discretions and protecting taxpayers' private property from
unfounded extraction. China has a legitimate need to develop a set of rules for
242

See infra Chapter VII for details on the protection of taxpayers' rights protection in China.
This section only presents a brief introduction of the topic
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promoting taxpayers' rights, the awareness of which emerge in a meaningful
and pragmatic manner for bettering outcomes of economic behavior and social
policy implementation. Taxpayers' rights primarily are divided into primary
and the secondary rights. Meanwhile, almost all deficiencies and drawbacks of
human rights protection and the tax law system fall into the taxpayers' rights
area. The constitutional enrichment of primary taxpayers' rights is weak
because of a misunderstanding of how to situate taxpayers to claim or interpret
primary legal rights. Secondary taxpayers' rights are supposed to be enriched
with enough clear-cut rules in detailing taxpayers' administrative and
legislative rights, but China's current framework fails to contribute those
details in a satisfying manner. Although the Tax Collection Law, the
Proclamation and relevant administrative procedural laws facilitate, to some
extent, clarification and expansion of rights available to taxpayers at first
glance, those stipulated rights remain short of jurisprudential significance and
practical value, showing the necessity to identify each category of taxpayers'
rights with enough details.
As to China's tax judicature reform, the most substantive rights are taxpayers'
right to know, right to plead, right to a fair hearing and right to appeal. The
right to know guarantees predictability of tax consequences after a taxpayer
learns details of applicable tax laws and regulations. Right to plead refers to
tax authorities' responsibility to explain details and evidence for reaching an
adverse decision against a taxpayer. Right to a fair hearing requires an
occasion where taxpayers and tax authorities can present arguments during a
pre-trial process. Usually, this happens when an administrative reconsideration
is filed. Right to appeal is the last resort that a Chinese taxpayer may rely on;
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however, it in quite many cases it leads to a settlement between the taxpayer
and tax authorities. To this end, the issue centers on the realization of
taxpayer's protections but not those found solely in legal documents.
Being mindful about frustrations of taxpayers' rights protection, it might be
over-cynical to understate the progress and merit of rights protection reforms
in China's tax context. Overall, China's tax mix still provides a formulated,
yet promising, framework to facilitate access to available legal remedies, both
administrative and judicial, for taxpayers. In particular, the administrative
lawsuits filed by taxpayers attain more respects and identification, although
such awareness is discounted by the "non-contentious" or "settlement" culture
in China.
In line with tax judicature reform, the protection of taxpayers' rights serves as
a key element substantiating China's construct of the rule of law order and
fulfillment of WTO principles. Both the tax judicature and the taxpayers'
rights provisions should embrace a fair, transparent, certain, consistent,

equitable, effective, and clear tax law for the sake of promoting the rule of law
order. The WTO principles require similar inculcation, into China's tax
judicature, of principles of transparency, uniformity and impartiality and

judicial review.

4.6.Summary

This subchapter focuses on the status quo and flaws of China's current tax
judicature, and to a much less extent, reviews the general Chinese judiciary
framework in terms of the competence, autonomy and independence through
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the lens of tax judicature. Mostly, the tax judicature system suffers from flaws
and particularities penetrated from both the tax context and China's general
judicial framework.
The first section suggests that the Chinese tax judicature system includes two
components: the tax administrative reconsideration and tax administrative
litigation. In particular, a few obvious flaws are discussed: (1) the condition of
the pre-trial tax administrative reconsideration; (2) the full payment
requirement for disputes arising from tax collection which receives
vehemently criticism from both judges and scholars; (3) the deficiency of
competence for judges hearing tax cases. All these flaws, coupled with
adamant efforts to increase revenue collection, call for an upgrade of the
Chinese tax judicature reform.
The second section reviews an interesting debate among Chinese tax scholars
as to the establishment of a tax court system. Arguments from three factions:
an opposition, supporters, and a middle path, are reviewed. (1) The opposition
treats this goal as impracticable under the current political and judicial settings
in China. They are skeptical of what they believe to be a requirement in the
plan of a complete overhaul of the entire judicial system and reform. Major
arguments include that the current system generally functions well and only
needs adjustment, an enforceable model is not available, and any major
judicial reform must come from and be oriented toward actual social and
political needs. (2) Supporters optimistically believe that a tax court system
invites tax disputes. Paradoxically, both supporters and oppositionists share
similar criticisms of the full-payment rule and the pre-trail tax administrative
reconsideration. A supporters' key point is that taxpayers need deliberations
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and more realistic protection of their rights through a tax court system. (3) The
intermediate view seems to strike an attractive compromise between the two
polar opposite positions at the first glance, but its transitory, costly and
overhauling nature and over-conformism misidentify a few key aspects of a
basic court system.
The third section reviews China's tax administration for a better construct of
the tax judicature system. A few flaws are identified. (1) The irregular local
enforcement of tax laws creates discrepancies which invite tax disputes. Local
tax administrations are entitled with overly expansive discretion in handling
tax collection and dealing with taxpayers. (2) The expertise and independence
of tax authorities are subject to challenge and improvement. The dualism of
superior and subordinate tax officials may make taxpayers' claim futile and
impractical. Taxpayers' right to know is severely discounted by tax authorities'
persuasion to accept settlement. (3) China's tax administration is resourceful
in preventing tax controversies. The issue is how adamant and flexible it wants
to honor taxpayers' legitimate requests. Advance ruling exemplifies one of the
cost-efficient approaches available to tax administrations.
The fourth section briefly reviews flaws in the general judicial review system
in China through the lens of the tax judicature system. (1) Non-uniformity:
distorted understanding and peculiarities of the tax laws and locality selfinterests create non-uniform adjudication of tax disputes. Cross-jurisdiction
irregularity in judgment may be brought against the same taxpayer and lead to
jurisdiction shopping. (2) Political intervention: mostly, pressures from three
factors, including local People's Congress, local tax authorities, and general
political and social policy orientations, impair the tax judicature system. (3)
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Impartiality: there is always an empirically-proven, flawed disparity in favor
of tax administration in adjudication practice. A few factors contribute to such
disparity such as burden of proof, merits of tax cases, litigation experience and
techniques, and over-expansive discretion enjoyed by the tax administration.
(4) Tax expertise: the deficiency in tax expertise is caused by weakened
training, shortage of case load, and dominance Of expertise concentrated within
the tax administration. (5)The narrow scope of judicial review: this flaw has
two prongs: the scope should include abstract administrative acts such as local
tax rulings, notices and directives, and tax disputes derived from uncontrolled,
over-meticulous and voluminous local tax administration acts should not be
unconditionally filed. The "case-merit control" should be incorporated but not
limited to the pre-trail tax administrative reconsideration "filter".
The fifth and last section briefly discusses the role of taxpayers' rights in
reform the tax judicature system. Mostly, taxpayers' rights should accord to a
rule of law order inviting a fair, transparent, certain, consistent, equitable,
effective, and clear manner within the tax law context. WTO principles
similarly require an inculcation of principles of transparency, uniformity and
impartiality and judicial review into the Chinese tax system.

V.

Submission of proposals for China's tax judicature reform

5.1.Two Prongs of tax judicature reform

The tax judicature reform in China has two major prospects.
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First, in light of the peculiar situation ofthe Chinese tax system in its legal and
institutional framework, the role of tax judicature should not be exaggerated in
regard to its potential for overhauling or extending to the whole tax law field.
Rather, the progress of judicature reform itself should be integrated into the
system piecemeal. Another key point is that taxation involves a balance among
extraction of taxpayers' private property, tax collection, and social wealth
distribution. Judicial review of tax administrative discretions should give
consideration to both the exigencies of tax collection and the protection
taxpayer rights. Any bias toward one of these elements impairs the other.
Therefore, uniformity of decisions, tax expertise in the judicature and
restriction of rights exploitation should be pursued with equal vigor.
Second, the penetration of flaws and established settings of China's general
judiciary framework into the tax laws arena must be carefully examined and
evaluated. Proposals for tax judicature reform should feature the judiciary
system in an efficient way. Fantasies about using the tax judicature reform to
fabricate a whole new judiciary system or expecting an immediate overhaul of
China's judicial reform will prove futile and rootless. Therefore, proposals
should be tailored realistically and pragmatically, with regard to their benefit
to administrative efficiency and rights protection.
It is essential that tax judicature reform, in line with upgrades of the tax

legislature, administration and taxpayer's rights protection, must be grounded
in the rule of law order embracing a fair, transparent, certain, consistent,

equitable, effective, and clear judicature. Meanwhile, it should also
incorporate WTO principles of transparency, uniformity and impartiality, and

judicial review. Those principles might not be directly translated into due
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process enclosed in the tax judicature undertakings, but the jurisprudential
value reflected in the general judiciary framework must be incorporated.
Based on these notions, this thesis would submit the following proposals in the
order of tentative feasibility and significance.

5.2.Repudiation of the full-payment rule

This thesis shares the position that China should eliminate the full-payment
rule. 243 By statute, a taxpayer must first pay or remit tax payments, surcharges,
and late fees (if applicable) due or provide guarantee in the first place before
filing an application for the tax administrative reconsideration or a law suit. 244
As discussed, this rule should be abolished for the following reasons. The fullpayment rule bars financially incapable taxpayers from exercising the right to
seek relief through administrative or judicial tribunals. The full-payment rule
is not in line with principles of equity and ability to pay. Based on the
principle of proportionality, it is suspected to add the burden of proof on the
taxpayers' side, and this worsens the already imbalanced bargaining position
prejudicing taxpayers.

5.3. Summary judgment for small tax cases

Summary judgment is increasingly encouraged by the Supreme People's
Court,245 especially for the adjudication of administration cases. 246 However,
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See irifra section 4.1.2. for analysis and accompanying footnotes
See Article 88(1) of the Tax Collection Law
245
See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Kaizhan Xingzheng Susong Jianyi Chengxu Shidian
Gongzuo de Tongzhi [SPC Notice on Experimental Work on Advancing Summary Judgment
244
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this rigorous effort has not been extended to the tax field yet. The past three
years have seen an increase in the number of administrative cases decided on
summary judgment. Most of that growth has come in rulings in the industrial
and commercial areas.

The tax judicature system should take this

unprecedented opportunity to include summary judgment in its reform agenda.
Moreover, the U.S. Tax Court practice shares the same trend of increasing use
of summary judgment for tax collection due process suits.
Summary judgment of tax cases should be offered to collection due process
lawsuits. In particular, taxpayers should be entitled to elect a "small tax case"
procedure, which would allow for summary judgment, if the amount in dispute
is less than a prescribed value, say RMB 100,000. If the tax administration is
not comfortable with losing discretion, the summary judgment could even be
limited to such small tax cases.
Adopting summary judgment for small tax cases has two advantages. (1)
Keeping the current pre-trial tax administrative reconsideration procedure
unchanged, if a taxpayer has a qualifying tax collection case, she may check
the box for a summary judgment. This adds efficiency for all three parties
involved: the taxpayer; the tax administration; and the tribunal. (2) The
summary judgment process provides unparalleled opportunities to train judges
in the tax field. The caseload in this area is larger and issues are more
straightforward. Further, this training process also prepares judges to staff a
tax court, should it ever be created in China. Summary judgment also enjoys
for Administration Lawsuits] (SPC No. 446, 2010) {:fti!iA.~$i!}f;~=.f7f~rriS!:i.lfillfm ~
~~li\:;@.If1=a9JM~} ($ (2010) 446 ~)
http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show.php?file_id=146359 (last visited on March 15, 2011)
246
Hainan Province started the experimental work on summary judgment in April 2010 and
received very good feedbacks from both judges and petitioners,
http://www.cpd.eom.cn/n1695/n3569/c 1406229/content.html (last visited on March 15, 2011)
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several other advantages: lower burden of proof, less discovery practice,
relatively cooperative procedural standards at trial. To this end, the settings of
"small tax case" procedure, i.e., summary judgment, creates a win-win
situation. Also, the summary judgment helps reinforcing the longstanding
emphasis on stipulation and informal cooperation.

5.4.Cautious restructuring of the tax administrative reconsideration

The thesis cautiously agrees, with those who oppose the creation of a tax court,
that improving the structure of the pre-trail tax administrative reconsideration
mechanism is more feasible. 247 It shares an opinion with the opposition to the
tax court that realistic reforms must be pursued first. It may be too brusque to
abolish this pre-trail reconsideration procedure. Further, such reconsideration
does have value in "filtering" meritless cases or plainly dogmatic application
of laws. Finally, it might be feasible to set up a separate "internal tribunal"
unit within the tax administrative framework to perform the reconsideration.
However, this "internal tribunal" can be best made possible by political drives,
but not for the sake of administrative efficiency. 248

5.5. Building up tax expertise

Promotion of tax expertise in judges is straightforward. It requires selecting
junior judges with strong tax training and specifically assigning them more tax
cases, and expanding the current pool of judges with tax expertise by hiring
247
248

See irifra section 4.1.2. and accompanying footnotes
See Xiong supra 70, at 184
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experienced tax experts from the tax administration. This could create
conflicts of interests, but the risk is worth it. Also, hiring tax scholars with
adjudication experience for expert opinions on an ad hoc basis is quite feasible
given that the authority of tax judges can be established with tax scholarship,
which is a key factor in the Chinese court practice.

5.6.Subject general administrative actions to judicial review

Following the WTO principle of judicial review, discretionary actions made
by administrative authorities are subject to judicial review in WTO member
countries. These discretionary actions generally include abstract administrative
acts, such as promulgation or enforcement of locally-tailored tax rulings,
notices or directives. Under Chinese law, even they clearly violate or are not
in line with laws of higher authority, such abstract tax administrative acts
would escape from judicial review. 249 The best a taxpayer can do is to report
such discrepancies but have to wait for a superior administrative order which
sounds nebulous in practice. A clear proposal is to subject certain illegitimate
local tax rulings, notices or directives to judicial review by the administrative
tribunal of the same hierarchical level. In particular, a county's (the lowest
administrative hierarchy) tax rulings should be subject to review by the basic
administrative tribunal in the same jurisdiction (the lowest tribunal available).
At the moment, this judicial review has to be kept at the lowest level of the
administrative hierarchy in selected localities for two reasons: (1) the potential
of creating administrative turmoil there is slim; and (2) selected localities
249

See generally The Administrative Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China,
(effective as of October 1, 1990). 9=t:f¥!A~~.fOIJ1rll&Wi'ti';f,
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should at least include coastal economic development zones where better
services and tax officials are available for preventing contingencies. 250

5.7. Tax Court

Seconding the views of those opposed to the establishment of a tax court, this
thesis does not advocate establishing such a tax court system at this stage or in
the foreseeable future, nor does it concur with the middle path of inserting a
"transitory" tax tribunal within the current court system. It makes two reform
suggestions along these lines.

5. 7.1. The Structure of tax court system

Even if a tax court system were to be adopted, the desirable structure would be
a circuit tax court exercising both original and appellate jurisdiction. Original
jurisdiction would make it a court of first instance, but it would exclude those
summary judgment cases in which the amount in dispute was less than, say,
RMB 100,000. The circuit tax court should sit permanently in six to eight
regions covering nationwide territory and report to the SPC Tax Tribunal
based in Beijing. The designated High Tax Tribunal is an SPC subsidiary,
paralleling peer criminal or civil tribunals. It should have the ultimate
appellate jurisdiction over tax cases appealed at circuit tax courts and

250

In the field studies at local tax bureaus at Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone in Shanghai, this
proposal was even praised by tax officials who believe, unofficially, such judicial review will
help them concentrate on interpretations rather than promulgation (notes on file with the
author)
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provincial high courts and responsibility for tax court system administration or
management.

5. 7.2. Policy orientations and tradition

The intermediate view described above should be denounced as well. First,
aside from shortcomings as noted above, 251 the eventual goal of the middle
path is still adopting a tax court system, but doing so as a spin-off of the
current system. Given the complications brought in by the midlist structure
such as inserting a tribunal to each level of court at every locality, its
transitory, costly and overhauling feature and its impracticality render it
infeasible. Second, an established but unwritten routine for tax law or judicial
reform in the past three decades mostly follows a pattern of reaching
finalization through experience of experimental work in selected localities, but
rarely took the detour of transient proposal. Again, this thesis shares with
oppositionists' view that the establishment of a tax court system is a decision
based on political needs and social pressure.

5.8.Summary

This subchapter submits a few proposals for China's tax judicature reform.
Mostly, the proposals remain based on the following theoretical analysis: (1)
the tax context has its particularities. Tax judicature's role therefore should not
be exaggerated in overhauling or extending to the whole tax law field. (2)

251

See infra Section 4.2.3. and accompanying footnotes for detailed discussions.
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Flaws and established settings of China's judicial framework translated into
the tax law context must be carefully examined and evaluated.(3) the tax
judicature should ground itself on the rule of law order emphasizing a fair,
transparent, certain, consistent, equitable, effective, and clear system. (4) The

WTO principles of transparency, uniformity and impartiality and judicial
review should be fulfilled utmost extent possible with a set of niceties and

convenient courses of action, even those principles might not directly apply to
the tax context.
The following proposals are raised in this subchapter. (1) The full-payment
rule should be abolished. For an adverse tax collection decision, a taxpayer
does not need to pay the assessed payment or provide guarantee at the first
place before filing an application for a tax administrative reconsideration. (2)
A summary judgment procedure should be established for small tax cases as a
tax collection due course procedure. The summary judgment generally enjoys
several advantages: keeping the current reconsideration procedure untouched,
promoting tax expertise of judges, lower burden of proof, less discovery
practice, relatively cooperative procedural standards at trial. (3) A better
scheme should be designed for the tax administrative reconsideration
mechanism, but the structure must be calculated and designed. (4) Tax
expertise can be strengthened by teaming up more experienced personnel with
those who specialize in tax. (5) At the lowest level of the local bureaucratic
hierarchy, abstract administrative acts should be subject to judicial review.
This reform could be implemented, at first, in a few coastal localities which
have better tax talents. (6) If a tax court should be established, the desirable
structure is to adopt a circuit tax courts framework with all courts exercising
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both original and appellate jurisdiction and sitting permanently in six to eight
regions covering a nationwide territory and reporting to the SPC Tax Tribunal
based in Beijing. The designated High Tax Tribunal is an SPC subsidiary and
should have the ultimate appellate jurisdiction over tax cases appealed at
circuit tax courts and provincial high courts, and perform tax court system
administration or management.

VI.

Conclusion

The Chinese tax judicature involves three fundamental actors and perspectives:
tax administration, the general Chinese judiciary, and taxpayers. Tax
judicature reform is not an isolated undertaking. It calls for considerations
from various related contexts. China's tax law framework has its peculiarities.
The role of tax judicature, as a key component, should not be prolonged for
overhauling the whole tax law arena. Flaws and established settings of China's
judiciary framework translated into the tax judicature must be carefully
examined and evaluated. Any over-romantized tax judicature reform proposals
must be proactively reviewed in the context of the general judicial situation in
China. Under China's socialist legal system, the tax judicature should ground
itself honoring a rule of law order emphasizing a fair, transparent, certain,

consistent, equitable, effective, and clear framework. Meanwhile, the WTO
principles of transparency, uniformity and impartiality and judicial review
should be incorporated to the utmost extent possible. Overall, "China's tax
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judicature should reflect its social and economic development situation before
.
ducmg
. pragmat.tc re fiorm proposa1s. ,252
mtro

First, the administrative law system reform expects to submit tax authorities'
discretion for a functional and productive judicial review process. Taxpayers'
awareness raises the request to find a more taxpayer-friendly and just tax
judicial setting for rights protection. Overwhelming but irregular local
legislations efforts in the tax areas create inconsistency. The goal of uniform,
impartial, and transparent tax administration encourages the assimilation of an
upgraded reform of the tax judicature system. More importantly, the market
economy and the rule of law order urge the tax judicature to accommodate
diversified economic interests and social needs in a fair, impartial, accessible,
efficient and clear-cut manner. Pressures from international interests derived
from the WTO principles raise the bar for Chinese tax judicature reform
according to transferable practice from other tax jurisdictions. In addition, a
tax judicature system contributes competitive advantages to Chinese economy
by keeping and encouraging foreign investments and improving revenue
collection.
To this end, the precedent and experience of other established tax judicature
systems are of high reference value. It would be foolish to suggest the direct
transfer of techniques from the discussion of the U.S. Tax Court particularities.
Rather, certain relevant factors in the U.S. system might cater to pragmatic
reform needs in China's tax judicature system. Roughly, like many other tax
judicature systems, U.S. taxpayers and the IRS share similar concerns, such as
the discretion of the court, the litigation timeline, cost-efficiency, complexity
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See generally Xu supra 2
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of the issue, settlement potentials, trial, and appeals. These factors must be
measured under the general framework of U.S. judicial system based on
separation of powers, overall financial settings, and social and fiscal policy
needs. Again, there is no uniform, globally applicable model that could be
applied widely in any tax judicature system. The most informative takeaways
should be those commonly accepted factors for tax judicature reform.

Second, the status quo and flaws of China's current tax judicature might be
used as a reference for understanding the general Chinese judiciary framework
in terms of the competence, autonomy and independence. The tax judicature
system suffers from flaws and particularities coming from both the tax context
and China's general judicial framework. China's taxjudicature system has two
components: the tax administrative reconsideration and tax administrative
litigation. In particular, a few identified flaws include the pre-trial tax
administrative reconsideration, the full payment rule for tax collection due
process, and the deficiency of judicial competence in hearing tax cases. All
these flaws are aspects of national efforts to increase revenue collection.
There has been a heated debate among Chinese tax academia on the
establishment of a tax court system. Arguments from each of three factions those who oppose and those who support a tax court, as well as an
intermediate position - are not without merits. This thesis shares more
common ground with the opposition, finding that this goal is impracticable
under China's current political and judicial situation and that any major
judicial reform must be oriented to social and political needs. A key difference
between oppositionists and supporters is whether a tax court system in China
creates tax disputes. After all, the current tax judicature system generally
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functions well and no realistic tax court system model has been meaningfully
proposed. Paradoxically, both supporters and oppositionists share similar
criticisms on the full-payment rule and the pre-trail tax administrative. A
major contribution that supporters make is that taxpayers need deliberations
and more realistic protection of their rights through a tax court system. The
least acceptable is the midlist view which looks attractive at the first glance.
But the transitory, costly and overhauling nature embodied in midlist-ism and
over-conformism misidentifies a few key considerations in both Chinese court
construct and its reference to the U.S. Tax Court system.
China's tax system primarily is administrative in nature. Therefore, a few
flaws in the tax administration system directly influence the underrating of tax
judicature system. For example, tax disputes may arise when irregular local
enforcement of tax laws creates discrepancies. Local tax administrations are
entitled with too-expansive discretion in handling tax collection and dealing
with taxpayers. Meanwhile, many scholars question the expertise and
independence of tax authorities. The dualism of superior and subordinate tax
officials may pose taxpayers' claim futile and impractical. Equally noteworthy
is that tax administration is so resourceful that settlement becomes a preferred
approach in removing tax controversies. Flaws and discrepancies in the
general judicial review system in China also penetrate to the tax judicature
system. Some identifiable flaws are non-uniformity, political intervention,
impartiality, shortage of tax expertise, and the narrow scope of judicial review.
As to the tax judicature, a "case-merit control" should be incorporated but not
limited to the pre-trail tax administrative reconsideration "filter".
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Moreover, taxpayers' rights should be guaranteed in structuring the tax
judicature reform. Mostly, taxpayers' right should accord to a rule oflaw order
inviting a fair, transparent, certain, consistent, equitable, effective, and clear
manner within the tax law context. The WTO principles attach similar
assimilation into tax judicature in terms of honoring the transparency,
uniformity and impartiality and judicial review principles with a full set of

details and convenient courses of action.
Third, this thesis contributes a few proposals for China's tax judicature reform

based on above-noted theoretical analysis: the particularities in China's tax
context, flaws and established settings of China's judiciary framework, the
rule of law order construct, and the WTO principles fulfillment.
Proposals tentatively submitted include: (1) the abolition of the full-payment
rule. (2) Establishment of a summary judgment procedure for small tax cases
as a tax collection due process procedure. (3) The calculated adjustment, but
not the abolition, of the pretrial tax administrative reconsideration mechanism.
(4) Strengthening the tax expertise of the courts by teaming up more
experienced personnel with those who specialize in tax. (5) At the lowest
bureaucratic level, making abstract administrative acts subject to judicial
review. This reform could start as an experiment in a few coastal localities
with better tax talents. (6) If there is a tax court system established, the
adoption of a circuit tax courts framework in which courts exercise both
original and appellate jurisdiction, sitting permanently in six to eight regions
covering nationwide territory and reporting to the SPC Tax Tribunal based in
Beijing. The designated High Tax Tribunal is an SPC subsidiary and should
have the ultimate appellate jurisdiction over tax cases appealed at circuit tax
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courts and provincial high courts, and perform tax court system administration
or management.
Overall, the tax judicature reform in China should consider both the idea of
permanence and that of flexibility. It must balance the dynamic between tax
administration, the general judicial framework, and taxpayers' rights. As law
supports the government's political authority as well as the power of the legal
system, the principles and tenets of tax judicature system should be enshrined
in a jurisprudential manner, honoring the rule of law order. With hopes to
deepen the reform, this chapter concludes with a quote from an official excerpt
proclaimed by the Communist Party for the judicial system reform in China.
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Our goal is to improve the allocation of judicial powers and responsibilities;
standardize judicial activities, establish a fair, efficient, and authoritative
socialist judicial system, ensure that court and procuratorates exercise their
powers and carry out responsibilities fairly, independently, and according to
law; strengthen the corps of political-legal workers; and strictly and fairly
enforce the law in a civilized manner.
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See Hu Jintao zai Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shiqici Quanguo Daibiao Dahui shang de
Baogao [Hu Jintao 's Report to the Seventeenth CCP Congress], October 24, 2007, ( «m'ilili#
1'£rp !E:t-lii""Jt:m+-tlJ\1:!E{~~::k% l:fnW.15 )) }(in Chinese)
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Chapter VII
Taxpayers' Rights Protection -An Under-Delivered Promise

I.

Introduction

The awareness of taxpayers' rights has influenced China's tax law reform in
the past decade. 1 The understanding that "political rights involve political
duties ... [a]mong them is certainly the duty to pay taxes" 2 substantiates the
latest development in the taxpayers' movement to challenge the rights
protection status quo in China. As China has been called the most miserable
Asian country in terms of tax3 , this issue is particularly important, because the
increase of Chinese tax revenue has been greater than its GDP growth in the
past decade. 4 Coupled with an inflationary currency and high CPI, this fact has
driven tax payers to demand reform. Taxes are imposed by law, and as a result
1

See Xu Shanda, Zhongguo Shuiquan Yanjiu [China Tax Jurisdiction Research], (China
Taxation Press, 2004) Preface
2
See Edwin R. A. Seligman, Essay in Taxation (101h ed. 1931), at 111. Seligman is an early
contributor in advancing formation of international tax standards and principles was cherished
by his involvement in the earliest transnational collaboration on coordination in international
tax matters. This is not to suggest that no other literature articulates these ideas, but only to
point to an early piece of analysis as one source of such a perspective
3
See "China ranks the second in Forbes Tax Misery Index" and accompanying discussions at
http://forum.globaltimes.cn/forum/showthread.php?t=10043 (last visited on March 15, 2011);
see also, The Forbes Tax Misery Index 2009,
http://pdfforbes.com/media/pdfs/TaxMisery.pdf(last visited on March 15, 2011)
4
For more details on China's GDP development, see supra Chapter I
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they compose an indispensible element of China's legal framework.
Moreover, enlarged tax basis has caused taxpayers to examine the public
benefits they receive compared with the level of tax they pay, and inevitably
seek rights protection against unreciprocated taxation.
Meanwhile, Chinese government's official endorsements of universal values
and generally accepted human rights principles 5 advance the debate on
reframing China's legal and social settings. 6 However, traditional tax policy
discourse 7 lacks a framework for exploring whether or how taxpayers' rights
paradigm may guide and impact China's pursuit of sensitive human rights
protection goals that would help promote social order and an international
image as a country in which individual rights and freedoms are fully realized.
This Chapter argues that taxpayers' right protection could be an avenue to
dealing directly with the problems of social welfare and economic inequality
in China. For instance, a list of pragmatic and proactive taxpayers' rights
promotes human rights protection, which is both morally defensible and
politically viable.
The concept of taxpayers' rights is not isolated from general legal and social
environment. It is generally defined to limit the state power to promulgate,

5
Hu Jintao, China's President, in concluding the Convention for Sino-Japan Strategic
Beneficial Relationship, on May 7, 2008, posited that universal value is a mutual
understanding of international community and China would embrace such notion in fostering
human rights protection with Chinese characteristics, see generally Zhongri Guanyu
Quanmian Tuijin Zhanlue Huhui Guanxi de Lianhe Shengming [Declaration for the

promotion ofSino-Japan Strategic Beneficial Relationship], May 7, 2008, i!iJ'I.m~ {Jtll::t ~'T
~MHIJtt6i~1i~~~i¥gl!XftJBIIA} 20081¥5 ~ 7 l::t; See, e.g., Shi-kun Li, Chuyi Jiazhi
Shehui Zhuyi Hexin Jiazhi he Pushi Jlazhi [Thinking About Value, Socialist Core Value and
Universial Value], Journal of Beijing Union University (Humanities and Social Sciences)
(2009-04), In Chinese
6
See generally /d., Li
7
See, e.g., Jian Fan, Lun Shuishou Zhengguan Zhong de Wei Nashuiren Fuwu [Serving
Taxpayers in Tax Administrative Collection], (Taxation Research, 1998-04), in Chinese (1G:IJ£:
«~:fJl45c1iEt'f*'B<l"79~f~J\JIH5·")) , «m*WfJ'L)) 1998 if~ 4 WD
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administer and enforce the tax laws and to bindingly obligate uniformity,
transparency and procedural justice. The rule of law in this sense warrants
taxpayers' reliance on rights protection.

8

On an international level, the

protection of taxpayer rights has received widespread attention and
legislations of various sources define and defend taxpayers' rights. Many tax
administrations and international organizations have promulgated bills,
declarations and manuals specifically designed for the protection of taxpayer
rights. 9 The competitive advantage provided by taxpayer rights protection in
international markets further ensures against interference to taxpayers' rights,
and the WTO exemplifies a robust multilateral regime embracing capital
mobility and free trade. Rights exercised by taxpayers demand that protection
standards on par with international standards be incorporated into China's tax
law system to safeguard both revenue collection and fuel economic
development.
This Chapter reviews China's taxpayer's rights framework and proposes
reform guidelines for enforceable taxpayers' rights protection under China's
rule of law conception and in accord with WTO principles. Subchapter II
describes the rationale for taxpayers' rights

10

\

based on the relationship

between taxation and the state. The discussion grounds on a theory of the
state, which holds that legal rights are meaningless unless they are accessible

8

See generally G.S. Cooper (ed.) Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law (Amsterdanm, IBFD
and ATRF, 1997) for an early review of rule of law and taxpayers' rights
9
For example, U.S. passed the "Declaration of Taxpayer Rights" in 1988 (and amended in
1996); Canada passed the "Declaration of Taxpayer Rights'' in 1985, and OECD constituted a
Model Tax Convention for its member countries
10
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to document voluminous literatures on the origin,
definition and interpretation, see generally, C. Wellman, "Concepts of Rights" in L.C. Becker
and C.B. Becker (eds), Encyclopedia ofethics, Duty and Obligations Vols 1 and 2 (New York,
Garland Publishing Inc., 1992)
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and enforceable. 11 It therefore posits that taxpayers' rights are primarily part of
civil and political rights, concerned with harmonizing taxpayers' rights against
and duties to the state. It also posits that broader human rights protection can
be achieved following the construction of a set of meaningful taxpayer's
rights. Subchapter III critically accesses the taxpayers' right structure in
China, in terms of constitutional interpretation, primary rights and secondary
rights available for Chinese taxpayers. Subchapter IV identifies how the
conception of rule of law and the WTO principles affect the reform of
taxpayers' rights. It also contributes a proposed guideline with high practical
significance. 12
II.

The Rationale for Chinese taxpayers' rights protection

Discussion of taxpayers' rights has been limited and did not carry much
weight until recently in China 13 • A conscientious search of constitutional
sources for taxpayers' rights embarrassedly shows that, other than a prescribed
duty to pay tax under Article 56 of the Chinese Constitutional, there are no
explicit protections or statements about the normative relationship between
state and taxpayer. Only a few vague constitutional rights are even indirectly
associated with the basic framework for safeguarding individual rights as to
tax administration, collection, and enforcement. Given the notorious futility of
Chinese Constitutional Law in practice, the constitutional conception of
11

See OECD, Taxpayers' Rights and Obligations: A Survey of the Legal Situation in OECD
Countries (Paris, OECD, 1990), discussing the accessible legal rights available to taxpayers in
OECD members
12
A list of taxpayers' rights is listed based on the summary of interviews conducted by the
author from 2005 to 2008. The author presents this order as a proposal of practical value and
an outcome of his long-stretched attention in Chinese taxpayers' rights. The interviewees are
12 experienced tax collection officials working on first-front tax services from 12 local I
municipal tax authorities across China
13
This chapter submits respectfully that the seemingly voluminous literature (in Chinese)
about taxpayers' rights is of ambiguity and utilitarianism
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taxpayers' rights is not a useful avenue for challenging the State's power to
tax.
The Chinese tax system however, in its attempt to incorporate international
market standards and empower taxpayers and its situation in a broader
campaign to improve public service in China, it is an important and fertile area
for rights protection reform in the Chinese legal system. The official notion of
"small government, big society," endlessly government corruption scandals,
and the steady growth of the civil service corps have driven Chinese taxpayers
to question the distribution and handling of their tax payments. The rising
expectations of individual liberty nowadays further propel Chinese taxpayers
to demand reciprocation from the state for the taxes they pay. This Subchapter
sets out the rationale underlying why a timely articulation of Chinese
taxpayers' rights is essential especially in the context of socialist rule of law
construct, human rights protection and the fulfillment of WTO principles.

2.1. Taxation, the state and rights

Theoretically, taxation is usually viewed as a restriction on fundamental
individual property rights. 14 Taxpayers make tax payments according to laws

15

in the hopes of receiving quality benefits returned to them by the state. Tax,
therefore, essentially envisions a balancing of necessary state fiscal and
administrative power and individual rights. Articulation of individual property

14

See Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice (New
York, Oxford University Press, 2002) at 6
15
See supra Chapter III of this thesis for discussions on Rule of Law and accompanying
footnotes on divergent views on origin oflaw
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rights presumes basic individual liberty and an established legal framework
ensuring exclusivity and ownership. 16 State power to levy tax must recognize
individual property rights 17 as part of a citizen's natural entitlement and the
basis for social welfare accumulation.

18

The origin of taxation

19

is

fundamental to theories of the state, 20 and therefore can be justified as a check
on individualliberty21 or essential to the finance, operation, and growth of the
public order22 and to uphold economic development. 23 However, China's tax
system, founded on a Marxist public ownership ideology, traditionally has
paid little respect to individual property rights and framed the tax law as
collecting financial sources for the redistribution of social wealth?4
Although legal reasoning developed by influential jurists and theorists 25 can be
equally applied to the tax law, 26 tax scholars' focus has been centered

16

The author submits that different definitions of rights and duties provide various
understanding of taxation
17
See Murphy and Nagel, supra14, at 42-45, discussing Consequentialist and Deontological
theories
18
!d., at 44
19
See David Bentley, Taxpayers' Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation (Kluwer Law
International, 2007), at 3-5
2
For a general discussion on the theory of the state, see generally Robert L. Carneiro, A
Theory ofthe Origin of the State, New Series, Vol. 169, No. 3947 (Aug. 21, 1970), American
Association for the Advancement of Science, at 733-738, see also, Hazard, Geoffiey C. Jr.,
General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 241 (1965)
21
See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980), at 155,
276-277, positing a type of common good that is not fundamental, but which allows members
of a community to collaborate to attain reasonable objectives supported by a legal system that
is specific, not arbitrary and mains reciprocity between subjects of the system and its lawful
authorities; See also Murphy and Nagel, supra 14 at 42-45 for a discussion on the
deontological theory
22
See Murphy and Nagel, supra 14 at 8
23
/d., at 43, see also generally Reuven Avi-Yonah and Joel Slemrod, (How) Should Trade
Agreements Deal with Income Tax Issues? (September 2001). Michigan Law and Economics
Research Paper No. 01-008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=285345 or
doi:10.2139/ssrn.285345 (last visited on March 15, 2011)
24
The definition of taxation is interpreted quietly differently based on various understanding
of individual rights, see generally, R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York, Basic
Books, 1974), emphasizing that taxation as necessary to uphold the state's pursuit of goals but
limited as far as possible based on its direct interference with the basic concept of maximizing
individual choice; see also A.P. d'Entreves, Natural Law (London, Hutchinson University
Library, 1967), Chap VI, viewing taxation as a means of distributing important social goods
and has a wider role. See Bentley, supra 19 at 14 for summaries of both examples
25
See infra Chapter III of this thesis, Rule of Law and accompanying footnotes

°
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primarily on framing a robust tax legislative, administrative, and judicial
structure for the purpose of raising revenue and distributing social goods
efficiently and fairly. 27 Rarely, however, have they focused on taxpayers'
rights. This is apparent in the 1200-page two-volume treatise authored by
Victor Thuronyi on tax law design, in which only two pages are spent listing
impracticable taxpayers' individual rights,

28

showing little interest in

contemplating or detailing their substance. Not surprisingly, the voluminous
literature on international tax and multilateral tax collaboration published in
the last several decades shares the same lacuna, 29 and such exclusion also
extends to procedural rights and arrangements especially pertinent to
taxpayers.
The development of taxpayers' rights and obligations formulation has
evocative merits. Essentially, the conception of taxpayers' rights suggests two
lines of inquiry: capturing the dynamic relationship between tax authorities
and taxpayers with enumerated rights expressed in law, 30 and encouraging
taxpayers' compliance with tax law, 31 especially in the globalization era with
increased capital movement and free trade. 32 On the tax administration level,
the taxpayer-oriented client service approach is a major recent improvement in

26

!d., re-interpretation as legal theories are presented including tax theory due to conflicting
values and social orders. Radin specifically raises that theories developed on a case-by-case
interpretation
27
See Victor Thuronyi, Tax Law Design and Drafting (IMF, 1996), at 110
28
/d., at 111-12
29 !d.
30
See A. Sawyer, A Comparison of New Zealand Taxpayers' Rights with Selected Civil Law
and Common Law Countries- Have New Zealand Taxpayers been "Short-Changed? (1999)
32 Vanderbilt J. of Transn'l L, 1346-47; see also generally, Philip Baker and Anne-Mieke
Groenhagen, The Protection of Taxpayers' Rights - An International Codification (London,
European Financial Forum, 2001); see M. McLennan, The Principles and Concepts in the
Development of the Taxpayers Charter" (2003), 32 Australian Tax Review, 22
31
See Thuroyni supra 27; see also generally Benley (ed.) Taxpayers' Rights: An International
Perspective (Gold Coast, Revenue Law Journal, 1998)
32
See generally Valerie Braithwaite (ed.), Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance
and Evasion (Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2003).
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the direction of taxpayer rights protection. Tax authorities have shifted from a
controlling or coercive position to that of a friendly collection service
provider. Although it is entitled with state power to collect taxes, the tax
administration has begun positioning itself almost as an interface between
taxpayers and the state. This encouraging transformation may partially be
attributed to increasing cross-border transfer of capital and taxpayer-friendly
policies provided by many developing countries, which face harsh challenges
for keeping their tax base when so much of it is predicated on large capital
exportation. Similarly, because of the direct economic advantage received
from their services to foreign investors, tax authorities, especially those in
developing countries, have inner motivations to consistently maintain quality
services for taxpayers to keep and attract investments from the outside.
From the point of view of compliance, voluntary fulfillment of obligation to
pay tax due is rewardingly encouraged. An obvious drive is the enlarged social
welfare scale and high density of economic activities, which are beyond
traditional capacity of tax authorities to monitor closely of taxpayers'
behaviors.

Coupled

with

enforceable

criminal

sanctions,

taxpayers'

obligations to pay taxes are generally interpreted broadly to circumvent
calculated evasion and noncompliance. Voluntary compliance is a costefficient strategy to carry on business and maximize investment profits.
Further, in the international marketplace, the convergence of global taxpayer
treatments restrains tax-avoidance-shopping investment behaviors to a
minimum without the potential for manipulation by any state actor. Given the
limited room to explore evasion possibilities, taxpayers have a rational interest
in monitoring the scope of their rights and the extent of protection therefrom.
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As a result, taxpayers' rights are alternatively strengthened by compliance
together with the dynamic relationship built between the tax authorities (state)
and taxpayers.
Overall, taxpayers' rights require a valid recognition of individual property
rights and their obligations to the state. The state's power to tax cannot be
arbitrarily enforced. It is also critically important to emphasize democracy and
the rule of law in a social and legal order in order to ensure tax laws are not
subject to arbitrary enforcement. The conception of taxpayers' rights firstly
has to accept a set of generally accepted, accessible and enforceable individual
liberties. For instance, taxpayer's rights in originally derive from a framework
human rights, but they embrace influences from a broader scope of political
and civil rights.

2.2. A practical recourse to human rights protection

The conception of taxpayers' rights attaches to and presumes a basic
framework of human rights including individual property rights. A legal order
without recognition of universally accepted human rights and values likely
would render taxpayers' right futile and rootless. At the same time, a robust
system of taxpayers' rights to a large extent advances and translates into
realization of human rights protection. This Chapter assumes a positivist view
of the rule of recognition but not of the inherent nature 33 of rules, and further

33

See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1994) at 250-251
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puts front a presumption that there is a "common"34 set of universal human
rights standards that nations can pledge, although the formulation, clarity and
content of those western-dominated standards are subject to debate and
selective customization by signatories to international human rights treaties.
This assumption also calls for prerequisites of an able legal order that can
accommodate the accessibility and enforceability of those universally accepted
standards.
This positivist assumption for taxpayers' rights has merit and is not groundless.
The "universal nature of the rights and freedoms" is an acknowledged
consensus 35 and is "beyond question," 36 and such universality and some
freedoms are "fundamental."

37

Cultural traditions, religious preference,

political ideologies and diversified customs are also valued in supporting such
universality: "all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent
and interrelated."

38

Meanwhile, "universal human rights emerge with

sufficient flexibility to respect and protect cultural diversity and integrity. The
flexibility of human rights to be relevant to diverse cultures is facilitated by
the establishment of minimum standards and the incorporation of cultural
rights," 39 but "cultural consideration in no way diminishes States' human
rights obligations." 40 In this connection, recognition of rules composes the
34

See Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted on
December 10, 1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nations proclaims it as a
"common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations".
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml (last visited on March 15, 2011)
35 !d.
36
!d., Article I; see also Diana Ayton-Shenker, The Challenge of Human Rights and Cultural
Diversity, United Nations Background Note, quoting Vienna Declaration and Program of
Action, http://www.un.org/rights/dpil627e.htm (last visited on March 15, 2011)
37
!d., see also Article 5 of the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action
38
See Articles 1 and 2 Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
adopted on December 10, 1948
39 !d.
40 !d.
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rational for adopting a set of universally accepted rules with the understanding
of cultural, religious and social diversities.
Inherited from the minimum standards of human rights, recognition of
taxpayers' rights at least can be interpreted with universality and flexibility.
Analogically, a set of rules embracing basic taxpayers' rights should be
established and commonly accepted. For instance, there is no need to create a
new set of rights specifically for taxpayers, rather, many rules are in place
already and need only be customized to the tax context. To a state that has
needs to design and reform taxpayers' rights system, many technically welldesigned taxpayers charters and models are available to adapt to specific legal,
cultural, political and economic settings. On the other hand, taxpayers' rights
as political and civil rights are less debatable, and more importantly, less
sensitive or disturbing to states than human rights. Therefore, threats caused
by the codification and enforcement of minimum taxpayers' rights would be
unlikely to jeopardize revenue collectability of states.
Approaching human rights through the lens of taxpayers' rights supports a
focus on fairness in social policies. For example, taxpayers' rights would
denounce an order which tends to "distribute tax burdens towards more
economically vulnerable groups." 41 This approach also brings in efficiency
aspects in evaluating of a given social policy by considering the potential costs
of taxpayers. The reciprocal dynamic derived from the balance between
taxpayers' rights and the government is quite informative or crucial to human
rights protection, especially for developing countries where the status of

41

See Allison Christians, Fair Taxation as a Basic Human Right, 9 lnt'l. R. Const. 211 (2009)
at 22
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taxpayers is generally more favorably treated than citizens with general claim
of basic human rights. Philosophically, an established, accessible, and
enforceable set of taxpayers' rights facilitates the realization of basic human
rights. Even though the tax context is limited in nature, a social and legal order
without adequate taxpayers' rights protection can hardly be a society
embracing basic universally accepted human rights standards. Fulfillment of
taxpayers' rights easily may spill-over to other areas of laws, all of which
contribute to a bettered protection of human rights. Ultimately, taxpayers'
rights might lead to a reconsideration of the relationship between individuals
and state, the way we debate what fairness requires and with respect to whom,
and the way we balance fairness against efficiency and other tax policy
goals 42 .

2.3. A pragmatic demand for tax law reform in China

The subject oftaxpayers' rights has progressively shaped public and academic
discussion of tax law reform in China. The official agenda of China's legal
construct also generates the need for taxpayers' rights protection to fuel
economic development and to help achieve a harmonious society. Growing
awareness of individual property and social rights cultivate taxpayers with
concern on the fair redistribution of social wealth and enthusiasm in public
affairs participation. An emerging service-orient and client-friendly culture in
daily economic activities, on the other hand, compels authorities, including the
tax administration, to refine their manners in properly handling constituency

42

/d.
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and state dynamics. Meanwhile, an increasingly complicated tax system and
systematized international influences shift the concentration of intensifying
investment to modernizing a well-rounded full-service tax system, in which
taxpayers' rights are indispensable and of significance.
China's legal development over the past three decades has, in many ways,
shaped the motivation and needs for safeguarding taxpayers' rights. A primary
driver is the conception of inviolable individual property rights incorporated
into the Amendment to China's Constitution, enshrining a clear-cut private
property establishment but conceptually obscuring its borders with the
previously dominant public ownership model. The full-bodied legal
development in major arenas of economic activities promotes quality market
participation in the hope to create a social order based on libertarianism and
citizenry. Anger over corruption and erosion of individual rights together with
wealth disparities suggest growing expectations for the quality, fairness, and
transparency of government services. Exposure to western lifestyles and the
availability of information from the internet and international relationships
also foster the awareness and pursuit of individual liberty in China. All these
vigorous searches contribute to a forceful push for taxpayers to demand
respect and safeguards of their rights.
The imbalanced structure of the Chinese tax law reform for the past three
decades by itself also spawns desires for taxpayers' rights. Large portions of
tax policies oriented mostly toward attracting and catering to foreign
investments, and a capably managed tax regime has been formed at least as to
governing tax matters of foreign and domestic enterprises. An improved
turnover tax system was also formulated to channel capital mobility and
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redistribution of social goods, but such indirect-tax-dominant system cuts do
not engage the contact between the state and actual consumers who take the
final burden of tax payments. Tax administration, on the other hand, based on
computerization upgrades and the dual-track central-local structure, has
produced steady trends of tax audit and evasion reduction with criminal
sanctions and encouraging voluntary compliance. Returning to jurisprudential
analysis, however, systematic measures to secure taxpayers' rights have been
neglected, if not intentionally avoided. Adopting taxpayers' rights is
discounted m legislation and very few efforts are aimed at integrating
taxpayers' rights into the tax system. Procedural rights available to or
specifically designed for taxpayers, similarly, are subordinated or loosely
attached to the existing nascent administrative or civil procedural reforms. For
individual or enterprise taxpayers, a framework of rights for administrative
reconsideration composes a burden dealing with tax authorities. Meanwhile,
political pressures of improving GDPs and preserving investments entail tax
authorities especially local officials to develop a set of taxpayers' rights, at
least on paper, to show their friendly gestures to taxpayers. For instance, it
continues to be important to reveal irregularities of tax administration in
practice across regions and sub-provincial localities.
Taxpayers' calls for rights can be attributed to an extraction of emerging
litigant culture deposited in commercial activities and formed over thirty years
of economic complexities - taxpayers are not collectively "non-contentious"
anymore. The inefficient dispute resolution scheme in practice fails to
safeguard legitimate pursuits of taxpayers, which creates a mindset of
victimism and an aversion to authorities including tax administration and
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judiciary incompetence. In this sense, taxpayers as revenue contributors
gradually build up a determination to challenge and litigate against tax
authorities following procedures. Information available according to the
Information Disclosure Regulation (effective as of May 1, 2008) and various
local regulations of the same nature encourage and invite taxpayers to inquiry
tax administrations as to budgetary arrangement and revenue distribution.
However, the lack of enforceable taxpayers' rights renders such legitimate
concerns futile. In this connection, out of unpredictable benefits, taxpayers
have strong inclination to safeguard a set of rights for their own sake.
A key drive underlying taxpayers' rights development originates from
principles of the rule of law and compliance with international obligations,
including China's WTO obligations. In constructing the socialist rule of law
order, taxpayers' rights nimbly accommodate basic elements ofthe rule of law
in terms of demanding for notice or publicity, prospectivity, clarity,
conforrnability, stability, and congruence. The rule of law order requires that
taxpayers' rights be procedurally just and an existing legal framework to make
those rights accessible and enforceable, in certain extent in connection with
morality and social etiquettes exercised by tax officials. International
organizations such as the WTO and international treaties on human rights
protection

demand

transparency,

uniformity

and

neutrality

in

tax

administration on one hand, and prompt acceptance a set of well-accepted
taxpayers' rights on the other. Foreign investors, experiencing established
taxpayers' rights regime in developed tax systems, are reluctant to further
invest after tax preferential policies have been exploited. In this sense,
taxpayers' rights serve as a measure of comfort and assurance to keep and
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foster investments. Foreign enterprise taxpayers, are among those active
boosters in China for institutionalizing an organized taxpayers' rights
framework.
Overall, institutionalization of taxpayers' rights enjoys a systematic powerful
drives from taxpayers themselves, tax administration, general legal settings
and international influence, all of which are intertwined with human rights
protection and the rule of law order. The rationale for legitimizing a set of
taxpayers' rights in China is, in part, to compensate the shortage of tax
administrative efficiency. It also promotes a dynamic balance between the
taxpayers and the state, vertically with due process and horizontally with
fairness norms. China, facing a growing revenue base and a more complex
administrative structure, needs a set of taxpayers' rights to fill in legislative
gaps and to remedy the potential erosion of tax bases.

III.

Taxpayer's rights protection in China

This subchapter aims to critically review China's legislations and status quo of
taxpayers' rights. It firstly classifies taxpayers' rights as primary constitutional
and administrative rights and secondary administrative rights. Based on a brief
appraisal of available rights to Chinese taxpayers, the probable causes for
deficiencies are analyzed and summarized in the hope of furnishing creditable
reform guidelines. Discussion of the impact of the rule of law order and the
WTO principles follows.
China, in line with its Constitution and embrace of the socialist rule of law
order, showed reasonable efforts for the protection of taxpayers' rights in the
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past three decades. Partially designed as a responsive gesture for WTO
accession, an amended Law of Administration ofthe Levy and Collection Tax
ofPRC (the "Tax Collection Law" or "TCL") was passed in April2001 based
on a previously nascent draft promulgated in September 1992. The Tax
Collection Law, on one hand, enhances the means of tax law enforcement and
serves as a guideline for tax collection procedures, and on the other delineates
the relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities in terms of taxpayers'
rights. Many obscure descriptions of taxpayers' rights in the earlier version
were clarified and abolished in the 2001 Tax Collection Law such as the right
to confidentiality, the right to give statement and appeal, the right to relief and
compensation. However, several generally accepted taxpayers' rights were
stipulated evasively or too sketchily especially those associated with
procedural arrangements.
A recent interesting and informative document on taxpayers' rights is the
Proclamation on the Rights and Obligations of Taxpayers, released by the
SAT in December 2009 (hereinafter referred to as the "Proclamation"). This
first systematic attempt by the SAT summarizes taxpayers' rights and
obligations prescribed in the Tax Collection Law with detailed explanations on
enforcement and simple case illustrations. However, the Proclamation did not
receive the favorable reception from taxpayers and even from Chinese tax
administration body itself, which it anticipated. Taxpayers remain suspicious
of the tax administration and taxpayers' rights are regarded as "traps" in
exchange of formidable taxpayers' duties stipulated in the Proclamation. This
dilemma is particularly evident as SAT issued many follow-up notices or
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administrative rulings to integrate the Proclamation into its official
propaganda.

3.1. An overview of the classification of taxpayers' rights

A careful reading of taxpayers' rights protection in the U.S. 43 and in OECD
countries 44 would conclude a long list various rights available to taxpayers
under different criteria. For simplicity's sake, two major types of rights are
identified, which can further be classified into different categories based on
their enforceability 45 . Addressing the vertical relationship between the state
and taxpayers, the first type deals with interaction between tax authorities and
taxpayers in terms of administration, collection, and enforcement with fairness
and efficiency, and envisions the anticipation of protection predicated upon
legitimate compliance. The second type of rights comprises a balance of
dynamics between the taxpayers and the tax laws in terms of compliance,
operation and application. 46 This second type of rights in substance is enforced
by administrative and legislative mechanisms for the fundamental operation of
tax laws. 47

43

See U.S. Taxpayer Bill of Rights (amended in 1996)
http://www.irs.gov/advocate/article/O,id=98206,00.html (last visited on March 15, 2011)
44
See generally, Taxpayers' Rights and Obligations: A Survey of the Legal Situation in OECD
Countries (OECD, 1990); see also Minoru Nakazato and J. Mark Ramseyer, Tax Law, Hiroshi
Kaneko, and the Transformation ofJapanese Jurisprudence, 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 721 2010, for
a discussion of Japanese taxpayers' rights; D. Albregtse and H.P.A.M. van Arendonk (eds),
Taxpayer Protection in the European Union (Kluwer Law International, 1998)
45
The author submits that there are many criteria to classifY rights which can be broken down
into meticulous categories. There is no right or wrong, better or worse, classification of rights
as different barometers is applied In this connection, for an ably detailed summary of
classification of taxpayer's rights, see generally Bentley supra 19 Chapters 4 and 6
46
See Bentley supra 19 at 186-89, arguing that a third type of rights but drops it as
administrative in nature
47
As evidenced by the next two paragraphs, the author obligates to posit that this thesis adopts
a sharply different analytical method of taxpayers' rights that David Bentley employs in
"Taxpayers' Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation" (Kluwer Law International, 2007).
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Revisiting a brief jurisprudential analysis as conceptualized by legal positivist
H.L.A. Hart, a further distinction between primary and secondary legal rights
has considerable merits if it appropriately applies to the taxpayers' rights
context. According to Hart, a primary rule or right governs conduct while a
secondary rule or right deals with the procedural methods by which primary
rules are enforced, operated, prosecuted and so on 48 . Hart specifically
enumerated three secondary rules which have particular reference value for
analyses of taxpayers' rights. 49 First, the rule of recognition, the rule by which
any member of society may check to find out what the primary rules of the
society are. As stated by Hart, the recognized rule might only be what is
written in a sacred book or what is said by a ruler. Second, the rule of change,
the rule by which existing primary rules might be created, altered or deleted.
Third, the rule of adjudication, the rule by which the society might determine
when a rule has been broken and prescribe a remedy. In conjunction with two
prescribed types of taxpayers' rights: primary and secondary, Hart's
enumeration proffers practical guidelines on classifying taxpayers' rights to an
extra categorization, and the similar approach also applies to other major areas
of law as well.
Accordingly, a further classification deserves consideration for a meaningful
examination of main the categories of taxpayers' rights therein. First, the
primary legal rights generally center on processes of tax law making, such as
validity of the imposition of a tax and certain constitutional limitations. This
category covers rights promulgated by legislatures, administrative agencies
Bentley mostly tailors classification of taxpayers' rights for his ambition of designing a
worldwide acceptable model. This thesis aims as simple as laying a positivist background to
review the deficiency of taxpayer's rights protection in China.
48
See H.L.A. Hart, supra 33, at 251-52
49 !d.
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and those interpreted through case law by the judiciary. However, due to the
historical constraints on drafting of Constitutions, primary rights may appear
in either in express or implied terms. In countries such as the U.K. without a
Constitution, the description oftaxpayers' rights is different.
The secondary level of taxpayers' rights includes enforceable rights focusing
on specific operations of the tax law such as its administration, collection,
enforcement procedures, and includes Hart's rules of recognition, change and
adjudication, respectively. In daily operation of the tax law, secondary rights
are those rights that taxpayers are more familiar with and practice, such as
rights for confidentiality, rights of being informed oflatest tax regulations, and
rights to request an impartial hearing or initiating dispute against tax
authorities. Secondary rights also prescribe special procedures and processes
available to taxpayers such as individual requests for deductions or advanced
rulings negotiated with tax authorities. Secondary rights sometimes are
stipulated in administrative regulations, and are similar to primary
administrative rights - although the issues that these two categories cover may
be similar, but the nature of the rights is different. Having said the above, there
are also administrative rights that do not belong to any of the categories above,
because they are not rights per se and often arise in the form of social
etiquette, performance standards or other "soft" expectations. (Figure 16)
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Tax authorities

Tax laws

3.2. An overview of Chinese taxpayer's rights- primary legal rights

Since primary legal rights are usually the measure of the validity of the tax
law, Constitutions, if available, are supposed to provide the strongest
protection of enforceable primary taxpayer's rights. China's Constitution,
however, only stipulates, in Article 56, taxpayers' duty to pay tax due
according to law. There is no expressed language of taxpayers' rights or any
exact description of tax per se except those generally prescribed citizenry
rights, which may be applied to taxpayers. 50 Given the public finance and legal
situation in China, this thesis shares the regrets and vehement criticism of
these omissions of taxpayers' rights in China's Constitution, 5 1 but it suggests,
after reviewing available Chinese tax scholarship, that such a lacuna is
arguably tolerable, and the necessity of amending China's Constitution for
inserting the taxpayers' right language should be considered by both
constitutional legislatures and tax academia.
50

See generally, Chapter II, Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens, Constitution of
People's Republic of China [XIAN FA (1982)(P.R.C.), as amended]
51
See, e.g., Weiguang Li, Gonggong Caizheng de Xianzheng Siwei - Gonggong Caizheng
Jingshen Quanshi [Public Finance and Constitutionalism: An Interpretation of Public Finance
Spirit], in Strategy and Management (zhanlue yu Guanli) 2002-3 : ~.Hi§ ::l't : 0 ;J:~:; m;1-il&~':\til&,\!l.
~t-0 ;J:~:; m;1-D&~1$iiff: <<~~ !31!fri >> 2002 4 ~ 3M
http://www.xschina.org/show.php?id=848 (last visited on March 15, 2011)
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Constitutions are diversified in overdrives and magnitude to which they
provide for taxpayers' rights. Some Constitutions stipulate express and
implied taxpayers' rights, but some fail to do so. 52 In countries that are
prominent for tax collection not being a major source of state revenue, such as
some middle-eastern countries, which rely on petroleum trading, rarely would
enquiring tax scholars bicker the significance of relevant literally provisions
on taxpayers' rights available in those relevant Constitutions. But this does not
mean that taxpayers' rights are not protected in those countries. Some
Constitutions do not contain elaborated expression of taxpayers' rights at all,
but may have meaningful implied rights available to taxpayers. For example,
Sweden's Constitution only has a prohibition against retroactive effects of tax
statues. 53 The United Kingdom does not even have a formal Constitution, but
British taxpayers enjoy quite commendable protection of their rights.
Consequently, for some critics of the omission of taxpayers' rights in China's
Constitution, there is a need for a certain broadening of scope from the
Constitutions ofthe United States and Germany in the process of looking for a
viable transplant provision.
One important question to be considered is whether the lack of an explicit
taxpayers' rights provision in China's Constitution violates the principle of
legality 54 as to Chinese taxpayers' rights. The principle of legality 55 as to
taxpayers' rights is more constitutionally interpretative than literally
52

See Thuronyi, Comparative Tax Law, at 48-49
See Anders Hultqvist, Taxpayers' Rights in Sweden, Revenue Law Journal: Vol. 7: Issue. 1,
Article 4 (1997), http://epublications.bond.edu.au/rlj/vol7/iss1/4 (last visited on March 15,
2011); see also generally, Sawyer supra 30
54
It is beyond of this thesis to review the discussion on the principle oflegality but quite a few
Chinese tax scholars and economists evidently display conflicting understanding in this
connection.
55
See generally in Thuronyi, supra 52, discussing major tax families and their comparative
advantages
53
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descriptive. A few Chinese tax scholars embrace Hart's positivist view that
any member of society may search for what the primary rights through the
Constitution, but exclude another aspect of same positivism that the
recognition rule might only be what is written in a sacred book or what is said
by a ruler 56 on the other. However, a narrowly defined or manipulatively
applied principle of legality by itself does not substantiate the notion that
taxpayers' rights in China are without constitutional legality. Neither does the
omission of an explicit provision for taxpayers' rights in China's Constitution
necessarily impair constitutional protection of Chinese taxpayers' rights.
Philosophically, the idealized provision for taxpayers' rights, if inserted in
China's Constitution, does not necessarily initiate taxpayers' rights but
somehow would discount the essentialism which is fully-embodied in the
positivist view of taxpayers' rights protection. In this sense, this thesis argues
that a more sophisticated discussion of the principle of constitutional legality
should prioritize its application to the topic of taxpayers' rights as primary
legal rights. 57
Approaching human rights through the lens of taxpayers' rights also
complicates the insertion of an explicit provision into China's Constitution. A
set of fundamental human rights, bearing selectively interpretable universality
and flexibility, is endorsed literally in Chapter II of the China's Constitution,
and provides the foundation for enforcing taxpayers' rights in the specific tax
context. Taxpayers' rights cannot escape from the general circumstance of
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See generally Li supra 51; see also Weiguang Li, Lun Gonggong Caizhng de Shiming [The
Historical Role of Public Finance], Public Finance Research 2002-3 and 2002-4 ($:1$:]1[; (( i~
0;t:!JJj!;)(i¥JBJ 51:~$)) , O:fj!;)(WfJL)) 2002 :¥ 3, 4 M)( in Chinese)
57
See generally Thuronyi, supra 52; see also, Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an
Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development (The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 1999)
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human rights protection. As long as those fundamental human rights, at least
as arguably shown on paper, are subject to flexible adaption to the tax context,
the legislature in providing specific provisions for taxpayers' rights might
weaken the minimum protections provided by general human rights norms.
After all, there is no special category such as bankers' rights or farmers'
rights, and taxpayers' as a term philosophically may lower the minimum
standard of treatment or weaken the enforceability of what are actually general
human rights norms. Meanwhile, opponents of such provisions argue that
worldwide human rights treaties such as the UDHC and Vienna Convention
do not automatically endorse a worldwide acceptable set of taxpayers' rights.
This is unlikely what supporters of the taxpayers' rights provision hope to
dispute given the diversified customization tailored by various subscribers of
some international treaties.
Returning to the taxpayers' duty to pay taxes due as stipulated in Article 56, a
seemingly straightforward argument raised by supporters of a taxpayers' rights
provision is the "symbiotic" mutuality of rights and duties -a duty must have
a concomitant right to accord with the principle of legality.
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This

oversimplified reasoning is of little value in jurisprudential analysis. Legal
positivism does not support duty recognition, and duties can be unilaterally
prescribed by laws without proffering any rights. A careful reading of much
Chinese tax scholarship shows that supporters of this reasoning are not a
minority.
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See Shaoying Cheng, Lun Zhongguo Nashuiren Quanli Baohu [Analysis of Chinese
Taxpayers' Rights Protection], arguing that a duty must have a concomitant right and
therefore
the
Chinese
Constitution
should
contain
taxpayers'
rights,
http://www.eftl.org/Article/ShowArticle. asp? ArticleiD=240 (last visited on March 15,
2011)( in Chinese)
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The problems of statutory drafting may further complicate notions of
incorporating such an express provision for taxpayers' rights into China's
Constitution. Chinese tax scholarship usually stops at the point of urging such
a provision without extending to thoughts on how to draft it. This welshing
displays a lack of legislative drafting studies and may prejudicially be
attributed to a flap in studies over taxpayer's rights. This thesis submits that, at
the current stage of legal setting, the statutory drafting of an insertable
Constitutional provision about taxpayers' rights is hard to achieve, if not
impossible. First, definitions of "taxpayer" and "rights" are controversial and
not subject to consensus. China's tax system relies in large part on the indirect
or turnover tax regime, so the nominal taxpayers are not identical to citizens
who actually bear the burden of paying tax, which makes the scope of
"taxpayers" vague. An expansively generalized term of"taxpayer" may not be
advantageous for legislators to accept. The definition of "rights" itself creates
further sensitivity and invites selective interpretation, and the definition of
"taxpayers' rights" remains difficult to make explicit. Second, China's
Constitution already has a whole chapter on fundamental rights and duties,
singling out a "taxpayers' right" might be redundant or create confusion as to
its relative status to these fundamental rights. If the legislative intent of
prescribing "a duty to pay tax due" in Article 56 could be explained by the
dominant ideology of putting national interests over everything else, the
legislative purpose for defining taxpayer's rights, as the counterpart of
taxpayers' duties, is therefore analogically hard to search for its ideological
roots. Third, linguistically the exact wording "safeguarding taxpayers'
interests" is complicated to translate. Wordings in Chinese such as

462

"guarantee"

(baozhang)

and

"protection"

(baohu)

are

employed

interchangeably, if not confusedly, and create nuances. For a legislative bill
with Constitutional significance, a provision as to taxpayer's rights has to be
made clear.
Finally, a review of the four amendments made to China's Constitution so far
since 1982 shows that constitutional revisions are usually colored by highly
political strains or subject to political manipulation. The establishment of
socialist rule of law order, market economy setting and protection of private
property may in some senses enjoy jurisprudential proclaims, but a conscious
reader of other inserted terminologies may confess strong underlying
ideological influence therein. 59 Amending the constitution for the sake of an
explicit provision for taxpayers' rights would require a significant social and
political constituency. Further, such proposed amendment would entail an
overhaul in the legal and public finance schemes as well. However, this thesis
suggests for these reasons that a taxpayers' rights provision will be
unprocurable in the foreseeable future.
To summarize, taxpayers' rights on the level of primary legal rights, i.e. as
formulated in an explicit provision, in China's Constitution is not attainable.
This thesis shares the notion that taxpayers' rights can be read into China's
Constitution60 under the positivist view, and agrees that the omission of an
explicit provision arguably tolerable. The approach of employing an
amendment to China's Constitution to insert a taxpayers' right provision is not
of much practical value or jurisprudential meaning at the current stage.
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See Larry Cata Backer, Chinese Constitutionalism, Sange Daibiao (the "Three
Represents''), and the Rule ofLaw, 16 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 29, 33-34 (2006) for a
detailed analysis of the rule of law reform and the "Three Represents"
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See generally Li supra 51
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3.3. An overview of Chinese taxpayer's rights -secondary legal rights

Secondary legal rights in the tax context, i.e., secondary taxpayers' rights,
compose the main body of modern taxpayers' rights system in international
practice. Modern tax systems stipulate secondary taxpayers' rights dealing
with the taxpayer's dynamics with the operation of the tax laws in terms of
administration, collection, adjudication, as well as procedural justice and
budgetary planning. Secondary taxpayers' rights in practice integrate the
administrative, judicial and legislative branches to construct an enabling tax
jurisdiction. Secondary taxpayers' rights can be located in major tax laws and
administrative regulations. Those rights on one hand presume a foundation in
primary rights and an established legal order to enforce them. They further
expand the interpretation of general human rights. Administrative agencies by
and large dominate the daily implementation of secondary taxpayers' rights
through orders, notices, proclamations and interpretative notes, and sometimes
may overlap with enforcing administrative primary rights concerning
constitutional protection, if any. Statutory protection is often arranged to fit in
a general procedural framework to ensure a fair and impartial decision making
process avoiding prejudice against individual taxpayers.
Secondary taxpayers' rights in China features the above-mentioned routine,
i.e., a system of secondary legal rights, administrative rights and the principles
of good conduct of tax authorities, but they are not without limitations.
Particularly, for the operation of the Constitution and the Tax Collection Law,
SAT and MOF as tax administrative bodies promulgate statutory regulations
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and guidelines on secondary taxpayers' rights in almost all aspects. Processes
involving the operation of Chinese tax laws are integrated into the general
framework of civil, criminal and administrative procedural requirements, on
both central and local levels. Meanwhile, China's secondary taxpayers' rights
system is young, and a few general frustrations in China's rights protection
regime are visible in the tax context as well. It is also important to mention a
few drawbacks specific to secondary rights in the Chinese tax context.

3.3.1. The 2001 Tax Collection Law

The 2001 Tax Collection Law 61 (TCL) enacted on the eve of China's
accession to the WTO, in the hope of enhancing tax law enforcement and
catering to international expectations, represented the one and only of four
pieces of legislation eventually passed by the NPC exclusively managing tax
related issues by then. 62 It aims to serve and guide the operation of the tax
laws in general, and tax collection, administration, and protection of
taxpayers' rights in particular. Previously opaque but imperative taxpayers'
rights are enumerated in a categorized, albeit loosened and irregular, structure
carding in the laws, which provides for the right to confidentiality, the right to
give statements and to appeal, and the right to relief and compensation, among
others. In conjunction with a set of detailed implementing rules (the TCL
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See Xiaoyu Guo, Shuishou Zhengshou Guanlifa Xiuding Gongzuo Yi Quanmian Qidong
[The Revision and Amendment ofTCL Started] November 20, 2010, Legal Daily ($~a~~. f5t
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The other three pieces of tax legislation is the Agricultural Tax Regulation (abolished in
2004), The Individual Income Tax Law (revised three times in the 1990s') and the FIE Income
Tax (replaced by the new FIE Income Tax Law as ofJanuary 1, 2008)
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Implementation Rules), 63 the Tax Collection Law, for the first time, enriches
the Chinese tax system by grafting its operation with China's Criminal Law by
imposing administrative penalties and criminal sanctions of accuracies in the
hope to rationalize dynamics between taxpayers and the tax laws.
A cautious reading of the Tax Collection Law and its implementation details
would reveal Chinese taxpayers' rights designed as the following:

Rights to confidentiality (TCL Article 5): information subject to
confidentiality primarily includes legal trade secrets (bank account,
production/operation and corporate finance) and valid personal data
(property and marital status) oftaxpayers and withholding agencies;
Right to choose suitable means of tax return filing upon prior
approvals (Article 30 of the TCL Implementation Rules);
Right to apply for extension of tax payment due (TCL Article 31):
this privilege is usually given if hardships such as bankruptcy or
financial insolvency cause a tax payment due not to be paid on time.
In practice, however, enterprise taxpayers mostly would choose a late
penalty rather than going through a unpredictable process of
application;
Right to request refund of overpaid tax (TCL Article 51): the merits
derived from this right are significant in terms of privileging taxpayers
to review tax returns done and submitting tax authorities to make a
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way to accept taxpayers' feedbacks. Although tax authorities must
refund the overpaid tax within a reasonable time, in practice, tax
authorities usually prefer offsetting the forthcoming tax liability for
the next year rather than getting a check from state treasury;
Right to apply for deduction or exemption of tax payment due: the
application of this right is primarily for encouraging enterprise
taxpayers with foreign investment to keep after-tax profits in the same
local tax jurisdiction.
Right to apply for preservation measures upon tax payment or tax
enforcement: the implementation details of this right deserve
consideration because those details are scattered throughout the TCL
and the TCL Implementation Rules, and also because this right is not
specifically singled out for taxpayers to initiate. This right mostly
serves as part of the safe cradle to cure potential mistakes made by tax
authorities', if any;
Right to request State compensation (TCL Article 43): this right, back
in 200 I when firstly initiated, was not novel. It is derived from
China's State Compensation Law rather than a specific tax right;
Right to pursue liability for defaults in the tax law enforcement: this
right is stipulated in the Pursuit of Liability for Law Enforcement
Defaults in Tax Collection (Trial Implementation).

However,

conscious taxpayers would find a friendlier way to handle filthy
undertakings of tax officials, if any;
Right to request a hearing, appeal or make statements: (TCL Article
8): this right is nothing but an applicable split of the generalized right
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to appeal in the tax context under China's Administrative Penalty Law
(Article 6). Taxpayers are not different from other citizens in
employing this right;
Right to use the challenge system against some tax enforcement
personnel: this is another application of generalized procedural rights
based on the withdrawal system in the tax context;
Right to use a tax administrative reconsideration or review: this is an
application of generalized administrative procedural rights in the tax
context. But the Tax Collection Law stipulates a set of minimum
requirements for employing this right, such as the thresholds of
penalty, determination of the respondent tax authority, and specific
tax-wise procedures;
Right to initiate administrative proceedings: this right is also an
application of generalized right to institute administrative proceedings
in the tax context. Taxpayers are treated the same as regular
petitioners.
Right to claim reward for exposing tax evasion or illegal enforcement:
the value of this policy is dubious although it is supplemented by a set
of detailed notes in exercising this right.

As outlined above, taxpayers' rights stipulated in or advocated by the TCL and
relevant implementation details are less rich in than expected in reality. For
example, the right to request rewards for reporting tax violation is
counterproductive to the spirit of impartial administration and is a violation of
the principle oftransparency in administration. The economic logic underlying
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this measure is groundless as it takes the advantage of to-be-paid revenue as
an incentive. The TCL does not clarify the necessary qualifications of a
reporter, which in tum may arouse confusion or distrust in daily handlings.
Even assuming such a reward is sustainable, detailed rules on how to classify
contributions are available, it is unclear whether the reward should be
determined according to the amount of tax evasion, the social impact of the
case, the scale of the tax liability, or other criteria. More importantly, tax
authorities may abuse the information provided by anonymous reporters in
interfering repartee's business operation with a catch-all "economic crimes"
statement. The lack of implementing rules in this connection is also not in line
with the spirit of the deepening transparency as set out in the general
provisions ofthe TCL.
Three lessons can be derived the stipulation of taxpayers' rights under TCL.
First, some rights especially those associated with administrative procedures
are not particularly tailored for the tax context and are at best derived from
existing generalized rights available to citizens and reiterated in the tax
context. Second, a few important rights, even with implementation details,
need further procedural substantiation, such as the right to confidentiality, the
right to know, and right to request rewards for reporting tax evasions. Third,
limitations imposed on implementation of some rights may dishearten tax
authorities to cooperate rights claims initiated by taxpayers. For example, the
scheme and procedure to claim refund of overpaid tax usually take recourse of
offsetting rather than immediate bank transfer. Moreover, the right to claim a
reward for exposing tax evasion requires identification of the reporter, and this
practice subjects reporting individuals to revenge by suspected violators. To
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this end, the Tax Collection Law, although it makes advances in taxpayers'
rights protection, frustrates the ultimate purpose of giving qualified play of
taxpayers' rights protections.

3.3.2. The Proclamations of Taxpayers' Rights and Obligations

The most recent document on administrative taxpayers' rights is the
Proclamation on the Rights and Obligations of Taxpayers (hereinafter referred
to as "the Proclamation") released by the SAT in December 2009, which is
further decoded by the "Interpretation of Proclamation" published by the SAT
to celebrate the anniversary of releasing the Proclamation. 64 This move is
inspiringly informative, and without question this Proclamation mostly serves
to broaden tax bases and augment revenue collection, marginalizing the
dynamics between taxpayers and the tax laws as a side effect. It is the first
time that SAT has purposefully clarified and sorted out the scattered
provisions concerning the rights and obligations of taxpayers contained in a
number of different laws. In this sense, The Proclamation hardly can be
viewed as an expansion or enrichment of meaningful rights, rather, it only
represents a synopsis of the totality oftaxpayers' rights that already have been
prescribed in the TCL Implementation Details, the State Compensation Law,
China's Administrative Procedural Law, and relevant laws and administrative
regulations in taxation.
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3.3.2.1. Taxpayers' rights

The Proclamation and its official interpretation stipulate that taxpayers are
entitled to 14 rights in fulfilling tax liabilities (in the order as prescribed):

Rights to know: taxpayers have right to get informed of available tax
legislations and regulations that are directly applicable in the tax
context;
Rights of confidentiality: confidential information of taxpayers and
withholding agencies are subject to protection which is limited only to
legal information or data without interfering with legitimate
administrative investigation;
Rights to supervise tax law enforcement: this policy arms taxpayers to
report or expose illegal or inappropriate tax enforcement behaviors by
tax officials;
Right to choose suitable means of tax return filing upon prior
approvals in accordance with Article 30 of the TCL Implementation
Rules;
Right to request extensions in tax return filing;
Right to request extension for paying tax due;
Right to request refund of overpaid tax;
Right to enjoy tax preferential measures: usually those measures refer
to deductions, exemptions or other special tax treatments;
Right to engage representation of an agent (CPAs or attorneys) to
handle tax matters;
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Right to make statements and plead: this right empowers taxpayers to
make pleading or explanation in front of tax authorities before any
formal administrative procedures are taken;
Right to refuse investigation: If tax investigation certificate or notice
is not exhibited or presented, taxpayers may refuse to any form of
investigation of tax related matters such as searches of their enterprise
books, financial records or bank accounts.
Right to seek legal remedy: taxpayers are entitled to have accessible
and available resources to initiate administrative reconsideration, file
an administrative suit and claim State compensation iftheir legitimate
rights are infringed or violated.
Right to request a hearing: in the case where penalties are determined
by tax authorities, taxpayers may request a hearing on causes,
decision-making process and amount of penalty after receiving the
notice of penalty imposition;
Right to obtain receipt of tax payments made: taxpayers are entitled to
receive legal proof or receipt of tax payment made for corporate
booking, evidence for administrative reconsideration or claiming
credits for withheld taxes.

A careful comparison between the enumeration of taxpayers' rights stipulated
in the TCL and the Proclamation reveals a few appealing observations. First,
the Proclamation mostly summarizes and details stipulated taxpayers' rights
contained in various provisions relating to tax matters, but does not expand the
scope of the taxpayers protections. In this sense, the status quo of under-
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protected taxpayers' rights remains unaffected systematically. Secondly, the
Proclamation selectively attenuates or evades discussing a few taxpayers'
rights prescribed in the TCL, such as the right to challenge administrative
enforcement. Third, the Proclamation elaborates in detail regarding how to
realize taxpayers' administrative procedural rights, which is a pleasant sign for
commentators. However, the timing of the release of the Proclamation in
December 2009 makes it unclear whether it was promulgated for the sake of
taxpayers, as a part of the general administrative reform undergone during the
same period of time, or both. There has been a strong move to upgrade and
reform the administrative sector since early 2009.

65

Rights available for

taxpayers such as to challenge tax authorities or to monitor behaviors of tax
officials, after all, may signal a much stronger message of rectifying internal
management of tax authority itself but putting it in the name of protecting
taxpayers. If this speculation is validated, the underlying significance of the
provisions for taxpayers' protection by the SAT would be highly discounted.
Fourth, taxpayers' rights prescribed in the Proclamation and the Tax
Collection Law are still sketchy as compared with the Taxpayers' Manual in
the U.S. or the taxpayers' protection laws in Europe. Finally, the
"Interpretation of the Proclamation" contains a number of case analyses to
introduce the rights available to taxpayers. However, those case illustrations
appear to create a misunderstanding that taxpayers' rights are confined to
those illustrated only, and this limitation fails to resolve the shortage of
implementation guidelines in a systematic manner.

65

See Zou Keyuan, Administrative Reform and Rule of Law in China, discussing the
administrative Jaw reform in China after the WTO accession,
http://rauli.cbs.dk/index. php/ cj as/article/viewDownloadlnterstitial/814/829 (last visited on
March 15, 2011)
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3.3.2.2. Taxpayers' obligations

In line with taxpayers' duty to pay tax due as stipulated in China's
Constitution, the Proclamation, not surprisingly, stipulates 10 obligations that
taxpayers have to earnestly fulfill as a condition to enjoy stipulated rights.
They include (listed in the order they are prescribed):

obligation of fulfilling registration as a taxpayer: this obligation
obviously targets enterprise taxpayers that are reluctant to file
registration in a timely manner;
obligation of establishing, and safekeeping of account books and
relevant

documents

and

issuing,

employing,

acquiring

and

safekeeping invoices: this obligation is quite a challenge to smallsized enterprises or private enterprises that have less needs to establish
a fantasized full-bodies corporate accounting practice;
obligation of adopting financial accounting rules and accounting
software: this requirement, similarly, lacks general applicability to
small-sized or private enterprises in terms of operational scale and
financial capacity;
Obligation of installing and utilizing tax control devices (software):
the author submits that this obligation represents a central, and
surprisingly harsh reason behind the Proclamation. This obligation is
the center and basis for eliminating tax evasion and enjoying available
taxpayers' rights;
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obligation of declaring tax liabilities timely and faithfully;
obligation of paying taxes in a timely manner;
Obligation of withholding and collecting tax on an agent basis: this
obligation invites a mutual monitoring scheme among taxpayers and is
a direct undertaking by tax authorities to expand their administrative
jurisdiction.
obligation of accepting tax investigations;
Obligation of providing information in a timely manner: this
obligation looks quite straightforward but embodies a set of problems.
First, the scope of the information is not defined and this gives tax
authorities uncontrolled discretion in setting the boundaries of the
information; Second, the type of information in the "Interpretation of
Proclamation" provides unclear guidelines for application; Third, the
wording "in a timely manner" confuses taxpayers;
Obligations of reporting other tax-related information: a few concerns
arise with regard to this obligation. First, the scope of tax-related
information as prescribed is too broad and even includes certain
confidential information such as trade secrets or individual data that
are not appropriate to disclose such as merger and acquisition details,
secured transactions and bankruptcy. In this sense, the balance of
exercising the right to confidentiality and this obligation is hard to
achieve. Second, tax authorities' usage of tax-related information is
not subject to control and monitoring by taxpayers. The management
of information might be of concerns to taxpayers. Finally, looking at
the illustration in the "Interpretation of the Proclamation," even if
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certain tax-related information provided to tax authorities is sensitive
enough from the point of view of taxation, tax authorities may have
limited discretion to transfer such information to other non-tax
authorities.

As summarized above, significant obligatory requirements for Chinese
taxpayers and narrowly-interpreted rights are present in the same document,
but show different rule-making rationales. First, obligations stipulated in the
Proclamation are calculated and over-expansive. They are likely to hamper the
compliance of taxpayers, who view them as cost-inefficient burdens rather
than reasonable duties. Second, taxpayers' obligations mostly were described
in general terms until the Proclamation detailed them. The effect of stipulating
those obligations may inhibit the ongoing process of rapprochement between
Chinese taxpayers and administrators. Third, certain obligations are not
applicable to all taxpayers, rather, they are derived from particularistic
administrative deficiencies that are not generalizable throughout China or
across taxpayer groups. For instance, the behaviors of enterprise taxpayers are
constrained while less discussion is given to individual taxpayers. Indeed
many of these measures are procedural and have been articulated elsewhere,
making their specific adaptation to the tax context here redundant. Finally,
taxpayers' obligations by themselves are limited to the tax context, therefore,
how taxpayers may fulfill the obligations is in large part based on tax
authorities' discretion. If the obligation is concerned with tax officials, the
value of accepting the obligation is not guaranteed. Taking the obligation to
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accept investigation as an example, taxpayers may find it difficult to protect
their rights while submitting to the overbearing requirements of tax officials.

3.3.2.3. Summary

The merits ofthe Proclamation cannot be understated. It facilitates taxpayers'
apprehension of rights in paying tax liabilities, facilitating their capability to
protect their own interests. It further notifies taxpayers of corresponding
obligations to comply with relevant tax procedures and payment obligations,
facilitating and incentivizing full compliance in the system. It also helps to
standardize tax administration, administrative enforcement, and a serviceoriented culture to enhance the dynamics between taxpayers and the tax laws.
However, the Proclamation frustrates taxpayers in many respects as well.
First, the legislative status and enforceability of the Proclamation is a concern.
It is only an administrative document released by the SAT, not in a regular

form of regulation, ruling, or notice which has interpretative authority in tax
administration. In this sense, the Proclamation serves as an explanation or a
report, and is not enforceable itself. Second, the burden brought by stipulated
obligations is too overwhelming to taxpayers. Third, the Proclamation
stipulates many obligations that are associated with operation of tax
authorities. However, such operational details are not available to taxpayers
and thus subject to manipulative interpretation by tax authorities. Fourth, the
Proclamation is drafted with an unbalanced initiative, putting too much focus
on enterprise taxpayers, substantive details, administration, and less focus on
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meaningful rules as to individual taxpayers, procedural requirements,
adjudication, and tax audits.

3.3.3. Other tax-related laws and regulations

Secondary taxpayers' rights are also found in many other tax-related laws and
regulations. In particular, better-prescribed individual rights are offered in the
Individual Income Tax Law and its implementation regulations. A major
hotspot oftax reform in China is how to promote supervision of individual tax
filing and withholding for those taxpayers with higher annual income. Without
a doubt, the reform of individual taxpayers' rights deserves more attention to
watch. The Golden Taxation Project guidelines on computerization of
enterprise tax and indirect tax filing provide detailed rights related to tax audit,
record keeping and corporate booking. Centrally-owned SOEs usually may
have privileges in negotiating with tax authorities on specific filing procedures
and audit routines. It is repeatedly important to mention the undergoing reform
of administrative law system in which many procedural rights of taxpayers are
embedded. For instance, the State Compensation Law outlines procedures and
requirements for claiming tax authorities' liability. The administrative
reconsideration procedures are also under revision. Meanwhile, various
notices and rulings have been released on compliance of taxpayer's
obligations as well.

478

3.4. Summary

This subchapter explores the classification of rights in the hope to analyze the
Chinese taxpayers' rights system: primary legal rights, secondary legal rights,
administrative rights and the principles of good conduct of tax authorities.
Those rights are offered in a variety of tax-related laws and regulations.
Paradoxically, taxpayers' rights are expanding simultaneously with the
expanding economy scale and a larger tax enforcement force. Following the
positivist rule of recognition, both legislative and administrative rights should
be available for the protection of taxpayers.
The discussion of Chinese taxpayers' rights shows the necessity to identify
each category oftaxpayers' rights with enough details. Chinese tax authorities
should feel the insufficiency of setting up a hasty comprehensive framework
of tax without considering taxpayers' rights and obligations. The connection
between the general administrative law framework and the tax law context
should be better defined to determine whether an application of specific
provisions in the tax context is appropriate or not. This comprehensive
approach should include both legal and administrative rights, looking
extensively at all factors that may affect taxpayers.
Taxpayers' rights deal with dynamics between taxpayers and the operation of
the tax laws. Chinese taxpayers' rights, in this connection, are limited by the
inherent deficiency of the general tax framework. This is particularly
evidenced by the discrepancy in the internal management of tax authorities.
Moreover, because secondary legal rights, administrative rights and the
principles of good conduct of tax authorities are put altogether in the Tax
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Collection Law and the Proclamation, the protection of each right is not
guaranteed with enough singularity and attention, and the divorce among those
rules should be surfaced.

IV.

Supranational Taxpayers' Rights for the Rule of Law
construct

In line with the supranational undertaking for the protection of basic human
rights, taxpayers' rights have evolved with similar goals and compose part of
the global convergence of legal rules. Chinese taxpayers' rights protection, in
the context of the rule of law construct, has striven to incorporate both
supranational influences and rule of law elements. The scope of the term
"supranational," for the purposes of this thesis includes: (1) international
treaties that China has given direct domestic enforceability; and (2) obligations
the Chinese government has transplanted into its domestic legal system by
way of legislation and adjudication. The recognition of taxpayers' rights, in
this sense, embodies basic elements of the rule of law and the WTO principles
that the Chinese government has striven to uphold.

4.1. Taxpayers' rights protection from the rule oflaw construct

Returning to the debate of the contested conception of the rule of law, primary
legal rights are fundamental to the operation of the legal system in general,
and can be customized to the tax context in particular. There are three basic
questions central to the definition of the rule of law and its requirements for
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China's tax law reform. First, what is a valid rule? Answers to this question
must consider the principle of legality and basic elements required for the
validity of a rule. Second, what is a good rule? This question implicates
notions of morality, and presumes an established social and legal order. How
should we enforce valid, meaningful, good rules. Answers to this question
have included notions of democracy and a limited government. Primary
taxpayers' rights, in this connection, should be interpreted on the basis of the
makings of valid rules incorporating basic elements; and secondary rights,
should be set up and built in the legislative and administrative framework to
employ better implementation of tax laws, both substantive and procedural.
The validity of rules elaborating taxpayers' rights is measured according to the
same jurisprudential rationale as rights protection in other areas of the law.
Dicey elaborated three characteristics of the "the rule or supremacy of law":
absence of arbitrary power on the part of government; ordinary law
administered by ordinary tribunals; and general rules of constitutional law
resulting from the ordinary law of the land. 66 In this connection, Dicey's
thoughts are germane to the design and making of taxpayers' rights.
Taxpayer's rights presume the absence of interference from the arbitrary
power of tax authorities. Taxpayers' rights should fit into the general
administrative and judicial procedures. Most importantly, primary taxpayers'
rights implicating the principles of legality are part of the constitutional law.
Taking Dicey's thoughts further, Lon Fuller's instrumental conception of the
rule of law advocates an adaptation of details and interpretations for
taxpayers' rights. To realize the "inner morality of law", taxpayers' rights
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See A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 179-92 (1908)
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without a doubt demand a relative certainty and uniformity in their
application, regular and impartial administration, 67 whereby the tax system is
hopefully regarded as "the product of a sustained purposive effort" fulfilling
certain moral qualities

68

•

To this extent, the tax legislature and administrative

authorities may use the institutions of tax laws and the method adopting the
enforcement of taxpayer' rights as an instrument of tax policy in terms of
separation or dynamics between the tax laws and taxpayers. For instance,
Fuller outlined eight elements whereby to measure the rule of law, which
include "the inner morality" that makes taxpayers rights protection meaningful
and practical: generality; notice or publicity; prospectivity; clarity; consistency
or non-contradictoriness; conformability; stability; and congruence. 69
Failures to adhere to Fuller's elements would render the tax laws incomplete
thus constrain the protection of taxpayers' rights futile. Translating those
elements into the tax laws would formulate a better reference to the rules of
Chinese taxpayers' rights protection. For instance, taxpayers' rights under the
rule of law order should incorporate the following the rights at minimum.
Tax must be imposed by law (taxpayer's rights following the principle
of legality)
Tax law must be published (taxpayer's right to know)
Tax law must not be retroactive (the tax consequence of a transaction
is legally predictable in the Chinese tax laws)
Taw law must be applicable, fair, certain, understandable, and noncontradictory (taxpayers' right to know the certainty, transparency,
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clarity and details of the tax laws , and taxpayers are able to obey the
Chinese tax-related laws and regulations);
Tax law must be consistent (the change, reform, or upgrade of
Chinese tax laws and regulations must not undermine prescribed
taxpayers' rights)
Taxpayers must not pay more than the correct amount of tax or be
subject to double taxation (tax laws must be certain and transparent
based on the principle of proportionality)
Taxpayers should be treated equally (tax laws must be fair, nondiscriminatory and equitable in treating all types of taxpayers
irrespective of source of capital, ownership and or wealth of an
individual)
Taxpayers should have rights to access of information, privacy,
secrecy, and confidentiality (tax laws must be fair in promoting
economic activities)
Taxpayers should have access to procedural protections and redress
from judicial tribunals (tax laws should be fair to realize procedural
rights and justice):
o An independent tribunal (either administrative or judicial)
o A fair and public hearing to a tax case and promulgation of tax
laws;
o

A fair trial

o Right of representation by a qualified agent, CPA or attorney
o Receiving judgment in a timely manner
o Right to appeal and plead

483

o Right to administrative remedies or State Compensation

Returning to a jurisprudential analysis based on a rule of law order, taxpayers'
primary and secondary rights should be contained in various provisions with
procedural protections. Each right, if established, should be supported by
subsidiary rules, administrative enforcement, and judicial protections. Chinese
taxpayers, given the guarantee of a rule of law system, should enjoy these
supports. In this connection, Chinese legislative, judicial and administrative
authorities should theme taxpayers' rights in a fair, transparent, certain,
consistent, equitable, effective, and clear protection within the framework of
the tax laws.

4.2. Supranational taxpayers' rights

Taxpayers' rights are not exclusively derived from taxpayer's home
jurisdiction. Signatory states are obligated to translate rules and principles
from international treaties including trade treaties and human rights treaties to
their domestic legal and administrative systems. Meanwhile, taxpayers may
invoke the rules and precedents from treaties directly in safeguarding their
interests without bothering with transplanted rules, but to which extent a
domestic court interprets, accepts, and applies such rules and is an issue of
whether the treaty is self-executing. For example, the Constitution of the
United States may possibly incorporate a ratified treaty into its domestic legal
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system. Some other common law systems may require an enabling process
either through legislation or case interpretation to complete such ratification70 •
In connection with taxpayers' rights, multilateral trading regimes of which
China is a member state, in particular, the WTO, should compose a major
forum to advance the protection of taxpayers. There are three ways in which
taxpayers may seek to use this pressure. First, they may appeal to the language
of international human rights treaties, to which China is a signatory country.
Second, they may look to multilateral or bilateral tax treaties that China has
contracted. Finally, they might consult international and multilateral trading
regimes, of which China is a member state, such as the WTO. As there is not
an international comprehensive framework of tax law or taxpayers' rights
protections, 71 taxpayers may have to selectively combine these approaches to
maximize their protection.

4.2.1. Inference from human rights treaties

As to taxpayers' rights protection based on human rights treaties or
conventions, this pursuit is very immature given China's general framework of
human rights protection. True, the conception of taxpayers' rights attaches to
and presumes a basic framework of human rights including individual
property rights. But, China's legal order or political promise has not matured
to an extent of fully recognizing or accepting universally accepted human
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rights and values. This awkward situation renders taxpayers' rights without
legal foundation. From a jurisprudential perspective, taxpayers' rights are
generally considered separate from the framework of human rights protection,
because taxpayers' rights demand a fair and consistent procedural protection
while human rights are compounded with variably changing interpretation and
acceptance.

4.2.2. Limited protection from tax treaties

Bilateral or multilateral tax treaties might in theory have a profound impact on
the realization of taxpayers' rights, but in practice they focus almost
exclusively on double taxation avoidance and international cooperation to
circumvent tax evasion between countries. In this sense, the pragmatic value
of bilateral or multilateral tax treaties is constrained by their focus and
legislative intent. Normatively, tax treaties are designed to safeguard state
interests in maintaining a stable tax base. Although in fact certain benefits are
stipulated in tax treaties for taxpayers, such protection conforms more to the
practice of cross-border cooperation but does not substantiate an architecture
for taxpayers' rights. To a large extent, tax treaties provide a framework for
tax laws to be fair and effective, not for substantiating too many detailed
privileges. To this end, bilateral tax treaties or multilateral tax arrangements
are one-sided mechanisms for managing the international extension of
taxpayers' rights.

4.2.3. Impacts from the WTO on taxpayers' protection
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Returning to the WTO principles, taxpayers of signatory states may be pleased
by a cautious expansion of rights in trading and transactional activities, which
compose the mainstream basis of taxpayers' right claims. Given the limited
impact of international human rights treaties and bilateral tax agreements,
China's substantial incorporation of principles prerequisite to WTO
membership, such as transparency, uniformity and impartiality and judicial
review, has significantly increased the protection oftaxpayers' rights in accord

with international standards.
First, the concept of transparency is central to the WTO agreements as well as
to the construction of the rule of law. The transparency commitment in
China's Protocol is substantive. The adaption of transparency principles
encompasses almost all aspects of taxpayers' rights protection. For primary
taxpayers' rights governing the relationship between taxpayers and the state,
transparency in general requires that all laws must be published and applied,
and taxpayers have legitimate access to courts. Taxpayers' rights in this sense
should be accessible, and be consistently found in primary legal sources as the
Constitution and charters. Such primary rights should be guaranteed by
independent and impartial tribunals, available public hearings, fair trials, and
rights to representation.
Secondary taxpayers' rights, in conjunction with the principle of transparency,
are more important in terms of establishing a complete set of substantive rules,
but they are expressed differently from primary rights. Secondary taxpayers'
rights should advocate taxpayers' rights with more precision, clarity, and
enforceability in terms of their promulgation and application. Taxpayers
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should be able to predict the tax consequence of specific trading and
transactional activities. To this end, the tax laws should not be imposed
retroactively. On the other hand, to fulfill the transparency requirement,
taxpayers are entitled the right to privacy, confidentiality, and secrecy in
themselves and, at the same time, access to information about laws and
regulations.
The transparency principle for taxpayers' rights is evident in efforts to comply
with the national treatment provisions under the WTO. Specifically tax rules
should not discriminate, and there should be equality before tax laws.
According to national treatment provisions, China is required only to provide
foreign taxpayers "no less favorable" treatment than those offered to domestic
interests. Foreign enterprises have legitimate grounds to request nondiscriminatory treatment as a taxpayer, and to anticipate in advance the
consequence in terms of frustrating local protectionism.
Second, the WTO principle ofuniformity and impartiality in administration is
particularly decisive to the protection of Chinese taxpayers' rights. China
agreed in the Protocol to apply and administer all laws, regulations, and other
measures in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner. Actually, a major
challenge confronting China's protection of taxpayers centers on enforcement
of the tax laws, which presumes impartial tax authorities and qualified tax
officials staff with clear lines of authority and the capacity to submit neutral
decisions on taxpayers' pursuits. In reality, uniformity in the substance and
application of the tax laws relies heavily on the commitment and fortitude of
tax authorities.
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The concern of uniformity and impartiality in tax administration has plagued
Chinese tax authorities in many ways. Unprofessional or inappropriate tax
enforcement tops this list. Taxpayers often are quite frustrated by unexpected
enforcement or tax audits conducted by tax officials, especially where those
activities impose harassment or interference with daily operation. Similarly,
the irregular quality of services provided by tax authorities creates further
frustration. In coastal or otherwise more developed economic areas, this
discomfort is not evident. However, in emergent economic regions and
hinterland areas, requesting legitimate tax services often proves to be an ordeal.
Taxpayers are therefore disincentivized to deal with tax authorities. Another
common affliction in Chinese tax administration is corruption, which
manifests in many ways such as holdup tax collection of closely-related
taxpayers, delaying in replying individual tax service request, setting up
barriers in tax filing and soliciting bribes.
A highlighted problem for the uniformity and impartiality in taxpayer's
protection centers on administrative procedural compliance. According to the
TCL and procedural rights prescribed in generally applicable Administrative
Procedure Law and Administrative Reconsideration Law, taxpayers are
concerned with how to effectively file an administrative claim within the tax
framework, which is a prerequisite to file an administrative lawsuit. Although
current laws offer public hearings, the right to representation, and the rights to
a timely judgment and pleading, taxpayers are insecure about whether their
reasonable claims will result in just rewards or simple vengeance from the tax
authority on the ground that they are troublemakers. Meanwhile, taxpayers are
required to pay the full amount of tax payment, whether correct or not, before
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they can file an administrative claim. In this sense, the stake of fulfilling
administrative rights for Chinese taxpayers is too high, and the limitation on
discretionary judgment by tax authorities is too low.
Third, China's Accession Protocol to the WTO mandates the establishment of
tribunals, contact points, and procedures for the prompt review of all
administrative actions relating to the implementation of the laws, regulations,
judicial decisions, and administrative rulings of general application referred to
in the WTO rules. As the judicial review principle under the WTO applies to
taxpayers' rights protection, a Chinese court hearing tax cases or taxpayers'
requests must be independent of Chinese tax authorities and shall not have any
substantial interest in the outcome of the tax matters. Tribunals hearing
taxpayers' rights claims may be administrative or judicial, however, the right
to appeal must be granted if taxpayers originally submit the case for an
administrative review following due process.
Tax laws in China formally offer a comprehensive set of measures for
administrative and judicial review available to taxpayers. Taxpayers, as
citizens, are able to enforce their legitimate rights in challenging
administrative decisions, including those made by tax authorities. Chinese
taxpayers mostly are able to file administrative lawsuits only against
administrative decisions. Two concerns are worthy of attention in this regard.
First, there is a concern that tax administrative lawsuits are procedurally
flawed and subject to more general problems with administrative and judicial
trials in general, such as administrative reconsideration procedures and
petitioners' rights in administrative lawsuits. The other problem is specific to
the tax context where taxpayers are positioned in a particular position: the
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dilemma of revenue contribution of taxpayers and the limitation on tax
administrations.
A reading of the Proclamation reveals that taxpayers are not fully aware the
means to seek legal remedies or those rights associated therewith. Here, a
discrepancy between the awareness as a taxpayer and awareness of effective
taxpayers' right protection involves. This divergence manifests both the
weakness of legal protections of taxpayers' rights through judicial review and
a deeper concern about taxpayers' ignorance of their protections in this regard.
Judicial review of tax administrative decisions in this way may be little more
than a propaganda mechanism to safeguard the authority of tax administration
rather than promotion of taxpayers' rights. Regarding China's judicial review,
The WTO principle of judicial review, in its focus on regularity and the use of
mechanisms such as precedent requires a movement away from the current
state of affairs in which administrative and judicial reasoning and decisionmaking is inconsistent and poorly reasoned across jurisdictions.

4.2.4. A proposal from tax administration's perspective

Returning to the structure of taxpayers' rights, a jurisprudential analysis based
on requirements of the rule of law order and WTO principles would help this
thesis to submit a sensible proposal for an improvable awareness of protection
for Chinese taxpayers. Outlined below is a summary of surveyed taxpayers'
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rights from local tax administration perspective, m the order of their
anticipated practical value: 72

Notice: taxpayers should have the right to be informed of a tax

assessment, a decision on adjudicated payment due. 73 Tax payment
amount is the foremost concern for Chinese taxpayers, a better
knowledge of such amount will help taxpayers evaluate which remedy
they may prefer, or just make the payment as a cost-efficient
calculation;
Explanation: Chinese taxpayers in general are rational individuals and

enterprises with good standings. An assessment, therefore, should be
substantiated by a reasonable, timely and accommodating explanations
made by tax authorities or courts. Such explanation is expected to be
delivered in a friendly way under a professional setting;
Rational audits: investigation or audits by tax authorities are not

averted by Chinese taxpayers in general. However, such audits should
not interfere with ordinary financial order of an enterprise taxpayer,
and tax officials should not harass taxpayers with unfounded informal
or random audits that impede operation of taxpayers;

72

This order is a summary of interviews conducted by the author from 2005 to 2008. The
author presents this order as a proposal of practical value and an outcome ofhis long-stretched
attention in Chinese taxpayers' rights. The interviewees are 12 experienced tax collection
officials working on first-front tax services from 12 local I municipal tax authorities across
China: Eastern China (Shanghai (2 branches: Puxi and Waigaoqiao), Southern China
(Shenzhen (2 branches: Luohu and Nanshan)), Guangzhou, and Hangzhou), Northern China
(Beijing (2 branches: Chaoyang and Haidian) and Ji'nan), Western China (Chengdu), and
Central China (Zhengzhou (2 branches: Jinshui and EDZ). Interview notes are on file with the
author for reference
73
See I.R.C. §633l(d)(3) for a similar but more detailed description applicable to US
taxpayers
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Hearing and recording: Chinese taxpayers are entitled to hold a

hearing in front of tax authorities from which they can present
evidence or explanation of specific tax behaviors. In this sense, an
effective interaction between taxpayers and tax officials is appreciated
before reaching adjudication. Tax authorities should honor a request
for a hearing in a professional and considerate way. Meanwhile,
taxpayers should be firmly entitled to receive a record of meeting
minutes and hearing deposition as the basis for their understanding or
evidence for any prospective lawsuits;
Confidentiality: Chinese taxpayers are sensitive about their reputation

and trading or business secrets. Tax authorities should prioritize
protection of taxpayers' confidential business information without
sacrificing a reasonable investigation;
Discovery: Chinese taxpayers expect to be more active and voluntary

in seeking and understanding evidence that tax authorities will employ
in adjudicating their cases. A clear perception of the government's
substantiation in adjudicating somehow predicts possible attitudes or
behaviors that taxpayers may initiate- acceptance, aversion, or appeal;
Appeal: Chinese taxpayers dislike filing appeals, because they want to

maintain a friendly, professional or mutually beneficial relationship
with tax authorities and appeal in nature is not cost-efficient. True, a
comprehensive set of administrative lawsuit procedures are available to
them in China, but appeal is the last resort that taxpayers want to
pursue. Taxpayers hope to maintain an orderly operation but dislike
any appeal that may interfere with their well-being;
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Counsel: Chinese taxpayers are risk-averse but profit-driven. Even

they prefer professional counseling or representation from CPAs,
attorneys, or other qualified agents, as they are not typically in a
position to recognize and exploit benefits through such representation
unless they have to. It is an unwritten rule in China that many retired
tax officials or closely-related friends/relatives of tax officials take
advantage of such representation. The taxpayer as a rational actor has
the pressure to save representation charges and litigation costs.
Fair trials: if cases develop into administrative lawsuits against tax

authorities, what the taxpayer will want most is a fair trial with a
timely delivered decision and transparency. Because this is the last
resort taxpayers may rely on, any discrepancy that hurts taxpayers'
confidence in China's judicial system is usually magnified. If this
frustration is set up or spread, at the end of day, the overall local
economic setting is the most regrettable victim at least.

Although the taxpayers' rights outlined above are derived from the angle of
reforms to be implemented by the tax authorities, they are reasonable and
practical. First, tax authorities believe that these rights are what taxpayers
want in daily operation, and that taxpayers are more likely to honor their
responsibility to cooperate in a system that affords them those protections.
Second, tax authorities, especially those first-front tax officials, believe that
they can implement those rights in a professional and enforceable way.
Therefore, the dynamics for a mutually beneficial interaction between
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taxpayers and tax authorities can be largely achieved through the
implementation of taxpayers' protections in tax laws.
To further substantiate the merits of the outlines above, two examples are
informative. First, the right to applying for relief under the TCL upon tax
payment preservation measures is open to discussion. It is possible that if tax
authorities adopt tax payment preservation measure prior to the scheduled tax
payment period where a taxpayer engaged in production or business operation
is not involved in an act of tax evasion. Meanwhile, there is no detailed
implemental guideline on how tax authorities could employ this measure.
Transparency is severely needed to execute this measure.
Second, the right to pursue liability for acts committed in the process of law
enforcement by tax authorities also offers an interesting question. The Pursuit
of Liability for Law Enforcement Defaults in Tax Collection Procedures (!'rial
Implementation), promulgated by the SAT provides that taxpayers have the

right to pursue liability for defaults by tax officers in law enforcement. This
measure is more than welcome. However, the problem of lacking detailed
implementing rules arises. In theory this right looks substantial and
sophisticated, but in practice it is virtually a dead letter as so few details exist
in law to facilitate and guided its application. As a result, this right is neither
appreciated by taxpayers nor realistically assists tax officials in remedying
their wrongful enforcement handlings.
Beyond proposed rights, the construct of the rule of law order and acceptance
of the WTO principles direct China's taxpayers' rights protection to
embracing basic rights consciousness and assimilating international routines.
The influence, substantively and procedurally, is palpable in terms of China's
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reforms to promote a service-oriented tax administration and well-grounded
judicial review establishment. For example, Fuller's instrumental conception
of the rule of law provides comprehensive theoretical support for designing
the scope and details of taxpayers' rights. With this theoretical framework in
mind, Chinese legislative, judicial and administrative authorities should
establish taxpayers' rights in the form offair, transparent, certain, consistent,
equitable, effective, and clear protections within the framework of the tax laws.

Meanwhile, WTO principles attach international force in shaping and
rectifying the administration and adjudication of Chinese taxpayers' rights.
Protection measures honoring transparency, uniformity and impartiality and
judicial review principles embody a full set of details and practical guidelines.

For example, the uniformity and impartiality in tax administration, if broadly
realized, would even advance protection of taxpayers' rights. A well
functioning judicial review mechanism might also root out preventable
taxpayers' lawsuits. Moreover, since foreign enterprise taxpayers expect to
receive qualified tax services and non-discriminatory treatment from Chinese
tax authorities as a baseline, this influence also enjoys far-reaching spill-over
benefits to domestic enterprise and individual taxpayers. Therefore, a key
contribution credited to the WTO principles is the growing appreciation of
taxpayers by tax authorities. Such a respect from administrative organs is not
common in China and has high realistic value.
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V.

Concluding remarks

The discussion of this Chapter has two prongs. First, it contributes a review of
the status quo of China's taxpayer's rights framework. In this connection,
taxpayers' rights are based on a dynamic interaction between the State, the tax
system, and taxpayers. Second, it examines China's mechanisms for enforcing
taxpayers' rights under the rule of law conception and WTO principles and
proposes reform proposals74 thereafter.
This Chapter contributes an analysis that the concept and protection of
taxpayers' rights presumes a generalized enabling framework of human rights.
At the same time, approaching human rights through the lens of taxpayers'
rights supports a focus on fairness in social policy orientations, and considers
efficiency in evaluating social policy by considering the potential obligation
against taxpayers. Ultimately, human rights protections might be better served
if a set of taxpayers' rights tended to uphold a professional institutional order
that balances state interests and taxpayers' necessities. In this connection, the
situation of China's taxpayers is awkward: the human rights framework is not
fully incorporated in China's legal system, and the tax law system itself is in
the nascent stages of its development.
Furthermore, China has a legitimate need to develop a set of rules for
establishing and protecting taxpayers' rights, the awareness of which
facilitates economic, behavioral, and social policy implementation. An
examination of the primary and secondary taxpayers' rights in China reveals
that almost all deficiencies and drawbacks of human rights protection and the

74

See supra Section 4.2.4. of this chapter
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tax laws system fall under the taxpayers' rights category. This discovery is not
surprising. The constitutional fortification of primary taxpayers' rights is weak
due to an absence of the term "taxpayers' rights," but also, and to a much
greater extent because of a discontentedly misunderstanding of how to situate
taxpayers to claim or articulate their primary legal rights. Secondary
taxpayers' rights are supposed to be enriched with enough clear-cut rules in
detailing taxpayers' administrative and legislative rights, while China's
current framework fails contributing those details, rather, somehow it
misidentifies the roles played by administrative primary rights and secondary
legal rights. The result is that an amalgamation of laws, rulings, and notices is
displayed out-of-order, and there lacks a systematic certainty of the intended
system for the protection of taxpayer's rights. Although the TCL, the
Proclamation, and other relevant administrative procedural laws facilitate, to
some extent, in clarifying and expanding rights available to taxpayers at the
first glance, those stipulated rights remain short of jurisprudential significance
and practical value, showing the necessity to identify each category of
taxpayers' rights with enough details.
Being mindful of deficiency in taxpayers' rights protection in China, it is
excessive to understate or neglect the progress and merits as to rights
protection regime in China's tax context. Overall, China's tax system still
provides a formulated, yet promising, framework to channel available legal
remedies, both administrative and judicial, for taxpayers. From the TCL and
the Proclamation, continuous efforts and attention are paid by China's tax
authorities to advancing taxpayers' awareness and recognition of their rights.
In particular, the administrative lawsuits filed by taxpayers attain more
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respects and identification, although such awareness is discounted by the
"non-contentious" or "settlement-preferred" culture in China. This chapter
also acknowledges the frustration due to the paucity of resources in
modulating related research, since many questions of this topic left
unaddressed in full extent or some questions are just not answerable given
current development stage of the tax legislation reform.
Meanwhile, the protection of taxpayers' rights is a key element substantiating
China's construct of the rule of law order and fulfillment of WTO principles.
Chinese taxpayers' rights should be written and applied in a fair, transparent,

certain, consistent, equitable, effective, and clear manner within the
framework of the tax laws.

Meanwhile, the WTO principles inject

international market standards and vitality into the process of designing and
implementing Chinese taxpayers' rights in terms of administration and
adjudication. China's tax laws should embody and honor the transparency,

uniformity and impartiality and judicial review principles that are at the heart
of their WTO commitments.
Last but not least, having examined deficiencies, based on the positivist view
in jurisprudence for taxpayers per se, the construct of the rule of law order and
the WTO principles, this thesis submits a summary proposal for improving
China's taxpayers' rights protection. This proposal should attempts to balance
theoretical goals and practical significance, and largely is underpinned by
considerations from both tax authorities' and taxpayers' perspectives. In this
sense, it is not a reordering or rearrangement of existing prescribed rights,
rather, it is submitted as reflective of and applicable to daily practice.
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Chapter VIII

Tax Treatments of Nonprofit Organizations -A Comparative Study

I.

Introduction

This chapter contributes a comparative study of the tax treatments for the
nonprofit sector in the U.S. and China for three reasons. First, the development
of China's nonprofit sector 1 has been tremendous in the past two decades, but
few comprehensive studies have been initiated on reforming China's nonprofit
tax system - the crucial component that binds nonprofit sector as a partner of
the state. Echoing China's success in economic growth in the past decades,
literature on Chinese tax typically focuses on tax incentives for foreign direct
investment and tax policies catering to economic development. Second,
collaterally, the rule of law development in the past decade has motivated new
scholarship regarding the modernizing of China's charity sector with an "all-in"
charity code 2 or cultivating expansive grassroots NGOs. These idealistic

1

See generally, Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector", 41 Viii. L.
Rev. 433-440 (1996), discussing that the third sector often uses the terms "charity" and
"nonprofit" interchangeably; see also generally D.B. Reobertson Should Churches be Taxes?
40-68 and Chapters II, Ill and IV(1968). The same problem exists in the limited research as to
the definition or literal description of"cishan" or "gongyi", i.e., "charity" in China
2
See generally "China's Draft Charity Law is in shape"
http://www.chinacom.cn/news/gongyi/20 10-08/02/content_20620246_ 2.htm (last visited on
March 15, 2011)
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studies, however, suffer from a lack of focus on the tax treatment for the
nonprofit sector and a consequently unrealistic understanding of the legal and
political settings in which Chinese NGOs operate. Third, this analysis has
commercial implications. China's integration into the WTO and the global
trade system has been met with complaints about national treatment and fair
competition from both foreign and domestic enterprises. A key issue arising is
the gradual downplaying and elimination of preferential tax treatment of
foreign investment in China. 3 However, there is no materially meaningful tax
law regarding the nascent NGO sector. No thought has been given to the
economic and fiscal potential ofNGOs as foreign investment vehicles. Aiming
to address concerns above through a comparative study, 4 this chapter proceeds
cautiously along two distinct tracks.

3

See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis
of the Welfare State, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573 (2000), presenting the relationship between tax
incentives and revenue; Professor Avi-Yonah examines the increased use of tax incentives as
weapons in the international competition to attract investment. Professor Avi-Yonah argues
that the establishment of tax havens allows large amounts of capital to go untaxed, depriving
both developed and developing countries of revenue and forcing them to rely on forms of
taxation less progressive than the income tax. Professor A vi-Yonah contends that both
economic efficiency and equity among individuals and among nations support limits on
international tax competition, and he presents a proposal that accommodates the competing
concern for democratic states' ability to set their tax rates independently. He proposes the
coordinated imposition of withholding taxes on international portfolio investment, with the
goal of ensuring that all income may be taxed in the investor's home jurisdiction. Professor
Avi-Yonah also proposes that multinational corporations be taxed initially in the jurisdictions
where their goods and services are consumed. Professor A vi-Yonah outlines that, both
developed and developing nations would be able to preserve the progressivity of the income
tax and to broaden and stabilize their tax bases in time to stave off the fiscal threat to the
welfare state
4
The literature on comparative tax and federalism is voluminous. See Reuven Avi-Yonah,
Preface to Comparative Fiscal Federalism: Comparing the European Court of Justice and the
US Supreme Court's Tax Jurisprudence, by R.S. Avi-Yonah, J. R. Hines Jr. and M. Lang, coeditors, xvii-xviii. EUCOT AX Series on European Taxation, 14. Alphen aan den Rijn (The
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2007); Michael A. Livingston, From Milan to
Mumbai, Changing in Tel Aviv: Reflections on Progressive Taxation and "Progressive··
Politics in a Globalized but Still Local World, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 555 (2006), Professor
Livingston is one of the topmost contributors of the comparative tax literature and has
conducted extensive research; see also Victor Thuronyi, Comparative Tax Law, (Kluwer Law
International (2004)) for a detailed account of comparative tax methodologies and comparison
oftax systems of over 20 countries
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First, modern tax studies are debated predominantly in Western terms such as

progressivity, equity and efficiency, but the scarcity of decent comparative
legal tax scholarship fails to generate a "lively debate on comparative tax
works and their methodologies," 5 in general. Meanwhile, "a shortage of
paradigmatic discourse in comparative tax invites the simultaneous existence
of bluntly conflicting arguments, taking parallel courses, yet never engaging
each other." 6 Although some frameworks of comparative tax studies have
been proposed, 7 there are more theoretical than practical. 8 One pragmatic
concern with these frameworks is that only very limited areas of tax are
forcefully

analyzable by tax comparativists. This embarrassment is

particularly challenging to scholars in the Chinese tax context who want to
exploit the "tax transplant" methodology. 9 In this connection, this thesis
contributes that a comparative tax study relating to China might be better
achieved by focusing on a "tax law sub-discipline" rather than on a specific
tax concept. One reason is that a tax concept, usually a transplanted
vocabulary of western origin, is too narrow to substantiate a patulous,
meaningful, productive comparative analysis. The other reason is that specific
tax provisions are contingent on their contexts and not easily extrapolated to

5

See Carlo Garbarino, An Evolutionary Approach to Comparative Taxation: Methods, and
Agenda for Research, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 677, 684 (2009) ("[t]here are three aspects related
to the peculiar nature of taxation that make comparative research particularly difficult: rapid
legislative change; the complexity of tax systems; and the heterogeneity of local tax
concepts"); see also, Omri Y. Marian, The Discursive Failure in Comparative Tax Law, 58
AM. J. COMP. L., http:// ssrn.com/abstract=1404323, at 1 (arguing that there have been
several efforts at defining a theoretical framework for comparative taxation, but these efforts
have been "largely ignored by everybody except their own authors" leading to an ongoing
"non-discourse" that characterizes the field) (last visited on March 15, 2011)
6
!d., Omri at 1
7 /d.
8 /d.
9
See Jinyan Li, Tax Transplants and Local Culture: A Comparative Study of the Chinese and
Canadian GAAR, Theoretical Inquiries in Law: Vol. 11: No. 2, Article 8. (2010) arguing the
issues arising as to comparing a westernized conceptions,
http://www.bepress.com/til!default/voll1/iss2/art8 (last visited on March 15, 2011)
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others. For example, an international tax concept at the maximum can only
throw in scrappy value to other major tax areas such as turnover tax or income
tax. 10

Second, the specific cultural, social, political, and legal roots and contexts of a
tax governance framework usually are much less discussed or are even
purposefully ignored by tax comparativists. This "snooping" methodology
unavoidably provokes abundant "contemptuousness" and skeptics from
orthodox tax scholarship against tax comparative studies. A tax study
ultimately has to pay attention to the general cultural, social, political and legal
contexts in which a tax system is embedded. Otherwise, a comparative study
may easily turn into descriptive, mechanical and perfunctory analysis. The
practical and scholastic significance of comparative tax studies can hardly be
achieved by a limited comparison of the technical elements of a tax concept
and no more. The "big-picture" perspective nonetheless must be employed to
conduct a comparative study as to the Chinese tax context. The same rationale
applies to studies of the impact of both the rule of law development and
China's assimilation to the WTO system, as well. Therefore, this thesis also
focuses on the role of philanthropic culture in its comparison between the U.S.
and Chinese tax systems.
The development of China's nonprofit sector 11 has been marvelous, especially
after recent natural disasters, 12 the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, and various

/d.
See Brody supra 1 at 436-37, discussing that the third sector often uses the terms "charity"
and "nonprofit" interchangeably. See also generally D.B. Reobertson supra 1
12
See China Daily, August 18, 2010, listing recent natural disasters that involving high
casualty and economic loss including the 2010 South China floods & Yushu Earthquake,
Sichuan Earthquake in May 2008, the southern China snowstorm crisis in early 2008, etc.
10

11
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latest celebrities' donation scandals 13 . Regulatory deficiency in the treatment
of nonprofit organizations has alarmed China's failure to maintain its rich
tradition of state-centered social provision and the exacerbation of economic
disparities between rural and urban citizens. Surges of grassroots NGO
activity, millions of affectionate "netizens" during the natural disasters, and
faithful volunteers for the Olympic and Paralympics Games also resonate the
malfunctioned administration and messed allocation of charitable resources.
Meanwhile, the Chinese government has seriously identified the indispensable
role played by the nonprofit sector in alleviating the bureaucracy, downsizing
government, stimulating wealth mobility, reducing regional inequality, and,
ultimately, promoting a harmonious society.
The current Chinese legal framework fails to establish an enabling and
operative nonprofit sector. Mostly, the state fails to regulate it through a potent
tax system, creating various tax preferences and ensuring no abuse of those
preferences occurs. Even it had been suggested that a comprehensive charity
law should be enacted, the existing charity tax laws and regulations sojourn
discordant, anachronistic and inoperative. Worse is that certain bureaucratic
management and unprofessional administration have jeopardized the
incentives and confidence on reforming the nonprofit sector.
The United States system on tax treatment of nonprofit organizations has been
a well established and sought-after model for decades. It is regarded as
particularly appropriate for emerging NGO sections in worldwide. This thesis
proffers special emphasis on China's tax reform for the charity sector which
has expanded as a result of remarkable economic growth and legal system
13

See "Zhang Ziyi began to address quick scandal"
http://www .hollywoodreporter.com/hr/content_display /world/news/e3 i4 fe3 d6 7e44c8b3 addc7 a
3a9589c41c58 (last visited on March 15, 2011)
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reform. Although there is no single pattern fitting in various global needs, the
U.S. model provides quite established principles of federalism, fiscal
incentives and economic adaptability which make it a powerful system. This
thesis compares current nonprofit tax rules in China and U.S. in practice, and
highlights suggestions that may benefit charity tax law reform in China.
Following this introduction, subchapter II presents a brief overview of China's
current charity laws and regulations, the historical development of charity tax
laws and those in practice, especially on charitable tax exemptions. Subchapter
III outlines a number of institutional and theoretical backgrounds of the
current U.S. charity tax exemption systems. Subchapter IV highlights the
institutional and practical similarities and differences between the China and
U.S. systems. Subchapter V concludes with major findings by commenting on
potential nonprofit tax law reform in China.

II.

Overview and Background of Nonprofit Laws in China

2.1 Historical Development

China runs according to a complex party-state system in a struggle within
itself to find its way to modernize the nonprofit sector. In 1950, China adopted
its first 1aw 14 to manage societal organizations; however, pre-reform (pre-1978)
social

organizations

were

government

operated

non-governmental

organizations ("GONGOs") and are not "true" NGOs based on the western

14

See Shehui Zuzhi Zhuce Zanxing Tiaoli [The Provisional Rules on Social Organization
Management], the first law governing social organizations "Provisional Procedures on the
Registration of Social Organizations", and it remained e±Tective until 1989
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definition. Those GONGOs 15 were established and absorbed into the partystate system as part of government branches. Leaders of those organizations
are either current or retired senior government officials and their staffs enjoy
the same benefits and privileges of government officials. Apparently,
GONGOs are exempt from registration and administration requirements which
are required of China's NGOs.
The 1980s' saw the development of a plethora of various forms of NGOs
surging from economic reform and the "open-up policy." In response to
liberalization in economic development and the state-owned enterprises
("SOE") modernization reforms, the state realized its shortage of capacity and
resources to provide all necessary social services to function a rapidly
reforming society. In the 1990's, the central government proposed a "small
government, big society" policy, transferring part of service responsibilities
that had come from the government to private or nonprofit sectors. Following
the party-state tradition, private and nonprofit sectors have been consistently
been treated as auxiliary and subordinate agents of the state in bridging the
gap between state and the people, especially in areas like poverty relief,
elementary education support, aging population welfare and environment
protection. Although the first authentic civil society organizations debuted in
somewhat embarrassed way in the early 1980s, they have since shown
remarkable potential to outshine the government as a major platform of raising
critique and promoting social welfare and justice. However, in sensitive areas
like human rights, political reform, religion and freedom of speech, the
government territorially maintained an iron grip in controlling related
15

Mostly, those organizations are semi-government entities, such as "'the Chinese Communist
Youth League", "the China Writers' Association", "the All-China Workers' Union", and "the
All-China Women's Federation"
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activities and did not allow private sector or nonprofit sector to step into this
realm.
In the second half the 1980s, the government was confronted with a clear and
sweeping

demonstration

of democratic

movements

coupled with

a

rudimentary and obsolete system ofNGO management. In particular, the year
of 1989 witnessed a speedy promulgation of the new Regulation on
Registration and Management of Social Organization. Not surprisingly,
tightened measures, such as dual management system, approval and
management of supervisory unit and membership requirements, all have been
established since 1989, and the scale of the NGO sector has risen and fallen
according to rounds of re-registration hurdles.
Notwithstanding the fluctuating 16 numbers of registered NGOs, legislation has
been unexpectedly friendly to the nonprofit sector in general. Coupled with the
establishment

of

specific

government

branch

to

manage

societal

organizations, 17 the Article 3 5 of the 1982 Constitution recognizes the right to
freedom of association, and the General Principles of Civil Law ("GPCL")
categorized social organizations together with government organs and public
institutions that are different from commercial enterprises. This tolerance
continued for over 15 years and led to the 1998 promulgation of two important
pieces of legislation, most importantly the 2004 Foundation Regulation, which
even permits entry of foreign foundations.

16

18

However, quantification of

See MA, Qiusha, The Governance ofNGOs in China since 1978: How Much Autonomy? 31
Nonprofit & Volumtary Sector Q. 305-306 (2002); see also Qu Di Fei Fa Min Jian Zu Zhi
Zan Xing Ban Fa [Provisional Rules Banning Illegal NGOs] (promulgated by the Ministry of
Civil Affairs, effective as of April 10, 2010), targeting mostly at Falungong and other qigong
movements
17
For details of the nonprofit organizations management and government apparatus,
http://cszh.mca.gov.cn/ (last visited on March 15, 2011)
18
see infra Subchapter III
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growth of the nonprofit sector in China has been always difficult. A majority
of NGOs remain unregistered, or registered as for-profit entities' to evade
arduous administrative proceedings, and many even dissolve before any
formal registration procedure is taken.

2.2. Summary of Current Laws and Regulations

In China, NGOs

19

are classified into three major categories: social

organizations (SOs or shehui tuanti), private non-enterprise units (PNEUs or

minban feiqiye danwei), and foundations (jijinhui), according to three
important NGO legislations: the Regulations on Registration and Management
of Social Organizations (hereinafter "SO Regulation" or "Shehui Tuanti

Dengji Guanli Tiaoli"); the Provisional Regulations on Registration and
Management of Private Non-Enterprise Units (hereinafter "PNEU Regulation"
or "Minban Feiqiye Dengji Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli"); and the Regulation for
the Management of Foundation (hereinafter "Foundation Regulation", or

Jijinhui Guanli Tiaoli). In particular, Chinese citizens may incorporate,
manage, and participate in SOs and PNEUs, while a foreign citizen can only
act as the legal representatives of a foundation. 20

See Ma supra 16, the term civil society organizations ("CSOs") is Minjian ( ~fi3]) or
popular organizations. It is also interchangeably be referred as NGOs. See Na La, Zhongguo
Caogen NGO de Wenze Xianzhuang yu Wenti, [Analysis and Problems on the Development
of Grassroots NGOs in China] [hereinafter "Na La"] !z)J~tf::
9=t 001iLm NGO 1¥1 !'OJ ~l)ll;jA
l=i ii'iJ n2!
discussing the literal meanings of NGO, CSO, NPO, SO and Foundation (in
Chinese), http://www.nporuc.org/html/achievements/20090907 /167.html (last visited on
March 15, 2011)
20
See Art. 24, Regulations on Management of Foundations [Ji Jin Hui Guan Li Tiao Li]
(promulgated by the State Council, March 8 2004, effective June I, 2004) [hereinafter "the
2004 Foundation Regulation''],
http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004-03/18/content_l372870.htm (last visited on March
15, 2011)
19

«

»,
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The Bureau of Administration ofNGOs (Minjian Zuzhi Guanliju) within the
Ministry of Civil Affairs ("MCA") (previously the Department of Social
Organizations or "Shetuan Si") is the primary official agency in charge of
nonprofit organization and is responsible for the registration and filings,
detailing implementation rulings and interpretation of laws and regulations in
the nonprofit sector. Likewise, other government agencies join in regulating
NGOs in certain areas. Under appropriate delegation of authority, the SAT and
the MOF issues regulations and rulings on the tax-deductibility of donations,
tax exemptions or preferences, and internal governance;

21

the State

Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) coordinates non-public
fund-raising foundations and certain for-profit activities conducted by NGOs;
and the Ministry of Public Security may police NGOs for certain criminal
disobedience. 22 In addition, local MCA and other administrative branches
promulgate various region- or industry-specific rules and regulations to
manage NGOs 23 .

2.2.1. Social Organizations

2.2.l.l.Dual management requirement

21

See Art. 29, Regulations on Registration and Management of Social Organizations [She Hui
Tuan Ti Deng Ji Guang Li Tiao Li] (promulgated by the State Council, October 25, 1998,
effective
September
25,
1998)
[hereinafter
"SO
Regulation''],
http://www.cnca.gov.cn/rjwbgs/ztxx/ldgzhbzJ4570_4.shtml (last visited on March 15, 2011)
22
!d., Art. 35
23
Beijing is considered to be the most conservative in NGO registration and management due
to its political sensitivity, while other provinces such as Yunnan and Guangdong take a
relatively more liberal approach toward NGO management
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The SO and PNEU Regulations and the Foundation Regulations all require a
dual management structure. Each type of organization, before it files
registration at the national or local level office of MCA, must first seek a
professional supervisory unit ("Yewu Zhuguan Danwd') to review ("Shen
Cha") and approve ("pi zhun ") such registration, and then monitor NGO's

operation, governance and finances etc after its establishment. 24 Although any
government agency at the national, provincial, or city level, or any certified
GONG0, 25 can act as an NGO sponsor, NGOs, especially grassroots NGOs,
do not have much luxury to select appropriate supervisory sponsors.

26

In

reality, many SOs remain unregistered or even underground barely because
the potential supervisory units deny such sponsorship or the NGO's proposed
major purposes and activities do not fall within sponsor's scope of duties, 27
and any operative unregistered SOs risk criminal liability.

24

28

Therefore,

See Arts. 6-9, 27-28, Provisional Regulations on Registration and Management of Private
Non-Enterprise Units [Min Ban Fei Qi Ye Dan Wei Deng Ji Guan Li Zan Xing Tiao Li]
(promulgated by the State Council and effective as of September 25, 1998) [hereinafter
"PNEU Regulation"],
http://www.ha.xinhuanet.com/fuwu/kejiao/2004-03/29/content_l869912.htm (last visited on
March 15, 2011)
25
See Art. 6 SO Regulation
26
See generally Na La, supra 19; see also, He and Ashley Opening One Eye and Closing the
Other: The Legal and Regulatory Environment for "Grassroots" NGOs in China, 26 B.U.
Int'l J. 29 (2008) [hereinafter "He and Ashley"]. In practice, the dual management
requirement has proved to be the most difficult hurdle for grassroots NGOs to surmount in
gaining legal status. In order to secure the support of a government supervisory agency, the
founders of an NGO must cultivate personal relationships with government officials to
develop trust and connections. From a government agency's perspective, acting as a sponsor
to a grassroots NGO creates many new duties, responsibilities, and political risks, but reaps
few benefits. The extreme difficulty of finding a government sponsor is widely considered to
be the major reason why over 90% ofNGOs in China are either underground and unregistered
or registered as commercial enterprises
27
See Art. 6 SO Regulation Art. 6
28
See Art. 35 SO Regulation, stipulating that an unregistered NGO operating in the name of
an SO could be subject not only to civil, but also to criminal liability. According to Article 54
of the Law on Public Security Administrative Punishments, a person convicted under this
provision could be subject to up to 15 days in prison and a fine of up to 1,000 RMB. Given
that many NGOs across China are not officially registered, this provision could be viewed as
an axe always hanging over their heads
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granting approval by supervisory units is utterly discretionary, 29 and there is
no standard filing paperwork requirement on obtaining sponsorship by an
S0/0 and therefore potential government supervisory sponsors may ostensibly
stretch the approval process31 or demand unnecessary paperwork maliciously.
The dual management requirement creates several layers of problems
reflective of historical fears of uncontrolled social movements. First, it does
not offer Chinese citizens reasonably accessible venues to the constitutionally
protected freedom of association to form all kinds of associations. 32 The nature
of the supervisory units usually dominates the scope of the activities to be
conducted by the application organizations. Although scholars feel powerless
to advocate for this precious right, the complaint of the lack of right to
association has been, somewhat controversially, published in various
periodicals of academic pursuit. 33 Second, the dual management structure
inhibits the dynamic development of responsive associations for emergency
situations.

34

This drawback was particularly evident during the time of

emergent natural disasters. Many volunteers had to establish ad hoc NGOs to
conduct relief activities and they were not even able to find supervisory units
within a tight timeframe. Third, it prohibits NGOs from engaging in activities

29

See generally Ge Yunsong, On the Establishment of Social Organization under Chinese
Law, 2 Int'l J. ofNot-for-Profit L. (2000),
http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol2iss3/art_2.htm (last visited on March 15, 2011); see
also generally, He and Ashley supra 26, discussing a case study of establishment of an eye
care center
30
See generally, !d., Ge
31 /d.
32
See Karla Simon Regulation of Civil Society in China, 32 Fordham Int'l L. J. 964. Professor
Karla Simon is a major contributor in the field of non-for-profit organization studies.
[hereinafter "Simon"]
33
!d., discussing that scholars complain about not being to form appropriate organizations for
academic studies
34 /d.
511

across multiple sectors 35 . Usually, a supervisory unit is risk averse and thus
prefers approving NGO

sponsorship within

its

scope

of assigned

responsibilities and very reluctantly oversees NGOs that carry out unfamiliar
activities, for example, a healthcare supervisory unit usually would refuse
supervising NGOs in the education area. Therefore, NGOs have to be
singularly focused and are not flexible to receive donations from diversified
sources. Fourth, government agencies may set up an SO as a vehicle during
government reshuffles to retain their redundant staffs or retirees. 36 Fifth,
government agencies also often set up GONGOs to raise external sources of
funding 37 and to disqualify private applicant organizations.

2.2.1.2. Constraints on repeated and cross-regional subsidiaries

A derivative of the dual management requirement is the "non-repetition"
constraint. In particular, the supervisory unit or MCA may deny the
registration of an NGO if "in the same administrative area there is already a
social organization active in the same or similar area of work. " 38 The nonrepetition provision stipulates that in a particular area of activity, such as
elementary education, only one SO in service is allowed to operate in a given
geographical region (city, provincial, or national) 39 although the definition of

35

See generally Na La supra 19
!d.
See e.g. Simon supra 32 and He and Ashley supra 26
38
See generally Ge, supra 29, citing The Interpretation of the Regulation on the Registration
and management of Social Organization and the Interim Regulations on the Regulation and
Management of Private Non-enterprise Units 36 (The Dep't of Politics and Law of the State
Council & The Bureau of Admin. of Non-governmental Orgs. of the Ministry of Ciil Affairs
eds., 1999)
39
See He & Ashley, supra 26, at 44-45, noting an example that, if there is already a national
AIDS NGO, a similar organization could register only at the provincial or city level. This
limitation reflects the Party's corporatist view of the state-society relationship, considering
36
37
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"area of activity" is quite discretionary. It is well argued that the nonrepetition requirement has the merit of avoiding too many organizations
"developing without planning," and possibly potential "malicious competition"
among nonprofit organizations. 40
A further ramification of the non-repetition constraint is that an SO has to be
real name identification member-based and therefore often subjects its
members to political surveillance. 41 In addition, the SO Regulations prohibit
cross-regional branching. 42 For instance, the administrative hierarchy of the
supervisory unit delineates the geographical application within which an SO
can operate. If an SO wishes to reach out its registered geographic region and
branch a subsidiary or representative office elsewhere, it has to obtain an
approval in advance from its own supervisory sponsor and even the
permission of local MCA in the desired subsidiary location which oversees
similar areas of activities. 43 Literally, national SOs cannot establish branches
in different provinces although they are merely permitted to conduct activities
across the country. 44 Moreover, SO subsidiaries cannot set up second-tier
subsidiaries and an SO legal representative (fa ding dai biao ren) must not at
the same time act as a legal representative for another S0. 45

SOs' purpose to be to serve as a bridge between the state and society by representing the
interests of various constituent groups--for example, those with AIDS or, more traditionally,
women or the disabled--at a given administrative level
40
See generally Ge supra 29
41
See generally SO Regulation supra 21
42 Id.
43
For instance, a city-level SO can branch within the city, but cannot conduct activities
outside of its registered city. If an SO wishes to conduct activities in multiple cities of the
same province, it has to seek a provincial-level government sponsor and register at that level.
And if an NGO wants to conduct activities in cities outside its home province, to apply the
language of the regulation literally, the NGO would have to seek a ministerial-level sponsor
and register a national NGO to legally carry out its mission
44
See Arts. 12 and 13, SO Regulation supra 21
45
!d. Arts.14 and 19
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The non-repetition constraints coupled with branching prohibitions prevent
locally-registered NGOs to conduct activities across China, and suppress
networking and resource sharing among SOs. Moreover, an SO must not
endanger or conflict with the interests and safety of the state and the unity of
all ethnicities, and must not violate the state interests, public interests, or
public morals. 46 Those constraints again reinforce the deeply rooted fear
against mass political movements that may threaten the party-state. 47

2.2.1.3. Exempted Organizations

Some organizations are exempted from the registration requirement according
to Article 3 of the 1998 SO Regulation. These organizations include those that
participate in political consultative meetings, such as the Chinese Communist
Party-sanctioned eight political parties and nine other associations including
the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, the Communist Youth
League,

and

the

All-China

Women's

Federation.

Other

exempted

organizations include 14 well-known GONGOs, such as the China Writers'
Association, the Song Qingling Foundation, and the Red Cross Society of
China, 48 just to name a few. These GONGOs are usually considered to have
the same status as administrative branches and are often viewed as part of the
government bureaucracy.

46

!d. Art. 4

47

See Na La, supra 19, Chapters III and IV, discussing that the highly restrictive provisions

against pluralism, branching, and networking are based on government concerns over an SO
becoming a rival power and thus threatening the reign of the Chinese Communist Party. For
instance, national-level NGOs are presumably not able to register at all and usually the most
closely monitored and controlled by the central government
48
a complete list of these exempted GONGOs is http://www.mca.gov.cn (last visited on
March 15, 2011)
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What is more interesting is the third clause of Article 3, which states that any
organization that is set up by a government entity or a GONGO and that
conducts its activities within such entity is exempted from registration. In
practice, many NGOs exploit this provision and struggle to gain semi-legal
status by attaching themselves to a governmental or semi-governmental entity
that holds more liberal attitudes toward NGOs. Higher educational institutions
are a common example of such liberal entities that shelter and sponsor
grassroots NGOs 49 and nonprofit organizations of a research and academic
nature.
The legal status of a GONGO is a precious resource. Some GONGOs find it in
their financial interest to offer shelter to grassroots NGOs in exchange for
membership fees and management dues. The sheltered NGOs are thus
exempted from registration. Sometimes, GONGOs may even formally sponsor
NGOs with a second-tier SO status by acting as their supervisory units and
allowing them to register with the MCA or its local bureau. A nonprofit
organization may take advantage of such an affiliation with and supervision
under GONGOs and gain legitimacy and important governmental connections,
though often at a high financial stake. For example, one GONGO under the
MCA sponsors a nonprofit organization and charges them annual membership
fees as high as RMB 200,000 (U.S.$ 25,900). 50

49

See e.g. Jude Howell, New Directions in Civil Society: Organizing Around Marginalized
Interests, In Governance in China, 143, 155-65 (Jude Howell ed., 2004)
50
See He and Ashley, supra 26 at 46
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2.2.2.

Private Non-Enterprise Unit

The Private Non-Enterprise Unit (PNEU) form, first created by the 1998
Provisional Regulations on Registration and Management of Private NonEnterprise Units (PNEU Regulation), is a special NGO category in the
Chinese context. By definition, a PNEU is a privately-run noncommercial unit,
and its main purpose is to provide social services, 51 mainly in the fields of
education, public health, technology, and sports. These facilities historically
have been almost entirely owned and operated by the state. Ever since the
economic reforms starting in the late 1970s, private institutions have gradually
proliferated

and

replaced

government

agencies

m running

related

organizations and PNEUs thus emerged into the picture. The 1998 PNEU
Regulation formally recognized the legal status of these then state-operated
now privately-run entities and granted them nonprofit status. In practice, a
majority of PNEUs are for-profit entities in the areas of education and
healthcare. The PNEU sector has grown very rapidly since the promulgation
of the PNEU Regulation. As ofDecember 31, 2006, a total of 159,000 PNEUs
have been registered 52 , accounting for about 46% of all registered NGOs in
China, and roughly half of these PNEUs are private schools. 53
Many key provisions of the 1998 PNEU Regulations mirror those in the SO
Regulation, such as the dual management system, non-repetition within the

51

See PNEU Regulation, Arts 1 and 2
See Sun Weilin, Head of National Bureau ofNGO Management, Zai Quan Guo Min Jian
Zu Zhi Guan Li Gong Zuo Shi Pin Hui Shang De Jiang Hua [Speech at the National NGO
Management Coriference] (January 31, 2007), http://www.mca.gov.cn (last visited on March
15, 2011)
53
See Zhao Yong, Min Ban Fei Qi Ye Dan Wei You Guan Fa Lu Wen Ti Zhi Si Kao
[Thoughts on the Legal Issues of PNEUs], in Zhong Guo Fei Ying Li Zu Zhi Fa Lu Mo Shi
Lun Wen Ji [Collected Essays on the Legal Models of Chinese NPOs], 220 (2005) (in Chinese)
52
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same administrative region constraint 54 , and not surprisingly, similar broad
and vague languages subject to discretional interpretation by the state police
power. 55 One additional constraint imposed on PNEU is that a PNEU may not
set up branches even within its registered administrative region. 56 Difficult to
substantiate as it is, this provision envisions the disadvantaged position of
state-run noncommercial organizations (e.g. schools and hospitals) in
competition against PNEUs.
Traditionally, PNEUs aim to provide social services and thus are less
politically sensitive to the government. PNEUs are even encouraged and
fostered as stated in a recent MCA work report, 57 and adopted by grassroots
NGOs as a good vehicle to obtain the nonprofit status and the legitimacy
attached thereto. Noticeably, the PNEU Regulation casts out sincere efforts by
the government to fashion a tiered-management structure for NGOs and
diversify NGO categories.

2.2.3. Foundations
The 2004 Foundation Regulations marked a major step for China's NGO legal
framework. Noticeably, for the first time, a foreign NGO, other than a
chamber of commerce, 58 could legally establish its presence in China as a
nonprofit entity, 59 and a foreign citizen, subject to a three-month residency
requirement for certain key management personnel, was able to incorporate

54

See PNEU Regulations, Arts. 5, 8, and 13
See SO Regulations Arts. 4 and 35
56
See SO Regulations Arts. 4, 13, and 27
57
See generally Sun, supra 52
58
See Wai Guo Shang Hui Guan Li Zan Zing Gui Ding [Provisional Regulations on
Management ofForeign Chambers of Commerce] (promulgated by the State Council, June 14,
1989, effective July I, 1989)
59
See 2004 Foundation Regulation Arts. 6, 13, and 14
55
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°

and participate in domestic private foundations. 6 Foreign foundations are not
allowed to raise funds inside China.

61

Superior to the 1998 SO Regulation and PNEU Regulation, the 2004
Foundation Regulation features some modem NGO prerequisites and
standards

in particular, management appointments, internal governance,

donation and financial management. Not surprisingly, the Foundation
Regulations disappointed observers by keeping the dual management, 62 and a
provincial level of government sponsor is required, which is more restraining
than the SO and PNEU regulations.

2.2.3.1. Categories ofFoundations and Capital Requirements

The Foundation Regulation elaborates separate treatment for domestic
foundations and for representative offices of foreign foundations. 63 A domestic
foundation is further classified geographically as a national foundation and a
regional (provincial) foundation, and also classified either as a private or
public foundation based on the sources of its funds and donations. 64 A national
foundation, the representative office of a foreign foundation, or any foundation
whose legal representative is not a mainland Chinese citizen has to register
with the MCA and secure the backing of a ministerial-level government
supervising agency or a sponsor recognized by the State Council. 65

60

!d., Art. 24
!d., Art. 25
62
!d., Art. 7
63 !d., Art. 13
64
!d., Art. 8; see also Na La, supra 19, Chapter III
65
!d., Art. 7. In particular, a foreign citizen may serve as a legal representative or Chairman of
the Board for a domestic private foundation, though it is yet to be seen whether this will be
allowed in practice. At a minimum, foreign citizens or citizens from Hong Kong, Macau, or
61
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The minimum capital threshold to set up a private foundation is RMB 2.0
million (about $295,000), 66 RMB 8 million (about $1.18 million) for a
national foundation, and RMB 4 million (about $590,000) for a regional
foundation. 67 Local MCAs may at their discretion impose higher initial capital
requirements. The initial capital is presumably kept on book and thus cannot
be used for programming activities.

2.2.3.2.Constraints on Cross-Regional Subsidiaries and Standards for Internal
Governance

A foundation may set up branches upon approval of the MCA or its provincial
branch, and the civil affairs bureaus have the discretion to deny the
application. 68 The 2004 Foundation Regulation requires particular internal
governance requirements,

69

such as the board of directors formation,

appointment of a supervisory official,

71

70

and a legal representative. 72 Moreover,

the Foundation Regulation also elaborates financial management standards,

Taiwan can assume important management positions of a foundation and thus potentially
control its operations in significant ways
66
!d., Art. 8
67 !d.
68
!d., Art. 12
69
The SO and PNEU Regulations, in contrast, have almost none.
70
See 2004 Foundation Regulation Art. 20, stipulating that the board must have between 5
and 25 members, 2) for private foundations established using the assets of a private individual,
no more than a third of board members may be close relatives of that individual, and for other
foundations, close relatives may not serve simultaneously as directors 3) no more than a third
of a foundation's board members may receive financial compensation from the foundation
71
!d., Art. 22, providing that the official cannot be a member of the board, a close relative of a
board member, or on the financial staff of the foundation
72
/d., Art. 23, providing that the legal representative of the foundation may not concurrently
represent any other organization and a public or private foundation's legal representative
should be a citizen of mainland China if the foundation's original funds are of domestic
Chinese origin
519

such as annual expenditure restraints, 73 and capped management compensation
and capped overhead fees. 74

2.2.4. Unregistered NGOs

The taxing registration requirement, especially the difficulty of searching for a
"supervisory or administration unit," encourages the establishment of many de

facto NGOs including grassroots NGOs in China that do not seek registration.
In fact, the unregistered NGOs that operate openly and legally may well
outnumber registered ones. 75 As mentioned above, a social organization can
operate as an internal organization of another enterprise and social
organization without registration.

76

Some de facto social organizations

incorporate themselves as corporations and are treated the same way as a
normal commercial enterprise. If the NGO can demonstrate its nonprofit
nature to the local governmental and tax authorities, even though it is hard to
prove, there might be some flexible and compromised accommodation can be
reached between NGOs and local MCA and SAT.
Many NGOs especially grassroots NGOs simply do not exist as legal entities
because they never seek registration. However, some of these NGOs operate
73

!d., Art. 29, stipulating that the amount of money spent annually by public foundations on
public benefit activities must not be less than 70% of the previous year's income, and private
foundations' annual expenditure must not be less than 8% of the surplus from the previous
year
74
!d., a foundation may not allocate more than 10% of its total expenditure to cover staff
wages and benefits and other overhead costs.
75
This thesis excludes secret, underground organizations that operate illegally for discussion
for two reasons: ( 1) the numbers are not collectable or verifiable in any official means; (2)
illegally operated underground organizations are loosely associated and sometimes at best are
motivated gatherings for spiritual pursuit
76
Often, those organizations reach beyond the scope of serving the affiliated enterprise or
organization. For example, in many universities, the affiliated social organizations are also
serving the society in general and the government will often just turn a blind eye to these types
of activities
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openly (acknowledged by some governmental entities and officials) and are
generally accepted in the community. Since Chinese tradition favors a
tradition of connection (guan xi) and flexibility in resolving problems when
the official process is burdensome and costly, well connected unregistered
NGOs will likely continue playing an important role and leading to many
administrative discrepancies and uncertainties.

2.3. Tax treatment of Chinese N GOs

China does not have a comprehensive tax code governing various NGO forms.
Charitable tax exemptions from major Chinese taxes are mostly based on the
"nonprofit" conception 77 which is prescribed and interpreted by scattered
provisions within the various tax laws and regulations, the China Trust Law
(on charitable trust) and the Public Benefit Donation Law which is the only
law passed by the National People's Congress governing NGOs. 78

2.3.1. Tax Treatment of Charitable Donations

As noted above, rules about income tax treatment of donations scatters in
various laws and regulation as shown below.

77

See 2004 Foundation Regulations Art. 2; SO Regulation, Art. 2; PNEU Regulation, Art. 2
See generally in Leon Irish, Jin Dongsheng & Karla Simon, China's Tax Rules for Not-forprofit Orgs. 12-16 (2004), and in practice, registration with the MCA or its local branch in one
of the three recognized NGO forms guarantees exemption, even the local bureau of industry
and commerce may consider NGOs as for-profit commercial enterprises on a case-by-case
basis and apply normal business tax rates
78
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Date of
Enactment

Legislation

Description

'Individual income donated to educational and
other public welfare undertakings" refers to the
donation by individuals of their income to
~ducational and other public welfare
~rticle 24
!Undertakings, and to areas suffering from
~egulations for the
~erious natural disasters or poverty, through
lTanuary 28, 1994 mplementation of the
~ocial organizations or government agencies in
ndividual Income
he People's Republic of China. That part of
Tax Law of the PRC
he amount of donations which does not exceed
30 percent of the amount of taxable income
declared by the taxpayer may be deducted
rom his amount of taxable income
~rticle 6(4)
Provisional
Donations for community benefits and
February 4, 1994 Regulations of the
!charitable donations by a Taxpayer in a year
PRC Enterprise
pre deductible up to 3% of the Taxable Income
ncome Tax
Article 24 When donating property for public
welfare undertakings according to the
provisions of this Law, corporations and other
enterprises may be given preferential treatment
in enterprise income tax according to the
provisions of laws and administrative
Articles 24 and 25,
egulations.
September 1,
Chapter IV
1999
Preferential
l.-\rticle 25 When donating property for public
Measures, PBDL
welfare undertakings according to the
provisions of this Law, Natural persons,
individual businesses of industry and
!commerce may be given preferential treatment
·n individual income tax according to the
provisions of laws and administrative
egulations.
Joint Notice on
ncome Tax
Donations made to non-profit social
Treatment of
organizations and state apparatus (such as the
July 12, 2000
Donation by
Red Cross) by enterprises, social organizations
!Enterprises to the Red and individuals should be fully deducted from
tross (SAT and
axable income
MOF)
Joint Notice on
ncome Tax Policies tharitable donations made to charitable
as to Perfecting
organizations, foundations, or non-profit social
March 8, 200 1 Experimental Works organizations by enterprises, social
~cor Urban Social
organizations and individuals should be fully
Securities System
deducted from taxable income
SAT and MOF)
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oint Notice on
haritable donations made to China Health
ncome Tax
ehicle Foundation, Sunzhifang Economic
eduction as to
Science Foundation, China Charity
onations to Five
oundation, China Legal Aid Foundation and
September 22,
oundations
2003
hina Justice-Upholding Foundations by
ncluding the China
nterprises, social organizations and
ealth Vehicle
individuals should be fully deducted from
roject (SAT and
axable income
OF)
rticle 8, Joint Notice onations made to the educational institutions
n Education related y taxpayers through non-profit organization
ebruary S, 2004 ax Policy (SAT and nd state apparatus in China should be fully
educted from taxable income
OF)
n relation to the expenses from charitable
rticle 9, Enterprise
onations incurred by Enterprises, the portion
March 16, 2007
ithin 12% of the total annual profit may be
ncome Tax Law
educted from the taxable income.
(Table 3)
Individuals and corporations can deduct their charitable contributions with
some constraints in China. For individuals, "personal contributions to
educational and other undertakings for public welfare shall be deducted from
the taxable income in accordance with the relevant regulations by the State
Council."

79

The regulations thereunder define donations as "donations by

individual[s] of their income to educational and other undertakings of public
welfare, and to areas suffering from serious natural disasters or poverty,
through social organizations or government agencies in the People's Republic
of China."

80

The regulations further limit the deduction to 30 percent of

taxable income. 81
According to the recent unified Enterprise Income Tax Law, which took effect
on January 1, 2008 and unifies the treatments between foreign and domestic
enterprises, enterprises are allowed to deduct up to 12 percent of taxable

79

See The Individual Income Tax Law ofthe P.R.C., Art. 6
See The Regulations for the Implementation ofthe Individual Income Tax Law ofthe P.R. C.,
Art. 24
81 /d.
80
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income for contributions to causes for "public benefits and social welfare." 82
As stipulated in the Provisional Rules and Regulations thereunder, causes for
public benefits and social welfare are defined in almost the same way as the
Regulations for the Implementation of the Individual Income Tax Law. The
EIT Law explicitly states that donations directly to individual donees are not
deductible. As of July 2006, the MOF and SAT had only approved tax
deductions for donors to sixty-two organizations,

83

most of which are

GONCOs. Donations to these twenty-six organizations are fully deductible,
but for the other thirty-six organizations, individual donors can deduct up to
30% of taxable income, and corporate donors up to 12% under the recently
revised Enterprise Income Tax Law, which increases the permissible
charitable contribution deduction for both domestic and foreign companies
corporate donors from 3% to 12%. 84
The Chinese tax laws and regulations require that for charitable contributions
to be tax-deductible, they must meet both a specific "cause" requirement and
an organizational prerequisite, i.e., to be tax deductible, such contributions
have to cater certain causes as well as to pledge (through) certain
organizations. However, there is serious doubt about how important a role the
tax benefit consideration plays in individuals' or corporations' donation
considerations. 85 First and foremost, the MOF and SAT stipulate only a few
organizations that are eligible for receiving tax deductible charitable
82

See Enterprise Income Tax Law of the P.R. C., Art. 9, (promulgated by the National People's
Congress, March 16, 2007, effective January 1 2008) [hereinafter the EIT Law ofthe P.R.C.]
83
See Ci Shan Juan Zeng You Hui Zheng Ce [Preferential Policy for Charitable Donations],
http://www.juanzhu .gov.cn (last visited on March 15, 2011)
84
See the EIT Law of the P.R.C., Art. 9
85
See generally, Chinese Taxation Institute, Report on Tax Policy Studies for Promoting
Domestic Needs [Guanyu Jinyibu Kuoda Neixu de Shuishou Zhengce Yanjiu Baogao ], ~ r;!llf#,

*~kc~~*-~r*~•~m~••~~*~»
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n480462/n7921376/n7921576/n7921766/n7921902/8800885.htm1
(last visited on March 15, 2011)
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contributions. Donations made to non-certified NGOs are not tax deductible.
Second, due to the high volume of donative activities in times of emergency,
eligible organizations might have insufficient human and resources to collect
and manage donations. Third, the infrastructure linking individual income tax
reporting and charitable deductions is weak.

86

Finally, the complicated

administrative procedure may thwart taxpayers to claim such deduction, the
nominal value of which is insignificant in most cases.
In addition, although recent natural disasters in China have stimulated a round
of personal charitable donations, such economic endowments remain
infrequent in China for various reasons. First, the feeling of distrust still
occupies minds of individual donors regarding the likelihood of a reasonable
and fair allocation of charitable donations. Second, the absence of an estate or
gift tax in China reduces the motivation for making donations. Third, the
government adopts an unsympathetic controlling practice toward unregistered
NGOs, which mostly are underground churches, religious groups and elderly
care centers. Finally, corruption by government officials overwhelmingly
impairs their capacity to request further donations.
According to the PBDL, qualified public welfare organizations are allowed to
receive public welfare donations under the following conditions: 87 i) activities
carried out by social bodies and individuals to provide disaster relief, aid for
the poor, and giving support and assistance to the physically disabled; ii)
educational, scientific, cultural, public health, and sports undertakings; iii)
construction of environmental protection facilities and public utilities in
86

see supra Chapter V on tax legislation
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gong Yi Shi Ye Juan Zen Fa [Public Welfare Donation
Law]
Art.
3
(effective
as
of
September
I,
1999),
http://www.gq b.gov.cn/node2/node3/node5/node9/userobject7ai 1270.html (last visited on
March 15, 2011)
87
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society; and iv) other public and welfare undertakings in society that aim to
promote social development and progress.
Noticeably, the donations have to be made to certified public welfare social
organizations and public welfare private non-enterprise units under the Public
Welfare Donations Law. Therefore, the importance of achieving registration
with the MCA as a gateway to receive various benefits is foremost over other
considerations in establishing an NGO. The 2001 Trust Law provides for the
first time some promising support to the establishment of a public (charitable)
trust (with certain limitations). In particular, the purpose of trusts for charity
and public interests should include poverty relief, emergency relief, assistance
to the disabled, development of education, science and technology, culture,
and sports, medicine and health welfare, and environmental protection.
However, the establishment of a public trust and trustee appointments for a
public trust are all subject to the approval and oversight of MCAs. 88
As part of friendly legislations to the NGO sector, 89 in January 2007, the MOF
and SAT jointly have released encouraging measures and rulings for
promoting tax exemption and deductibility. "All public benefit social
organizations or foundations established upon approval of the civil affairs

88
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xin Tuo Fa [The Trust Law of the PRC], Arts. 62, 64,
65, 67, and 70, which stipulate that public trusts shall establish a trust supervisor. The trust
supervisor is prescribed by the trust documents or appointed by the public welfare authorities
if there is no such prescription in the trust documents. The trust supervisor has the right to file
an action or establish other legal activities in his own name for the benefit of the beneficiary.
The duties of the trustee of a public trust have been enhanced. The trustee must make a report
about the disposition of the trust business and the status of the trust assets at least once a year.
If the public trust expires, the trustee must report the cause and date of the expiration to the
public welfare authorities within 15 days ofthe occurrence of the event forming the reason for
expiration of the trust
89
See generally Simon supra 32, noting that a comprehensive Charity Law is under discussion
and is intended to address multiple aspects of the regulation of charities in China, including
tax deductibility of donations. The MCA and MOF have sought broad input on the law, a draft
of which was circulated for comment in September 2006. See also, Int '! Ctr. for Civ. Soc y
Law, Comments on the Draft Charity Law for the PRC, 5, Int'l J. Civ. Soc'y L. 12, (2007)
[Hereinafter the Simon: Comments]
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administrative department" would be eligible to receive tax-deductible
donations, subject to a review conducted by MOF and SAT and is designed to
confirm the organization's public benefit nature. 90 Therefore, the category of
organizations eligible for charitable tax exemption or deduction expanded to
include charities such as aging people care centers, ethnic minority education
programs, and health care centers for the treatment of specific diseases. 91
Moreover, in 2008 the MCA upgraded its operations dealing with charity
statistics and other charity activities from a semi-independent "bureau" to a
Ministry Department. 92
A further reading of charitable tax exemption laws and regulations reveals that
passive investment income (interest and dividends earned on investments) of
NGOs is still subject to tax. 93 Investment income has always been one of the
major sources of revenue for all NGOs, especially for NGOs in the U.S.
However, interest income realized by Chinese foundations, which are
established with a high permanent capital requirement, will mostly end up
being subject to EIT in the course of an NGO's operation and existence. 94
Therefore, the fragile availability of NGO revenue resources again will be
hijacked, resulting in actual reductions in charitable finances and low capital
mobility. Although this problem has not emerged severely within the SO and

90

See "Guan Yu Gong Yi Jiu Ji Xing Juan Zeng Shui Qian Kou Chu Zheng Ce Ji Xiang Guan
Guan Li Wen Ti De Tong Zhi" [Notice Concerning Policy and Related Questions on the PreTax Deduction of Public Benefit Relief Donations] (promulgated by the MOF and SAT jointly
and effective on January 8, 2007) [hereinafter "the 2007 Notice"]
91
See Ci Shan Juan Zeng You Hui Zheng Ce Hui Bian [Collection of Preferential Policy for
Charitable Donations], http://www.juanzhu.gov.cn (last visited on March 15, 2011)
92
See generally China Adds Government Department for Charity Activities", People's Daily
Online September 11, 2008, stating that, in China, such escalation of administrative hierarchy
means a lot in terms of management authority, resources allocation and enforceability ofNGO
administrative regulations
93
See infra Subchapter IV
94
See, e.g., Biqiang Wang, A Taxing Time for China's Non-profits, The Economic Observer
Online February 19, 2008
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PNEU sectors, a responsive ruling from the SAT should likely remove their
fears in this connection. 95

2.3.2. Procedural reform for charitable tax exemptions

Messy and sometimes opaque procedural practices are not foreign to the tax
law field in China, and charitable tax exemption is not an exception in this
regard. In the 2007 MOF and SAT joint ruling, a procedural scheme is
provided but is too advanced to fully implement comparing with existing tax
administrative capacities. Still, smaller sized and more independent charities
all expect to see an easier fundraising. It may also challenge the domination of
fundraising by the large government related charities such as GONGOs and
the municipal charity foundations.
According to the 2007 Ruling, tax deductible donations may be made to all
public "welfare social associations or foundations established upon approval
of the department of civil affairs of the State Council." 96 Apparently, this
welcoming gesture of the government comforts donors in many ways,
especially when deductions are permissible for donations made to passthrough organizations 97 . Given the enormous economic interests such as
commissions or management fees available in pass-through organizations,
such procedures for qualifying the organizations that are permitted to receive
tax deductible contributions are unlikely to be implemented in the near future.
Furthermore, to qualify as a public welfare organization enjoying deductible
95

See generally Simon, supra 32, raising that the SAT has taken this issue under advisement
and may soon release new policies with regard to tax exemption of revenues earned on funds
held by CSOs. A change to reflect the recommendation in the Tax Report would be welcome.
96
See 2007 Notice, supra 90
97
For example, the All-China Charity Federation and the China Red Cross Society
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contributions, a confirmation letter from appropriate level of tax authorities is
required. 98 To obtain such recognition letters, an application should be filed
enclosing evidence that the organization, inter alia, is non-profit, is
established and managed consistently with the law, may not distribute any
surplus upon dissolution or termination,

99

may not engage in business

activities unrelated to its public welfare purposes, has an oversight body that is
not "aimed at making private profits," has an internal financial and accounting
management, and a charter. 100
The 2007 Ruling also stipulates instructions on handling donations and
communicating with its donors. Those instructions include that 1) no donor
may participate in the asset distributions or take ownership to such assets; 2)
organizations eligible for donation-based pre-tax deductions shall use public
welfare relief for specific purposes; 101 and 3) a special voucher for public
welfare relief donations must be used. 102 The 2007 Ruling also prescribes
procedures to be followed by donors to claim deductions on their tax returns.
For instance, the donor must submit the certification by the authorities of the
donee organization; the original receipt received from the donee organization;
and other materials as required to be submitted.
Many scholars 103 have expressed deep interests and completed extensive work

98

See 2007 Notice, supra 90
!d.
100 !d.
101
For example, education, civil affairs, other public welfare undertakings, or for the districts
that suffer from natural disasters or the poverty-stricken districts. Moreover, the non-profit
public welfare social associations and foundations, as well as the people's governments at or
above the county level and their departments''
102
The organizations must "separately use the vouchers for public welfare relief donations as
uniformly printed under supervision of the central or provincial public finance department
according to the financial affiliation, and affix their respective special financial seals; and shall
issue receipts if any individual asks for it for his donations."
103
See generally Rebecca Lee Modernizing Charity Law in China, 18 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J.
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toward the promulgation of a comprehensive charity law, which aims to
embrace all valid factors involving nonprofit organizations. For instance, the
draft Charity Law provides that current tax laws and regulations fail to detail
the approaches by which nonprofit organizations obtain licenses to engage in
public fundraising. Article 24, Paragraph 2 of the draft Charity Law 104 states
that only organizations with a "[c]ertificate of the certification for charitable
organizations" may engage in fundraising activities from the general public
(shehui gongzhong). This does not apply "if laws or administrative regulations
provide otherwise." Limiting public fund raising in this manner gives the
MCA control over the organizations that raise money from the public. This
should generally be seen as an important consumer protection, and thus it
would be important to enact similar rules in the final Charity Law. 105
As criticized by Professor Simon, the various other rules with respect to
permits for fundraising in the draft Charity Law (Articles 26-27) and the rules
with respect to public fund raising (Article 28) are, however, not detailed
enough to protect the public at the present time. 106 While Articles 26 and 27 of
the draft outline the licensing procedure: "certified charitable organizations"
must apply at the MCA offices of the people's governments above the county
level, there is no clarity as to what information will be required for a license,
etc. In addition, it is important to note that in times of natural disaster, the need
for a license may inhibit some fundraising--this may prove to be problematic if
there are no organizations that have sufficient public trust to collect and
disburse the massive funds needed in cases like the one presented by the
Sichuan Earthquake. It will be important to put the Charity Law in place
104
105
106

See generally Simon Comments, supra 89
/d.
/d.
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quickly so as to allow more independent nonprofit organizations to obtain
. status an d fu n drmsmg
. . 1'Icenses. 107
ch anty

III.

Institutional and theoretical background of the current U.S.
federal NGO tax exemption system

The U.S. federal law of tax-exempt organization derives its authority from the
taxation powers of congress, and related tax provisions are codified in the
Internal Revenue Code (the "IRC"). In general, a charitable organization is
defined as the one that "pays no tax on its income and whose donors derive a
tax benefit as a result of their donations.

108

The U.S. system adopts a

classification method that lists objective standards for qualifying organizations
exempt from Federal income tax.

3.1. The Exemption

The current language on NGO tax exemption appeared first in section
501(c)(3) of 1954 IRC. The charitable income tax exemption refers to the
statutory relief from the obligation of certain nonprofit entities to pay income
tax. Pursuant to IRC section 50l(c)(3), such relief is automatically offered to
entities that are granted tax-exempt charitable status upon application and
approval. A variety of non-charity entities are also entitled to income tax
exemption.

107
108
109

109

Moreover, charitable nonprofit organizations, unlike practically

!d.
See Besty Buchalter Adler, Rules of the Road(1999), at 3

Other forms include social welfare organizations, labor organizations, business leagues and
social clubs
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all other tax-exempt nonprofit organizations, are the only tax-exempt nonprofit
organizations that are also eligible to receive charitable donations from the
public entitling the donor to federal income tax benefits. The IRC provides
that individuals and corporations that donate money or property to charitable
entities may be entitled to receive a tax savings when computing their own tax
liability. The potential savings can be quite significant depending on the
amount ofthe donation, the type of property donated, the income ofthe donor,
and the type of charity to which the donation is given. This ability to receive
tax deductible donations from the public is the key federal tax law distinction
. . an d oth er tax-exempt nonpro fitt orgamzattons.
. .
110
b etween ch ant1es
An interested nonprofit corporation should file an application with the IRS to
obtain the tax-exempt charitable status. Not surprisingly, such complex
paperwork

demands

accurate

and

ample

information

concerning

organizational structure, principal activities, financial assets, expected and past
revenue streams, internal policies, and much more. The IRS evaluates the
information

provided to

determine

if such proposed activities and

organizational structure are deemed "charitable." Noticeably, the IRS, subject
to later judicial review, has sole discretion as to whether to grant or deny the
applicant tax-exempt charitable status based if the information provided on the
organization's forms do not adequately comply with the law. The IRS may
even revoke the "charitable" status if the charitable entity does not operate in
compliance with federal law. Accordingly, a charity must often also update
annual information reports to the IRS about its operative activities after initial
filings.

110

I.R.C. Section 50l(c)(3)
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These extensive requirements on obtaining and maintaining tax-exempt
charitable status are only a few of the many aspects of the charitable tax
exemption including, but not limited to, not paying federal income tax. Under
the requirement of filing specific forms to obtain the tax-exempt status, the
forms required for tax-exempt charitable status are much more complicated
than those required of other tax-exempt nonprofit organizations. Such added
complexity is mostly due to the additional financial impact on tax revenues
because charities are also eligible to receive tax deductible donations from the
public. 111 The IRS, by granting an organization tax-exempt charitable status,
not only saves the organization from the requirement to pay federal income tax,
but also communicates assurances to potential donors that donations will be
used for charitable purposes.

3.2. Theories of Charitable Exemption

Traditional theories of the charitable tax exemption are principally based on
concepts of economic efficiency. These efficiency-based theories explain the
charitable tax exemption as either a subsidy by government for public goods, a
necessary result of using net income to define tax liability, or a means of
compensating charities for capital constraints. Other efficiency-based theories
contend that the charitable tax exemption is either a payment for an entity's
ability to garner donations or a means of compensating charities for the risk
111

See David Brennen, A Diversity Theory of Charitable Tax Exemption- Beyond Efficiency,
Through Critical Race Theory, Toward Diversity, 4 Pitt. Tax Rev. l. (2006) at 3-5, discussing
that the added complexity could be related to something that has nothing to do with dollars, or
perhaps the added complexity has something to do with the nature of charities in a market
society, and the reason charities are eligible to receive tax deductible contributions is that they
are required to use these monies for charitable purposes, as opposed to mutual benefit
purposes as is the case with other tax-exempt nonprofit organizations
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they assume in providing public goods. Each of these economic theories for
the charitable tax exemption has its strengths and its weaknesses. They are
also useful in sculpting the contours of the charitable tax exemption. However,
these traditional theories lack significant non-economic considerations, which,
ultimately, make them incomplete. This explanatory deficiency also means
that these efficiency theories cannot fully guide us in sculpting the contours of
. bl e tax exemptiOn
. Iaw. 112
chanta

3.2.1. The traditional Public Benefit Subsidy Theory

The public benefit subsidy theory views the charitable tax exemption as an
approach whereby the government pays organizations consistently engaged in
providing public goods. In other words, charitable tax exemption is offered
essentially to "pay" or "compensate" private entities that supply public goods
and services as noted in Bob Jones University v. United States.m The theory
fundamentally assumes that the government subsidizes certain "goods" or
"services" that it either cannot or will not supply on its own due to various
constraints, such as constitutional constraints as to religion and political
constraints as to campaign support. Another assumption underlies this theory
is that government, under neutral principles, can determine what constitutes a
public good or service for purposes of the charitable tax exemption. Therefore,
112

See Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis,
Antithesis and Syntheses", in P. Bater et al. The Tax Treatment ofNGOs, 253-283
113
See Brennen, supra Ill at 6-8, arguing that charitable exemptions are justified on the basis
that the exempt entity confers a public benefit-a benefit which the society or the community
may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and advances the work of
public institutions already supported by tax revenues. History buttresses logic to make clear
that, to warrant exemption under § 50l(c)(3), an institution must fall within a category
specified in that section and must demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public
interest. The institution's purpose must not be so at odds with the common community
conscience as to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be conferred
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the government somehow takes exemption as a form of financial support for
charities on what they produce.
The traditional subsidy theory alone does not fully validate the charitable tax
exemption. One problem with the theory is that it fails to justify why
governmental financial support for charities has to be a tax exemption rather
than a direct grant or privileged access to resources. Meanwhile, this theory
does not identify a coherent protocol as to what goods and services are for the
public benefit. For this instance, although the neutral market principles might
drive the process of deciding what benefits the public, 114 the "neutral"
efficiency principle alone does not substantiate a basis for understanding how
a public benefit is determined.

3.2.2. The Base-Defining Theory

By pointing out the insufficiency of the public benefit subsidy theory, Boris
\

Bittker and George Rahdert proposed the base-defining theory, which
essentially states that charities (and many other nonprofit organizations) are
not suitable targets ofthe income tax and thus should be exempt from income
tax. Specifically, Bittker and Rahdert argue on the economic aspects of the
exemption:
... [Charities] should be wholly exempted
from income taxation, because [(1)] they do not
realize "income" in the ordinary sense of that
114

!d., Brennen presents that, in Bob Jones University, a private university was identified in
the charitable tax exemption statute as a public benefit-education, yet the Court held that the
education in that case was not entitled to exemption due to the presence of invidious racial
discrimination. Brennen further argues that efficiency analysis alone does not provide a
rationalization for this aspect of charitable tax exemption
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term and because, [(2)] even if they did, there is
no satisfactory way to fit the tax rate to the
ability ofthe beneficiaries to pay. 115
The base-defining theory explains that measuring the income of a charity is a
conceptually difficult, if not impossible, task.

116

Since one common

Congressional exclusion from income is gifts, money or property given with
"detached and disinterested generosity" is not usually treated as taxable
income. In checking the sources of a charity's typical revenues such as interest
on endowment, funds, membership dues, and gifts/donations, Bittker and
Rahdert summarized that, with the exception of interest on endowment funds,
charities simply do not realize revenues in of the type that constitute taxable
income. According to Bittker and Rahdert, membership dues, gifts, and
donations to the charity preferably would be categorized as excludable gifts
from members or donors. Moreover, the charitable entity itself behaves as a
mere conduit for passing the economic enrichment, which may be viewed as
excludable gifts to the charity's beneficiaries.
Another intricacy entails counting deductible expenses incurred in acquiring
revenue. Bittker and Rahdert identified charitable expenditures as potentially
including items such as staff salaries and medical welfare programs for
indigents. Firstly, considering a deductible expense as an "ordinary and
necessary expense incurred in carrying on a trade or business" activity is selfcontradictory because this treats mission-focused charitable activity as a "trade
or business". Further, even if the definition of "business" includes providing
115

See generally, Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal
Income Taxation, 85 Yale L.J. 299 (1976)
116
/d., measuring an entity's income by a determination of the entity's gross income in excess
of expenses incurred in acquiring the income. Gross income is generally any economic
enrichment that is not excluded from income by Congress
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charitable benefits, since ultimately all revenues are committed to charitable
purposes leaving no revenue to insiders as profits, a charity would essentially
have no tax liability. 117 Moreover, treating the expense as eligible for the
charitable contribution deduction is arguably unrealistic since either structural
impediments in the statute authorizing the charitable deduction or the
necessary zeroing out of income prohibit such deduction.
Another concern underlying the base-defining theory concerns the appropriate
tax rate to apply to charities. According to Bittker and Rahdert, tax rates
implicate conceptions of efficiency related to either the "benefit" or "ability to
pay" theories of taxation. 118 Difficulty in identifying beneficiaries necessarily
causes an inefficient tax on income. Moreover, charity beneficiaries might not
be able to spot the exact charitable gifts as excludable gifts and make tax
payment. There is simply no way of design a proper tax rate if charities were
to be subject to the income tax.
Although the base-defining theory centers on an economic explanation 119 of
the charitable tax exemption, it fails to address a few non-economic aspects
aside from the elimination of a financial obligation, such as justice and
fairness in resource allocation and opportunities for societal enhancement and

117

/d., net income-save for some instances of multi-year accumulations for specific purposeswould always equal zero, resulting in no tax liability.
118
/d., arguing that a charity's income should be imputed to its beneficiaries for rate
determination purposes since it is most likely the beneficiary who would bear the burden of
any tax on the charity's income. The problem, Bittker and Rahdert explain, is that the
beneficiaries are usually unknown at the time the income is received and, thus, it is nearly
impossible to determine an appropriate income tax rate. Even if the entity were taxed as a
surrogate for the beneficiaries
119
See Brennen supra Ill at 12-15, presenting that, throughout their base-defining theory,
Bittker and Rahdert explain that, even if the federal income tax were to apply to a charity's
income, it is quite likely that no tax revenue would result. However, Evelyn Brody explains
quite well in her sovereignty theory of charitable tax exemption: While most observers have
described tax exemption as a subsidy, a zero rate of tax differs qualitatively, not just
quantitatively, from a one-percent rate of tax. Tax exemption maintains an independent
distance between charities and the state. Similarly, exemption differs in an important political
way from an equivalent system of direct grants, see also generally Brody, supra I
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betterment. More precisely, Bittker and Rahdert's thesis fails to fully address a
few issues including the difference between a zero or near-zero tax liability
and a tax exemption, political activities and lobbying, the definition of
"charitable," and private foundation rules.

120

3.2.3. The Capital Formation Subsidy Theory

In response to the base-defining theory, Professor Henry Hansmann proposed
his capital formation subsidy theory on charitable tax exemption. 121 Professor
Hansmann explains that the rationale for the charitable tax exemption
concerns the access of charities to capital markets. 122 Professor Hansmann
argues that the tax exemption compensates charities for the lack of access to
capital markets, and such "capital subsidy" promotes "efficiency especially for
industries where nonprofit firms serve consumers better than their for-profit
counterparts." If markets operate at optimal efficiency, and if nonprofit
organizations are the most efficient producers of "contract failure" goods and
services, nonprofit organizations should be subsidized to grow and expand as a
societal unit.
A key to Professor Hansmann's capital subsidy theory is the notion of contract
failure which "derives from the inability of some or most consumers to make
accurate judgments concerning the quality, quantity, or price of services
120

!d., presenting that Bittker and Rahdert's base-defining theory uses a similar type of non
base-defining (non-economic) analysis to fully account for the educational exemption for
museums, colleges, and orchestras
121
See H. Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate
Income Taxation, 91 Yale L.J. 54 (1981)
122
!d., Professor Hansmann explains: [T]he best justification for the exemption is that it helps
to compensate for the constraints on capital formation that nonprofit organizations commonly
face, and that such compensation can serve a useful purpose, at least for those classes of
nonprofit organizations that operate in industries in which, for various reasons, nonprofit firms
are likely to serve consumers better than would profit-seeking firms
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provided by alternative producers." Professor Hansmann typically used the
American Red Cross 123 to exemplify contract failure in that nonprofit firms are
more efficient than for-profit firms in circumstances of contract failure.

124

Professor Hansmann explains that constraints on the ability of nonprofit
organizations to obtain capital make their income tax exemption appropriate.
With the three major sources of funding for nonprofit organizations being debt,
donations, and retained earnings, unlike for-profit firms, charities do not have
access to equity capital and cannot issue shares. Nonprofit organizations also
simply fail to obtain appropriate debt capital due to high bankruptcy rates and
operative risks involving loans. Notably, donations are also problematic due to
their uncertainties and insecurities. Therefore, nonprofit organizations roughly
should rely entirely on retained earnings to operate and develop. Professor
Hansmann further argues that the exemption is necessarily based on the lack
of access to capital and contract failure experienced by nonprofit organizations.
Similar to the base-defining theory, the capital formation subsidy theory fails
to articulate a few issues that have no necessary connection to economic
efficiency, such as exemption to commercial nonprofit organizations 125 that
produce simple standardized services, and the assertion that nonprofit
hospitals should not be eligible for tax exemption. 126

123

See generally Brennen, supra 111, arguing that, Professor Hansmann thinks nonprofit
firms are more efficient than for-profit firms in providing certain types of contract failure
services because of the nondistribution constraint. Consumers are not as concerned with
nonprofit firms as they would be with for-profit firms about donations being diverted to
shareholders because nonprofit firms do not have shareholders
124
Id., at 19-21
125
ld., Brennen points that Professor Hansmann's view is the statement that "[t]here would
obviously be little point ... in granting the exemption to a nonprofit hardware store." Further,
Professor Hansmann misses that even a hardware store might provide the type of benefit,
under certain circumstances, that society wants, needs, or otherwise values
126
Id., Brennen further argues that Professor Hansmann's articulated reason for this assertion
is the lack of contract failure or need for capital evident in the hospital industry. It is important
to realize-and this is a point that Professor Hansmann and many others miss-that the value
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3.2.4. Donative Theory

The donative theory of tax exemption was developed by Mark Hall and John
Colombo. Under this theory, tax exemption is considered a subsidy, which is
justified where neither the government nor the private market effectively
provide a service that is demanded by a significant number (but not a majority)
of citizens. In order for the government to assume a duty, there must generally
be majority support. In the absence of such support, the needs of significant
sector of society may go unmet. A tax exemption thus provides a way for the
government to subsidize important services without the necessity of majority
support or the ability to control the organizations providing the services.
Voters will support tax subsidies for services provided by minority-supported
organizations in which they have no interest because they, in tum, receive tax
subsidies for services provided by other minority-supported organizations in
which they do have an interest.
Hall and Colombo use donations as a proxy for public support. If an
organization receives enough public support, the organization can be said to be
doing something that is important to a significant segment of society, which is
not being done by the government or the private sector. As such, the
organization is entitled to tax exemption. The use of donations as a measure of
inherent in a particular form of charitable organization may not be readily apparent by means
of traditional efficiency analysis. Brennen also refers to Professor Jill Horwitz's empirical
research concerning hospitals. Professor Horwitz concludes that-despite the myriad of calls for
ending tax exemption for hospitals that do not serve the poor-empirical research shows that
tax-exempt nonprofit hospitals provide societal benefits that for-profit hospitals simply do not
provide. The special benefits of nonprofit, as compared to for-profit and government hospitals
include the provision of "more profitable services than government hospitals and more
unprofitable services than for-profit hospitals." Brennen posits that though Professor Horwitz
does not conclude that these unique benefits of tax exempt nonprofit hospitals are caused by
tax exemption, she does acknowledge that this connection has not been disproven
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exemption-worthiness separates traditional nonprofit organizations from forprofit institutions, which may also benefit society but which do not receive
donations.

3.2.5. Summary

As the rationales underlying the tax exemption described above reveal, there is
no generally accepted theory explaining the existence of tax exemption.
Scholars have different rationales in explaining tax exemption for nonprofit
entities. When a state designs nonprofit tax exemption laws and policies, it is
inevitable to include all possible theoretical reasoning for more open and
inclusive discussions and hearing. It is notable that those theories do not
explain the rationales for giving tax deductions for charitable contributions
made to nonprofit entities.

3.3. Overview of financial incentives in the NGO Sector

Central to the NGO tax exemption system is the incentive under IRC section
170 - the tax deduction for charitable contributions. Sections 501(c)(3) and
170 of IRC stipulate an objective formula with measurable standards for
exemption and deductibility, and 28 categories of nonprofit organizations are
eligible for exemptions from federal income tax. However, only those that
qualify under section 50l(c)(3) are entitled for the "most favored" treatment
per se. While charitable organizations enjoy the generous tax benefits, they are,
at the same time, subject to the most stringent monitoring.
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A quantitative measurement of public support is to label a public benefit or
"charitable" organization based on the extent and type of public support it
receives. Section 50l(c)(3) classifies public support organizations into "public
charities" and "private foundations". Public charities are further categorized
into three types: donative charities under section 509(a)(l); service provider
charities under 509(a)(2); and supporting organizations under 509(a)(3). Each
type of pubic charity has its respective tax treatment based on the extent and
nature of their public support. A donative charity must raise at least one-third
of its total eligible revenues from a combination of gifts, grants and contracts
from the public sector. A service provider charity must raise at least one-third
from a combination of revenues derived from fees, admission sales, and
revenues from the sale of related products, as well as from public gifts and
grants. A supporting organization need not raise funds from the public because
of it unique affiliation with another publically supported charity.
A charitable organization has to pass the "organized" and "operated" tests
under section 501 (c )(3 ), and certain objective standards are applied in this
connection. A nonprofit organization is recognized as exempt if it is organized
for a recognized exempt purpose and is operated in service of such exempt
purpose. Since subjectivity and discretion plays an insignificant role in these
determinations, the analysis and test procedures are ascertainable and
standardized. Any organization soliciting exemption should affirmatively seek
recognition of its exempt status from the IRS. On the other hand, IRS merely
performs the role of applying and recognizing exemptions according to the
objective standards.
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IV.

The Charitable Tax-exemption System in Practice - a Further
Comparison

After briefly evaluating fundamental features of China and U.S. NGO tax
treatment systems, some important provisions in both systems are worthy of
detailed comparison. This subchapter explores the details of the differences
between the U.S. and Chinese systems. Again, this comparison is selectively
oversimplified to embrace concepts are that interpreted differently in the U.S.
and Chinese tax contexts. Therefore, the goal is to exemplify in which settings
those terms are introduced or interpreted rather than focusing on the technical
meaning of elements involved therein.

4.1. Formation and Registration

4.1.1.

u.s.

In the U.S., the organization must be "organized" for an exempt purpose. The
IRS has no discretion to approve or deny exempt status based on subjective
factors, provided the applicant organization can demonstrate that it has been
properly formed under state law and that its charter contains the appropriate
language required by Federal Law. The process is straightforward and
predictable. The applicant organization submits an "Application for
Recongnization of Exempt Status under Section 50l(c)(3)" (IRS Form 1023)
supported by a conformed copy of the Articles of Incorporation, corporate
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bylaws, various financial schedules and a narrative describing current and
planned activities programs and contemplated fundraising strategies. An
applicant organization will satisfy quite easily the organizational tests if the
governing documents articulate the organization's exempt purpose.

4.1.2. China

In China, every law student studying NGO laws knows about the difficulty of
establishing and registering an NGO. As discussed in Part II above, there are
several issues central to the registration and application ofNGOs China.

4.1.2.l.Dual Management

The dual management requirement forces many NGOs to remain unregistered
or even operate subversively because the potential supervisory agencies
probably will refuse to oversee applicant organizations. Worse is that there
may be even no appropriate supervisory agency willing to take on such a
role.

127

Although slackness to perform supervision may result in a judicial

review, obtaining approval for registration from government branches or
GONGOs that are sought as sponsoring organizations does not appear to
require them to act at all - the granting of permission is entirely discretionary
on the part of supervisory agencies. Additionally, even a tentatively complete
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See generally Simon supra 32, suggesting only those SOs that choose to be and are
defined as charity organizations, would be subject to strict scrutiny under the drafted Charity
Law. If this were to be done, the new Charity Law would contain the provisions to accomplish
the type of organizational integrity and the institutional oversight necessary for organizations
operating for public benefit
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list of required documents for submission to obtain supervisory sponsorship by
an appropriate entity does not exist. This is but one of the reasons potential
supervisory sponsors can ostensibly prolong the application process by
imposing unreasonable paperwork requests.
In this manner, the dual management requirement offers the government the
ability to manipulate the number of organizations that can be registered in a
given territory. Moreover, the Ministry of Civil Affairs may deny registration
if "in the same administrative area there is already a social organization active
in the same (xiang tong) or similar (xiang si) area of work, there is no need for
a new organization to be established." On the one hand, this provision helps to
create an orderly situation that avoids organizations with duplicated purposes,
and to eliminate malicious competition for limited social resources. On the
other, however, a this also allows the government, if it wants to control certain
area of social services, to establish an NGO beforehand or during the
application process so as to rule out the possibility of the registration of a real
NGO applicant seeking to do the same work.
The dual management system should be revoked, not only to remove barriers
to establish NGOs, but also to realize the fundamental freedom of association
as stipulated in China's 1982 Constitution Law. Advantages of removing the
dual management structure are obvious. Many temporarily formed NGOs have
made great impacts during early stages of natural disaster relief and rescue
activities. The government has been intentionally silent and permissive of
those activities conducted by unregistered NGOs, and it has thereby de facto
eliminated unnecessary administrative barriers. Arguably, a revised provision
as to dual management is more desirable allowing special or emergent
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formation of NGOs. This solution has also been implemented well in other
. sue h as Japan. 128
countnes

4.2.1.2.High Endowment Requirement for Foundations

The 2004 Foundation Regulation provides two different types of foundations:
private foundations (formed by individuals or private businesses) and publicfundraising foundations. The former kind of foundation is intended to
encourage affluent individuals and moneyed corporations to form their own
foundations to carry out charitable activities. There has clearly been a positive
response in that regard, as the giving statistics from 2007 and press reports
regarding new foundations indicate.

129

Public fund-raising foundations in

practice are mostly institutions organized nationally and staffed throughout the

°

country by the party-state itself. 13 For instance, a public benefit purpose is
required for a public fund-raising foundation, and additional review as to
formation and registration of such fund-raising foundations is validated and
expected in the application process.
Admittedly, the requirement that foundations have to maintain high
endowments or capital reserves needs further deliberation. As illustrated in
128

/d., drawing an interesting comparison between the China and Japan NGO management
system similarly preserving the fundamental freedom of association, which the Chinese
constitution guarantees the Chinese people. Only those SOs that choose to be and are defined
as charity organizations, would be subject to strict scrutiny under the new Charity Law. If this
were to be done. the new Charity Law would contain the provisions to accomplish the type of
organizational integrity and the institutional oversight necessary for organizations operating
for public benefit.
129 /d.
130
!d., Simon further argues that the regulations appear to permit the Ministry of Civil Affairs
to act as the registering and oversight agency with regard to large national private foundations,
and the experience ofthe Narada Foundation offers proof that MCA will assume this role. The
language of the regulations also opens the possibility that as a practical matter MCA may not
necessarily enforce the dual management requirement of the 2004 regulations with regard to
smaller foundations when it chooses not to
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Part II, a national private foundation is expected to keep at least two million
RMB yuan as a permanent endowment; a local private foundation that does
not engage in fund-raising is expected to invest at least two million RMB yuan
as permanent endowment. As to public fund-raising foundations, a local one
should invest at least four million yuan (U.S.$58,400) as permanent
endowment, and a national one should invest at least eight million yuan
(U.S.$116,800). Notwithstanding the legislation goal of nurturing solid and
well-standing foundations, these thresholds are somewhat haughty and may
thwart enthuse of interested parties to form and develop fund-raising
foundations.

4.2. Recognized Exempt Purpose and Definition of Charity

4.2.1.

u.s.

There are seven purposes listed in the U.S. law as recognized exempt
purposes 131 under IRC section 50l(c)(3) which are inclusive and intentionally
broad. Among the seven purposes, treasury regulations mostly interpret three
purposes comprehensively: charitable, educational, and scientific purposes. In
the meantime, the U.S. system has adopted extensive flexibility in interpreting
the other four purposes according to social realities and economic
131

J.R.C. Section 501(c)(3) stipulates ''Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or
foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur
sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic
facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the
net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no
substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting,
to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not
participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office."
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development initiatives. 132 As a result, the U.S. system has bolstered the
nonprofit sector by enabling creativity, such as through joint ventures between
the enterprise and government to serve both the investment capital needs and
encourage continued commitment to public benefit. 133 As to the educational
and scientific areas, the Treasury has expanded the original tax treatment by
providing a mechanism for accommodating distance learning technologies and
unconventional classrooms along with interactive internet activities.

4.2.2. China

The exempt purpose determination usually depends on the definition and
coherency of the term "charity" in China. A careful reading of current laws
and regulations will reveal several different definitions of "charity." In
practice, the adoption of the conception "public benefit" to define charitable
organization is widely accepted by many jurisdictions. For example, the
English Charities Act 2006 clarifies the definition of "charity" by emphasizing
that public benefit be created. 134
The definition of charity also appears to differ from that of "public welfare"
for public welfare trusts (gongyi xintuo) stipulated in the Trust Law, while the
"public benefit" terminology used in the 2004 Foundation Regulation and the
132

See GCM 36993 (1977), providing that innovative enterprises qualify under section
501(c)(3) for passing the organization test as long as they I) lessen burdens of government, 2)
promote community welfare by lessening neighborhood tensions, 3) eliminate prejudice and
discrimination and 4) defend human and civil rights served by law or 5) combat community
deterioration and juvenile delinquency.
133
See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-12, I.R.B. 6.; see also Redlands Surgical Services v.
Commissioner, 242 F. 3'd 904 (91h Cir. 2001), both of which determined that a nonprofit
hospital and a for-profit healthcare company could form an LLC to benefit both parties, on the
conditions that the nonprofit serve as the general partner and that the exempt purpose drive the
enterprise. Furthermore, the LLC's board would be required to reflect the majority interest of
the exempt organization and retain its control over the nonprofit hospital.
134
See generally supra 19
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tax rules defines charity with broader scope. Gong yi is the term used in
almost all of these legal documents. It is defined in Article 60 of the Trust Law
in the context of "public welfare trusts" and in Article 3 of the Public Welfare
Donation Law in the context of "public welfare undertakings" (gongyi shiye).
The Foundation Regulations include no definition of "public welfare," but
refer to the term public welfare institutions (gong yi shiye) in Article 2 to
define foundations. And the language in the new tax rules with regard to
entities qualifying to receive donations is that they must use the money "for
education, civil affairs, other public welfare undertakings, or for the districts
that suffer from natural disasters or the poverty-stricken districts." In fact, the
word for "charity" (cishan) 135 has only been used one time, at the time of this
writing, in Chinese laws and regulations. In Article 10, Paragraph 2 of the
PWDL, there is a reference to the regulations of social organizations being
established "with the principal aim of developing charities."
According to Professor Karla Simon, the definition of "charity" in the draft
Charity Law incorporates certain enumerated purposes in Article 3 of the
PWDL: 136
- Emergency and crisis relief for regions, individuals and groups in
difficulty;
- Relief for disadvantaged people;
- Education, health, science, culture, sports for social benefit; and,
- Promotion of urban and rural community development and
environment.
In addition to the above specifically enumerated categories, Article 3,
135

!d., stating that there has been some consideration in the Chinese literature of whether the
meaning of the two terms is actually the same or different.
136
See Simon supra 32 at 946
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Paragraph 5 also includes the term "other charitable activities," which
provides for future development of the concept of charity.
Therefore, an expansive definition of "charity" should be considered and
adopted. As Lee proposed, a charity should be regarded as an eligible charity
so long as it: 1) is organized and operated exclusively for public benefit
purposes by engaging in public welfare activities (including emergency relief,
relief for the poor, education, health and social benefit, promotion of
community development, etc.); 2) contains restraints on distribution of profits,
dividends, or assets to its members (non-distribution constraints) and 3) is
required to spend its remaining assets on charitable purposes after its
termination.

4.3. Requirement of Operation for an Exempt Purpose

4.3.1.

u.s.

The operational test in the U.S. system views the organization's financial and
program activities as indicators of its operations, and such review is monitored
on an annual basis. 137 Usually, the IRS will wait and see how newly formed
and approved nonprofit organizations operate and behave by issuing a
provisional "advance ruling" for a four year period, in which the organization
can demonstrate its operations in a more concrete manner. At the end of the
four-year period, the IRS assesses the organization's level of public support
and makes a final determination as to exempt status.

137

See Brennen supra Ill, at 6-8
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Admittedly, the operational test has been quite flexible over decades of
development and practice. It recognizes the importance of monetary resources
for the nonprofit organizations. Mostly, it enables the organization to charge
fees for services and general dues and non-dues-based revenues without
compromising its exempt status.
An exempt organization needs to file an annual information return (Form 990)
to the IRS if it receives more than $25,000 in annual revenues and is not a
church. The Form 990 asks pointed questions about the organization's
program, activities, contributions, grants, compensation and administrative
expenses. Moreover, the U.S. system recently improved accountability of
exempt organizations by posting all related available information online to
promote visibility and exposure. Undoubtedly, this practice makes ensures the
exempt organizations continue to operate in the interest of their initial exempt
purpose.

4.3.2. China

Monitoring the operation of nonprofit organizations in China presents one of
the crucial problems in the development of nonprofit sector. It is not even
clear he extent to which currently registered nonprofit organizations of all
three types need to go through administrative applications and oversight
processes in order to become "verified charities" or the exact benefits if they
get verified.
A primary problem is determining institutionally which government organ is
the overseeing authority as to the activities of nonprofit organizations. Given
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the dual management requirement for nonprofit organizations, it appears that
an additional layer of supervisory authority is necessary, however burdensome
this might be. It has been suggested that a new agency should be created to
oversee all the aspects of institutional development, transparency and
accountability (reporting requirements) without involving a sponsoring
organization in the formation process.
Unlike the IRS in the U.S. system, the Chinese MCA and SAT are most likely
to involve the verification process of all nonprofit organizations, however, due
to the

intergovernmental conflicts and staffing problems, nonprofit

organizations are not able to cost-efficiently manage the administrative
reporting procedures to two departments, especially for deciding the exempt
status. As evidenced in the 2007 Ruling, there are very weak links between
MCA accreditation and SAT approval of tax exempt status. Therefore,
scholars have proposed a separate "Public Benefit Commission" to supervise
the charitable status of all nonprofit organizations.

However, due to the

infrastructure complexities in the party-state China, this proposal is too ideal
to implement.
In addition, due to the blurred boundaries among the three types of nonprofit
organization in China, a uniform reporting form like the U.S. Form 990 is
neither wise nor feasible. On the other hand, if each form of nonprofit
organizations has its own reporting scheme, the administrative costs will limit
the government's ability to adopt further monitoring and verification
procedures.
Finally, many nonprofit organizations in China may even want to register as a
commercial enterprise to carry on its exempt purpose. This is especially true
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of a few foundations set up by foreign individuals or international
philanthropic organizations.

These foundations still benefit from taxpayer

friendly provisions to enjoy tax holidays while avoiding arduous NGO
registration and operative process.

4.4. Prohibition of Private Inurement

4.4.1. U.S.
The IRS historically took a zero tolerance policy for personal benefits inuring
to any person with influence over the decision-making affairs of a charitable
organization. The IRS had to revoke the exempt status after it found a
violation of this rule. However, to balance the IRS and charitable community,
the Congress added a new provision IRC Section 4958, i.e. the Intermediate
Sanction clause, to the IRC. The Intermediate Sanctions focused on "excess
benefit transactions" by disqualified persons and legislated a two-tier excise
tax designed to punish the wrongdoer while spring the charity. Under this rule,
it is unjust enrichment transactions and their perpetrators that are sanctioned,
but not the charitable organizations.
By adopting the Intermediate Sanctions, the U.S. scheme again exhibited its
flexibility in balancing interests and competing tensions. Congress admits that
most charitable organizations behave properly; the Intermediate Sanctions
creates a safe harbor for the majority of nonprofit organizations and their
volunteers, staff and directors. Under Section 4958, an organization is
compliant with section 501(3)(c) if it i) maintains proper records, ii) obtains
comparability data regarding compensation arrangements and iii) has a
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conflict of interests policy.

4.4.2. China

The nonprofit sector has been infected with accountability issues since the
every outset. In particular, the efficient and responsible use of the funds is now
a public concern. A challenging accountability problem relates to corruption.
China's notorious corruption makes it less certain that charitable donations
reach the hands of those most in need and that no personal interests of
management personnel are involved. Widespread fears of corruption or
misappropriation of donated funds even stop the general public to donate or
switch to foreign nonprofit organizations which presumably have less
accountability issues.
A frustrating observation as to China's nonprofit organizational scheme is that
the values of accountability, transparency, and performance evaluation are so
downplayed in practice. Not surprisingly, the bad practice of non-observance
and lax implementation is displayed here. Article 21 of the Public Welfare
Donations Law provides for the donor's right to access information about the
use and management of the donations. The Foundations Regulations have
similar provisions. All current laws contain regulations on submissions of
annual reports to the relevant administrative authority. However, only the
Foundation Regulations contain a duty of disclosure of information, requiring
foundations to make the relevant annual reports public through media channels
to provide for public enforcement of accountability. Thus, compared to
information disclosure requirements of for-profit listed companies, disclosure
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requirements for charitable organizations are still very primitive and underdeveloped.
The misalignment of interests and information provides charity management
with great decision-making discretion. In order to prevent abuses, appropriate
checks and balances must be put in place to protect charity assets and ensure
the accountability of persons who control them. Appropriate use of checks and
balances to improve governance would be beneficial to the charitable sector as
a whole. Well-governed charitable organizations are more likely to enjoy
greater public confidence, which is critical for fund-raising. Conversely,
ineffective charitable governance may reduce the ability of the charitable
organizations to carry out their missions.

138

Another aspect deserving attention is that internal government and financial
management remains under-regulated. For example, Article 15 of the Social
Organizations Regulations requires that a social organization set out the
qualifications, powers, and duties of its members. However, the Regulations
give little additional guidance. For example, the Regulations do provide that
the highest authority rests with the members, but does not specify the scope of
their authority. The Regulations should clearly delineate the powers and
authorities that members can exercise at their meetings, including the power to
amend the organization's constitution, appoint or remove directors, and
dissolve the organization. The Regulations should also include procedures for

138

See Simon supra 32, suggesting that ninety-nine percent of corporations in China did not
engage in any form of charitable donations. While this may be explained partly by the fact that
any concept of corporate social responsibility is still embryonic among Chinese corporations,
it also partly reflects the lack of efficiency and accountability, and in turn, the lack of public
confidence in the charitable sector

555

calling meetings and passing resolutions. 139
Regarding the duty of loyalty, only the Foundation Regulations prohibit a
director and the director's associates from engaging in "self-dealing" with their
foundation. This approach must be amended so that all senior officers and
board members of a charitable organization are subject to duties of care and
diligence, as well as a fiduciary duty of loyalty that prohibits them from
having actual or potential conflicts of interest. Guidelines on how to deal with
board conflicts would help the management understand its responsibilities. At
the same time, because a voluntary board of trustees usually governs
charitable organizations, the law should provide that they may be relieved of
personal liability for breaches of certain duties if the court believes they acted
honestly and reasonably or in "good faith."

4.5. Political Activity and Support by NGOs

4.5.1.

u.s.

Although the U.S. tax exempt scheme has evolved showing flexibility and
tolerance to various economic needs and social services, the ban against
political action remains absolute. This prohibition insures the separation of
fiscal policy and political interests, thereby protecting the integrity and the
independence of the nonprofit sector. Direct or grassroots lobbying is
139

See generally supra 103, stating that good governance starts with the ability to recruit and
retain an effective governing board. This requires clear rules on the procedures for the
appointment and removal of directors, the qualifications and number of directors, the duration
of their appointments, and the terms of remuneration. The Regulations should also specizy the
duties and the potential liabilities of the board. While all laws currently governing the main
types of charitable organizations prohibit misappropriation of the organization's funds, they
fail to stipulate any duty of care for directors respecting their management duties
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permitted so long as it not substantial. The IRC section 501(h)'s "election"
provides a mechanism by which an organization can elect to exceed specific
amounts of lobbying activity in exchange for voluntarily submitting to an
excise tax tied to its lobbying expenditures.

4.5.2. China

Political and lobbying activities are rare for and foreign to the nonprofit sector
in China. The party-state China almost prohibits nongovernment entities to be
involved in any potentially harmful activities or association to the communist
reign. For instance, the government itself intentionally forms certain semigovernmental NGOs to perform social services that are not appropriate for the
party-state to carry over. Fine examples ofthose semi-governmental NGOs are
Chinese Writers' Association, All-China Workers Union and All-China
Women Federation, and usually government officials are appointed to serve in
leading or management roles in those organizations, some NGOs even have a
branch of the party as a monitoring organ to supervise related activities.
Therefore, some scholars argue that certain activities are politically sensitive,
but piercing the veil would reveal that those semi-government NGOs be real
government organs and political activities are almost never conducted without
being controlled by the government.
This situation reflects historical concerns about the potential of NGOs to
foment political dissent. The distrust of NGOs still limits the access to the
constitutional right of freedom of association, and also stalls the development
of NGOs as a responsive and flexible sector to supplement government
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services.

4.6. NGO Asset Management upon Dissolution, Termination and
Liquidation

4.6.1.

u.s.

The U.S. scheme requires that charitable assets remain within the charitable
sector. An exempt organization may not dissolve, terminate or liquidate
without insuring that assets remaining after paying outstanding liabilities
remain within the charitable sector. The board of directors of a dissolving
organization may select an appropriate charitable recipient with a similar
mission; however, under no circumstance can those assets be diverted to noncharitable recipients or for no-charitable purpose. This rule was tested
repeatedly in the 1990's when nonprofit organizations, usually community
healthcare institutions, merged with for-profit hospital chains. As a result,
foundations were set up to administer charitable assets after closing, and this
situation prompted various states' Attorneys General to implement protocols
to govern such transactions and to seek court approval for the allocation of the
assets before the transaction was completed. 140

140

This thesis shares Professor Douglas Kahn's concerns that unrelated business tax (UBT),
which has been established in the U.S. for decades, has not receive enough attention from the
Chinese tax authorities. Moreover, the current tax legislature is not evident in monitoring the
business activities ofNGOs.
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4.6.2. China

The treatment of dissolved or liquated NGOs is a deep loophole in China's
NGO legislation. Provisions on termination and liquidation of three forms of
NGOs in China are scattered over various laws and regulations, and most of
them are hard to implement or lack specific guidance in practice. For example,
Chapter 6 of the Trust Law stipulates the definition, creation, and termination
of a trust. However, there are no delineated rules on how to treat the assets
after paying all liabilities. Moreover, as discuss in Part II 141 , the 2007 Ruling
by MOP and SAT stipulates that exempt organizations "may not distribute any
surplus upon dissolution or termination," but this requirement is vague.
Typically, the 2007 Ruling does not establish any detailed procedures to
handle assets after dissolution and termination.

4.7. Tax Culture

4.7.1.

u.s.

The divergence between the nonprofit tax exemption in practice in the U.S.
and China can be attributed to the significant distinctions in the tax cultures of
the two countries. First, the U.S. tax exemption scheme evolved through a
long process, by balancing social needs and economic development, as well as
bridging the gap between the Congress, the IRS, and the nonprofit sector. In
China, the first law dealing with a rudimentary form of nonprofit organizations

141

See supra 90
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of modem conception was only adopted in 1989, after the party-state system
was shocked by the democratic movement and surges of grassroots social
movement. The development of nonprofit tax exemption scheme in China has
been a long painful process, even there are quite many transplantable values
and principles underlying modem tax law, such as, rule of law, the ideology of
freedom of association and cohesive legal infrastructure. While the SAT and
MCA have conducted quite good preparations by inviting leading scholars and
legislation consultants to design the charity law and related lessons from other
countries, the gap between the law on paper (which has been transplanted
from the West) and the law in action (which is defined by local conditions) is
still huge.
Moreover, the U.S. scheme is created in a federalist system, which has two
sovereign governments - state and national - each has its own authority on the
nonprofit sector. China, in contrast, is a party-state system that one central
government has formal authority over administrative subdivisions that
promulgate and implement the law. This creates the low efficiency in China in
carrying out and designing detailed rules for specific questions, let alone the
huge disparity as to the development level among different localities in China.
In addition to an established system of financial incentives including tax
exemption and tax deduction, U.S. history has created a culture of giving and
philanthropic activities, especially those associated with church and healthcare
institutions, which are protected by the constitutional right of freedom of
religion.
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4.7.2. China

These factors are currently deficient in China. The Chinese style of tax law
drafting makes it difficult for nonprofit organizations to engage in the charity
sector and related tax planning common in the U.S. To begin with, the text of
the law is unclear in many respects, such as the definition of charity, the
regulations on internal governance, the registration process, judicial review,
and administrative processes. While the U.S. scheme mostly rests on sections
50l(c)(3) and 170, the IRS has promulgated various regulations, rulings, and
notices to guide the practice, and case law also makes up a substantial part of
the content of the existing scheme. In China:, however, the situation is almost
the opposite of the U.S. scheme. The scattered regulations as to tax
exemptions and tax deduction are vague and subject to too much discretional
review of MCA and SAT. The "opaque" nature of tax legislation also fails
taxpayers in following the laws and drives applicant organizations into lengthy
process of application and registration.
Another important point is that the general public in China has a long tradition
of philanthropic and charitable giving. However, the distrust or fears for
unreasonable usage and corruption do inhibit charitable giving even after more
functional tax laws and regulations are promulgated in the future. This concern
in return leads to the formation of many grassroots or underground NGOs,
which sometimes again deepen the insecurities of donors of their charitable
giving or donations.
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V.

Conclusion- An egg vs. an orange

This chapter contributes the comparisons ofthe tax exemption schemes in U.S.
and China in three folds of consideration. First, given the tremendous
development of China's nonprofit sector, not many comprehensive studies
have been completed on reforms thereof. The tax treatment of nonprofit
organizations, as the crucial component to construct a nonprofit sector, is
unsophisticated and short of practical significance. Echoing China's success in
economic growth in the past decades, literature on Chinese tax typically
focuses on tax incentives for foreign direct investment and tax policies
catering to economic development. This shortage shows the prejudice against
the nascent nonprofit sector as a partner of the state. Second, under the rule of
law construct in the past decade, some scholars suggest China might
modernize its nonprofit sector through an "all-in" charity code or
unrealistically cultivate expansive grassroots NGOs. The study of the
nonprofit sector has to embody a down-to-earth understanding of China' legal
and political settings. Third, commercial implications of the nonprofit sector
invite studies of its tax treatment. Given China's integration into the WTO and
heightened complaints over national treatment and fair competition, a key
issue arising is that the profitability of foreign investment shrinks as the tax
preferential treatment is gradually discounted. The profitable potential of
nonprofit organizations

as

foreign

investment vehicles

may

induce

inappropriate tax planning activities. Therefore, it is never too late to develop
a tax framework for the nonprofit sector.
The expansion of the nonprofit sector in the past decades has resulted in many
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problems with its tax framework. Doubting the suggestion of promulgating a
comprehensive charity law, this thesis does not suggest any unrealistic idea of
transplanting all valid and enabling values under the U.S. tax exemption
system to China. The prime incentive for the tax deduction has not been
solidly rooted in the general public. There is a lack of stimulating push for the
tax authorities and MCA to adopt a systematic responsive reform measures.
However, some positive reforms especially on the tax exemption and tax
deduction in the nonprofit sector are more implementable and manageable. A
comparison of tax treatment in U.S. and China on nonprofit sector would
reveal the following observations.

First, the public benefit or charity purpose of nonprofit organizations has not
been coherently defined. This confusion predictably inhibits the development
of the nonprofit sector by stalling interested corporate and individual donors to
take exemption and tax deduction.

Second, China has not set up an enforceable fiscal incentive system to promote
charitable donations. The administrative procedure of obtaining a tax exempt
certificate is arduous and discourages donors from donating or causes them to
abandon obtaining the certificate, which worsens the efforts to modernize the
scheme.

Third, there are still burdensome requirements for the application and
registration of nonprofit organizations, such as dual management, high
threshold of capital endowment for foundations and prohibition on crossregion development;

Fourth, the administration and supervision on the internal management,
human and resource, and financial and accounting management of nonprofit
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organizations are very weak. China's complex administrative system for the
nonprofit sector, including the MCA, MOF and SAT, is bad at managing fund
raising, appropriate usage of donations, and profiteering from donations.
Corruption has also been a major concern of the general public discouraging
them from making donations.
Fifth, the determination of tax-exempt status and review of such status is ad
hoc and different from locality to locality. Such irregularities on one hand

invite unethical manipulation of tax preferential policies, and create resistance
to making donations through locally available venues.
U.S. tax system for the nonprofit sector arguably embraces maturity,
objectivity, flexibility and accountability. Evolving throughout the course U.S.
history, the U.S. scheme relies solidly on regulatory authority, government
authority checks and balances, and confidence in the rugged individualism of
American democracy. The qualification requirement to enjoy benefit of tax
exemption is objective and subjects to minimum level of discretional review.
Meanwhile, as an outcome-based set of measures, it enables the nonprofit
sector to adapt to new economic development and strike a continuous balance
between external regulation and internal government.
From a jurisprudential perspective, in the Chinese tax context two cautions are
methodologically identified. First, the scarcity of decent comparative legal tax
scholarship in general does not support quality comparison. A shortage of
paradigmatic discourse shows the simultaneous existence of bluntly
conflicting arguments, parallel courses, and irregularities in analysis. Although
some comparative tax frameworks have been proposed or compiled, their
value to the Chinese tax context is not evident. For this reason, this thesis
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argues that a comparative tax study relating to China might be better achieved
by focusing on a full "tax law sub-discipline" rather than on a specific tax
concept. One reason is that a western-originated tax concept might be too
narrow to meaningfully inform a Chinese policy orientation. The other reason
is that it lacks generality necessary to apply it to other subsidiaries oftax law.
Second, the tax cultural traditions and social, political and legal settings of a
systematic tax governance framework should be included in tax comparativists'
theorizations. A tax study ultimately has to be conducted from a "big-picture"
perspective in which a tax system is embedded. Otherwise, a comparative
study may easily turns into descriptive, mechanical and perfunctory analysis.
The practical and scholastic significance of comparative tax studies can hardly
be achieved by a limited comparison falling on the technical elements of a tax
concept. This "big-picture" perspective is also in line with the rationale
applicable to both the rule of law construct and assimilation to the WTO
system. This thesis therefore tentatively incorporates tax culture into its
considerations to compare primary elements of nonprofit tax schemes of U.S.
and China. It argues that a comprehensive tax transplant effort of valued ideas
and practices, whilst bold and uncomfortable for the recipient country at the
beginning, is what China needs to build a robust nonprofit sector.
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CHAPTER IX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This thesis aims to prepare a reasonable, handy and realistic foundation with
which to evaluate the progress of the Chinese tax law reform. Pushing this goal
further, this thesis tentatively submits - on the basis of debates on the rule of law
and understanding of the WTO principles applicable to China - a tailored,
pragmatic and practical set of proposals for the tax reform under China's current
legal infrastructure. The proposals are underpinned by instrumental notions of the
rule of law rhetoric, inter alia, generality, clarity, consistency, enforceability,
stability, congruence, and substantive notions of judicial independence, human
rights and the limitations of bureaucratic government with regard to the nonprofit
sector.
In terms of background, this thesis submits that economic globalization has been
realized not only through supranational legal regimes such as the WTO, but
through reforms to regulatory regimes and national laws advocated by
international institutions. These reforms have furthered deliberate policy choices
to liberalize trade and capital mobility, deregulate markets, increase commercial
participation, and eliminate cross-border transactional barriers. Moreover, the
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post-World War II development strategy of many developing or transitional
economies has included a special role for tax policy. All types of taxes,
particularly trade related taxes, are legitimate tools of the state in monitoring the
development process. Today, tax reforms mainly aim to establish a diverse mix
of taxes that will encourage savings and capital investment in open market
economies, since development priorities have shifted from promoting selfsufficiency and subsidizing domestic industry to encouraging export-led growth
and improving global market participation.

Legal system reforms typically

involve transplanting legal theories and institutions across borders.

Tax

governance, with its focus on institutional reform and (re)construction, has been a
focal point to facilitate legal system construct. This thesis also engages a short
empirical survey before discussing relevant theories, principles and analyses and
raising reform proposals on specific tax law topics. Such statistical analysis aids
understanding of the rationales that the overall circumstances of social and
political settings, economy size, position in global trading, international voicing
power, national treasury scale, and composition of tax revenue call for a set of
quality proposals in the Chinese tax context.
As tax reform has been a crucial component of economic development initiatives
and structural adjustment programs for developing countries, it usually focus on
universal development goals including a single-rate, broad-based VAT to replace
older-style sales taxes, a low-rate, broad-based corporate and personal income tax,
tax neutrality, and the reduction or eventual elimination of tariffs. Moreover, the
WTO distinguishes its role by indirectly interfering in domestic tax law reforms
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under the aegis of protecting free trade in domestic tax systems. The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) underlying all WTO activities includes
the key principles of non-discrimination and liberalization of trade. The nondiscrimination obligation is comprised of the Most-favored-nation (MFN)
principle, 1 which demands that trade concessions granted to any country be
extended equally to all other WTO members, and the National Treatment (NT)
principle, 2 which requires that no internal tax, charge, law, regulation or other
measure should discriminate between domestic and foreign suppliers.
A decade after China formally became the 143rd member of the WTO on
December 11, 2001, the WTO's technical assistance has been more than plugging
up loopholes or to crafting an implementation structure; rather, it aims to imbue
tax reforms with broader legal theories and structures conducive to international
trade. This thesis believes that an overview of China's rule of law order and postWTO legal reform is necessary for a discussion of the tax system reform. In
particular, the establishment of a "socialist rule of law order" and commitments
by the government to act "in accordance with law" have been incorporated as
amendments into China's Constitution. Consideration is also given to contested
rhetorical conceptions of the rule of law. Debates between instrumental and
substantive, positivist and natural law, and thin and thick models of the rule of
law, as well as the economic development rhetoric discussed ad infinitum in the
literature are all reviewed.

1

See General Agreement on Tariffs And Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, Art. I, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194.
2
/d., Art. III

568

This thesis suggests that the need to conceptualize a "rule of law-Chinese tax laws
reform rhetoric is too grand and too premature to undertake. First, the
development of a socialist rule of law is a paradox, being receptive to market
economy principles and modernizing state and private enterprise governance on
the one hand, while unabashedly preserving an autocratic form of socialism on the
other. Such a paradox can only be described as "the socialist rule of law with
Chinese Characteristics." Second, the tax law reform, which contains elements of
traditional conceptions of the rule of law, cannot be understood independently
from China's social, political, economic and legal inheritances. Different from
Western jurisdictions with liberal democratic frameworks, under China's quasisocialist, soft authoritarian system, the social-political evolution influences the
theory and interpretations of the rule of law in many ways as to China's tax
reform.
This thesis argues that China's accession into the WTO has been a double-edged
sword. A close examination of China's accession commitments reveals that
effective economic reform and trade liberalization call for substantiations from a
matching legal infrastructure reform. This is particularly evident in the Chinese
tax law context. WTO principles and the rule of law requirements must be
introduced and evaluated together in tax law reform proposals. WTO principles of
transparency, uniform and impartial administration, judicial review match the
instrumentalist's rule of law elements of consistency, generality, predictability,
enforceability, stability and congruence, and the substantive rule of law
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framework's requirements of democracy, limited government, accountable
administrative decision-making, and judicial independence.
This thesis further presents that China's tax law system is administrative in nature
but this characterization is complicated by legislative and judicial functions in the
tax law. In this sense, the tax law reform benefits from as well as is circumvented
by the post-WTO legal reform. The accession to WTO bounds China calling for
transparency, consistency, simplicity and certainty in terms of tax legislations at
both national and local levels. The hierarchical tax administration structure should
not impede enforcement of tax laws. Uniform and impartial administration of tax
regulations at various local levels should be eliminated or reduced to a level
acceptable to guarantee well-grounded tax administrative decisions and facilitate
tax judicature independence. Given the growing awareness of taxpayers' rights,
tax authorities should not dwell at the stereotype "monitor" position proclaiming
obligation to pay tax, rather, a workable system of protections should be
established and honored. Moreover, the tax treatment of the nonprofits sector as
the third sector of the society should be formulated and enforced. This thesis
contributes a few findings after examining the status quo of China's current tax
law system.
As to tax legislation, Chapter V concludes that the tax legislation reform has
endured a painful process of simplification, unification and the revenue sharing
scheme. Tax legislation started as FDI driven and incentive-focused, and so the
structure of tax legislation was imbalanced from the very beginning without
honoring tax equity and efficiency. Meanwhile, China's tax legislation reform is
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complicated under WTO Agreements and the rule of law order. In particular, rules
and principles of WTO Agreements call for China's turnover tax, enterprise
income tax and individual income tax legislation and reform to incorporate nondiscrimination principles and the transparency requirement. Chapter V further
shares and agrees with Avi-Yonah's proposal that, answers to fine-tune China's
tax legislation system might be found in an international tax arena through a
multilateral solution. It is essential that the fundamental goals of taxation and
WTO principles should be achieved in terms of revenue collection, social wealth
redistribution, transparency, uniform and impartial administration, and judicial
review. Equally important is to incorporate elements of the rule of law order as
well as to integrate China's tax legislation with an international perspective of
facilitating development and institutionalization of the tax system.
As to tax judicature, Chapter VI concludes that the tax judicature reform in China
should consider both the idea of permanence and that of flexibility. It must
balance the dynamic between tax administration, the general judiciary framework,
and taxpayers' rights. As law supports the government's political authority as well
as the power of the legal system, the principles and tenets of the tax judicature
system should be enshrined in a jurisprudential manner, honoring the rule of law
order.
Chapter VI also submits the a few proposals for China's tax judicature reform: (1)
the full-payment rule should be abolished. For an adverse tax collection decision,
a taxpayer does not need to pay the assessed payment or provide guarantee at the
first place before filing an application for a tax administrative reconsideration. (2)
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This thesis contributes the novel notion that a summary judgment procedure
should be established for small tax cases as a tax collection procedure. (3) China
should design a better scheme for administrative reconsideration, but the structure
must be calculated and designed. (4)Tax expertise can be strengthened by teaming
up more experienced personnel with specialty in tax. (5) At county or lowest
hierarchical government levels, abstract administrative acts should be subject to
judicial review, and this reform may start as experimental at a few coastal
localities with better tax talents. (6) Echoing the debates regarding the imaginary
Chinese tax court system, this chapter submits a tentative proposal. The desirable
structure is to adopt a circuit tax courts framework exercising both original
(conditioned first instance) and appellate jurisdiction sitting permanently in six to
eight regions covering nationwide territory and reporting to the SPC Tax Tribunal
based in Beijing. The designated High Tax Tribunal should be an SPC subsidiary
and should have the ultimate appellate jurisdiction over tax cases appealed at
circuit tax courts and provincial high courts, and perform tax court system
administration or management. Meanwhile, the transitory, costly and overhauling
midlist "spin-off' structure should be denounced based on tax policy routines.
As to taxpayers' rights, Chapter VII evidences that Chinese taxpayers' rights are
limited by the inherent deficiencies in the general tax framework. This is
particularly manifested by the discrepancy in the internal management of tax
authorities. Moreover,.because secondary legal rights, administrative rights and
the principles of good conduct of tax authorities are put together in the Tax
Collection Law and the Proclamation, the protection of each right is not
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guaranteed with enough singularity and attention, and the separation of those rules
and its impact should be considered.

Chapter VII summarizes that, China's tax system overall still provides a
problematic, yet promising, framework to channel available legal remedies,
administrative and judicial, for taxpayers. This thesis further supports the
protection of taxpayers' rights centers as a key element substantiating China's
construct of the rule of law order and fulfillment of WTO principles. Chinese
taxpayers' rights should theme with a fair, transparent, certain, consistent,

equitable, effective, and clear manner within the framework of the tax laws.
Meanwhile, the WTO principles attach assimilation into international taxpayers'
rights routine and vitality in designing and rectifYing Chinese taxpayers' rights in
terms of administration and adjudication. China's tax laws should embody and
honor the transparency, uniformity and impartiality and judicial review principles
with a full set of niceties and convenient courses of action in taxpayers' protection.

Chapter VII concludes a summarized proposal for refining China's taxpayers'
rights protection, based on the positivist view in jurisprudence for taxpayers, the
rule of law order, and WTO principles. This proposal balances practical
significance and largely is underpinned by points of consensus among tax
authorities and taxpayers alike. In this sense, it is not a reordering or
rearrangement of existing prescribed rights, rather, it is submitted being reflective
of daily practice.
As to NGO tax treatment and comparative tax, Chapter VIII identifies two
methodological notions as to comparative law in the Chinese tax context. First,
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the scarcity of decent comparative legal tax scholarship in general does not
support quality comparison. A shortage of paradigmatic discourse shows the
simultaneous existence of bluntly conflicting arguments, parallel courses, and
irregularities in analysis. Although some comparative tax frameworks have been
proposed or compiled, their value to the Chinese tax context is not evident. For
this reason, this thesis argues that a comparative tax study relating to China might
be better achieved by focusing on a full "tax law sub-discipline" rather than on a
specific tax concept. One reason is that a western-originated tax concept might be
too narrow to meaningfully inform a Chinese policy orientation. The other reason
is that it lacks generality necessary to apply it to other subsidiaries of tax law.
Second, the tax cultural traditions and social, political and legal settings of a
systematic tax governance framework should be included in tax comparativists'
theorizations. A tax study ultimately has to be conducted from a "big-picture"
perspective in which a tax system is embedded. Otherwise, a comparative study
may easily turns into descriptive, mechanical and perfunctory analysis. The
practical and scholastic significance of comparative tax studies can hardly be
achieved by a limited comparison falling on the technical elements of a tax
concept. This "big-picture" perspective is also in line with the rationale applicable
to both the rule of law construct and assimilation to the WTO system. This thesis
therefore tentatively incorporates tax culture into its considerations to compare
primary elements of nonprofit tax schemes of U.S. and China. It argues that a
comprehensive tax transplant effort of valued ideas and practices, whilst bold and

574

uncomfortable for the recipient country at the beginning, is what China needs to
build a robust nonprofit sector.
Putting the comparative tax as to tax treatment of the NGO sector, Chapter VIII
contributes the comparisons of the tax exemption schemes in U.S. and China in
three folds of consideration. First, not many comprehensive studies have been
completed on reforms thereof. The tax treatment of nonprofit organizations, as the
crucial component to construct a nonprofit sector, is unsophisticated and short of
practical significance. Second, under the rule of law construct in the past decade,
some scholars suggest China might modernize its nonprofit sector through an "ailin" charity code or unrealistically cultivate expansive grassroots NGOs. The study
of the nonprofit sector has to embody a realistic understanding of China' legal and
political settings. Third, commercial implications of the nonprofit sector invite
studies of its tax treatment. Given China's integration into the WTO and
heightened complaints over national treatment and fair competition, a key issue
arising is that the profitability of foreign investment shrinks as the tax preferential
treatment is gradually discounted. The profitable potential of nonprofit
organizations as foreign investment vehicles may induce inappropriate tax
planning activities. Chapter VIII provides the following observations as to the
comparison of tax treatment in U.S. and China on nonprofit sector. First, the
public benefit or charity purpose of nonprofit organizations has not been
coherently defined. Second, China has not set up an enforceable fiscal incentive
system to promote charitable donations. Third, there are still burdensome
requirements for the application and registration of nonprofit organizations, such
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as dual management, high threshold of capital endowment for foundations and
prohibition on cross-region development; Fourth, the administration and
supervision on the internal management, human and resource, and financial and
accounting management of nonprofit organizations are very weak. Fifth, the
determination of tax-exempt status and review of such status is ad hoc and
different from locality to locality. Such irregularities on one hand invite unethical
manipulation of tax preferential policies, and create resistance to making
donations through locally available venues.
In summary, this thesis intends to put forth a reasonable, practical and realistic
foundation to evaluate the prospects and progress of the Chinese tax law reform
on the basis of debates on the rule of law and understanding of the WTO
principles applicable to China. This thesis also contributes a tailored, pragmatic
and practical set of proposals for the tax reform under China's current legal
infrastructure and China's goal of setting up a socialist rule of law order. For quite
many Chinese tax topics such as NGO tax treatment, taxpayers' rights and tax
judicature reform, it is a first step that calls for further theoretical and empirical
research for emerging economies in general and for China in particular.
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